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
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






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Memoirs of the reign of George III.

Vol. 8

HISTORY  
OF  
GREAT BRITAIN,

FROM THE  
REVOLUTION, 1688,

TO THE CONCLUSION OF  
THE TREATY OF AMIENS, 1802.

---

BY WILLIAM BELSHAM.

---

IN TWELVE VOLUMES.

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Ac mihi quidem videntur huc omnia esse referenda ab iis qui præsunt aliis :  
ut ii qui eorum in imperio erunt, sint quam beatissimi. CICERO.

Beneficio quam metu obligare homines malit ; exterasque gentes fide ac  
societate junctas habere, quam tristi subjectas servitio. LIVY, lib. 26.

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VOL. XII.

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1805.





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# HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN.

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GEORGE III.

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BOOK XXXIV.

*NEGOTIATION for an Armistice between Great Britain and France, carried on by Lord Grenville and M. Otto. Great diplomatic Ability of the latter. Incapacity of the English Minister. Continental Armistice prolonged. Convention of Hohenlinden. Blockade of Malta by the English. Loss of the Queen Charlotte Man of War. Surrender of Goree to the English. Abortive Attempt on Ferrol. Extraordinary Vengeance inflicted on the Town of Cesenatico. Surrender of the Island of Malta,—and of Curaçoa, in the West Indies. Unsuccessful Attempt on Cadiz. Establishment of the Republic of the Seven Islands. Retrospective View of Transactions in Egypt. March of the Grand Vizier from Syria. Overture of General Kleber for evacuating Egypt. Successes of General Desaix. Convention of El Arisch. Letter of General Kleber to the French Directory. Infraction of the Convention of El Arisch. Victory gained over the Grand*

*Vizier at Heliopolis. Letter of General Kleber to the Kaimakan of Constantinople. Assassination of General Kleber. Command of the French Army transferred to General Menou. Resolution of General Menou to establish himself in Egypt. Election of Pope Pius VII. Death of Field-Marshal Suwaroff. Attempt on the Life of the KING. Public Honors paid to Lord Nelson. Re-commencement of Hostilities in Germany. Battle of Hohenlinden. Convention of Steyer. Misunderstanding between Great Britain and Denmark. State of Affairs in Sweden. Angry Dispute between Sweden and Spain. Alarming Proceedings of the Court of Berlin. Misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia. Extravagant Conduct of the Emperor Paul. Armed Neutrality revived by Russia and Sweden. Menaces of the Court of London to prevent the Accession of Denmark. State of Affairs in America,—and in France. Situation of St. Domingo. Wisdom of the Consular Government. Attempt on the Life of Bonaparte. Excessive Scarcity, and consequent Commotions, in England.*

BOOK  
XXXIV.

1800.

Negotia-  
tion for an  
armistice  
between  
Great Bri-  
tain and  
France.

**E**ARLY in the month of August (1800) lord Minto, ambassador of Great Britain at Vienna, in a note to baron Thugut, after expressing the satisfaction felt by the king his master at the conduct of his imperial majesty, declared the entire concurrence of his Britannic majesty in the negotiations which may take place for a general pacification, and his readiness to send plenipotentiaries to treat for peace, in concert with those of his imperial and royal majesty, as soon as the intentions of the French government to enter into a negotiation with his Britannic majesty shall be known to him.

Baron Thugut, in a dispatch dated August the 11th, to M. Talleyrand, informed that minister, BOOK XXXIV.  
1800. that the king of Great Britain, the ally of his imperial majesty, was ready on his part to concur in the negotiations for re-establishing general tranquillity, after which, suffering Europe has long sighed in vain; and it only remains therefore, he says, to agree upon the place at which the plenipotentiaries shall meet—proposing the city of Luneville.

In consequence of this communication, M. Otto, commissary of the French republic (resident in England), a man of great discretion and address, transmitted by order of his government a note to lord Grenville, dated August 24, demanding further explanations respecting the proposition communicated by the court of London to that of Vienna; observing, at the same time, the *impossibility* that, at the moment when Austria and England take a common share in the negotiations, France should find herself under a suspension of arms with Austria, and a continuation of hostilities with England. He proposes, on the part of the first consul, a general armistice between the fleets and armies of France and England, analogous to those which have taken place in Italy and Germany; and declares that he had received from his government the powers necessary for nego-



BOOK negotiating and concluding this general armistice.  
XXXIV.

1800.

Instead of admitting, in this critical conjuncture, M. Otto to an immediate personal conference with the English secretary, which would have so much facilitated the explanations required, a captain George, commissary for the exchange of prisoners, and therefore a gentleman personally known to M. Otto, was directed to confer with him, agreeably to a minute of instructions with which he was furnished. With regard to the naval armistice, captain George was directed to say, "that an armistice, as applying to naval operations, has at no period ever been agreed on between Great Britain and France during the course of their negotiations for peace, or until the preliminaries have been actually signed; that it cannot, therefore, be considered as a step necessary to negotiation; and that, from the disputes to which its execution must unavoidably be expected to give rise, it might more probably tend to obstruct than to facilitate the success of those endeavours which the two parties might employ for the restoration of peace; that the circumstances of a naval war are obviously not such as to admit of such equal arrangements as are easily established with regard to military operations, when suspended by such an agreement; *that it appears, therefore, at all events,*

PREMATURE to enter even into the DISCUSSION of the question!"

BOOK  
XXXIV.

1800.

Captain George was in return informed by M. Otto (August 28), that he had every reason to think that the continuation of the German armistice would depend upon the conclusion of the English armistice, the advantages of the latter being considered by France as an equivalent for the very obvious disadvantages of the German one. M. Otto further declared himself instructed to require an answer to the proposal for a general armistice, before the 3d of September; which made him conclude that hostilities might again commence about that time, should the proposed armistice be positively refused on the part of his majesty. From this declaration, the great importance attached to the naval armistice, by the government of France, plainly appeared. It was made the indispensable condition of prolonging the German armistice, and of admitting England to a joint negotiation with Austria. It remained with the English court to determine, whether it was least disadvantageous to her interests to admit the claim of France, or, rejecting it, to withdraw her own to the joint negotiation. To endeavour, *by arguing the case*, to obtain the advantage, and to avoid the disadvantage, was the policy best suited to the genius of the English secretary; though it was

BOOK  
XXXIV.

1800.

certain that nothing but ill humour and loss of time could result from such an altercation.

On the 29th an official note was addressed by lord Grenville to M. Otto, similar to the instructions of captain George; to which M. Otto replied on the following day, "that he was directed to submit to the British government the *projet* for a maritime truce; but the ministers of his majesty having judged that it would be PREMATURE to enter even into the DISCUSSION of this object, it is his duty to respect the motives which appear to them to militate against such a negotiation."

The 3d of September having passed over, M. Otto transmitted another note to lord Grenville, in which he stated, by express order from his government, "that preliminaries of peace had been concluded and *signed* between his imperial majesty and the French republic; and that the intervention of lord Minto, who demanded that England should be admitted to take part in the negotiations, prevented their ratification by his imperial majesty. That the suspension of arms, which had taken place solely in the hope of a speedy peace between the emperor and the republic, ought to cease, and will in fact cease, on the 24th Fructidor (11th Sept.), since France had sacrificed to that hope alone, the immense advantages which victory had secured to her; that,



in fine, the intervention of England rendered the question of peace so complicated, that it was impossible for the French government to prolong further the armistice upon the continent, unless his Britannic majesty will consent to render it common to the three powers." And M. Otto further informs lord Grenville, that the besieged or blockaded places which it is proposed to assimilate to those of Germany, are Malta, and the maritime towns of Egypt.

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XXXIV.  
1800.

The business became now very serious and pressing. The English court had surely, since the receipt of M. Otto's first note, sufficient time to consider upon what terms a naval armistice should be granted, if it were expedient to grant one at all. Yet lord Grenville appeared as much as ever at a loss how to act, and, still avoiding a personal interview with M. Otto, whose good sense might have proved essentially useful at this juncture, he wrote on the same day a letter to Mr. Nepean, secretary to the admiralty, importing, "that the French government having, *as it appeared*, determined to make the continuance of the armistice between Austria and France, and the commencement of the negotiations for peace, dependent on the conclusion of an armistice with this country, it was judged proper that he should see M. Otto, and inquire of him whether he was furnished with a projet of a treaty

BOOK of naval truce, and what were the conditions  
 XXXIV. of it." This was a strangely circuitous mode  
 1800. of asking a question—a question, indeed, wholly  
 superfluous, as M. Otto had in his official note  
 to lord Grenville, of the 30th of August, plainly  
 intimated that he was in possession of such a  
 projet. And he now avowed to Mr. Nepean,  
 that he was deterred from presenting it by his  
 lordship's declaration "that it was altogether  
*premature* to enter into the DISCUSSION of the  
 question!"

The projet consisted of seven articles, in substance as follows:—1. Suspension of hostilities.—2. Free navigation.—3. Vessels captured after a fixed period, to be restored.—4. Malta, Alexandria, and Belleisle to be assimilated to Ulm, Philipsburg, and Ingoldstadt; and all neutral or French vessels to enter with provisions freely.—5. The British squadrons which blockade Brest, Cadiz, Toulon, and Flushing, to withdraw from the coasts.—6. Armistice to be regularly notified.—7. Spain and Holland to be included.

On the 7th of September lord Grenville returned an answer to this note, which indicated extreme ill humour; and, indeed, the alternative to which the English court was reduced, must have been by no means a pleasant one: but ill humour ought never to display itself in the conduct of a negotiator, because it can

never forward the object of the negotiation. BOOK  
XXXIV.  
1800.  
 When an option is offered by an enemy, it may be either accepted or refused. In neither case can it be right to have recourse to reproach and invective, which can only tend in the first of these alternatives to prevent the return of friendship, and in the latter to inflame the motives of enmity. "The spirit of the note last received from M. Otto," lord Grenville tells that able and candid negotiator, "is unhappily but little consonant with those appearances of a conciliatory disposition, which had before been manifested. If," says his lordship, "it be really practicable, in the present moment, to restore permanent tranquillity to Europe, this object must be effected by very different means than those of such a controversy as that paper is calculated to excite." The English minister proceeds to state, in a very tedious and formal manner, the abstract principle on which an armistice ought to be founded, and employs much superfluous pains to expose the inequality of the conditions proposed by France, and their incongruity with the abstract principle laid down by him. "To a proposal," says this lofty statesman, "so manifestly repugnant to justice and equality, and so injurious not only to his majesty's interests, but also to those of his allies, it cannot be expected that any motive should induce the



BOOK king to accede." He then informs M. Otto that  
 XXXIV. he has transmitted to him a counter-projet,  
 1800. "containing regulations more nearly corresponding with that principle of equality on which *alone* his majesty can consent to treat. Even those articles are, in many important points, very short of what his majesty might justly demand from a reference to the general principle above stated."

The chief, and indeed only essential points of difference between the projet and the counter-projet, consist in the more rigid restrictions proposed, and no doubt very properly, by the English government, respecting Malta and the ports of Egypt, and insisting "that nothing shall be admitted by sea which can give additional means of defence, and provisions only for fourteen days in proportion to the consumption. And in regard to the ports of France, that none of the ships of war shall, during the armistice, be removed to any other station."

The letter and counter-projet of lord Grenville having been transmitted by M. Otto to Paris, he was authorised, on the 16th of September, to return an answer to the same; in which he informs the English minister, that the papers in question having been laid before the first consul, he has observed that the armistice proposed by England did not offer any advan-

tage to the French republic, and consequently could not compensate for the serious inconveniences which would result to it, from the continuance of the continental armistice. Hence it follows, that the counter-projet could be admitted only as the basis of a particular arrangement between France and England. But the effect of the proposed maritime truce being intended to serve as a compensation to the French republic, for the continental truce, the former ought to afford to it advantages equal to the inconveniences which it experiences from the latter.

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1800.

M. Otto, therefore, stated that he had received directions to make two proposals, of which his Britannic majesty might choose that which should appear to him most consonant to the interest of his dominions, or to his continental relations. The *first* was, "that the projet for an armistice be drawn up, and admitted, in terms analogous to those which have been proposed by the ministry of his Britannic majesty, but relative only to a separate negotiation between the two powers." And secondly, "that his Britannic majesty should continue to make common cause with the emperor, but that in this case he should consent that the maritime truce may offer to the French republic, advantages equal to those secured to the house of Austria by the continental truce.—The first consul has already

BOOK made, to the love of peace, a sufficiently great  
 XXXIV. sacrifice. If he should continue to derive no  
 1800. benefit from the successes of the war, it would  
 no longer be moderation, but weakness. It  
 would no longer be the means of arriving at the  
 conclusion of peace, but that of perpetuating  
 the war. Perhaps, in the judgment of states-  
 men, the French government may have already  
 too long delayed to avail itself of the contin-  
 gency which was favorable to it; but it has  
 only done so upon the positive assurances which  
 had been given to it, of a speedy and separate  
 peace."

To this concise and perspicuous statement of  
 the nature of the alternative offered by France,  
 lord Grenville, on the 20th of September, re-  
 turned a most confused (not to say perverse) an-  
 swer, ultimately importing, "that his majesty still  
 looks to a naval armistice, on suitable conditions,  
 as to a SACRIFICE which he may be induced to  
 make, in order to prevent the renewal of hos-  
 tilities on the continent, and thereby to facili-  
 tate those joint negotiations for general peace,  
 which might perhaps be accelerated by such an  
 arrangement, although they are by no means  
 necessarily dependent on it. But when it is  
 required that the extent of the sacrifice which  
 his majesty is to make, should be regulated nei-  
 ther by any fair standard of equality, nor by

the ordinary rules which govern such transactions; when, without any reference to the interests of his own people, he is called upon to proportion his concessions to the exaggerated estimates which his enemies have formed of the benefits derived to his allies, from the continental armistice; and when, on such grounds as these, conditions are insisted on which even these could not warrant; it becomes necessary to state distinctly, that his majesty neither recognises this principle, nor, if he did, could he agree in this application of it."

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1800.

But, in regard to this futile reasoning, it is obvious to remark, that a SACRIFICE cannot, from its very nature, be regulated by any fair standard of equality; that, in an extraordinary case, the ordinary rules which govern such transactions must necessarily be superceded; and that, for the English minister, in the outset of the negotiation, decisively to declare his majesty called upon to proportion his concessions to the exaggerated and unwarranted estimates of his enemies, was at once to prejudge the question, and to render all discussion ineffectual; because this was the precise point of difference which required to be argued and discussed. If his majesty did not recognise the principle, that it was expedient in this case to make a *sacrifice* for the sake of his ally, upon what principle did he



BOOK XXXIV. 1800. concur in the idea of a naval armistice at all? The application of the principle was, indeed, a matter of great difficulty, and certainly not to be

surmounted by waving all discussion relative to it, on the strange pretext of its being premature; for, if a question of urgency could ever occur, this was indubitably of that class.

On the 21st of September an answer was returned to lord Grenville's official communication by M. Otto, who expressed the deepest regret that the principles of conciliation contained in his note were not acceded to. "It was," he said, "not merely with a view to discuss those principles, but in order to propose fresh means of reconciliation, that he felt it his duty to request, in his letter of the 16th, an interview with his excellency." And he announced to the English minister, that the intentions of the first consul were anew detailed in the *projet* which he had the honor to inclose."

The second projet of France differed from that of England, chiefly in two points:—first, in the extraordinary stipulation, that six French frigates shall have the liberty of sailing from Toulon, of unlading at Alexandria, and of returning without being searched; and secondly, that the restriction respecting ships of war, in the fifth article, shall be confined to ships of the line.

On the 23d of September an official note

was addressed by M. Otto to lord Grenville, in which he again expressed his regret that the want of more direct communication with his majesty's ministers, had rendered it impossible for him to give his official overtures the necessary explanations. He now states, that, in conformity with the advice which he had transmitted to lord Grenville on the 4th instant, notification was given of the cessation of the continental armistice at the term which had been fixed upon; but the counter-projet of the British ministry, dispatched by the under-signed on the 8th of this month, having reached Paris on the 10th, and his imperial majesty having appeared to be convinced that his ally would not withhold his consent to an admissible armistice, the first consul determined for eight days to retard the renewal of hostilities. Orders were immediately dispatched to the armies of Germany and Italy; and in the event of those orders arriving too late in the last-mentioned country, and of the French generals having obtained successes in consequence of any military operation, they are ordered to resume that position which they occupied on the precise day on which hostilities were recommenced.

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XXXIV.  
1800.

It must be remarked, that, in his letter of the 20th of September, lord Grenville had expressed "the concern and surprise of his majesty, that

BOOK the orders for giving notice of the termination  
 XXXIV. of the continental armistice, must actually have

1800. been dispatched from Paris at the very time when the continuance of that armistice was proposed to his majesty as the condition and inducement for a maritime truce." This was a very extraordinary subject of complaint, after M. Otto had positively declared that such orders would certainly be transmitted at the time specified by him. The explanation of that candid and skilful negotiator, in his note of the 23d, might, however, have satisfied any reasonable suspicion. But lord Grenville in his reply (September 24th) renews his charge of duplicity, or rather of fraud, against the first consul, and endeavours to support this injurious and insulting accusation by a reference to dates. "The first proposal," he says, "made on the part of France for a naval armistice, was dated August 24th—the notices for terminating the continental armistice were given by the French generals on the 27th and 29th of August: the orders for that purpose must, therefore, have been actually sent from Paris before the 24th." To this it is obvious to answer, that, if the proposal of France had been accepted by England previous to the 3d of September, the day specified by M. Otto, counter-orders would doubtless have been dispatched to the armies; and, as fourteen days' notice was

Great diplomatic  
 ability of  
 M. Otto.

necessary previous to the re-commencement of hostilities, the requisite intelligence would have been conveyed in due time to the respective generals without difficulty.—But could lord Grenville have been once assured that the armistice would not be suffered to expire while the negotiation was pending, he would, no doubt, have gone on, in his characteristic manner, exclaiming and declaiming till the Grecian calends.

His lordship insinuates, that the only satisfactory evidence which the French government can *now* give of the sincerity of its disposition for peace, would be by engaging with facility in a joint negotiation with the king and the emperor. This presuming statesman even goes so far as to assert, “that no man who considers the past events of this contest with attention, or who is capable of judging with accuracy of the present situation of affairs, *can* believe, that if the present war is to be terminated by a succession of treaties between the different powers now engaged in it, any permanent or solid basis of general tranquillity could be established.”

Still persisting in his resolution not to *submit* to a personal interview with M. Otto, his lordship informs that gentleman of “the appointment by his majesty of a proper person to confer with him respecting the different proposals for a naval armistice. This step,” his lordship says,



BOOK XXXIV. "affords a new proof of his majesty's disposition

1800.

to bend himself to every reasonable facility which can contribute to a general pacification." But to appoint a proper person to confer upon a subject of national importance, seems no very wonderful or unprecedented mark of royal condescension. The person appointed was Mr. G. Hammond, under-secretary of state, who received from lord Grenville very ample and detailed instructions respecting the business on which he was to treat. His lordship might, however, have spared himself this trouble; for in the conference which took place between Mr. Hammond and M. Otto, on the 25th of September, and which appears to have been conducted on both sides with frankness and ability, the French minister made no scruple to acknowledge, "that the fourth and fifth articles contained the only points to which his government attached much importance; and such were its sentiments respecting them, that he conceived that it would not consent to any armistice of which they did not form a part." These were the rocks on which it was now evident, as it would have been to a statesman of sagacity in three days from its commencement, that the negotiation must ultimately suffer shipwreck. In these circumstances it would have been equally generous and politic in the British government, not merely

to have allowed, but encouraged, Austria to conclude a separate peace with France as speedily as possible, and upon the best terms that might be obtainable; and most unquestionably the treaty actually concluded by the French government with count St. Julien, was, considering the relative situation of the parties, extremely favorable to the interests of the emperor.

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As to England, she held too many pledges of value in her possession, to justify any serious apprehension that it would not be in her power at any time to put an end to the war on conditions of advantage to herself, separately considered, however completely she might have failed as to the attainment of any of the avowed objects of it. On the 7th of October, in a second conference between M. Otto and Mr. Hammond, the latter was in few words informed, "that the several important events which had recently taken place had completely changed the basis upon which the proposed armistice was to have been established, and put an end to the negotiation: that the first consul was, notwithstanding, invariably disposed to receive any overture relative to a separate negotiation between England and France; and that the mode of such overture entirely depended upon the option of his majesty: that the first consul would either grant a passport to a plenipotentiary of the

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king, to treat at Paris, or if his majesty preferred that the preliminary negotiations should be begun at London, special powers would be transmitted to M. Otto for that purpose." But on the 9th, Mr. Hammond informed M. Otto, by letter, that his majesty must steadily decline to enter into any measure tending to separate his interests from those of the powers who shall continue to make common cause with him in the prosecution of the war.

Incapacity  
of lord  
Grenville.

Thus, through the egregious incapacity of the English minister, another very fair and favorable opportunity of terminating the war was unhappily lost; and the essential interests of Austria (embarrassed by her subsisting engagements with the court of London) were sacrificed, without any prospect of advantage to Great Britain. Justly apprehensive, nevertheless, of the renewal of hostilities, the emperor, after joining the army in person, and practising to the utmost upon the forbearance of the first consul, by every warlike

Continental  
armistice pro-  
longed.

and every pacific demonstration, was at length induced to purchase a further prolongation of the armistice, for the term of forty-five days, commencing from the 21st of September, by the surrender of the important fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingoldstadt, into the hands of

Conven-  
tion of Ho-  
henlinden.

the French.—This was called the convention of Hohenlinden.

During this interval, it will be expedient to <sup>BOOK XXXIV.</sup> advert to the situation of affairs in other parts of the world. The island of Malta had now been <sup>1800: Blockade of Malta by the English.</sup> closely blockaded by a British naval force for near eighteen months; but such was the prodigious strength of the fortifications, that nothing short of an absolute destitution of provisions and military stores, could force the garrison to a surrender. In the month of February, this year, an attempt was made to throw supplies into the place, by a small squadron, consisting of five sail, one of which was of the line; but they were intercepted, off Cape Passaro, by a superior force under the command of lord Nelson: the flagship, which proved to be the *Généreux*, admiral *Perée*, struck her colours; and one of the frigates was also captured—the rest escaping with difficulty. In the course of the next month, the *Guillaume Tell*, a second-rate, of eighty-six guns and a thousand men, which had sought refuge in Malta after the battle of Aboukir, endeavouring at length to effect her escape, was overtaken, and brought to action by the *Foudroyant*, *Lion*, and *Penelope*, and, after a most gallant resistance against a disparity of force so great, admiral *D'Ecre*s, the commander, struck his flag—the *Guillaume Tell* being totally dismasted, and having lost two hundred of her crew.

These advantages were counter-balanced by



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1800.  
Loss of the  
Queen  
Charlotte  
man-of-  
war.

the unfortunate loss of the Queen Charlotte, lord Keith's flag-ship, mounting 120 guns, and one of the finest vessels in the British navy. On the morning of the 17th of March, being at that time four or five leagues distant from Leghorn, she was discovered to be on fire. All the vessels and boats in harbor, English and foreign, put off to her relief—but in vain. About eleven o'clock she blew up, with a tremendous explosion, suffering in a moment almost total destruction! About one hundred and fifty of the crew, only, were saved. The commander himself was happily on shore when this dreadful catastrophe happened. This was the ship on board of which lord Howe hoisted his flag on the memorable 1st of June, 1794; and in this ship the king and royal family were entertained, on occasion of the visit made by them to the fleet after that splendid victory. Such are the mournful reverses of fortune and of fate,—and so frail is the foundation on which rests the fabric of human vanity!

Surrender  
of Goree  
to the En-  
glish.

Early in the month of April, the island of Goree, on the coast of Africa, surrendered to commodore sir Charles Hamilton, commanding the Ruby and Melpomene ships of war, at the first summons, and without the slightest attempt at resistance, though a place of great strength and importance.

In the month of June following, sir Edward Pellew (an officer of high reputation), cruising with a small squadron off the coast of Bretagne, gained various advantages, and captured or destroyed a considerable number of store-ships and other vessels, laden with provisions, destined for the harbor of Brest. And in August, a much more serious expedition sailed from Portsmouth, under the command of sir John Borlase Warren, and lieutenant-general sir James Pulteney. The primary object of this great armament, was the conquest of Belleisle; but the defences appeared too strong to invite, or perhaps to admit, the attempt: they therefore proceeded to the coast of Spain, and arrived, August 25, before the harbor of Ferrol. After silencing the fire from a fort in the bay, the troops were disembarked, under the skilful direction of sir Edward Pellew, without sustaining the loss of a man; together with sixteen field-pieces, attended by seamen from the men-of-war, to carry scaling-ladders, and draw the guns up the heights above Ferrol. Just as they had gained the summit, the rifle-corps fell in with a party of the enemy, which they drove back. At day-break a considerable body of the enemy was repulsed with the loss of about one hundred and forty men, by the earl

BOOK  
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1800.

Abortive  
attempt on  
Ferrol.

BOOK of Cavan's brigade; so that the English re-  
XXXIV. mained in complete possession of the heights.

1800. It was now supposed that the batteries would have been opened against the place, and the attack (which was wholly unexpected) have been urged with all possible vigor; but, to the unspeakable chagrin both of the soldiers and sailors, emulously eager for action, the general, who in his official dispatch highly commends the spirit and alacrity shown by the troops—"comparing," as he says, "the difficulties which presented themselves, and the risk attendant on failure, on one side, with the prospect of success, and the advantages to be derived from it, on the other"—all at once issued orders for a re-embarkation, which was also performed without loss. If the Spaniards were surprised at the sudden appearance of this great armament, they were doubtless much more astonished at the equally sudden disappearance of it, having, according to the most authentic accounts since published, no hope of being able long to maintain the town; and it is even affirmed, that a deputation was preparing to wait upon the general with conditions of surrender.

The admiral and general immediately proceeded, with the squadron and convoy, "in ex-

ecution," to use the words of sir John Borlase Warren to lord St. Vincent, " of the latter part of his lordship's orders." BOOK  
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Nearly at this time a most extraordinary and signal act of vengeance was inflicted on the inhabitants of Cesenatico, a small maritime town situated on the Adriatic Gulf. The municipality of this obscure place, had, it seems, according to the accounts transmitted to lord Keith, arrested a British officer charged with public dispatches. As they might, not improbably, have acted under constraint from the French troops stationed in their vicinity, it would have appeared to the world no derogation of dignity, and much more agreeable to equity, if the noble commander had made some inquiry into the previous and attendant circumstances; instead of which, the *El Corso* and *Pigmy* sloops were, after a lapse of time which seemed to indicate that the offence, whatever might have been its magnitude, had passed into oblivion, dispatched "*to make a proper example of the town.*" The boats of both vessels landed at dawn of day on the 27th of August, and, after some opposition *from a body of French troops*, made themselves masters of the place, which they then, agreeably to their orders, completely destroyed—"the vessels and the harbor forming but one flame."—"Of thirteen vessels,



BOOK of different descriptions, lying within the mole  
 XXXIV. of Cesenatico, two were sunk, and eleven burnt;  
 1800. the harbor was choaked by the wreck of four  
 purposely sunk in the mouth of it, and both  
 piers entirely consumed\*." Thus did the  
 mighty arm of Britain, by a touch rather than a  
 blow, "all the flourishing works of peace de-  
 stroy" of an industrious and humble, but pro-  
 bably happy community, who could scarcely  
 suppose the possibility of so terrible a calamity;  
 for a revenge so dreadful, incited by an offence  
 so trivial, was perhaps never before inflicted in  
 any age, or heard of in any country the name  
 of which is known among civilised nations.

About the commencement of September, two  
 very large Spanish corvettes, receiving stores, as  
 was supposed, for the relief of Malta, were, by  
 an extraordinary exertion of naval gallantry,  
 cut out of Barcelona roads by the boats of the  
 Niger and Minotaur, commanded by captain  
 Hillyer and lieutenant Schomberg. And nearly  
 at the same time, two frigates, confined in the  
 harbor of Malta, making an effort to escape,  
 one of them (La Diane, of forty-two guns) was  
 overtaken and captured: the other got off, under  
 cover of the night. From this incident, it was  
 rightly conjectured that the place could not long

\* Official letter.

hold out. In fact, on the fifth of September articles of capitulation were signed, by general Vaubois, the French governor, for the fortress of La Valette, and all its dependencies, after a blockade of two years; the garrison surrendering prisoners of war. The fortifications seemed little damaged, and famine alone effected the reduction of this celebrated island—an event which added a new facility towards the accomplishment of the great work of peace.

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1800.  
Surrender  
of the  
island of  
Malta.

In the same month, the island of Curaçoa, in the West Indies, belonging to the Batavian republic, following the example of Surinam, voluntarily placed itself under the protection of his Britannic majesty's arms, upon conditions very advantageous to the inhabitants.

—And of  
Curaçoa.

Early in October, the whole British fleet in the Mediterranean, under lord Keith, consisting of above forty sail of the line or other large ships of war, with a cloud of sloops and transports, having twenty thousand land forces on board, under the command of sir Ralph Abercrombie, appeared before Cadiz, and summoned that important city to surrender. At this period a pestilential and epidemic fever raged in that place, which had made, and was still making, the most dreadful ravages—1857 persons having died of this disorder within seventeen days. The governor, Don Tomas de Morla,

Unsuccess-  
ful attempt  
on Cadiz.

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1800. in his answer, expressed “ his surprise that the British commander should direct his efforts against a place so circumstanced. He had too exalted an opinion of the humanity of the English people, as well as that of his excellency, to think that they or he would wish to render its condition more deplorable. However,” he continues, “ if, in consequence of the orders your excellency has received, you are inclined to draw down upon yourself the execration of all nations; to cover yourself with disgrace in the eyes of the whole universe, by oppressing the unfortunate, and attacking those who are supposed to be incapable of defence; I declare to you, that the garrison under my orders, accustomed to behold death with a serene countenance, and to brave dangers much greater than all the perils of war, know how to make resistance, which shall not terminate but with their entire destruction.”

To this letter the British admiral and general replied, “ that as the ships in the port were to be employed in joining and increasing the naval force of the French republic, and prolonging the calamities of Europe, an attack was to be diverted only by the surrender of those vessels.” This proposition being indignantly rejected by the heroic governor, arrangements were made by the British commanders for a descent; but when it was found that the precau-

tions of the enemy, and the strength of the works, were adequate to the defence of the place —the danger of infection being also considered— the British armament withdrew from Cadiz; and, like the former feints on Belleisle and Ferrol, the whole was, in the fashionable language of the court, glossed over as a diversion !

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After the final subversion of the Venetian republic, by the treaty of Campo Formio, the valuable islands situated near the Turkish coast, the property of that state, fell into various hands, and became a prey to great internal commotions. It was difficult for the great allied powers to agree upon a partition of these islands, and at all events desirable to prevent the aspiring court of St. Petersburg from forming any permanent establishment in the Mediterranean. At length, by a formal convention between Russia and Turkey, signed March 21, 1800, it was agreed that Corfu, Cephallonia, Zante, and the other Ex-Venetian islands (seven in number), should be united in one state, by the appellation of the Ionian republic. Like Ragusa, it was destined to pay a small and fixed tribute to the grand-seignor, in lieu of all other duties; and its independency was guaranteed both by the Turks and the Russians.

Establish-  
ment of the  
republic of  
the Seven  
Islands.

Egypt still remained a most important and interesting scene of action. The great victory



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1800.  
Retrospec-  
tive view  
of transac-  
tions in  
Egypt.

gained by Bonaparte previous to his leaving that country, over the Ottoman power at Aboukir, in which near ten thousand Turks were destroyed, did not retard for an instant the march of the grand-vizier from Damascus. The Turkish army at Aboukir was merely the van of an immense force, which gradually approached the Delta, and alarmed the French for the safety of the important post of Damietta. By the end of October, 1799, a great Turkish naval armament, joined by the English squadron in those seas, also rendezvoused before Damietta, of which sir Sydney Smith took the command; and under protection of the gun-boats a detachment of four thousand men made good their landing on the 1st of November, and entrenched themselves on a point situated between the right side of the Nile, the sea, and the lake Menzalah. But this division was soon after attacked by a corps of one thousand French, under general Verdier, who, charging with fixed bayonets, entirely dissipated the whole Turkish force, killing or taking prisoners great numbers, and driving the remainder of the fugitive Ottomans into the sea. They were, however, for the most part, saved by the boats, in which humane service sir Sydney Smith has the generosity to acknowledge "that the French did not much interrupt them."

This was only a part of a much larger force, and intended merely to establish a position on the eastern branch of the Nile, in order to divide the attention of the enemy. The grand army, under the vizier in person, slowly proceeded on its march from Syria, by way of the Desert; and on the 20th of December he had advanced from Gaza, his last resting place, to El Arisch, the siege of which key of Egypt, on that side, was immediately formed, with the assistance of a detachment of English marines under the able conduct of major Douglas. On the 29th, the fort surrendered at discretion. Major Douglas ascending the wall of the fort by means of a rope, received the sword of the French commander; but such was the barbarous ferocity of the Turks, that they could not be restrained from rushing in, and putting a great part of the garrison to the sword.

General Bonaparte, notwithstanding the brilliant achievements which distinguished the short term of his residence in Egypt after his return from Syria, being sensible that no reinforcements or supplies could be expected from France, acknowledged the country to be no longer tenable against the united strength of the British and Ottoman empires. Subsequent, therefore, to the victory gained by him at Aboukir, he addressed an able and artful letter to the grand-

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March of  
the grand-  
vizier from  
Syria.

BOOK XXXIV. vizier, in which he endeavoured to explain to  
 1800. that barbarian the political relations of France  
 and Turkey, and to convince him how much it  
 concerned the permanent interest of the Sublime  
 Porte to be reconciled to the French govern-  
 ment, “upon whose friendship she had for cen-  
 turies depended for protection against the evil  
 designs of her formidable enemies, Austria and  
 Russia.” Wishing rather, doubtless, to relin-  
 quish Egypt to the Turks, than to wait the re-  
 conquest of it by the English, he concludes with  
 saying, “If you wish to have Egypt, tell me  
 so: France has never entertained an idea of  
 taking it out of the hands of the Sublime Porte,  
 and swallowing it up. Give authority to your  
 minister who is at Paris, or send some one to  
 Egypt with full and unlimited powers, and all  
 shall be arranged, without animosity, to your  
 wish.”

The instructions of Bonaparte to general  
 Kleber, on leaving Egypt, breathe the same spi-  
 rit:—“If this year,” says the general-in-chief,  
 “in spite of all our precautions, the pestilence  
 should rage in Egypt, and destroy more than  
 fifteen hundred soldiers, I think that you *ought*  
 not to run the chance of the next campaign,  
 and that you are authorised to conclude peace  
 with the Ottoman porte, though the eva-  
 cuation of Egypt should be the principal con-

dition." The evacuation of Egypt being, therefore, in the view of general Bonaparte himself, regarded as a probable and necessary event, general Kleber, who possessed much less of enthusiasm in his disposition, without any hesitation, on the 4th of September addressed a letter to the grand-vizier, re-echoing the propositions of Bonaparte, and repeating the bold assertion, " that the French government never had *the least idea* of taking Egypt from the grand-seignor."

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1800.  
Overture  
of general  
Kleber for  
evacuating  
Egypt.

In the mean time, warlike operations were not interrupted on the part of the French. In the month of September, Mourad Bey, who had fallen down the Nile to El Ganayur, was driven back by general Morand. Overtaken in his flight across the Desert, his camp was surprised at Samahout, a great number of Mamelouks were put to the sword, and two hundred camels, laden with the spoils of Lower Egypt, taken; the bey himself narrowly escaping.—

General Desaix, who afterwards assumed the command in person, pursued Mourad with a body of infantry mounted on dromedaries, and, after three days of forced march, he again overtook him, on the plains of Sediman; and the Mamelouks, who furiously commenced the attack, being charged in their turn with great vigor,

Successes  
of general  
Desaix.



BOOK XXXIV. precipitately fled the field, seeking refuge among the Arabs of the Great Desert.

1800.  
Conven-  
tion of  
El Arisch.

On the capture of El Arisch, the grand-vizier nominated commissioners to treat with the French general for the total evacuation of the country; and on the 24th of January, 1800, a convention was signed at that place, and to that effect, by general Desaix on the part of the French, and by Mustapha Raschid and Mustapha Rassiche, plenipotentiaries, on the part of the grand-vizier; three months being allowed to provide vessels for the embarkation: and to this treaty sir Sydney Smith, as minister plenipotentiary of England, formally acceded; and also the Russian minister resident in the camp of the vizier.

General  
Kleber's  
letter to  
the French  
directory.

General Kleber transmitted, without delay, a copy of the convention to the directory, accompanied by a very excellent letter, vindicating, in a most able and satisfactory manner, the policy and propriety of his conduct. He reminds them of his having, in former dispatches, "given an account of the situation in which the army of Egypt was placed; and also of the negotiation begun by general Bonaparte with the grand-vizier, and which he had continued, though at that period he acknowledges that he had little dependence upon the success of the

negotiation; yet he hoped that they might retard the march of the vizier, and allow time for assistance to be sent from Europe. He founded this hope on the knowledge he had of the French and Spanish fleets being united at Toulon, and only wanting a favorable wind for sailing." They did, indeed, sail; but it was merely to repass the Straits, and to return to Brest. "This news," continues general Kleber, "was most distressing to the army, which learned at the same time our reverses in Italy, in Germany, in Holland, and even in La Vendée, without its appearing that any proper measure had been taken to arrest the course of the misfortunes which threatened the very existence of the republic. Meanwhile the vizier advanced from Damascus.—On another quarter, towards the middle of October, a fleet appeared before Damietta: it disembarked about four thousand Janissaries, who were to be followed by an equal number; but time was not left for their arrival: the first were attacked, and completely defeated in less than half an hour—the carnage was terrible; more than eight hundred of them were made prisoners. This event did not render the negotiations more easy: the vizier manifested the same intentions, and did not suspend his march any longer than was necessary for

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forming his establishments, and procuring the means of transporting his troops. His force was then estimated at 60,000 men; but other pachas were following him, and were recruiting his army with new troops from all parts of Asia, as far as Mount Caucasus: the van of this army soon arrived at Jaffa. Commodore sir Sydney Smith wrote me about this time—that is to say, some days before the debarkation of Damietta; and as I knew all the influence which he had over the vizier, I thought it my duty, not only to answer him, but even to propose to him, as a place for holding conferences, the ship which he commanded. I was equally repugnant to receiving, in Egypt, English or Turkish plenipotentiaries, or to sending mine to the camp of the latter. My proposition was accepted, and then the negotiations assumed a more settled aspect. All this, however, did not stop the Ottoman army, which the grand-vizier conducted towards Gaza. During the whole of this time the war continued in Upper Egypt; and the beys, hitherto dispersed, thought of joining themselves to Mourad, who, constantly pursued and constantly defeated, alluring to his cause the Arabs and the inhabitants of the province of Bennisoeuf, continued to keep some troops together, and to give disturbance. The plague, also, threatened us with its ravages,

and already was weekly depriving us of several men at Alexandria and other places. On the 21st of December, general Desaix and citizen Poussielgue, whom I had appointed plenipotentiaries, opened the conferences on board the Tigre, with sir Sydney Smith, to whom the grand-vizier had given power to treat. They were to have kept on the coast between Damietta and Alexandria, but a very violent gale of wind having obliged them to get into the open sea, they remained out at sea for eighteen days: at the end of this time they landed at the camp of the vizier. He had advanced against El Arisch, and had possessed himself, on the 30th of December, of that fort. This success was entirely owing to the remarkable cowardice of the garrison, which surrendered, without fighting, seven days after the attack. This event was so much the more unfortunate, as general Regnier was on his march to raise that blockade, before the great body of the Turkish army had arrived. From that moment it was impossible to hope to protract the negotiations to any length: it was necessary to examine maturely the danger of breaking them off; to lay aside all motives of personal vanity; and not to expose the lives of all the Frenchmen entrusted to me, to the terrible consequences which further delay would render inevitable. The most re-

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1800.



BOOK XXXIV.  
1800. cent accounts stated the Turkish army to amount to 80,000 men, and it must still have increased: there were in it twelve pachas, six of whom were of the first rank. Forty-five thousand men were before El Arisch, having fifty pieces of cannon, and waggons in proportion; this artillery was drawn by mules: twenty other pieces of cannon were at Gaza, with the *corps de réserve*. The remainder of the troops were at Jaffa, and in the neighbourhood of Ramli. Active foraging parties supplied the vizier's camp with provisions: all the tribes of the Arabs were emulous of assisting this army, and furnished it with more than fifteen thousand camels. All these forces were directed by European officers; and from five to six thousand Russians were every moment expected. To this army," general Kleber proceeds to state, that "he had to oppose 8,500 men, divided on the three points. Catieh, Salahieh, and Belbeis; and that his whole *disposable force* in Egypt did not exceed 15,000 men. Notwithstanding this disproportion of forces, he would have hazarded a battle if he had had any certainty of receiving reinforcements; but, being wholly disappointed in his expectations on this head, he deemed it incumbent upon him to provide for the preservation of his army while the means of safety remained." And again, adverting to the junction

of the French and Spanish fleets in the Medi-  
 terranean, he says, "We were then far from  
 thinking that these fleets would return into the  
 ocean, and that the expedition to Egypt, entirely  
 abandoned, would become a ground of accusa-  
 tion against those who had planned it." He  
 concludes with saying, "I wish to return to  
 France, with the army, at the latest by the  
 middle of June."

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Such is the celebrated letter of general Kleber to the directory, written in vindication of the convention of El Arisch; and with a pencil so masterly has he delineated the situation of the French army in Egypt at this period, and so clear and candid is his narration of events, that it would be doing injustice to this portion of history, to relate it in any other words than his own. It appears probable that this dispatch was penned after he had received unofficial intelligence at least of the revolution of Brumaire; for it seems scarcely less intended to throw reproach and odium (justly merited, indeed) upon the directory, than to establish the honor and rectitude of his own character and conduct in the view of the public.

The general of the army of Egypt, also, published a proclamation, dated February 6, at Salahieh, addressed to the divan at Cairo, and to those of the different provinces of Egypt, in-

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1800.

Infraction  
of the  
treaty of  
El Arisch.

forming them that he had, agreeably to the constant resolution of the French nation to preserve its ancient relations with the Ottoman empire, and to the purpose of his illustrious predecessor, general Bonaparte, when affairs of superior interest obliged him to return to Europe, concluded a treaty of peace with the grand-vizier, by which Egypt would be restored to the possession of the Sublime Porte, the ancient ally of France.

No sooner did the first intelligence arrive in England that a convention was likely to take place between general Kleber and the grand-vizier, the object of which was the immediate evacuation of Egypt, than orders were hastily dispatched to lord Keith not to permit the return of the French troops to Europe\*, where there was, undoubtedly, just ground for apprehension that they would immediately be employed in services very detrimental to the interest of the confederate cause. These orders being without delay communicated to sir Sydney Smith, that distinguished officer, with a noble frankness, instantly imparted the same to M. Poussielgue.—“ It would,” said he, “ be only throwing out a snare to my brave antagonists, were I to encourage them to embark ;” and he invited M. Poussiel-

\* Letter from the admiralty to lord Keith, dated December 15, 1799.

gue to proceed, on board an English frigate, to lord Keith, in order to confer with his lordship on the subject. "I depend much," says he, "on your abilities and conciliatory disposition, which facilitated our former agreement, in order again to support my reasonings respecting the impossibility of revoking what has been formally settled after a detailed discussion and a mature deliberation. I then propose, sir, that you should come on board, in order to consult on what is to be done in the difficult circumstances in which we are placed. I view with calmness the heavy responsibility to which I am subject. My life is at stake—I know it: but I should prefer an unmerited death, to the preservation of my existence by exposing both my life and honor."

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Lord Keith at the same time officially informed general Kleber, that he had received positive orders from his majesty not to consent to any capitulation with the French troops which he commanded in Egypt and Syria, unless they laid down their arms and surrendered themselves prisoners of war—delivering up all the ships and stores in the port of Alexandria, to the allied powers. And he adds, that, in the event of this capitulation, he could not permit any of the troops to depart for France before they have been exchanged.

It must be owned, that the English court was



BOOK not bound by the terms of any convention be-  
 XXXIV. tween the French and the Turks, *separately*  
 1800. *concluded*, as that of El Arisch was originally  
 supposed by that court to have been. But  
 even in this case, it appears extreme ill policy  
 to have driven so brave and resolute an army,  
 commanded by a general of such talents, to  
 desperation, by exacting of them terms with  
 which they could not comply without disgrace;  
 though, on the other hand, it seems to have been  
 a great error, on the part of sir Sydney Smith, to  
 allow of the immediate and unrestrained em-  
 barkation of those gallant troops for Europe,  
 where they might, in all probability, arrive in  
 time materially to influence the operations of  
 the ensuing campaign. The notification of lord  
 Keith was received by general Kleber in the  
 manner it deserved. "SOLDIERS," said the French  
 commander, in a bulletin addressed to the army  
 from Cairo, 27th of Ventose (March 18), "Be-  
 hold the letter which I have received from the  
 commander of the English fleet in the Mediter-  
 ranean!—SOLDIERS! we know how to reply to  
 such insolence by victories.—Prepare for battle!"

In consequence of the convention of El Arisch,  
 and not suspecting any obstacle to its ratifica-  
 tion, general Kleber had already relinquished, to  
 the vizier, the important posts of Salahieh, Cata-  
 hieh, Belbeis, and Damietta, concentrating the

main of his forces near the metropolis; and he had been peremptorily required by the vizier, to deliver also into his hands the city and citadel of Grand Cairo: but general Kleber absolutely refused to give up the only fortified place which was left him, excepting Alexandria. His refusal was notified to the grand-vizier, with his determination to resume hostilities, for which he had so wisely prepared his army by communicating to them the ignominious propositions contained in the letter of lord Keith. So far, however, was sir Sydney Smith from concurring in those opinions which could alone have incited the English court to attempt to impose such odious conditions upon the French army, that, pending the conferences held on board the *Tigre*, that gallant officer, in reply to the first demand of the French plenipotentiaries, dated 8th Nivose (December 29), viz. "that the French army evacuate Egypt with their arms and baggage," thus generously expresses himself—"The general-in-chief, Kleber, justly insists that nothing be proposed to the French army which might be prejudicial to its honor, or to that of the French nation." And in his official note, approved by the grand-vizier, dated off Cape Carmel, 30th of December, he thus more fully states his sentiments—"Though measures have been taken for surrounding the French army on all sides, yet its

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bravery, courage, and fame, remaining still unconquered, give them full right to believe that they may yet be able to resist for some time. They are, therefore, fully entitled to retain their arms and baggage. The means to enable them to evacuate Egypt shall be procured to them." Such is the language of true heroism; but, during the whole of the present war, the very same spirit of elation and presumption invariably discovered itself in the English cabinet, upon all occasions of partial success, as had formerly, and in so remarkable a manner, characterised the English court and ministers during the American contest; and, indeed, at the distance of more than twenty years, divers of the old advisers still retained all their former authority and influence in the management of public affairs, and all their ancient and fatal ascendancy over the mind and counsels of the sovereign.

The publication of the haughty and insulting propositions of lord Keith, and the animated appeal of general Kleber to that principle of honor which is so powerful in the breasts of the French soldiery, completely answered the intended purpose: every individual participated in the indignant feelings of the commander, and burned for the combat, notwithstanding the vast superiority of the enemy, and the dangerous nature of the position which they themselves now

occupied, surrounded as they were by the different military stations possessed by the Turkish forces.

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On the 20th of March, at break of day, the republicans began to cannonade the advanced posts of the Ottomans, at Maturia, near the site of the ancient Heliopolis, two leagues from Cairo. The grand-vizier drew out his army, and took possession of the ground between that post and the village El Hauca. The French army, consisting of about 15,000 men, was ranged in two lines, towards Boulac on the left—the right being flanked by a grove of palm trees. The Turkish cavalry began the attack, which was furious, and the Janissaries in their turn fell upon the French with great bravery; but the cannon was ill served, and produced little effect. The Turks, apparently discouraged, gradually gave way; and towards noon the French marched briskly forward, with a terrible fire of small-arms and artillery. Unable to stand the shock, the whole Ottoman army (thrown into irretrievable disorder) in an instant took to flight in all possible directions, and the grand-vizier himself was borne away in the torrent. The rout became general; and nineteen pieces of cannon, with a great part of the camp equipage, fell into the hands of the victors, whose loss was very trivial, while that of the Turks did not amount to less than 8,000

Victory  
gained over  
the grand-  
vizier at  
Heliopolis.



BOOK killed, wounded, or prisoners: after which, ge-  
 XXXIV. neral Kleber returned in triumph to Cairo.

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This signal victory was, however, far from extricating the French from their difficulties; and the thoughts of general Kleber were incessantly turned to the means of carrying into execution the articles of the convention, and of effecting the return of himself and his army to Europe.

On the 10th of April, he addressed a letter from Cairo to the kaimakan of the Sublime Porte—an officer of state who exercises the functions of prime-minister at Constantinople in the absence of the grand-vizier, with the obvious view of its being laid immediately before the grand-seignor. This letter, inscribed “to the kaimakan of the Sublime Porte, illustrious among the great, the enlightened, and the wise,” &c., was expressed in the following judicious terms:—

General  
 Kleber's  
 letter to the  
 kaimakan  
 of Constan-  
 tinople.

“Your excellency has, without doubt, been informed of the progress and result of the negotiations which I had concluded with his highness the supreme vizier Yousef Pacha; and, according to the assurances to that effect which I have received from persons of distinction of your nation, I have reason to think that the treaty of El Arisch has obtained the approbation of his majesty the emperor Selim the Second.

“Several articles of this treaty had already been

executed, and the French army in particular was faithfully fulfilling its engagements. I was upon the point of evacuating Cairo, when I received from lord Keith, commander-in-chief of the English fleet in the Mediterranean, a letter which excited the surprise, and above all the indignation, of the French: I herewith annex a copy of it. This paper, which evinces the most perfect ignorance of my situation, and the neglect of every thing due to allies, rendered illusory not only the convention of El Arisch, but also every kind of treaty which I might thenceforward conclude with the Sublime Porte. With regard to the injurious conditions contained in that letter, your excellency will readily perceive that the French army in Egypt can never be reduced to subscribe to them.

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“I had communicated these observations to the grand-vizier, and I proposed to him to postpone the evacuation of Cairo until this unexpected difficulty should be removed. I could not demand a more moderate pledge of the execution of our conventions. His excellency refused to consent to this proposal, and chose rather to expose to the fate of a battle the possession of a country which was absolutely assured to him. This battle took place on the 29th Ventose, and Heaven, protecting the justice of my cause, conferred the victory on me. Nevertheless, the sin

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cere desire which I have always had to re-establish the ties of friendship and of interest which during so many centuries have united the two nations, is not altered by that event. The Sublime Porte will still find me disposed to deliver up to it the possession of Egypt upon the conditions stipulated at El Arisch, with the exception of some modifications which the existing circumstances have rendered necessary.— Thus all motive for a fresh effusion of blood would be obviated, and a regular negotiation, the effect of which would no longer be prevented by unforeseen orders, would restore to the Ottoman empire those provinces of which it would be in vain to attempt to deprive us by force of arms. If your excellency shares these sentiments of peace and concord, you will communicate them to his majesty the emperor Selim the Second; and without doubt you will obtain orders to resume, without delay, those conferences which would conduct us to the object which we are equally desirous of attaining. I beg your excellency to believe in the high consideration I entertain for you.

“CAIRO, the 20th Germinal, year VIII. of the French republic, 10th of April, 1800, which answers to the 14th of the month of the moon Quyskade, in the year of the Hejira 1214.

“KLEBER.”

Also in pursuance of the generous counsels of  
 sir Sydney Smith, M. Poussielgue had made im-  
 mediate application to lord Keith, to explain to  
 him the circumstances of the convention, and to  
 induce him, if possible, to revoke the orders is-  
 sued by his lordship to obstruct the execution  
 of it. "The lives of 50,000 men," says M.  
 Poussielgue, in his letter to lord Keith of April  
 19, from on board the *Constance* frigate, "are  
 at stake, who may be destroyed without any  
 motive, since, according to the solemn treaty  
 made with the English, Russians, and Turks, all  
 hostilities had terminated. At the moment when  
 we concluded the convention at El Arisch, under  
 the simple pledge of English good faith, we were  
 far from suspecting that obstacles would be  
 started by the same power, the most liberal of  
 those with whom we had to treat."

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On the same day that lord Keith received this  
 letter, he replied, in very civil terms, to M.  
 Poussielgue, "that he had given no orders or  
 authority against the observance of the conven-  
 tion between the grand-vizier and general Kle-  
 ber, having received no orders on this head from  
 the king's ministers. Accordingly," says his  
 lordship, "I was of opinion that his majesty  
 should take no part in it; but since the treaty  
 has been concluded, his majesty being desirous  
 to show his respect for his allies, I have received



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1800. instructions to allow a passage to the French troops, and I lost not a moment in sending to Egypt orders to permit them to return to France without molestation." The declaration of this commander, that he had given no orders contrary to the observance of the convention of El Arisch, appears very strange, when contrasted with the tenor of his letter to general Kleber. But in some measure to obviate this incongruity, and to account for his change of policy, it must be remarked, that on the 28th of March a second order had been transmitted from England to lord Keith, stating, "that although the terms granted to the French by the late capitulation appeared to his majesty more advantageous to the enemy than their situation entitled them to expect, by restoring to the French government the services of a considerable and disciplined body of troops; besides that his majesty did not consider sir Sydney Smith as having been authorised either to enter into, or to sanction, any such agreement in his majesty's name; yet, as the general commanding the enemy's troops appears to have treated with him as a person whom he conceived to have possessed such authority, and as by annulling this transaction the enemy could not be replaced in the same situation in which he before stood, his majesty, from a scrupulous regard to the public faith, has judged

it proper that his officers should abstain from any act inconsistent with the engagements to which BOOK XXXIV. 1800. sir Sydney Smith had erroneously given the sanction of his majesty's name."

In consequence of the last declaration of lord Keith, the negotiations recently broken off were resumed, and apparently brought very near to a conclusion. General Kleber had gained many advantages over the Turks since the battle of Heliopolis; had re-possessioned himself of the posts of Belbeis, Salahieh, and Damietta, and compelled the army of the vizier to retreat across the Desert with disgrace, to Gaza: he had also concluded a treaty of peace with Mourad Bey, to whom were assigned the provinces of Girge and Assuan, in Upper Egypt; and he had made many salutary reforms and regulations in the civil department. But a horrid and unexpected catastrophe terminated at once the command and the life of this hero.

On the 14th of June the French general was walking with citizen Protain, an architect whose name deserves commemoration, on the terrace looking from the garden of the head-quarters into the great square Esbequier, when a wretch, suddenly approaching, struck him, with vengeful and skilful aim, a mortal blow with a poniard. The assassin, notwithstanding, still unsatisfied, gave him several other stabs, which

Assassina-  
tion of ge-  
neral Kle-  
ber.

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Protain in vain endeavouring to ward off, received no less than six wounds, none of which, however, proved fatal. The murderer, on the alarm being given, was discovered in a heap of ruins not far from the spot, and upon examination confessed that he was solicited to commit this crime by the aga of the Janissaries of the Ottoman army commanded by the grand-vizier in person.

This execrable wretch, who came from Aleppo, had lately arrived at Cairo, after crossing the Desert on a dromedary, and had been since watching for an opportunity of perpetrating this villainy. He had entrusted his secret to four petty scheiks of the law, who wished in vain to dissuade him from his purpose, but who, nevertheless, did not give any information by which the murderous deed might be prevented. A commission being forthwith appointed for the trial of the delinquents, the assassin was condemned to be impaled, and the guilty scheiks to be beheaded.

Command  
of the  
French ar-  
my trans-  
ferred to  
general  
Menou—

General Menou, who, affecting the habits and manners of a true Mussulman, had taken the name of Abdallah Bey Menou, succeeded to the command of the French army. He had the reputation of being a brave and active officer, but in capacity and military science he was far inferior to his predecessor. This new commander wrote an early account, June 19, to

sir Sydney Smith, of the event which had placed him at the head of the army of Egypt. From the tenor of his letter, it was evident that he had adopted a system very different from, if not totally opposite to, that of general Kleber; and that, elated by the recent successes of the French army, he eagerly aspired to the fame of being the defender and preserver of Egypt. "The behaviour which you, sir," says he, "observed with regard to the convention concluded at El Arisch, points out to me the road which I have to pursue. You demanded the ratification of your court; I must also demand that of the consuls who now govern the French nation, for any treaty that may be concluded with the English and their allies. As well as you, sir, I abhor the flames of war; as well as you, I wish to see an end put to the misery which it has caused: but I shall never, in any point whatever, exempt myself from what the honor of the French republic and of her army requires. I am fully convinced that these sentiments must also be yours. I have the honor to repeat to you, sir, that with enthusiastic pleasure I shall see the termination of a war which has for so long a period agitated the whole world. The French and English nations are destined mutually to esteem, and not to destroy, one another."

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—Who resolves to  
establish  
himself in  
Egypt.

Sir Sydney Smith returned an immediate an-



BOOK XXXIV.  
1800. swer from Jaffa, where he received the letter of general Menou. "At the instant," said this gallant officer," when I expected to see general Kleber under the most favorable and satisfactory auspices, I learned, with the liveliest concern and the most heart-felt sorrow, his tragical fate. I immediately communicated the intelligence to the grand-vizier and the Ottoman ministers, in the terms in which you announced to me that sad event; and nothing less than the certainty and detail with which you communicated it, could have induced their excellencies to credit the information. The grand-vizier has declared to me, formally and officially, that he had not the slightest knowledge of those who have been guilty of the assassination; and I am persuaded that his declaration is true and sincere. Be assured, that the hostile dispositions which have been recently announced, and which have acquired extent and publicity, may be appeased by the opportunities furnished to both parties by the present circumstances of mutual correspondence and communication; and that we shall at length be united by the ties of sincere friendship. In the mean time, we shall prosecute hostilities against you with the means which we have hitherto employed, and we shall endeavour to render ourselves worthy of the esteem of your brave troops. As general Kleber did

not, in the late preliminaries, *which were agreed to*, give us to understand that it was necessary the treaty which was to have followed them should be ratified by the consuls, this condition, now introduced by you in your preliminaries, has the appearance of a refusal to evacuate Egypt; and the grand-vizier has commissioned me to require of you, on that head, a clear and precise answer. You wish, as I do, for a termination of the war which desolates the whole world: it is in your power to remove one of the obstacles in the way of peace, by evacuating Egypt, according to the terms agreed upon with general Kleber; and if you refuse, we shall exert all our means, and those of our allies, in order to compel you to accept conditions which may not prove so advantageous. I shall literally adhere to all the instructions of my court: I know its principles to be founded upon the most punctilious equity and the most perfect good faith. As it is not yet decided in what direction I am about to act, I beg you will transmit to me your answer in two dispatches—the one addressed to Alexandria, and the other to Jaffa, at the camp of the grand-vizier.”

Notwithstanding this very forcible representation, general Abdallah Menou persisted in his resolution to obtain the ratification of the consuls to the treaty now in contemplation; which

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was necessarily considered as equivalent to an absolute declaration of war\*.

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In the French commander's dispatches to the first consul, from Cairo, 14th Messidor (the 3d of July), he speaks in boastful language of the favorable situation of affairs in Egypt. "All the arrears," he says, "due to the army, have been paid, and for the future their pay will be secured. The fortifications of Cairo are completing: twelve forts surround the city at present; in fifteen days the whole will be finished. The fortifications of Salahieh are much increased—Aboukir is entirely repaired—they are working with diligence at Alexandria. Our artillery is in the best condition; the works in the arsenal of Gizeh are in the greatest activity. I

\* It appears, from the publication of general Regnier's *STATE OF EGYPT*, that, subsequent to the victory of Heliopolis, the commander-in-chief, Kleber, conceived himself to stand on ground too high to be justified in subscribing to the same terms he had formerly submitted to in the convention of El Arisch, and that, if the neutrality of the Porte could have been obtained, he thought his force equal to the defence of Egypt against the English. But it is very improbable that the Turkish government would ever have consented to any treaty which left the French even in the temporary possession of Egypt, or have suffered it to be held, in the specious language held out to them, "as a pledge till the peace."—*Regnier's State of Egypt after the Battle of Heliopolis*, pp. 118, 123, 173.—Translation.

have established a *depôt* of 500 horses at Gizeh, and also a park of reserve of 500 camels. Many thousand Greeks have enrolled themselves in our service, and also 500 Cophts and Syrians. A caravan of 10,000 slaves and 15,000 camels is arrived from Darfur and the Niger. The institute is going to resume its sittings. The grand-vizier is at Jaffa, with about 7000 or 8000 men: he has 2000 at Gaza, and 1000 at El Arisch: if he should be able to recruit his army, and shall again attempt to pass the Desert, we will go to receive him at Salahieh—the troops are determined to beat him. Everywhere we are prepared: the army will combat till they die. Happy if we can preserve to the republic a great *colony*, of which you have been the founder!” Thus was a new and dangerous war kindled in Egypt, by that unpardonable presumption which refused to a great and generous foe, oppressed, but not vanquished, terms consistent with the dictates of discretion, of equity, and of honor.

The miscellaneous events of the present year remain now to be narrated. In the month of October, 1799, the college of cardinals met at the city of Venice, under protection of the emperor, in order to hold a conclave for the purpose of electing a successor to the late pope, Pius VI. The validity of this assembly was recognised by



BOOK all the catholic powers, and among the rest  
 XXXIV. by Louis XVIII., nominal king of France, who,  
 1800. in a letter dated from Mittau (November 24),  
 declared to them, "that God would doubtless  
 direct their proceedings in restoring a head to  
 the church.—It is in this firm confidence that we  
 acknowledge," says this phantom of royalty,  
 "the holy father of your choice ; and we hope  
 from Him by whom all kings reign upon earth,  
 to be replaced on the throne of our ancestors.

"We shall cause the legitimate rights of the  
 holy see to be respected throughout our domi-  
 nions, and shall thereby justify our title of most  
 christian king and eldest son of the church."

Election of  
 pope Pius  
 VII.

The conclave sat till the month of March,  
 1800, when the choice of the sacred college fell  
 upon cardinal Chiaremonte, bishop of Tivoli,  
 who took the name of Pius VII. The new pope  
 was accounted, and indeed soon discovered  
 himself to be, a man of good sense, moderation,  
 and discretion. He was of the order of Bene-  
 dictines, and had formerly read public lectures  
 in divinity and the canon law with great repu-  
 tation. He had been raised successively to the  
 dignities of abbot, bishop, and cardinal, by the  
 preceding pontiff. In a few weeks, things being  
 prepared for his reception, he set out for his own  
 dominions. The king of Sardinia, who had taken  
 a melancholy farewell of the late pope, on his

departure from the Chartreuse, near Florence, met the new pontiff at Ancona, and accompanied him to Rome; where he arrived on the 9th of July, and was received with incredible acclamations. His holiness immediately repaired to St. Peter's, where a solemn *Te Deum* was performed, at which an immense concourse of people attended. The great families of Colonna and Doria-Pamphili sent two sumptuous carriages, each drawn by six beautiful horses, to meet the holy father, as a complimentary present in token of their devotion to his interest—gifts the more acceptable, as during the late revolutionary tempest, from the sweeping blast of which nothing was too high or too low to escape, stables as well as palaces had been stripped and plundered. The Quirinal had, however, been magnificently fitted up for the reception of his holiness, and at night the whole city was illuminated in a splendid manner, being adorned with triumphal arches, and exhibiting all the other accustomed demonstrations of joy. From this time the king of Sardinia removed from Florence, and fixed his abode at Frascati.

In the month of May this year died, in an obscure retreat near Petersburg, the famous field-marshal Suwaroff, at the age of seventy. The fatigue of body and agitation of mind which he had undergone in the course of the last year,

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Death of  
field-mar-  
shal Su-  
waroff,

BOOK and above all the chagrin which he experienced  
XXXIV. at the ungrateful return his services met with  
1800. from the emperor, had wholly undermined his  
health and constitution. The reverse of fortune  
which marked the conclusion of that general's  
celebrated Italian campaign, was, indeed, more  
than sufficient, in the estimation of the capricious  
despot who now filled the throne of the illustri-  
ous Catherine, to obliterate all sense and me-  
mory of former merits. Behind the mountains  
of Glaris the sun of Suwaroff set for ever. He  
was not suffered to approach the presence of the  
emperor; and his disgrace at court was ac-  
companied, as usual in that semi-barbarous  
country, by a sort of general abandonment. It  
is said, that, when he approached the last  
stage of his illness, a letter was addressed to  
him from PAUL, containing some expressions of  
kindness and favor: but the haughty warrior in-  
dignantly declared, "that it could not be de-  
signed for him, a man forgotten, deserted, and  
disgraced; it was intended for the renowned  
field-marshal Suwaroff, who had always been  
found, covered with ensigns of honor and vic-  
tory, at the head of conquering armies." Such  
was the end of this extraordinary personage,  
upon whom the emperor, in the elation caused  
by his first rapid successes, had conferred the sir-  
name of ITALISKOI. The military talents of Su-

waroff were savagely great; and had he been allowed to give free and full scope to his genius, the consequences might have been very fatal to France. But he was fettered and entangled by absurd instructions from the aulic council at Vienna—that council being itself supposed influenced and biassed by the still more absurd ideas of the English cabinet, which aspired from the recesses of St. James's to direct the marches of armies, and the operations of war, on the mountains of Switzerland and the plains of Lombardy.

At this period happened in London a singular incident, threatening the life of the KING. On the evening of the 15th of May, his majesty, accompanied by the queen and princesses, went as usual to the theatre. On the king's entering the box, a man near the orchestra suddenly stood up, and discharged a pistol. On the report of fire-arms, and the confusion which ensued, his majesty stopped short; but upon the immediate seizure of the assassin came forward, and waved his hand to show that he was not hurt. Notwithstanding this alarming interruption, the play was performed to the end, when the king and royal family withdrew amid the loud gratulations of the audience.

The wretch who made this horrid attempt immediately underwent a close examination, in

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Attempt  
on the life  
of the king.



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the presence of the duke of York, who happened to be in the theatre at the time. His name was James Hadfield. He had for some years served as a dragoon in the 15th regiment, and was during that time distinguished for his courage and good behaviour. At Lincelles he received several sabre-wounds in the head, and had been left three hours among the slain: these wounds had ever since extremely impaired his intellect; and he appeared at the period of this attempt on his majesty's life, as well as on many former occasions, to be totally deranged. He had made use of a horse-pistol, loaded with a brace of slugs; and as he was known to be a dexterous marksman, it was wonderful that the king escaped unhurt. No cause appeared which should have induced him to the perpetration of this crime; but he talked, on his examination, in a mysterious way of dreams, and of a great commission which he had received in his sleep. He underwent a second examination before the privy-council, but nothing more interesting transpired. On the 26th of June he was brought to trial before the chief justice, lord Kenyon. The duke of York deposed to his personal recollection of the man, as one of his orderly dragoons. His exemplary behaviour in that capacity was fully proved; and the wounds received in the king's service being notoriously the cause of the dread-

ful insanity under which he labored, the trial was stopped, and the jury were directed to bring in a verdict of NOT GUILTY. The wretched maniac was immediately, by order of the court, conveyed to the hospital appropriated to persons of that compassionate description. Upon this occasion, addresses of sincere congratulation were presented to the throne from all parts of the kingdom.

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In the course of the present summer lord Nelson arrived in England, and was everywhere received with extraordinary acclamations. The public saw in him only the hero who had achieved the most splendid naval victory of modern ages: that unhappy part of his conduct during his abode at Naples, so much, to persons competent to judge, the subject of regret and astonishment, and which blended itself, like the deadly nightshade, with the immortal verdure of his laurels, was known comparatively to few—British humanity and British faith would equally have bled at the recital. Being invited by the city of London, on the 9th of November, to dine at the Guildhall of the metropolis, a sword studded with diamonds, of exquisite workmanship, was presented to him by the chamberlain, who, on this interesting occasion, pronounced a gorgeous civic oration, in which the exploits of his lordship were extolled as superior to the heroic

Public hon-  
ors paid  
to lord  
Nelson

BOOK acts of SESOSTRIS ! He was, moreover, compli-  
 XXXIV. mented as having exemplified, in the pious *non*  
 1800. *nobis Domine* of his modest dispatches, "that vir-  
 tue which the heathen world could not emulate."  
 And his lordship, with equal complacency, as if  
 equal in value, received the sword and the  
 panegyric.

During the existence of the second armi-  
 stice between Austria and France, though the  
 negotiations for peace at Luneville continued,  
 there seemed to be no remission of military pre-  
 parations on either side. The central army  
 of the French, commanded by general Moreau  
 in person, occupied the two banks of the Iser as  
 far as Landshut ; while general Grenier had ad-  
 vanced with a strong body of troops nearly as  
 far as Passau, on the left bank of the Danube.  
 Another army, under generals Augereau and St.  
 Susanne, possessed the country on both sides the  
 Maine ; and general Lecourbe was ready on the  
 first notice to force his passage into the Tyrol  
 and the Grisons. In every quarter they were op-  
 posed by the Austrians, now commanded by the  
 archduke John (prince Charles being in dis-  
 grace), with equivalent diligence and strength.  
 The armistice finally expiring about the middle  
 of November, general Moreau re-commenced  
 hostilities ; among other advantages, forcing, on  
 the 29th, the Austrian intrenchments upon the

Re-com-  
 mence-  
 ment  
 of hostili-  
 ties in Ger-  
 many.

Inn, near Wassenburg. But on the 1st of De- BOOK XXXIV.  
 cember the archduke attacked the French army 1800.  
 under general Moreau, though strongly encamped  
 on the heights near Haag, a position between  
 the Inn and the Iser; and, after an obstinate re-  
 sistance of ten hours, the Austrians, successively  
 carrying the different posts, were left in posses-  
 sion of the field and two pieces of cannon, with  
 800 prisoners; general Moreau retiring to his  
 former station of Hohenlinden. On the same  
 day the French made an attack upon the corps  
 commanded by the prince of Condé, in front of  
 Rosenheim, on the river Inn, and were repulsed  
 with loss. The royal dukes d'Angoulême and  
 d'Enghien, sons of the count d'Artois, and the  
 prince of Condé, and indeed all the nobility  
 and gentry who composed this gallant body,  
 distinguished themselves by their heroic valor.  
 But it was a fearful sight to the lovers of their  
 country, to see Frenchmen opposed sword in  
 hand to Frenchmen, and moistening with their  
 blood the fields of Germany.

General Klenau had by this time passed the  
 Danube, and invaded Straubing and Ratisbon.

Encouraged by the various successes of this Battle of Hohenlinden.  
 winter campaign, the archduke determined to  
 risk another and more general attack. Early  
 on the morning of the 3d of December the  
 army marched towards Hohenlinden in three



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columns—the centre along the principal road to Munich, which passed through Hohenlinden; the right and the left, in the woods on each side of the great road. From the accidental circumstance of a heavy fall of snow, the centre column alone arrived at its destination at eight o'clock. The left had even strangely lost its way, and bent its march towards Ebersperg, instead of turning to the right, which would have led to Hohenlinden. In this state of things, general Richepanse pierced between the left and the centre about nine o'clock; and fell upon the left flank and the rear of the central column, just at the time when it had formed in front and commenced its attack upon the enemy. The Austrians fought with great bravery; but the disorder soon became irretrievable, and a retreat was made to the heights of Ramsan, with very heavy loss. The left wing, also, being cut off from the main body, was completely defeated; and the right, under general Kienmayer, suffered severely in a persevering and at length successful effort to gain the banks of the Iser, on hearing of the terrible disaster which had befallen the other divisions of the army. Not less than ten thousand men were left in this fatal field by the Austrians, with eighty pieces of cannon and other trophies of victory. The French, who owed on this day as much to fortune as to skill

or valor, suffered very trivial damage. Pursuing their advantage with vigor, they drove the Austrians everywhere before them, and, after an uninterrupted series of triumphs, crossing the Inn and the Traun, and taking possession of the territory of Salzburg, they penetrated into Stiria, and even into Upper Austria.

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Success attended, at the same time, the arms of France in every other quarter. General Augereau had advanced into Franconia, and had made himself master of Bamberg. General Macdonald, from the country of the Grisons, piercing into the Valteline, opened a communication with the army of Italy, commanded by general Brune, who had passed the Brenta, taken possession of Trent, and now threatened Venice. In the duchy of Tuscany, hostilities had recommenced long before the expiration of the armistice; and the whole of that territory, as well as the Lucchese, was at this time in the actual possession of the enemy; the stores and merchandise at Leghorn, belonging to the English, being, not without difficulty, removed on board the ships in the harbor previous to the surrender of that place. The court of Vienna was once more struck with consternation, and immediate application was made to the archduke Charles to resume the command of the army, in order to animate the troops to fresh exertions.

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Conven-  
tion of  
Steyer.

But that prince, equally famed for prudence and for valor, exhorted the emperor to make the necessary sacrifices for obtaining another armistice, with a view to effect a final and lasting peace. General Moreau on his side, apprised of the inconstancy of fortune, and not insensible to the danger which he must incur by marching forward with the sole force which he commanded into the heart of the Austrian hereditary states, acceded with great facility to the overtures of the archduke; and on the 25th of December, 1800, a third convention was signed at Steyer, a town in Upper Austria, the preamble of which declared, "*that his majesty the emperor and king wished immediately to treat for PEACE with the French republic, whatever the determination of his ALLIES may be.*" The articles of this convention imported, that the fortresses of Kufstein and Schærnitz in the Tyrol, of Wurtzburg in Franconia, and Braunau in Bavaria, shall be provisionally occupied by the French, who should not advance beyond the banks of the Muhr;—the new imperial levies to be stopped; and the suspension of arms not to be of less duration than thirty days, with a subsequent notice of fifteen days.—The armistice to be indefinitely prolonged until the notice of rupture.

The dispatch in which this great event was

communicated to the French government by the pen of general Desolles, is replete with sentiments of good sense and moderation. “The archduke Charles,” says he, “has proposed an armistice to the general-in-chief, by announcing to him that the emperor had sent a courier to M. de Cobentzel, with orders to sign a peace. The general-in-chief, considering that the line of the Traun and the Inn was forced, that we were advanced a hundred leagues before the other armies, and were already near the rear-guard of the Austrian army in Italy; that consequently M. de Bellegarde could avail himself of the possession of Saltzburg and Inspruck, as the two grand openings by which he could send troops to join those which were left in the Tyrol, and, by attacking our rear with these, might cut off our communication with the Traun;—for these reasons he thought proper to agree to a suspension of arms, which procuring great advantages for us, would put us in a condition to learn the movements of the army of Italy, of which we had as yet heard no account. The character of the archduke Charles, and his well-known integrity, gave us sufficient assurances of the emperor’s desire to put an end to the war. He was also impelled to it by the deplorable condition of his army, which having, in the course of twenty days, lost seventy leagues of territory, 25,000 prisoners,

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12 or 15,000 killed or wounded, 140 pieces of cannon, and immense magazines, was no longer able, nor could it be able in three months, to hinder our army from conquering all Austria, and dictating laws in the capital. But in order to effect this without danger, it would have been necessary for the army of Italy to be already in possession of the defiles of Carinthia. Besides, the general-in-chief was of opinion, that to stop in the most brilliant victories was conformable to the character of moderation by which the first consul manifests himself to Europe." The armistice of Steyer was followed by another for Italy (concluded at Treviso, January 16, 1801), by which the Tagliamento was made the line of demarcation between the two armies. The court of London, now compelled by dire necessity to a measure in vain expected from her wisdom or generosity, and seriously alarmed at the situation in which, with inexcusable indiscretion, she had involved her imperial ally, at length released the emperor from all his engagements; from this time standing alone in the contest with France and her allies, and very doubtfully circumstanced in relation to the other great and leading powers of the continent.

Misunder-  
standing  
between  
Great Bri-  
tain and  
Denmark.

So long since as the month of December, 1799, an incident had occurred which gave rise to serious discussions between the courts of London and

Copenhagen. A small English squadron, cruising in the open sea, met the Danish frigate *Hauferfen*, having under her protection a convoy of merchant ships. The English commodore, thinking it proper to exercise (in conformity, doubtless, to his orders) the right of visiting this convoy, sent on board the Danish frigate, demanding from the captain his destination. The latter having answered that he was then going to Gibraltar, it was replied, that since he was going to stop in that bay, no visit should be paid to his convoy; but that if he did not mean to cast anchor there, the visit should be paid. Captain Van-Dockum, commander of the *Hauferfen*, then informed the officer who went on board, that he would resist any such step. Upon this answer, the English commodore made the signal for examining the convoy; in the prosecution of which order, a fire of musquetry from the Danish frigate wounded one of the boat's crew. After this, the frigate, without further resistance, went with her convoy into the bay of Gibraltar. Lord Keith, who then commanded on that station, requiring captain Van-Dockum to explain the nature of his instructions, was told they were in substance not to permit his convoy to be visited. A representation of these facts was made to the court of Denmark, by Mr. Merry, the English resident at Copenhagen, in a memorial dated

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April 10, 1800, demanding reparation and redress.—“The right of visiting and examining merchant ships in open sea, of whatever nation they may be,” says the resident, “and whatever may be their cargoes and destination, is considered by the British government as the incontestable right of every nation at war—a right founded on the law of nations, and which has been generally admitted and recognised. It follows, therefore, that the resistance of a commander of a ship of war, offered by a power at amity, must necessarily be considered as an act of hostility, and such as the king persuades himself cannot be enjoined to the commanders of the ships of war of his Danish majesty, in their instructions. His Britannic majesty, therefore, entertains no doubt that his Danish majesty will have felt much displeasure at hearing of this violent and insupportable conduct on the part of an officer in his service; and the king is persuaded of the alacrity with which his Danish majesty will afford him that formal disavowal, and that apology, which he has so good a right to expect in such a case, together with a reparation proportioned to the nature of the offence committed.”—The resident then proceeds to state, “that he is specially commissioned to demand this disavowal; and that, great and sincere as is the king his master’s desire to cultivate the

strictest harmony with the court of Denmark, nothing would induce him to depart from this just demand."

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To this note the minister, count Bernstorff, nearly related in blood to his immediate predecessor, the celebrated statesman of the same name, and laudably emulous of his virtues, returned an answer at once firm and temperate. "Both custom and treaties," says the Danish minister, "have no doubt conferred on the belligerent powers the right of searching neutral vessels, *not under convoy* by their ships of war. But as this right is not a natural one, but merely conventional, its effects cannot be arbitrarily extended beyond what is agreed to and conceded, without violence and injustice. But none of the maritime and independent powers of Europe, as far as the undersigned has observed, have ever acknowledged the right of permitting neutral ships to be searched, when escorted by one or several ships of war; and it is evident they could not do so without exposing their flag to degradation, and without forfeiting a certain essential proportion of their own rights. Far from acquiescing in these pretensions, most of those powers have been of opinion, since this question has been agitated, that they ought to hold out an opposite principle in all their conventions respecting objects of this nature, in



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conformity with a number of treaties concluded between the most respectable courts of Europe, which contain proofs of the propriety of adhering to that principle. The distinction attempted to be established between ships with and without convoy, is, moreover, equally just and natural; for the former cannot be supposed to be in the same predicament as the latter. The search insisted upon by the privateers or state ships of the belligerent powers, with respect to neutral bottoms not accompanied by convoy, is founded on the right of ascertaining their flag, and of examining their papers. When the papers of these ships are found in strict order, no further examination can be legally enforced; and it is consequently the authority of the government in whose name these documents have been drawn up and issued, that procures for the belligerent powers the required security. But a neutral government, in escorting by the armed ships of the state the commercial ships of the subject, thereby alone holds out to the belligerent powers a more authentic and positive pledge than that which is afforded by the documents with which these ships are furnished: nor can a neutral government, without incurring dishonor and disgrace, admit in this respect the least doubt or suspicion, which must be as injurious to that government as they would be unjust on the part

of those who should entertain or manifest them. And if it were to be admitted as a principle, that the convoys granted by a sovereign do not secure ships of his subjects from being visited by the state ships or privateers of foreigners, it would follow that the most formidable squadron should not have the right of relieving from a search the ships entrusted to its protection, if that search was exacted by the most insignificant privateer. But it cannot be reasonably supposed that the English government, which has uniformly and on the most just grounds shown a marked jealousy for the honor of its flag, and who, in the maritime wars in which it has taken no part, has nevertheless asserted with vigor the rights of neutrality, would ever consent, should such circumstances occur, to a humiliating vexation of that nature: and the king of Denmark reposes too much confidence in the equity and loyalty of his Britannic majesty, to harbor a suspicion that it is his intention to arrogate a right which, under similar circumstances, he would not grant to any other independent power. It seems sufficient to apply to the fact in question the natural result of these observations, in order to make it evident that the captain of the king's frigate, by repulsing a violence which he had no right to expect, has done no more than his duty, and that it was on the

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XXXIV. the rights of a neutral sovereign, and of a power  
1800. friendly to his Britannic majesty, has been committed. The king had hesitated to signify any formal complaint on this head, as long as he regarded it as a misconception, which might have been done away by amicable explanations between the respective commanders of the naval force which the two governments kept up in the Mediterranean; but seeing himself, much to his regret, disappointed in that hope, he has only to insist upon the reparation that is due to him, and which the justice and the friendship of his Britannic majesty seem justly to be called upon to secure to him."

Thus was this famous question, respecting the rights of neutral nations, as it were embodied, and by the improvident pride of the English court brought into formal and solemn discussion. In this state the dispute remained for some weeks, each party demanding of the other redress and reparation; when another and still more serious event of the same nature occurred, to exasperate and inflame the quarrel. In the month of July, six merchant vessels, under the convoy of *La Freya*, a Danish frigate, were encountered in the English Channel by a superior force, and refusing, as before, to admit of any search, a regular and severe engagement ensued,

and the Freya at length striking her flag, was carried into an English port. Upon this transaction being made known to him, count Wedel Jarlsberg, the Danish ambassador in London, preferred a formal complaint, in a note addressed to lord Grenville, of the outrage committed upon the Danish flag. On the very next day (July 30), lord Grenville replied in that tone of haughtiness which had long become habitual to him: and, as if the right claimed by the court of London had been recognised as indisputable by the whole universe, he says—"Notwithstanding the expressions made use of in count Wedel's note, his majesty cannot even yet persuade himself that it is really by the orders of the king of Denmark that this state of harmony and peace has been thus suddenly disturbed, or that a Danish officer can have acted conformably to his instructions in actually commencing hostilities against this country, by a wanton and unprovoked attack upon a British ship of war navigating the British seas. The lives of his brave seamen have been sacrificed, the honor of his flag has been insulted, almost in sight of his own coasts; and these proceedings are supported by calling in question those indisputable rights, founded on the clearest principles of the law of nations, from which his majesty never can depart."—Lord Grenville proceeds, somewhat offi-

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ciously to exhort the ambassador, "most earnestly to recommend to his court that a speedy and satisfactory answer may be given to the demand which his majesty has directed to be made in his name at Copenhagen, both of reparation for what is past, and of security against the repetition of these outrages;" and he concludes with declaring, "that his majesty has charged lord Whitworth with a special mission to the court of Denmark, which cannot but see in this determination a new proof of the king's desire to conciliate the preservation of peace with the maintenance of the fundamental rights and interests of his empire."

The commission with which lord Whitworth was charged, and which was enforced by the appearance of an English squadron in the Baltic, he appears to have executed with address and ability. In his note to count Bernstorff, dated August 21, instead of having recourse, like the English secretary of state, to the theatrical language of astonishment and exclamation, his lordship forcibly remarks, "that if the principle be once admitted, that a Danish frigate may legally guarantee from all search six merchant ships, it follows that the same power, or any other power whatever, may, by the means of the smallest ship of war, extend the same protection to all the commerce of the enemy, in all

parts of the world. It will only be necessary to find, in the whole circle of the universe, a single neutral state, however inconsiderable it may be, well disposed enough towards our enemies to lend them its flag, and to cover all their commerce without running the least risk; for when examination no longer takes place, fraud fears no discovery." The ambassador expresses "his deep concern that the Danish court still persists in supporting, not only the principle upon which it founds its aggression, but also the right of defending it by means of arms;" and he states explicitly to count Bernstorff, "that, notwithstanding the constant desire of the king to live in terms of friendship and alliance with Denmark, unless the Danish government shall adopt counsels more conformable to the interests of the two countries, and return a satisfactory reply to his demand, he is enjoined to quit Copenhagen in a week, reckoning from the date of the present note."

In answer to lord Whitworth's argument, "that by the right of guaranteeing from search merchantmen under the convoy of a ship of war, the least powerful neutral state would acquire the faculty of covering with impunity, with its flag, an illicit commerce," count Bernstorff "entreats the English ambassador to observe, that the government which should de-

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friend and ally of both sovereigns, will certainly have nothing more at heart than to conciliate them, and to prevent a fatal misunderstanding." BOOK  
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To this note lord Whitworth made (August 27) a concise but judicious reply. The English ambassador "requests count Bernstorff to observe, that if he does not animadvert upon the arguments he has made use of upon this occasion, it is because he thinks he shall render a much more essential service to his court, as well as to that of Copenhagen, by abstaining from all that might remove them from the object which both ought to have equally at heart. With respect to the mediation which the count de Bernstorff proposes as the most proper means of doing away the difficulties of this discussion, the ambassador thinks he can reply with certainty that, in spite of the apparent misunderstanding which may have existed between the two courts, there is no sovereign in Europe to whom the king would refer himself, with respect to his dearest interests, with more confidence than the emperor of Russia. No one is more ready," the ambassador says, "than himself, to do justice to the loyalty and zeal of that sovereign for the good cause; but he believes, that, in a similar case, it would be useless to recur even to that intervention, however respectable it may be, and that the court of Denmark, introducing into



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the discussion the same frankness as the court of London, and the same desire of preventing speedily all objects of fatal misunderstanding, will find out the means of effecting this object without difficulty."

The inadmissible proposition of reference being thus dexterously evaded, and the two ministers being reciprocally actuated by the same spirit of good sense and conciliation, *a preliminary convention* was in a few days concluded and signed, the principal articles of which imported—I. That the question, with regard to the right of searching neutral ships sailing under convoy, shall be referred to a future discussion;—II. That the Danish frigate *La Freya*, with the vessels which were under her convoy, shall be instantly released;—III. To prevent similar rencounters, his Danish majesty shall suspend his convoys until the ulterior explanation upon this point shall have given rise to a definitive treaty.

Thus was this perplexing and dangerous question for the present prudently compromised. The conduct of the British government upon this occasion, though by no means faultless, was, upon the whole, deserving of praise; and in no respect did the court of Denmark, in the progress and termination of this quarrel, deviate from the high character which it had for so many years

supported in Europe for wisdom, candor, and moderation.

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State of af-  
fairs in  
Sweden.

The kingdom of Sweden seemed, since the death of the late sovereign, notwithstanding some indications of a change of policy at the expiration of the regency, in all essential points to imitate the salutary example set by Denmark. In the month of March of the present year, the young monarch convened a diet at Norkoping, which he opened with an harangue extended to an unnecessary length by high-flown praises of his deceased father, but containing, in the main, very good sentiments. "On ascending the throne," as he with becoming diffidence expressed himself, "from which so many great kings have governed Sweden, he had reason to fear lest he might not be able to fulfil his sacred duties as he wished; but he had prayed for the assistance of the Almighty, to enable him to do justice to his sincere endeavours." In speaking of the birth of his son, named Gustavus, he declared his hope, "that his education would render him worthy of a name so dear to Sweden.—I shall ever represent to him," said the youthful monarch, "the great destiny of Providence, in order that from his infant days he may be impressed with the great importance of his future duty, and that he may never forget that he is born and destined to reign over a free, integral,

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and self-subsistent nation, and to promote its happiness—thus to enjoy the only, but greatest, consolation which a sovereign can wish for his manifold cares and troubles.” The diet in return displayed every demonstration of affection and loyalty; and Sweden, amid the brazen din of arms, seemed, under a watchful and provident government, to repose in tranquil security\*.

\* The picture drawn by an intelligent foreigner, at this period, of the state of Sweden, is, indeed, far from flattering; but it may be reasonably suspected that the colors are somewhat over-charged. “The sciences,” says this writer, “Gustavus III. treated with neglect; and even the fine arts, which he encouraged, were only designed to mollify and subdue the independent spirit of the Swedes. Under his reign, the national manners became visibly relaxed. Charles XII. lavished, indeed, the blood of the Swedes, but he inflamed their pride and heroism—Gustavus sought to extinguish every spark of honor, and every sentiment of freedom. During the regency of the duke of Sudermania, a considerable change and improvement took place in the Swedish government: peace was cultivated, and æconomy practised; liberty of discussion was tacitly permitted; and the people again began to feel the inspiration of freedom. The present king has adopted a line of conduct in every respect the reverse of that of his uncle. With feeble powers of mind, he is yet obstinate and conceited, and ambitious of governing without ministers. He is deeply tinctured with superstition; and the established form of Lutheran worship degenerates into the rites and ceremonies of popery. The liberty of the press is completely extinct—the reign of ignorance and bigotry gains ground—and Sweden now appears doomed to sink into the

It has been already mentioned, that in the month of September two Spanish corvettes were, by an effort of great naval skill and courage, cut out of Barcelona roads. This gallant exploit was, however, attended by circumstances by no means justifiable. The two English frigates, Minotaur and Niger, employed in this service, had, as it appears, forced the captain of a Swedish galliot lying in the roads to take on board a considerable number of sailors; and, under cover of the evening, the galliot was towed by several English boats beneath the cannon of the batteries—the Swedish captain being compelled to silent submission by a pistol presented to his breast. The stratagem not being suspected, the corvettes Esmiralda and La Paz were about nine o'clock attacked and captured by the boats of the English, under protection of the Swedish ship, notwithstanding a heavy and uninterrupted fire of shells and shot from the batteries and neighbouring fort of Mount Ioni.

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Angry dispute between Sweden and Spain.

The court of Madrid complained, with great energy, in a formal memorial dated from St. Ildefonso September 19, and addressed to the court of Stockholm, of this extraordinary

gloomy barbarism which envelopes Portugal and Spain." —  
ACERBI'S *Travels through Sweden*, &c.



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procedure, “ as an insult of the highest magnitude to the flag of his Swedish majesty, and as an outrage almost unparalleled in the maritime annals of Europe—such, indeed, as must not only tend to annihilate all commercial relations, but would make the flag which should suffer it to be considered as a secret auxiliary of the hostile power. And his catholic majesty expects of the court of Stockholm, that it should demand of the English government the severe punishment of the officers who have rendered themselves culpable, as well as the restoration of the vessels thus illegally captured.” The memorial concludes with a menace, “ that if, contrary to all expectation, the representations of his Swedish majesty to obtain reparation should not be attended with success *before the end of this year*, his catholic majesty will see himself obliged to pursue such measures, with regard to the Swedish flag, as may in future protect his ports and harbors from an abuse so dangerous.”

Of this memorial a copy was transmitted, enclosed in a circular letter from M. d'Urquijo, minister of state, to all the ambassadors of foreign powers resident in Spain. The court of Stockholm immediately returned an answer, by the chancellor Von Ehrenheim, to the Spanish memorial, at once spirited and discreet. His

Swedish majesty expresses "his extreme concern to be informed of the violence offered to his flag, and engages to demand from the court of London the satisfaction justly expected by his catholic majesty;" but he properly states, "that his remonstrances will have for their first object the rights of the Swedish flag and of Swedish subjects." He mentions the long process which Sweden had carried on in London upon the subject of restitution, and says, "there can be no reason to expect that speedier justice will be done in the case of an enemy; and, in the mean time, that he cannot consider himself as liable to any kind of responsibility with respect to an affair to the causes of which he was an entire stranger." It is observable, that, from the manner in which the Swedish vessel is described in the Spanish memorial, it might be supposed to appertain to the royal navy; but in the reply of Sweden it is merely styled "a merchant ship, from Swedish Pomerania."

Justly offended at the haughtiness of the Spanish memorial, the king of Sweden communicated to his friend, relative, and ally, the king of Prussia, "the surprise with which he viewed the public responsibility to which the court of Spain had called Sweden upon this occasion, and the menaces which it had thereto added. This procedure," he says, "gives him so much the

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 1800. desirous of being able, by his representations, to contribute to its restitution. His majesty will certainly make every exertion to effect an arrangement upon which the continuance of amicable relations between Sweden and Spain is unexpectedly made to depend; but he cannot at present take those steps, with respect to the two frigates, which he has not hitherto taken with respect to his own convoys, nor give the court of Spain any better hopes than he entertains himself\*." The good sense and moderation of these sentiments could not fail to be approved by the court of Berlin, which daily acquired new influence in Europe by the firmness, vigilance, and sagacity of its government.

Towards the conclusion of the year, another note was presented by the chevalier de Huerta, minister of the court of Madrid to that of Stockholm, complaining in the same, or even more insolent terms, of "the coldness of the Swedish court, and of the feeble and indecisive measures to which it had confined itself;" and he insists anew upon what the Spanish minister d'Urquijo had before in so high a tone de-

\* NOTE from the baron Von Ehrenheim to M. de Tarach, minister of Prussia at Stockholm.

manded. "I fondly flatter myself," says the chevalier to the chancellor Von Ehrenheim, "that his Swedish majesty will adopt far more active measures than the contents of your note allowed me to hope. It is not probable that you will expose Swedish ships to all the severity of the measures which circumstances require to be exercised against suspected vessels, and whose conduct might be considered as connived at, unless the Swedish court receives from England the most ample reparation respecting the affair of Barcelona." But the court of Sweden had by this time adopted new and very unexpected resolutions with regard to England, which, by their superior interest and importance, in a great degree superseded this disagreeable discussion.

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The grounds of political connexion which the court of London at this time maintained with that of Prussia, were as far from friendship as those on which she stood in relation to the courts of Stockholm and Copenhagen. Of all the states in Europe, Prussia was that to which France appeared to pay the most assiduous attention. Previous to the opening of the campaign, the chief consul had sent Duroc, his first aide-de-camp, to engage, if it were possible, the Prussian monarch to extend his line of demarcation to the river Maine, and thereby draw the



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states of that part of Germany into the armed neutrality of the north; detaching, by this measure, from the head of the empire, a considerable number of its members, and restraining within a narrower limit the military operations of the Austrian army; but that politic sovereign declined giving so public a demonstration of his amity with the French republic. M. de Bournonville, who was afterwards sent as ambassador to Berlin, could by no means persuade that court to deviate from its wise and dignified system of neutrality; and the mediation of Prussia was in vain offered to the belligerent powers, who had resolved to make their final appeal to the sword.

An effort of the Prussian monarch to equalise in some degree the mode of taxation throughout his dominions, being violently opposed by the nobles of his various states, an opportunity was afforded to that sovereign of displaying his prudence, by the abandonment of this too arduous and hazardous attempt. But he declared, at the same time, his fixed determination to extend the protection of government to all classes of his subjects, and admonished the nobles to refrain from all vexatious oppressions of their vassals.

Towards the end of the year, by order of his Prussian majesty, a large detachment of troops,

under general Wedel, unexpectedly took possession of the town of Cuxhaven and the adjoining bailiwick of Ritzebuttel, belonging to Hamburg, and situated at the mouth of the Elbe, under color of guarding against any infraction of the neutrality of the north of Germany. This step gave great uneasiness to the court of London, on account of the electoral interests of the king; and lord Carysfort, envoy-extraordinary at Berlin, addressed a note, dated November 16, on the subject, to the Prussian minister count Haugwitz, stating, "that as the specific reason assigned for the march of the troops was the refusal given by the government of Hamburg to cause a vessel to be released which, taken by one of his Britannic majesty's ships of war, had been compelled, in order to avoid the dangers of the sea, to enter that port; and not being exactly acquainted with the circumstances of the case, he had deferred his observations thereon, for the purpose of obtaining information: he had now reason to believe that the vessel in question, laden with contraband goods, was captured by one of his majesty's ships going into the Texel, and that it was restored as soon as the officer who had the charge of it could be informed of the orders of his superiors;" and his lordship expressed his hope, "that his Prussian majesty may still suspend

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the occupancy of Cuxhaven, until the two courts shall have the means of entering into mutual explanations; more particularly since such an occupation, in the actual circumstances, might give room to ill-disposed minds to attribute to his Prussian majesty views not less opposite to the sentiments of justice and moderation which govern all his measures, than to the friendship and good harmony which subsists between him and his Britannic majesty."

An answer not being immediately returned, a second memorial was presented by the English envoy, November 18, still more urgent than the former.

The Prussian minister at length replied to both memorials, "that he was authorised by the king completely to tranquillise the anxieties and apprehensions expressed in them. That, although the Prussian vessel had been restored, the mode of release had been as irregular as the previous proceedings respecting it; and that there had been a manifest infraction of the principles of the neutrality of the north of Germany. That the measure of causing a body of troops to occupy the port of Cuxhaven and the bailiwick of Ritzebuttel, was no longer capable of being revoked: but he declares, by order of the king, in express and positive terms, that this proceeding. (adopted from necessity) has no

other object than the maintenance of the system of which he is the author and defender; and that this object shall not be exceeded."—And with this answer the court of London chose to appear content.

But though Great Britain was at this period upon no friendly footing with any of the northern courts, the misunderstanding which appeared incomparably the most serious was that which had now for many months evidently subsisted with the court of St. Petersburg; although the English minister, long after the recall of the Russian armies from the scene of action, had assured the house of commons, "that the emperor of Russia had not withdrawn himself from the common cause, and from the interests of Europe." Of this, however, he had given, since that assurance, no other proof than the recent publication of a *ukase* full of invectives and maledictions against the French: and in the royal speech at the end of the session not a syllable was hazarded concerning his majesty's imperial and *magnanimous* ally.

Towards the close of the summer, the anger of this capricious and arrogant despot began to display itself, in regard to Great Britain, by very unequivocal proofs. In the month of August an edict was published, ordering, "in consideration of the violent behaviour of the English

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Misunder-  
standing  
between  
Great Bri-  
tain and  
Russia.

Extrava-  
gant con-  
duct of the  
emperor  
Paul.



BOOK against Denmark, and that one of their fleets  
XXXIV. had blocked up the passage of the Sound, and  
1800. for security against any disadvantage that may  
arise to the Russian commerce therefrom, that  
a sequestration shall be laid upon all property  
belonging to the English." And in the follow-  
ing month a notice was published in the Pe-  
tersburg Gazette, "that several political cir-  
cumstances inducing his majesty the emperor to  
think that a rupture of the friendship with En-  
gland may ensue, an army consisting of five  
corps is on this account to be collected, under  
the orders of general Von-der-Pahlen," &c.—  
About the same time the Russian chargé-  
d'affaires in England, M. Lisakewitz, applied  
for a passport from the English secretary of  
state, as for a courier, which, however, he made  
use of for himself; and, without any audience  
of leave, in this manner withdrew from the  
country.

Nevertheless, when the accommodation took  
place between England and Denmark, the  
emperor thought proper to remove the seque-  
stration upon English property. But that no  
flattering hopes might be entertained of his  
again becoming a party in the coalition against  
France, he caused the following most cu-  
rious article to be inserted in the Petersburg  
Gazette of October the 15th:—"According

to advices received from the privy-counsellor M. de Kalistchef, it has been made known that the emperor of Germany intended to send an extraordinary embassy to the court of his imperial majesty, to offer excuses for what happened at Ancona; and for this purpose he had named the prince of Aversperg, a lieutenant-general of the armies, and knight of the golden fleece, as his ambassador. It has not, however, pleased his imperial majesty either to accept the embassy or the ambassador, particularly in the person of the prince of Aversperg, who, during the journey of her imperial highness the grand-duchess Alexandra Paulouna, allowed himself to offer her several indignities. His majesty orders that no answer shall be returned to this notification."

Nearly at the same period (his distempered mind still brooding over projects of revenge against England) he published a memorable declaration, importing, "that, on mounting his throne, he found his states involved in a war provoked by a great nation which had fallen into dissolution; that, conceiving the coalition a mere measure of preservation, this motive induced him to join it; at that time thinking it unnecessary to adopt the system of an armed neutrality on sea for the protection of commerce; not doubting but that the sincerity of his allies, and their

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 1800. reciprocal interests, would be sufficient to secure the flag of the northern powers from insult;—but being disappointed in this expectation by the perfidious enterprises of a great power, which had sought to enchain the liberty of the seas by capturing Danish convoys, the independence of the maritime powers of the north appeared to him to be openly menaced: he consequently considers it a measure of necessity to have recourse to an armed neutrality, the success of which was acknowledged in the time of the American war.”

In a second declaration, published after a very short interval, this northern despot says, “Whereas we have learned that the island of Malta, lately in possession of the French, has been surrendered to the English troops; but as it is yet uncertain whether the agreement entered into on the 30th of December, 1798, will be fulfilled—according to which this island, after capture, is to be restored to the order of St. John of Jerusalem, (of which his majesty the emperor of all the Russias is grand-master)—his imperial majesty, being determined to defend his rights, has been pleased to command that an embargo shall be laid on all English ships in the ports of his empire, till the above-mentioned convention shall be fulfilled \*.” But though the

\* Petersburg Gazette, November 7, 1800.

court of London did agree, and very properly, to the restitution of the island of Malta to the order of St. John, it surely did not follow that the convention obliged her to recognise his imperial majesty of all the Russias in his self-created capacity of grand-master, which was evidently a mere pretext for gaining possession of the island, to which he had no sort of claim, founded either in truth or equity, and which it would have been the height of impolicy to have admitted.

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Proceeding in his furious career, he ordered forthwith the crews of all the English vessels in his ports to be arrested, and marched, with their captains, into the interior of the country. They were distributed in above a hundred towns, at a vast distance from each other, being allowed no more for their subsistence than five copeeks daily in money, a small measure of rye flour, and another of buck-wheat \*. The crews of two ships in the harbor of Narva having made some resistance to the edict of the emperor, and sailed away, his imperial majesty was pleased to order that the remainder of the vessels in that harbor should be burned.

\* Public letter of Mr. Sharp, consul-general of Russia, November 17.—The copeek is a small copper coin, about the value of a farthing.



BOOK XXXIV.  
1800. At the same time, by another proclamation, the warehouses of the British merchants were sealed, and all their property sequestered. They were also required to deliver in writing, to commissioners appointed for that purpose, a statement of all the balances of accounts in their books, and a schedule of effects and goods in their possession. The commissioners were moreover empowered to dispose of all English effects so sequestered, and to receive all balances of accounts, in order to satisfy those subjects of Russia who should appear to have just and valid claims upon the subjects of Great Britain.

By a circular note also, transmitted to all the diplomatic corps residing at St. Petersburg (November 23), it was declared, "that the island of Malta being, as was now fully confirmed, taken possession of, notwithstanding the repeated representations of his imperial majesty and the king of the Two Sicilies, in the name of the king of Great Britain, and the English flag alone hoisted, his imperial majesty sees, with just displeasure, such a breach of good faith, and has resolved that the embargo laid on all English vessels in the Russian harbors shall not be taken off till the conditions of the convention concluded in the year 1798 shall be punctually fulfilled."

The sentiments of the court of Stockholm, in respect to the re-establishment of the armed

neutrality, entirely agreeing with those of the court of Russia, a convention was concluded and signed at Petersburg, December 15 (N.S.), for that purpose, by the ministers of those powers, and soon after ratified in due form. The preamble to this convention declares, "that the two powers have determined to give a new sanction to those principles of their neutrality which are in their nature indissoluble. With this view, their majesties have, by their declaration of the 15th of August to the northern courts, who are equally concerned in the maintenance of those general regulations anciently recognised, given them to understand how sincerely it is the object of their hearts to restore, in its full independence, the general right of all nations to convoy their ships and merchandise freely, and without being subject to the control of the powers at war." The basis on which this convention was founded, consists of these grand and leading axioms:—I. That merchant ships under convoy are not liable to search;—II. That the effects which belong to the subjects of the belligerent powers in neutral ships, with the exception of contraband goods, shall be free;—III. That arms and ammunition only shall be considered as contraband. The contracting powers agree, that if the present convention, or any of the articles of it, shall be hostilely

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Armed  
neutrality  
revived by  
Russia  
and Swe-  
den.

BOOK XXXIV. contested, they shall make a common cause  
 1800. mutually to defend and support the same. And  
 all other neutral powers are invited to adopt its  
 principles, conform to its obligations, and par-  
 ticipate of its advantages.

This invitation the two other great powers of  
 the Baltic, Denmark and Prussia, accepted with-  
 out hesitation; the former immediately, through  
 the medium of her minister at the court of St.  
 Petersburg, confirmed by the ratification of his  
 Danish majesty on the 16th of January follow-  
 ing; and the latter, after a short and decent in-  
 terval of delay.

Menaces  
 of the  
 court of  
 London, to  
 prevent  
 the acces-  
 sion of  
 Denmark  
 to the arm-  
 ed neutra-  
 lity.

The court of London, jealous in the highest  
 degree of a naval confederacy of this nature  
 among the Baltic powers, transmitted express  
 orders to Mr. Drummond, resident at the court  
 of Copenhagen, positively to demand from the  
 Danish government “a plain, open, and satis-  
 factory answer on the nature and extent of the  
 obligations which his Danish majesty may have  
 contracted, or the negotiations which he is car-  
 rying on, with respect to a matter which so  
 nearly concerns the dignity of his Britannic  
 majesty and the interests of his people.”

Mr. Drummond's note was presented on the  
 27th of December, 1800, and on the 31st of  
 the same month count Bernstorff returned an  
 answer replete with good sense and moderation.

“The court of London,” he says, “must have received very incorrect information, to have been able for a moment to presume that Denmark had conceived projects hostile against it, or incompatible with the maintenance of the good understanding which subsists between the two crowns. The negotiation which is carrying on at St. Petersburg, between Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark, has no other object than the renewal of the engagements which in the years 1780 and 1781 were contracted by the same powers for the safety of their navigation, and of which a communication was at that time made to all the courts of Europe. His majesty the emperor of Russia having proposed to the powers of the north to re-establish these engagements in their original form, Denmark has so much the less hesitated to consent to it, as, far from having ever abandoned the principles professed in 1780, she has thought it her duty to maintain them, and claim them, upon all occasions, and not allow herself to admit, in respect of them, any other modifications than those which result from her treaties with the belligerent powers. Denmark has not made a mystery, to any one, of the object of her negotiation, upon the nature of which some suspicion has been infused into the court of London; but she has not thought that she departed from the

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usual forms, in wishing to wait the definitive result of it, in order to communicate an official account of it to the powers at war. The undersigned does not conceive in what respect the engagement taken by the previous convention of the 29th of August last, can be considered as contrary to those which Denmark is about to enter into with the neutral and united powers of the north. He flatters himself that the English government, after having received the required explanations, will have the frankness to allow, that the provisional and momentary abandonment—not of a principle, the question with respect to which remained undecided, but—of a measure whose right has never been, nor ever can be, contested, cannot be found at all in opposition to the general and permanent principles relative to which the powers of the north are upon the point of establishing a co-operation, which, so far from being calculated to compromise their neutrality, is destined only to strengthen it.”

Certainly the distinction upon which the stress of count Bernstorff’s argument in this note entirely depends, must in equity, and even in common sense, be admitted in its full extent. The court of Denmark never, by the terms of the convention with England, renounced, or could be supposed to renounce, her privileges,

real or assumed, as a neutral power. On the contrary, by the tenor of that convention, England agreed to rest satisfied with the suspension of the exercise of those privileges. There was nothing in the convention to preclude Denmark from joining with other powers in the assertion of their joint claims, as modified by the treaties actually subsisting with the belligerent powers; and to threaten Denmark, in consequence of the adoption or intended adoption of so inoffensive a measure, with a declaration of war, was, on the part of Great Britain, a complication of impolicy and injustice. Such a war could, in fact, be prosecuted only for the purpose of deciding an abstract question, which, so long as the convention remained in force, was, in relation to the contracting powers, of as little moment as to determine whether the eighteenth century did or did not terminate upon the day on which count Bernstorff dated his note.

Whilst Great Britain, already at war with France, Spain, and Holland, deserted by her allies, and baffled in her projects, seemed eager to involve herself likewise in hostilities with all the northern powers, the first consul, Bonaparte, favored as he was by fortune, courted and cultivated all the arts of conciliatory policy. The American plenipotentiaries who had ar-

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BOOK XXXIV. rived in France at the close of the last year, were received with distinguished marks of respect. In the speech of the president Adams, December 3, 1799, at the opening of the congress, an invidious distinction had been unnecessarily and impolitically made between France and England, in the declaration "that the result of the mission of France was uncertain; but, with regard to the question in dispute with the court of London, relating to British captures of American vessels, he could entertain no doubt that all difficulties would soon be removed." The event, notwithstanding, demonstrated that the disputes with France were much more easy to be adjusted than those with England.

1800.  
State of affairs in  
America—

The intelligence of the death of general Washington being received in Paris early in the new year, the most flattering public honors were paid to his memory; and the funeral éloge of that eminent man was pronounced in the presence of the chiefs of the constituted authorities in Paris. After some months spent in calm deliberation and amicable discussion, a treaty both of amity and commerce, upon the most fair and equal terms, was signed (September 30) between the republics of France and America, and, in respect of the right of search and definition of contraband, precisely

upon the principles of the armed neutrality; and those who had adhered to the pacific system of politics in America, obtained a signal and honorable triumph over the opposite party, who, with the president at their head, imagined that "the dignity of the American republic," and "the essential interests of the people," admitted no compromise, but loudly called for an instant declaration of war. Yet was the president a worthy and respectable man, who wished and aimed to do that which was right; but his mind was of narrow comprehension, and he was unfortunately of a disposition somewhat opinionated and pertinacious.

In the speech of the president, November 22, 1800, he informed the congress, "that the difficulties which suspended the execution of the sixth article of the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with Great Britain, have not yet been removed; the negotiation on this subject is still depending."—This being the primary meeting of the legislative body at WASHINGTON, the new metropolis of North America, the president noticed this striking circumstance in very appropriate and affecting language. "It would," said this venerable chief of a great and rising empire, "be unbecoming the representatives of the nation to assemble for the first time in this solemn temple, without looking up to

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the Supreme Ruler of the Universe, and imploring his blessing. May this territory be the residence of virtue and happiness! In this city may that piety and virtue—that wisdom and majesty—that constancy and self-government, which adorned the great character whose name it bears, be for ever held in veneration! Here, and throughout our country, may simple manners, pure morals, and true religion, flourish for ever!” Grave and weighty words, without all doubt; but it ought never to be forgotten, that PEACE ON EARTH forms the first and greatest lesson of that beneficent religion, the diffusion of which was so much the object of the president’s meritorious solicitude.

—And in  
France.

The conduct and policy of the consular government at this period, seemed in all respects excellent and exemplary. The pacific overture made to England, and so rashly and insolently rejected, was of great service to Bonaparte, both by raising his own reputation for moderation, and by exciting a new and ardent spirit for the prosecution of the war. The insurgents, who still remained obstinately in arms in La Vendée and the country on the left side of the Loire, and whose numbers in November, 1799, were supposed to amount to 60,000 men, were totally defeated, in the month of February following, by general Brune. Their leader, count

Louis de Frotté, the chieftain most distinguished for conduct and valor since the death of La Charette, and who spurned at every offer of indemnity and pardon, being taken, with six of his staff officers, in an ancient castle in the department of Orne, were tried by a military tribunal at Verneuil, and sentenced to be shot within twenty-four hours; and they all met their fate with compassionate enthusiasm and admirable fortitude.

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It appears that these miserably deluded people had invariably maintained a correspondence with England, and had occasionally received supplies of money and arms from thence; but what is still more surprising, it also appeared that a self-appointed committee of royalists in Paris, styling themselves a committee of counter-revolution, (the chevalier de Coigny being the chief), corresponding with another committee in London, over which the count d'Artois presided in person, had carried the spirit of intrigue so far as to make overtures to M. Talleyrand, whose delicacy was understood not to be offended by any propositions, of whatever nature, respecting the restoration of the KING. These overtures were, by consent of the parties, communicated to the first consul, and M. Talleyrand had instructions doubtless to amuse them for a time, in order to gain an entire knowledge of their plans. They

BOOK XXXIV. thought this minister far from inflexible; but  
1800. they acknowledged that their arguments made no visible impression upon the first consul. They were extremely eager that England should publish a decisive declaration in favor of the Bourbons, which they fancied would “not only encourage the spirit of insurrection, but give them an inconceivable advantage with the first consul, who,” say they, “is not blinded with respect to the embarrassments of his situation.” These extravagant ideas were not, as it seems, countenanced either by the court of London, or the emigrant committee: and the count d’Artois expressed his uneasiness, in a note or declaration signed by him on the 5th of January, 1800, at “the imprudent and dangerous situation in which the chevalier Coigny and Hyde (the two negotiators) had placed themselves;” and he refused to write the letter to Bonaparte requested of him. But the English government had no objection to making an explicit declaration in favor of the Bourbons; and this was the real motive for the otherwise unaccountable, and at all events absurd and ridiculous, mention of them in lord Grenville’s answer to Talleyrand. “Now that these intentions are well known,” says the count d’Artois, in the declaration above alluded to, “no pretence can remain to the wavering, or the *tremblers*, to hold

back, or stand neuter between the KING and the enemies of the throne. Every thing contained in the letter of lord Grenville, leaves nothing to desire with respect to the explanations demanded from the society in general, and from the English government in particular. The count d'Artois has not the smallest doubt but that these explanations will produce the best and greatest effect."

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In this, however, as in all his former political speculations, the count was completely deceived and disappointed. Before the letter of lord Grenville could be published in France, a general pacification had been concluded with the insurgents of La Vendée, and the chevalier de Coigny, with his colleague, arrested, and their papers seized. Their lives were, however, spared by the lenity of the government, in consequence of the ample avowals made by them of their plans, and the unreserved denunciation of their associates, of whom general Pichegru was one of the chief. Such extracts from their correspondence as were deemed necessary to satisfy the nation respecting the existence of this treasonable intrigue, were published by order of the government. It is impossible not to compare the sanguine and credulous expectations of the royalists subsequent to the French revolution, with the fond and foolish hopes so long



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cherished by the adherents of the house of Stuart in England; but it would be doing great injustice to the counsels of Louis XIV. to affirm, that his policy, in relation to the Jacobite party, was in the least degree similar to the weak, indecisive, and cruel system adopted by the English government at the present period, and for the seven preceding years, in respect to the unfortunate and gallant defenders of the cause of royalty in France, and by which so many thousands of them were, as they found too late, deluded to their utter and ultimate ruin.

Condition  
of St. Do-  
mingo.

The state of the invaluable island of St. Domingo excited at this crisis considerable uneasiness in the breast of the first consul. That great colony had been for some time past entirely under the power of the celebrated negro chief Toussaint Louverture, who had displayed extraordinary ability in re-establishing peace and order in a very considerable degree throughout the island, and to whose government all ranks of the inhabitants seemed willingly, and the major part even gratefully, to submit themselves. Domestic slavery was wholly abolished, and it appeared, by practical demonstration, that even in the West Indies the absolute dominion of the few over the many was not necessary to the existence of civil society. Whether Toussaint ever meant to acknowledge more than a nominal de-

pendency upon France was extremely doubtful at this period: however, it was deemed prudent to temporise; and a letter was written to him in the spring of this year, by the minister of marine, M. Forfait, containing the following flattering expressions:—"A strong government has succeeded an executive power feeble and divided. I depend on your zeal and your fidelity. Inform the troops under your command that the time of schisms is past. Unite all around the social compact of the French people. The rank of general-in-chief, with which the republic has honored you, and which the new government has confirmed, is the first of the military militia: it requires prudence and moderation. Use your influence, your talents, to calm all hatred, stifle all resentment; and be great by the good which you do. The first consul places confidence in you: you will show yourself deserving of it, by restoring peace in the fine colony of St. Domingo, which interests the whole nation in so many points of view. The government expects that the first advices which you shall dispatch will announce, that by your cares and your prudence peace has been re-established in St. Domingo."

This letter having been made public, was answered by Toussaint with corresponding expressions of zeal and attachment to the republic.

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He also joined, with M. Vincent, who had been sent to St. Domingo on the part of the French government, a deputation of two citizens to the department of the south, where disorder still reigned; who were empowered to proclaim a general amnesty to people of every description, provided they shall return to order; and that all men deceived and led astray shall enter once more into the bosom of their families. "In conformity," says the governor Toussaint, "with humanity, which is always my guide, and the letter of the minister, I protest to you that I have forgot and pardon every thing. I hold out my arms to receive you. Should you still resist my call, it is no longer my fault. An immediate answer—Yes or No. Health to the French republic!" These measures produced a happy effect, and the colony seemed rapidly returning to a state of permanent tranquillity and prosperity.

Wisdom of  
the consular  
government.

It was undoubtedly the grand and primary object of those who were concerned in framing the new constitution of France, to establish a great and mighty executive power in the nation, one and indivisible like the republic itself; which should possess sufficient energy, without passing the limits of its constitutional functions, to pervade every part of the state, and to rule with a firm and steady hand that immense and

discordant mass comprehended under the general appellation of the people of France. It was judged by Sieyes and his coadjutors, Cabanis, Talleyrand, &c., that France was in present circumstances unable to subsist under any system of government founded on the basis of political freedom. Since the æra of the revolution two constitutions had been established upon that foundation, and both had been found totally inadequate to the purposes for which they were designed. The third, therefore, they alleged, discarding all false and delusive theories, must be erected on a basis better adapted to the attainment of its object—more solid, more powerful, more permanent: it must be such a government as should suffice effectually to repress the rage of faction and extinguish the horrors of anarchy. That in the execution of this idea a greater weight of authority might be thrown into the executive scale than even the existing circumstances (alarming as they were) really demanded, is, indeed, highly probable; but, on the other hand, it is also possible, that speculative reasoners completely out of reach of the danger, would not make sufficient allowance for the difficulties which those persons had to encounter upon whose decision the fate of millions depended: for were they a third time to establish a government which should

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BOOK prove only a prelude to oppression and misery,  
XXXIV. the purity of the abstract theory would ill com-  
1800. pensate, to the victims of these visionary pro-  
jects, for its practical weakness and folly.

It is not, therefore, hastily to be inferred, that the framers of the new constitution were deliberate enemies to liberty, or that they willingly and purposely banished it from their system. On the contrary, by the fundamental principles of the constitutional code, the enjoyment of civil liberty is secured to the people at large in a very extensive degree. All seignorial tyranny, all feudal oppression, is abrogated; all those odious distinctions of rank, which in France divided the community as it were into two nations, are abolished: one equal, just, and powerful law pervades the whole, and extends alike its protection to all. Under this government there exists not any citizen so humble in fortune as to be excluded from the possibility of rising by merit to the most important and honorable stations. All the various branches of the executive authority are (as in England) exercised, mediately or immediately, by the chief magistrate; and the departmental administrations were taken out of the hands of the central and elective assemblies, from whose selfish or capricious partialities intolerable inconveniences had arisen, and transferred to prefects and sub-

prefects nominated by the first consul. Thus every thing was connected, and the links of this mighty chain were firmly and permanently held together. BOOK  
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The functions of the legislature were, indeed, extremely circumscribed; and from the mode of electing the members of that body, it presented a very faint and imperfect image of representation; but still, upon the whole, even considered merely as a chamber for enregistering the edicts of the executive power, and granting pecuniary supplies, the absolute negative with which it was vested must be regarded as an important bulwark against tyranny, and defence of the privileges conferred by the existing constitution. The title of free states was never refused to the aristocratic cantons of Switzerland, although their forms of government were far more exceptionable, and less favorable to liberty, than the new constitution of France. In those aristocracies, however defectively composed, the fundamental laws of the community were in their general tendency favorable to the enjoyment of civil liberty. Person and property were secure—justice was impartially administered—the citizens were equal in the eye of the law: prosperity and happiness were the general result; the great ends of government were attained; and they were, by the universal consent of mankind, allowed to be

BOOK a free people. Why then might not the same  
 XXXIV. indulgence be extended to France? Why might  
 1800. not a constitution which produced such great  
 and instantaneous benefits to the community,  
 and which secured such privileges to the mass of  
 the people, be recognised in general language as  
 a free constitution, and left, undisturbed by pre-  
 mature praise or censure, to its natural and  
 genuine operation?

Although a vehement outcry was raised by  
 the friends of liberty in England, strongly and  
 justly *prejudiced* (if the expression may be per-  
 mitted) in favor of their own form of govern-  
 ment, against the new constitution of France, ill  
 understood and partially considered, though pas-  
 sionately censured; yet the liberality and mode-  
 ration of the consular government could not  
 but be acknowledged by all. The present rulers  
 even appeared active and eager to repair the  
 wrongs which their predecessors had committed.  
 Great numbers of emigrants were allowed to re-  
 turn on the simple promise of obedience to the  
 existing authorities; and, what was regarded as  
 of still higher interest and importance, the list  
 of emigrants, which had been thus long kept  
 open as the readiest instrument of tyranny, was  
 definitively closed. All the vexatious laws which  
 excluded the nobles and the relations of emigrants  
 from public employments, were abrogated, and

several persons of this class, as well as members of all the former governments indiscriminately, were occasionally appointed to public functions.

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Towards the conclusion of the year 1795 a number of emigrants had been wrecked on the coast of Picardy. By order of the directory they had ever since been confined in close custody, and the sentence of death was continually suspended over their heads. The minister of police, Fouché, was now commanded to make a report of the case of these shipwrecked emigrants. His report was this—"The emigrants shipwrecked at Calais have often suffered the punishment inflicted on emigration: for death is not the blow that strikes and deprives us of life; it consists in the agonies and tortures which precede it. For four years past, these individuals, thrown by a tempest on the soil of their country, have breathed there only the air of the tombs. Whatever then may have been their offence, it is expiated by the shipwreck." A consular decree immediately issued, declaring the emigrants shipwrecked at Calais, and detained in the castle of Ham, to be in no case within the contemplation of the laws against emigrants; but that they should be conveyed out of the territory of the republic. In the number of emigrants thus favored, were the dukes of Montmorenci and Choiseul, and various other persons of distinction.



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An exact account being, by order of the government, transmitted to M. Fouché, of the state of the prisons in Paris, great numbers of persons were in consequence released; and the minister upon this occasion declared, "that all which justice required, should be done; and all that humanity solicited, without danger to the state, should be favorably listened to."

The theatres having been too frequently perverted to factious or to adulatory purposes, M. Fouché, in a public notice or admonition, addressed the conductors of those favorite sources of amusement, informing them, that "the present government abjures and disdains the resources of faction: it wishes for nothing from these: it will do every thing for the republic. Let the sentiments of concord, the maxims of moderation and wisdom, and the language of great and general passions, be alone dedicated to the stage. Let nothing that may divide the minds of men, foment their hatred, and prolong melancholy recollections, be tolerated there."

The decrees against priests also, of the 19th Fructidor, 5th year, were repealed, so far as related to those who had taken the oaths prescribed by the laws; and religious liberty was restored in its fullest extent on swearing fidelity to the new constitution. The decrees prohibiting places of public worship to be used except

on the *decadi*, were revoked; and the churches were again everywhere opened, as formerly, on the Sunday. Even the freedom of the press seemed for a time established, and the printers and journalists exiled by the directory were recalled.

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Notwithstanding, however, the flattering appearance of things, and the acceptance of the constitution by an immense majority of French citizens—more in number perhaps than ever before, in any age or nation, had joined in the expression of the same opinion—the government of Bonaparte was exposed to the attacks of very formidable enemies; from the fatal effects of which, nothing less, probably, than the magnitude of the power which he possessed, could have protected him. Far from being softened or conciliated by the indulgence they experienced, the royalists and other classes of emigrants, now in crowds returning to France, seemed inspired with a most implacable hatred both to his person and administration. Scarcely did they observe the language or the external forms of decency to the government, while they accepted of its favors. In the departments near the capital, the non-juring priests openly officiated in the public service, and used, without fear or hesitation, the ancient formulary of prayer for the safety of the *reigning* monarch. Consultations

**BOOK** for effecting a counter-revolution disdained the  
**XXXIV.** veil of concealment; and the public journals  
1800. under their influence attacked the consular government with the utmost rage of political and party violence.

On the other hand, the faction of the jacobins, although less openly clamorous, were regarded as still more dangerous adversaries of the government; because more profound in their designs, and more daring and desperate in the means of accomplishing them. Though comparatively far from numerous, they compensated by their activity and courage what they wanted in physical force; and watched, with unceasing malignity, for opportunities of once again reviving the reign of anarchy and terror. What seemed particularly remarkable, was the concert which appeared systematically to prevail between the two opposite factions of royalists and jacobins. Both indeed aimed at the same object, *viz.* the subversion of the existing government; and for this purpose they were willing to embark in the same machinations and conspiracies, though absolutely certain, if successful, immediately to turn their swords against each other. The first consul seemed, however, determined to persist in his plan of indulgence and liberality, when an extraordinary incident gave a new and very unfavorable bias to the political system.

On the 24th of December, as the first consul was going in his carriage from the Tuilleries to the opera, he passed through the rue Vicaise, a narrow street, in which stood a sort of car of somewhat uncommon construction, and placed so as apparently to obstruct the way. The coachman drove rapidly; but scarcely had he, with great dexterity and good fortune, passed the car a minute, when it blew up with a most dreadful explosion; greatly damaging many of the adjoining houses, and wounding several individuals very dangerously. The velocity with which the carriage moved, fortunately saved the first consul, against whose life this *infernal machine*, filled with combustibles, was no doubt solely designed and directed. Through the indefatigable researches of M. Fouché, the minister of police, divers of the assassins concerned in this atrocious plot (framed, as it appeared, by a combination of royalists and jacobins), were discovered and brought to trial, and in different modes received the just reward of their villany. But it made a deep and lasting impression upon the mind of the first consul, whose character, from this time, acquired an adventitious tincture of suspicion and severity not naturally belonging to it. A striking proof of this was exhibited in the subsequent promulgation of an act of government, sanctioned indeed by the senate, by

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Attempt  
on the life  
of Bona-  
parte.



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virtue of which 132 persons, accused of disaffection, were sentenced to banishment without any previous trial; and special tribunals were also, by a legislative decree, erected throughout the entire extent of the republic—armed, in all cases relative to offences against the state, with new and despotic powers, and superseding the constitutional use of juries.

Excessive  
scarcity in  
England—

At this period the domestic situation of Great Britain was singularly afflictive and alarming. The harvests of the last two years had been beyond all precedent scanty and unproductive; and, although just apprehensions of a scarcity had been very generally entertained in the autumn of 1799, the ports were not opened for a free importation of corn till the ensuing spring. The additional consumption and enormous waste arising from a war of such unbounded extent and expense, greatly, though unavoidably, enhanced the evil; and the rapid and excessive rise of every article of provisions, during the summer and the autumn of the present year, menaced the kingdom with the dreadful prospect of absolute famine. England, with the riches of the world flowing into her lap, was dying of hunger, and, like Midas, starving in the midst of her gold.

It being a very prevalent and popular notion, that the present alarming scarcity was, if not

primarily caused, yet at least artificially enhanced, by the evil practices of engrossers, forestallers, and regraters, the law was enforced against these different classes of delinquents with great severity. The statutes relating to offences of this equivocal nature had been indeed repealed; but offences they still remained at common law; and, in various instances, persons engaged in those branches of trade which naturally led to commercial speculations in the necessities of life, were convicted and punished.

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The sanction thus given to folly and prejudice, and the enforcement of the mistaken legal remedies intended for the suppression of visionary mischiefs, led to real mischiefs of the most serious nature. A vehement clamor was raised all over the kingdom against corn-factors and millers, of the greatest respectability and eminence, as engrossers, forestallers, and regraters. In the month of August, riots in many parts of the country—Birmingham, Nottingham, Oxford, &c.—became very frequent and alarming. The houses of bakers, mealmen, &c. were violently attacked; and no corn-factor could sleep in his bed with security.

—And consequent commotions.

In the succeeding month, these barbarous and disgraceful commotions extended to the metropolis; but the lord-mayor, Combe, a man of courage and address, immediately took the

BOOK necessary precautions to secure the public  
XXXIV. peace. It was observed that the Quakers, who  
1800. deal largely in this branch of commerce, were  
the peculiar objects of the popular rage, notwithstanding the general beneficence and attention to the poor which mark the character of that truly respectable sect. The riot becoming more serious, his lordship, accompanied by several of the aldermen, addressed the people on the folly and danger of their conduct, reminding them of the obvious truth, that unless the dealers were protected in bringing their corn to market, both rich and poor must alike perish. At length, finding his expostulations of no effect, and that they were proceeding to the commission of the most violent outrages, he read the riot-act; and, with the assistance of the constables, secured several of the rioters; with great humanity forbearing to order the volunteers, who soon reached the spot, to fire upon the misguided and deluded populace—thus, by his firm and judicious conduct, acquiring high and just reputation, not only in the metropolis but throughout the kingdom.

A royal proclamation immediately issued for the suppression of riots and tumults; and the common-council of London being assembled, voted a petition to the king, “that his majesty would be pleased speedily to convene his par-

liament, that they may concert such measures as they in their wisdom shall judge most effectual to remove the sufferings and supply the wants of his people, thereby preserving to them the blessings they have long enjoyed under his majesty's mild and gracious government." The king, in answer, declared himself "always desirous of recurring to the advice and assistance of his parliament on any public emergency; and that, previous to receiving their petition, he had given directions for convening his parliament for the dispatch of business."

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The duke of Portland, secretary of state for the home-department, on occasion of the riots in the midland counties had written a judicious and excellent letter to the duke of Marlborough, lord-lieutenant of the county of Oxford, stating "the necessity there must be for the exertion of all the lord-lieutenant's great influence and authority, to combat and counteract the prejudices which have operated, no less powerfully than unfortunately, in disposing a very large part of the community to believe the scarcity artificial, and owing to the views and speculations of certain interested and rapacious men, who take advantage of the difficulties and distresses of the times to enrich themselves at the expense of the public."—The letter then adverts to the notoriously unfavorable circumstances of the two



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last seasons, as fully sufficient to account for the present dearth. "The produce of the late harvest, upon the most sanguine estimation, is not," it is affirmed, "likely to amount to more than three-fourths of an average crop, or, according to the information of others, three-fifths. And the lord-lieutenant is instructed to prosecute, without distinction, all persons concerned in any acts of violence, or modes of intimidation, in the most vigorous, exemplary, and impressive manner, which the power, military as well as civil, under his command, will most speedily and effectually enable him to do."—"If the employment of property," says his grace, "is not secure—if every man does not feel that he has power to retain what he possesses as long as he pleases, and dispose of it at the time, in the manner, and for the price, he chooses to fix upon it—there must be an end of confidence, of industry, and of all valuable and virtuous exertions of every description."

But though it was unquestionably true that the extreme scarcity of the commodity was the grand and primary cause of the dearness of it—that the war contributed in a very subordinate degree to the same effect—and that monopolising, forestalling, and regrating, had no injurious influence whatever; yet another question of a high and momentous nature forced itself on

the public mind in these circumstances,—*viz.* BOOK  
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how far the astonishing accumulation of taxes within the last half century had contributed to the equally astonishing and progressive increase of the price of all the necessaries of life within the same period of time.—“Every new tax,” says an elegant and acute writer, “does not only affect the price of the commodity on which it is laid, but that of all others, whether taxed or not, and with which, at first sight, it seems to have no manner of connexion. Thus, for instance, a tax on candles must raise the price of a coat, because out of this all the taxes on the candles of the wool-comber, weaver, &c., must be paid. A duty on ale must raise the price of shoes, because from them all the taxes upon ale drank by the tanner, leather-dresser, and shoe-maker, must be refunded. No tax is immediately laid upon corn; but the price of it must necessarily be advanced, because out of that all the innumerable taxes paid by the farmer on windows, soap, candles, malt, hops, leather, salt, and a thousand others, must be repaid. So that corn is as effectually taxed as if a duty by the bushel had been primarily laid upon it \*.”

This is indeed strictly true; but unfortunately it is not the whole truth. The produce of the

\* SOAME JENYNS On the High Price of Provisions.

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1800. land, in all its branches, and of all which depends upon the land, must be enhanced in price, not merely to indemnify the laborious farmer, but the opulent landlord, who, by raising his rental, transfers the additional burdens imposed upon him by the legislature, to his tenant. The general mass of consumers, who pay double or treble the ancient prices, must, in their several professions, raise the price of their respective commodities; and the rise of each causing again the rise of every other, all is action and reaction; and the price of labor rising, as is justly observed by a celebrated writer on Political Economy, last of all \*, the lower classes of the community ultimately sustain incomparably more than their proportion of the whole enormous pressure.

In that highly artificial state of society, also, which results from the creation of an exorbitant national debt, a perfectly new description of men, immensely rich, will appear under the denomination of stock-holders. These MONIED MEN, whose revenue arises from the produce of taxes levied upon the community at large for their peculiar advantage, emulous to vie with the ancient gentry and nobility, will live in a state of unbounded luxury and extravagance;


\* ADAM SMITH On the Wealth of Nations. .

and, by paying negligently, or even ostentatiously, the highest prices demanded, the markets are raised above their natural level. The vast and prodigious fortunes made by government-contractors, commissaries, loan-jobbers, and agents of different descriptions, "whose equipages shine like meteors, and whose mansions rise like exhalations," are also the deadly fruits at best of the public necessity—too probably of the public corruption—and obviously tend to enhance the magnitude of the evil.

The whole commercial system, fostered, and forced as it were, into morbid energy by its connexion with the funded system, concurs to heighten the general effect. The excessive influx and increase of wealth among these several classes of "monied men," supply the immense sums too often squandered in the prosecution of projects the most pernicious; and, in its turn, this national improvidence adds to the aggregate of commercial wealth, into which, from opposite quarters of the globe, streams richer than Pactolus continually flow. But what is the ultimate result of the general system? This excess of affluence naturally produces luxury; the progress of which, in a thousand modes, generates every species of artificial consumption. The necessities of life perpetually and proportionally increase in price; the value of money, and con-

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BOOK XXXV.  revenue of the country is mortgaged for nearly 1800. as much as the fee-simple of the land is worth. Half the poor are maintained by coercive contributions: the jail and the workhouse rise by the side of the palace; the cottages are in ruins; and the miserable inhabitants, perishing with cold and hunger, are told in vain that they live under the mildest of governments, and enjoy the inestimable benefits of the freest and most excellent of all constitutions.

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*SESSION of Parliament 1800-1801. Debate on the Address. Measures adopted to relieve the public Distress. Maximum proposed and rejected. Bill for ascertaining the national Population. Motion respecting Egypt. Motion respecting Peace by Mr. Sheridan. Supplies voted for three Months. Arrangements relative to the Union. First Session of the Imperial Parliament. Debates on the Address. Dissensions in the Cabinet. Total Change of Administration. Mr. Addington First Minister. Sir John Mitford chosen Speaker. Extraordinary Declaration of Mr. Pitt. Motion for an Inquiry into the State of the Nation. Loan for 25,500,000*l*. State of the Irish Finances. Martial Law continued in Ireland. Character of Mr. Pitt. Indulgence granted to the French Fishermen revoked. Embargo on all Russian, Swedish, and Danish Ships. Negotiation with the Northern Courts. Rupture with the Baltic Powers. Grounds of the War with the Northern Powers. Treaty of Lunéville. Convention between France and Spain. Treaty between France and Naples. Embassy from Russia to the First Consul. English Fleet sails to the Baltic. Battle of Copenhagen. Death of the Emperor Paul. Auspicious Change in the Politics of Russia. King of Prussia seizes on the Electorate of Hanover. Second Motion of Inquiry into the State of the Nation. Habeas-Corpus Suspension, and Sedition Acts renewed. Indemnity Bill passed. Clergy Incapacitation Bill. Subsidy to Portugal. Statement of India Affairs. Negotiation with France respecting Peace. Convention between*

*Great Britain and Russia. Invasion of Portugal by the Spaniards. Treaty of Badajoz. French Invasion of Portugal. Pacification of Madrid. Expedition to Egypt. Battle of Alexandria. Death of Sir Ralph Abercrombie. Final Conquest of Egypt by the English. Treachery of the Turks. Reduction of the Danish and Swedish Islands in the West Indies. Victory obtained by Sir James Saumarez. Gallant Defence of Porto Ferrajo. Threats of Invasion. Heroism of the British Nation. Preliminaries of Peace signed. Transactions on the Continent. State of St. Domingo. Affairs of Germany—of Switzerland—of Holland. Treaty of Peace between France and Turkey. Concordatum. Character of Bonaparte. Election of Mr. Jefferson to the Presidency of the American States.*

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1800.  
Session of  
parliament  
1800-1801.

ON the 11th of November, 1800, the session of parliament commenced with a speech from the throne, expressive of his majesty's "tender concern for the welfare of his subjects, and his sense of the difficulties with which the poorer classes particularly had to struggle from the present high price of provisions; recommending to their care and wisdom the adoption of such measures as might appear best calculated to relieve this severe pressure. If," said the monarch, very guardedly and prudently, "it shall appear to you, on the result of your deliberation, that the evil necessarily arising from unfavorable seasons has been increased by any undue combinations or fraudulent practices for the sake of adding unfairly to the price, you will feel an earnest desire of effectually preventing

such abuses; but you will, I am sure, be careful to distinguish any practices of this nature from that regular and long-established course of trade which experience has shown to be indispensable, in the present state of society, for the supply of the markets and for the subsistence of my people."

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Towards the conclusion of his speech the king adverted to the unsuccessful negotiation recently carried on with France, the papers relative to which he had ordered to be laid before parliament: "You will see in them," said his majesty, "fresh and striking proofs of my earnest desire to contribute to the re-establishment of the general tranquillity. That desire on my part has hitherto been unhappily frustrated by the determination of the enemy to enter only on a separate negotiation, in which it was impossible for me to engage, consistently either with public faith or with a due regard to the permanent security of Europe."

On the extraordinary statement which the king, deceived by the misrepresentations of his ministers, was thus advised to make to the parliament and to the public at large, it is essential to remark, that although, by the convention signed by lord Minto and baron Thugut at Vienna, June 20 (1800), Great Britain was indeed restrained, for the space of one year, reckoning from the 1st of March preceding, from



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making a separate peace, or negotiating but in concert with the emperor; yet, so soon as the 28th of July following, the imperial minister at Paris, count St. Julien, actually signed preliminary articles of pacification with the French government; which were not ratified, or carried into effect, because they were objected to by the British ambassador at Vienna as contrary to the subsisting convention between the two courts. Had Austria at that time, therefore, been released from her engagements, conformably to the dictates of sound and obvious policy, Great Britain might assuredly have entered into a separate negotiation with France in perfect consistency with the faith pledged to the emperor. And it was moreover not correctly stated that France would enter *only* into a separate negotiation; for an option was repeatedly and explicitly offered by the French government, either to treat jointly with Great Britain and Austria, upon the footing of an equivalent for the advantage arising to the allied powers from such joint negotiation, which included a prolongation of the continental armistice; or to treat separately with each, upon terms of reciprocal and perfect equality; both these alternatives being, after much loss of time, in very critical circumstances, haughtily refused by the minister, lord Grenville.

In the house of lords the address was moved in the usual style by the duke of Somerset. An

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amendment was proposed by lord Holland, containing the following expressions: " We should receive with peculiar satisfaction any proof of his majesty's anxiety to restore the blessings of peace to these kingdoms; but we cannot conceal from ourselves, nor will we, by any ill-timed flattery, dissemble from his majesty, that a total change of councils appears to us necessary for the accomplishment of that desirable end, and the re-establishment of peace on any sure or solid foundation:" but this was over-ruled by a vast majority.

In the house of commons a similar address was moved by sir John Wrottesley; and, in the course of the debate which took place, Mr. Pitt hazarded the very extraordinary assertion, that the war was no cause of the scarcity, nor had any evident or necessary connexion with it. He even declared that nothing could be more atrocious than to inculcate so false and dangerous a doctrine. This position was combated with animation and ability. It was by no one, indeed, maintained that the war was the sole or even the principal cause of the scarcity; but it was clear, to every person of common sense and common observation, that it was a powerful concurrent cause. The extreme unfavorableness of the seasons undoubtedly laid the foundation of the present excessive dearness of provisions; but the weight of taxes, the depreciation of money

Debate on  
the address.

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occasioned by the prodigious influx of paper, and the consumption and waste necessarily incident to a war of such extent and magnitude, were grand assisting causes. The imprudence of government, moreover, as it was remarked, contributed to the same eventual result. In the year 1795, during the former scarcity, factors and agents were employed, on the part and upon the account of government, to import corn from abroad; by which means the course of commerce was interrupted. The corn-merchants who embarked in the trade, expecting no such competition, were extremely injured by their speculations; and, though the present dearth had been long foreseen, they would not again engage in a branch of commerce attended with such extraordinary risk and hazard; and, in consequence, the importation of corn had been hitherto wholly disproportionate to the urgency of the occasion.

Mr. Grey at length moved an amendment to that part of the address relative to the question of peace or war, and expressive of approbation relative to the recent conduct of ministers, which was negatived without a division.

Measures  
adopted to  
relieve the  
public di-  
stress.

No time was lost by the legislature in endeavouring to provide remedies for the public distress. A select committee was appointed in each house to inquire into the causes of the high price of provisions. The house of commons

voted large bounties on the importation of different kinds of grain\*. The use of grain in the distillation of spirits was prohibited; also the exportation of rice and other articles of sustenance. A bill was passed permitting the importation of Swedish herrings, &c. duty free; also for allowing the use of salt, duty free, for preserving herrings, pilchards, and other fish, in bulk. Another bill was passed, of a very doubtful nature, prohibiting the manufacture of flour or meal from wheat, or any other grain, finer than a specified standard; for, if the whole of the edible product of the grain is converted into bread, it seems wholly unimportant in what proportion of fineness it may be consumed by different persons. And, in fact, these bills, however well intended, or however in appearance calculated to alleviate the evil, produced no visible effect. The distress of the lower orders of the people, on the contrary, rose gradually to a height unexampled for centuries. The

\* The policy of these bounties seems extremely problematic. What was chiefly wanting was, a full assurance that government would not, as before, intermeddle with this branch of commerce, and become the competitors of the corn-factors. The enormous price which grain of all sorts bore in the English market, was bounty sufficient. And it is a fact well ascertained, that the price of corn in the foreign marts rose in a determinate *ratio* to the amount of the parliamentary bounties.



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Maximum  
proposed  
and reject-  
ed.

families of the greater part of the laboring poor were maintained, at an immense expense, from the parish rates, which amounted in many places to fifteen or twenty shillings in the pound; and in some the parochial assessments far exceeded the aggregate of the rental.

The bold measure of a MAXIMUM was (December 5) brought forward in the house of peers by the earl of Warwick, as the only effectual remedy for the existing scarcity, which his lordship affirmed to be in a great measure artificial; and he proposed to fix the highest value of wheat at ten shillings per bushel, although the actual price was more than twenty. But the false and dangerous notion of an artificial scarcity was exploded by the calm wisdom of that assembly; and the motion itself was rejected with marked disapprobation. That a comparatively small number of farmers, who had been peculiarly fortunate amid the general failure of crops, were growing suddenly rich, could not be denied; but, to the great majority of agriculturists, the high price was a very inadequate compensation for the deficiency of the produce; and, in many parts of the kingdom, the land yielded little more than was again required for seed.

Bill for as-  
certaining  
the national  
population.

Among other causes of dearth, the great increase of the national population was repeatedly mentioned; and in the course of the session a bill was brought in by Mr. Abbot for ascertain-

ing the population of England and Wales, which passed through its several stages into a law : and upon an actual subsequent enumeration, it appeared, to the general surprise, that the amount was little, if at all, short of ten millions—a result exceeding the highest previous conjecture. And it is probably not too much to estimate the aggregate of the population of the two islands at sixteen millions.

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On the 18th of November Mr. Tyrwhit Jones moved for a copy of the letter alluded to in general Kleber's letter to the kaimakan of the Sublime Porte. And he desired to be informed whether sir Sydney Smith was not joint plenipotentiary of Great Britain with his brother Mr. Spencer Smith? whether he had not power to treat at Acre? and whether lord Elgin had not since expressly instructed sir Sydney Smith to remove the French out of Egypt by all possible means? Finally, he asked whether the letter of lord Keith, now moved for, was not the cause of preventing the evacuation of the country by the enemy, and of the eventual defeat and destruction of the Turkish army?

Motion respecting  
Egypt.

Mr. Pitt, in reply, said, that, before the order to lord Keith went out, there was no supposition that sir Sydney Smith was then in Egypt; nor that he would be a party to the treaty between the Ottoman Porte and the French gene-

BOOK XXXV. 1800. ral. He had no such power from his situation, for he was not commander-in-chief. But as soon as it was known in England that the French general had the faith of a British officer pledged to him, and was disposed to act upon it, instructions were sent out to have the convention executed, though the officer in question had in fact no authority to sign it.

The motion, modified in point of form, and changed into an address to his majesty for copies of all letters sent from the commander-in-chief of the fleet in the Mediterranean to general Kleber, being put, was rejected by a great majority; as was also a similar motion in the house of peers by lord Holland. And indeed it sufficiently appeared that the government had acted with honor on this occasion, and a due regard to the public faith, however deficient ministers might have shown themselves in point of political prudence and penetration.

Mr. Sheridan's motion respecting peace.

On the 1st of December Mr. Sheridan moved an address to the throne, assuring his majesty “ that the house had taken into their most serious consideration the papers relative to the negotiation for peace with France; and that the result of their reflexions on that important subject, founded as well on due examination of the documents now referred to them, as on experience of the past conduct of most of his majesty’s allies,

was a humble but earnest desire that his majesty would omit no proper opportunity which might arise, consistently with the good faith ever preserved on the part of his majesty, of entering into a separate negotiation with the government of France for a speedy and honorable peace; and further, to implore his majesty not to sanction any new engagements which should preclude such a mode of negotiation.”

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The object of this address, though every day's experience showed more clearly that it was the only practicable mode of obtaining peace, was exclaimed against by Mr. Windham, as so extravagant, and even ridiculous, that it wholly precluded the necessity of any observation. He warned the house against listening to the counsels of those who wanted to make a peace of pure love with a jacobin republic, and to take from them the fraternal embrace; and he prayed God to avert such a peace from this country.

Mr. Grey, in a very able speech, acknowledged there were so many objections to the principle of a naval armistice, that ministers were justified in refusing to accede to it; although—admitting the principle—the terms proposed by the French did not seem unreasonable. But, though the proposition of joint negotiation was involved in so many difficulties, the enemy offered us an opportunity of treating se-



BOOK XXXV. 1800. parately for peace. The precise point here was, whether, knowing as we did the disposition of our allies on former occasions, and particularly the general conduct of Austria in the present war, ministers were entitled to sacrifice the peace of the country to the prospect of any advantages to be derived from joint negotiation. The interests to be attended to were so discordant; the compensations to be made were so much the subject of jealousy; and the propensity to opposition was encouraged by so many circumstances; that it was no wonder to perceive joint negotiations so seldom attended with cordiality, or followed up with success. And, upon considering the present case in all its bearings and relations, he thought ministers highly culpable in refusing to treat separately for peace. Their incapacity and want of foresight being evident in the whole transaction, he would give his cordial support to a motion, the adoption of which tended to disentangle the nation from its present embarrassments.

Mr. Dundas, on the other hand, declared "that it would have been very unwise, engaged as we were in an arduous contest with such an enemy as France, to separate ourselves from such an ally as Austria." And he reminded the house, that, by an established maxim of our constitution, in all questions of peace or war the de-

cision belonged to the king, and that it was not the province of that house to interfere, unless on very great and important occasions; and such occasions could scarcely occur, except where the interposition of the house ought to be accompanied with an advice to his majesty to choose new counsellors. On a division, there appeared for the motion 35—against it 156 voices.

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In this, which, though short, was an integral session, estimates were presented to the house respecting the different branches of the public service, and supplies voted for three lunar months. The army and navy sedition bill was prolonged till the 1st of April, 1801. The suspension of the Habeas-Corpus act was continued for six weeks from the 1st of February, 1801; and the alien bill (passed in 1793) until the period of six months after a peace. On the last day of the year, the king, after giving the royal sanction to the bills presented to him, closed the session of parliament with great acknowledgements to both houses, for the distinguished industry and zeal with which they had applied themselves to the relief of the public distress: and observing that the time fixed for the commencement of the union between Great Britain and Ireland necessarily terminated their proceedings on that important subject, he expressed his persuasion that the consideration of

Supplies  
voted for  
three  
months.

BOOK it would be resumed with the same zeal and  
 XXXV. temper on the first meeting of the parliament of  
 1800. the united kingdom.

The detention of the property of his subjects in Russia, contrary to the most solemn treaties, and the imprisonment of British sailors in that country, had excited in him sentiments in which he was sure that the parliament and all his subjects would participate. He had already taken such steps as that occasion indispensably required.

Arrange-  
 ments rela-  
 tive to the  
 union.

His majesty, before he retired, ordered the chancellor to read a proclamation, declaring that the individuals who composed the expiring parliament should be the members on the part of Britain of the parliament of the united kingdom. A grand council was held on the same day, in which the requisite regulations were settled: and on the 1st of January (1801) a royal declaration was issued concerning the style and titles appertaining to the imperial crown of Great Britain and Ireland; and also the ensigns armorial, flags and banners thereof. In the new heraldic arrangement, the *fleurs de lis*, so long idly retained, were wisely and seasonably omitted; and the royal dignity was in future to be expressed in the Latin tongue by these words: *GEORGIUS TERTIUS, Dei Gratia, Britanniarum Rex, Fidei Defensor*—and in the vernacular lan-

guage **GEORGE** the **THIRD**, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland King, Defender of the Faith. BOOK  
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The great seal of Britain was delivered up and defaced, and a new seal for the empire was given to the chancellor. A new standard also, combining the three crosses of St. George, St. Andrew, and St. Patrick, was hoisted amid the discharge of artillery in each of the three capitals of England, Scotland, and Ireland. In honor of the **UNION**, many promotions were likewise made, and many titles conferred; and the new century, thus rendered peculiarly memorable from the auspicious event which took place at its commencement, was ushered in with every demonstration of joy.

The **IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT** assembled for the first time on the 22d of January (1801). It was opened by commission, and the lord chancellor signified the pleasure of his majesty that the house of commons should proceed to the election of a speaker; and Mr. Addington, the former speaker, was re-chosen with perfect unanimity and the highest marks of approbation. On the 2d of February the king came in person to the house of peers, and delivered a speech in the usual form. His majesty declared the great satisfaction he felt in being enabled, for the first time, to avail himself, at a crisis so important to

First session of the  
**IMPERIAL**  
**PARLIAMENT.**



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the interests of his people, of the advice and assistance of the parliament of his united kingdom. He expressed his confident hope that this memorable æra, distinguished by the accomplishment of a measure calculated to augment and consolidate the strength and resources of the empire, and to cement more closely the interests and affections of his subjects, would be equally marked by that vigor, energy, and firmness, which the circumstances of our present situation peculiarly required. "The unfortunate course of events on the continent," said his majesty, "and the consequences which must be expected to result from it, cannot fail to be matter of anxiety and concern to all who have a just feeling for the security and independence of Europe.

"Your astonishment, as well as your regret, must be excited by the conduct of those powers, whose attention at such a period appears to be more engaged in endeavouring to weaken the naval force of the British empire, which has hitherto opposed so powerful an obstacle to the inordinate ambition of France, than in concerting the means of mutual defence against their common and increasing danger. The representations which I directed to be made to the court of Petersburg, in consequence of the outrages committed against the ships, property, and per-

sons, of my subjects, have been treated with the utmost disrespect; and the proceedings of which I complained, have been aggravated by subsequent acts of injustice and violence. Under these circumstances, a convention has been concluded by that court with those of Copenhagen and Stockholm, the object of which—as avowed by one of the contracting parties—is to renew their former engagements for establishing, by force, a new code of maritime law inconsistent with the rights and hostile to the interests of this country.

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“In this situation, I could not hesitate as to the conduct which it became me to pursue. I have taken the earliest measures to repel the aggressions of this hostile confederacy, and to support those principles which are essential to the maintenance of our naval strength, and which are grounded on the system of public law so long established and recognised in Europe.”—Towards the conclusion of this speech his majesty was pleased to say, “You may rely on my availing myself of the earliest opportunity which shall afford a prospect of terminating the present contest on grounds consistent with our security and honor, and with the maintenance of those essential rights on which our naval strength must always depend.”

Upon the whole, from the tenor of this speech,

BOOK it appeared very evident that the daring and  
XXXV. desperate spirit of the present administration  
1801. would not hesitate to involve the kingdom—already at war with France, Spain, and Holland—in open hostilities with the powers of the North, rather than bend in the least degree to the pressure of circumstances, or relax an iota from the rigid enforcement of their most obnoxious claims in relation to ships navigating under the flag of neutral nations. Never did public affairs wear a more gloomy and menacing aspect than at the present moment; and never did the power of the existing administration, in the view of the world, which saw no end to its miseries, appear to rest upon a firmer basis.

The address in the house of peers was moved by the duke of Montrose, and opposed by lord Fitzwilliam. This truly respectable nobleman acknowledged frankly the complete disappointment of his hopes. No one had more deeply felt the consequences of that spirit of anarchy which had broken out in France, or had more earnestly deprecated the destruction to which it led. The people of France had been called on to rally round the standard of their ancient monarchy; but he now perceived that the cause was hopeless: it no longer depended on the power and energies of this nation to withstand the organisation of the new order of things in

that country. The die was cast—we must sub-  
mit. But he could not think it possible for that <sup>BOOK XXXV.</sup>  
house, consistently with their duty, to omit an <sup>1801.</sup>  
inquiry into the causes of the failure of our  
efforts, when such large and almost unbounded  
powers had been intrusted to ministers, and  
when they had all Europe in friendship with  
them in the common cause; and why, instead of  
succeeding in this great object, they had all at  
once plunged us into a contest with our own  
allies. We had it in our power to suspend the  
discussion of the neutral code. It was actually  
suspended without any evil consequences in  
1780, when this country was in a situation of less  
difficulty than at present. But, by litigating  
this question, we had consolidated the power of  
Sweden and Denmark with that of Russia. If it  
was unjust in the emperor Paul to detain our ships  
and property, it was equally unjust in us to seize  
and detain the ships and property of Sweden  
and Denmark. It had not been deemed neces-  
sary to go to war with them for the neutral  
code in the year 1780, and we had suffered  
nothing from our moderation. His lordship af-  
firmed it to be incumbent upon that house, before  
they granted to ministers that new confidence  
and new support which were now demanded, to  
examine their past conduct, and to ascertain  
precisely in what manner they had used the ex-



BOOK XXXV. 1801. extraordinary powers with which they had been intrusted. The encroachments made on the property and freedom of the subject had been unexampled: yet what had been achieved by ministers? Every expedition they had undertaken had been attended with discomfiture—with imbecility in the contrivance, or culpable delay in the execution." His lordship concluded by moving an amendment to the address, declaring, "that the house would proceed with all possible dispatch to make such inquiries into the state of the nation, into the conduct of the war, and into our relations with foreign powers, as shall enable them to offer to his majesty such advice as may be conducive to the honor of his crown, and the general interests of his people," &c.

Debates on  
the ad-  
dress.

A very animated debate ensued, in which the lords Suffolk, Darnley, Carnarvon, Moira, Holland, and Fife, spoke in favor of the amendment. The latter, a nobleman venerable for his years and still more for his virtues, declared, "that, whether the war was in its origin just or unjust, it appeared too certain that none was ever worse conducted." His lordship said, "he had seen and been intimate with all the different parties from the death of Mr. Pelham to the present hour. But in this horrid war had he first witnessed the blood and treasure of the nation ex-

pended in the extravagant folly of secret expeditions which had invariably proved either abortive or unsuccessful. Grievous and heavy taxes had been laid on the people, and wasted in expensive embassies and in subsidising proud, treacherous, and useless foreign princes, who would have acted much better for themselves had we saved our money and taken no concern with them. I do not condole with you," said the noble lord, "on your present unfortunate situation in having no friends: I only wish you had been in that situation from the beginning of the war. What have we gained by our boasted conquests? If a proper regulation for commerce were made, I wish they were all sold, and the money arising laid out to pay the national debt, and to relieve the country from those oppressive taxes which bear hard both on the rich and poor—on their income, their industry, and, what is worse, their liberty."

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The cause of administration was supported by the lords Romney, Mulgrave, Grenville, and others. Earl Spencer, one of those ardent and zealous alarmists who at different times exhibited symptoms of the most frantic fears and the most chimerical hopes, contended, that an inquiry, during the present war, would infallibly weaken our exertions and impede our success. Not that he meant to imply any doubt

BOOK XXXV. but that, whenever an inquiry should be made, it would redound to the honor of ministers, 1801. as well as of the troops and officers employed: but this was not a period for investigation, but action. As to the new contest, it was not *possible* to avoid it; and we retained strength and ability enough to conduct it to a happy issue. On a division of the house, the amendment was rejected by 73 against 17 peers.

In the house of commons a precisely similar amendment, moved by Mr. Grey, was negatived by a majority of 245 to 63 voices.

Dissensions  
in the ca-  
binet.

For some weeks past rumors had been extremely prevalent, of a difference of opinion upon some essential points between the monarch and his ministers. It was even reported that the king disapproved of the late violent measures—that he was earnest for peace—and that the marquis of Lansdowne was destined once again to take the lead in affairs, and to rescue these kingdoms a second time from the mischiefs and horrors of war. But it was soon ascertained that the quarrel was of a totally different nature.

The union of the two islands was, with reason, regarded by Mr. Pitt as the transaction which reflected the greatest lustre upon his administration; and although he had uniformly and firmly opposed the claim of catholic emancipa-

tion during the existence of the separate legislature of Ireland, he thought fit, in order to facilitate the accomplishment of this favorite object, to give, in concurrence with his colleagues, to the principal Irish catholics, in return for their assistance, or at least their acquiescence, secret assurances of a complete participation in all political privileges so soon as the union should have taken place; and this, without being properly authorised so to do by the sovereign, upon whose will this great concession must ultimately depend. When this proposition therefore was stated in the cabinet-council, the king, astonished and alarmed at the nature and extent of the claim, in very peremptory terms refused his assent to its being brought forward by ministers in parliament. He was even, by some strange sophistry, made to believe that this assent could not be given in consistency with the oath which he had taken at his coronation; although no opinion could be more void of any just foundation. By the first clause of the oath, his majesty bound himself "to govern the people according to the statutes in parliament agreed on, and the laws and customs of the realm;" which words could not be intended to preclude any subsequent modification or alteration authorised by the legislature. In the next clause, he swore "to maintain the protestant reformed



BOOK religion as established by law ;"—that is, accord-  
 XXXV. ing to the construction of common sense, that  
 1801. religion as it is or may be modified by the legis-  
 lative power of parliament. For any person to  
 insist that the form of the oath restrained his  
 majesty, in a legal sense, from concurring with  
 both houses of parliament in any legislative act,  
 might even appear an assertion very nearly al-  
 lied to treason. If it was lawful, both in a civil  
 and religious sense, for his majesty to assent to  
 the repeal of the far greater part of the penal  
 laws and disabilities of the Irish code in 1778,  
 1782, and 1793, what could make it now un-  
 lawful for him to assent to the repeal of that  
 comparatively small portion of them which still  
 remained in force? The mind of the king  
 was, however, by some means not accounted for,  
 deeply impressed with this idea; and the cabinet  
 ministers, with the chancellor of the exchequer  
 at their head, being resolved to carry their point,  
 resorted in this emergency to an expedient which  
 Mr. Pitt had, as there is reason to believe, found  
 effectual on former occasions, viz. *an offer of*  
 RESIGNATION;—supposing, doubtless, that no other  
 administration could be formed without having  
 recourse to the determined opposers of the war,  
 and that the king must ultimately submit. But  
 it unexpectedly happened that his majesty, after  
 consulting with his secret advisers (who were

believed to be the earls of Liverpool and Clare), BOOK XXXV. resolved to run all risks, and to accept the re-  
 signation thus tendered to him. The monarch, 1801. Total change of administration. even appeared to exult in the resolution he had taken. The arrogance of Mr. Pitt had been long the subject of his complaint, and he highly resented the rudeness with which, on this as on former occasions, obnoxious measures had been urged and forced upon him; and, according to current report, he repeatedly declared his satisfaction that Mr. Pitt was at length UNCROWNED.

But the grand difficulty was to establish a new administration, which should have sufficient influence to support the old system, any change in which does not appear to have been for a moment in the royal contemplation. After much consultation, the pre-eminent offices of first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer were conferred upon the speaker of the house of commons, Mr. Addington, who had acquired the high esteem of all parties by the candor and impartiality of his conduct in that distinguished station, but who, in the capacity of a statesman, was altogether untried and unknown. The post next in dignity, and which requires beyond all others knowledge, sagacity, and talents—that of secretary for foreign affairs—was given to lord Hawkesbury, son of that ancient, trusty, and well-beloved counsellor of the king, Charles Jen-

BOOK XXXV.  
 1801. kinson, earl of Liverpool, and as a politician famous chiefly from his notable project for terminating the war in one campaign by marching straight to Paris. The earl of St. Vincent, a seaman of the highest professional merit, was placed at the head of the admiralty. Lord Eldon, chief-justice of the common-pleas (formerly sir John Scott), succeeded lord Loughborough in the court of chancery. The lords Hobart and Pelham were nominated secretaries of state, in the room of Mr. Dundas and the duke of Portland. Mr. Yorke succeeded to Mr. Windham, as secretary at war. His brother, the earl of Hardwicke, was destined to the government of Ireland. Lord Lewisham was placed at the head of the board of control. Lord Auckland obtained the lucrative sinecure of post-master. The duke of Portland and lord Westmoreland only retained their stations in the cabinet—the first as president of the council, the second as lord privy seal \*. A more entire

\*The promotions of lord St. Vincent and lord Hawkesbury appeared in the Gazette February the 20th and 21st; those of Mr. Addington, lord Hardwicke, lord Hobart, and Mr. Yorke, March the 17th; of lord Auckland, the 19th; lord Eldon, April 4th; lord Loughborough (created earl of Roslyn), April 18th, and lord Lewisham, the 25th; Mr. Pelham (created lord Pelham), July the 30th.—Duke of Portland declared, on the same day, lord president.

change of administration has seldom been known, and it seemed upon the whole to diffuse great joy throughout the kingdom: not that the new arrangement was perfectly approved by perhaps a single individual, but that every one was weary of the last arrogant and loquacious set of ministers, whose magnificent boasts and pompous professions had invariably been followed by disappointment, disaster, and disgrace, in whatever related to the avowed objects of the war; though it had undoubtedly been attended with those successes, which, had the purpose of it been rational, and the conduct of the executive government able, must have long since ensured its accomplishment. Never was such confidence placed by the parliament, or the nation, in any ministers—never had the army or the navy exerted themselves with more zeal and bravery; yet were not the ends, for the attainment of which this confidence was given, and these exertions made, in any one instance fulfilled\*.

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\* A celebrated wit, who had but too frequently and too justly offended while he diverted the public by the licentiousness of his effusions, thus, in happy satiric strains, commemorates the FALL of Mr. Pitt:—

“ ——— Procumbit humi bos.”—VIRGIL.

“ Tossing poor Englishmen in scorn,

“ The BULL no more exalts his horn—



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Sir John  
Mitford  
chosen  
speaker.

On the 10th of February, 1801, Mr. Addington addressed a letter to the house of commons, signifying his resignation of the office of speaker, in consequence of his majesty's declared intention of appointing him to a public station incompatible with it; and expressive of the highest respect and gratitude to the house for the favor and indulgence which he had experienced in the exercise of his functions. On the next day sir John Mitford was chosen speaker in the room of Mr. Addington, to whom a vote of thanks unanimously passed in the most flattering terms of esteem and regard.

“Thank God! the beast is put at last to pound;  
 “And that he never may get out,  
 “To make another cursed rout,  
 “Forms many a hearty wish, and prayer profound.

“What! is there not one song of sorrow—  
 “One tear of pity?—Let me say,  
 “There's neither dirge nor tear to-day,  
 “Whatever there may be to-morrow:  
 “Nay, cannons roar applause, and bells are ringing,  
 “And EARTH, rejoicing, breaketh forth in singing.

“See the stern shade of CHATHAM rise!  
 “On *thee* he darts his eagle eyes:  
 “‘Fool!’ cries the angry, disappointed ghost,  
 “Was it for this I show'd thy youth  
 “The paths of glory, and fair truth?  
 “Lo! by thy flagrant folly—ALL IS LOST!”

P. PINDAR.

Although the new arrangements were nearly completed, they were not formally announced. BOOK XXXV.  
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The agitation of the king's mind had so materially affected the state both of his health and intellects, as to occasion a total interruption of the regal functions; and during this indisposition the former ministers continued to discharge the duties of their respective offices.

In this interval, a very extraordinary paper was transmitted by Mr. Pitt to the marquis Cornwallis, lord-lieutenant of Ireland, and by that nobleman allowed to be circulated among the Roman-catholic nobility and gentry, as a part of an official or demi-official communication from the English minister. It is as follows:—"The leading part of his majesty's ministers finding insurmountable obstacles to the bringing forward measures of concession to the catholic body while in office, have felt it impossible to continue in administration under their inability to propose it with the circumstances necessary to carry the measure with all its advantages: and they have retired from his majesty's service, considering this line of conduct as most likely to contribute to its ultimate success. The catholic body will therefore see how much their future hope must depend upon their strengthening their cause by good conduct in the mean time. They will prudently consider

Extraordinary declaration of Mr. Pitt.

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1801. their prospects as arising from the persons who now espouse their interests, and compare them with those which they could look to from any other quarter. They may, with confidence, rely on the zealous support of all those who retire, and of many who remain in office, when it can be given with a prospect of success. They may be assured that MR. PITT will do his utmost to establish their cause in the public favor, and prepare the way for their finally attaining their objects. And the catholics will feel, that as Mr. Pitt could not concur in a hopeless attempt to force it now, he must at all times repress, with the same decision as if he held an adverse opinion, any unconstitutional conduct in the catholic body.

“Under these circumstances, it cannot be doubted that the catholics will take the most loyal, dutiful, and patient line of conduct; that they will not suffer themselves to be led into measures which can, by any construction, give a handle to the opposers of their wishes, either to misrepresent their principles, or to raise an argument for resisting their claims on proper occasions, until their object can be finally and advantageously attained.”

This paper was regarded, by very many persons by no means inimical to the measure of catholic emancipation, as highly indecorous,

not to say unconstitutional. "What," it was said, "must be the feelings of the king, when he found himself held up to the Irish catholics, by the minister whom he had so long honored with his confidence, as the principal enemy of their claims, and who directed their hopes from the crown, the source of grace and favor, to those who were now no more than private individuals? This paper, in fact, solicited the suffrages and support of the Irish catholics for Mr. Pitt and his friends, as those alone who could make their cause ultimately successful. It was not from the benignity of the king, the wisdom of parliament, or from the candor and justice of the people of England, that the Irish catholics had any thing to hope—but from the re-elevation of Mr. Pitt and his party to power." Such were the remarks naturally excited, and very generally circulated, in consequence of this extremely exceptionable declaration\*.

\* The strong attachment of Mr. Pitt to power and office, was so well known, that the utmost astonishment prevailed at his sudden resignation, which can by no means be accounted for but by the supposition that he never expected or intended that it should be accepted. Some curious speculatists refined so far on the occasion as to imagine, that the ostensible differed entirely from the real cause of this event; and that, despairing of an honorable termination of the war, he voluntarily seceded, in order to give his friend Mr. Addington an opportunity of negotiating a peace; and with



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Motion for  
an inquiry  
into the  
state of the  
nation.

On the very same day that Mr. Addington had by letter resigned his office of speaker, the earl of Darnley moved for an inquiry into the

the view of *resuming* his situation, which the new minister was disposed, according to this *fine* hypothesis, complaisantly to relinquish to him on the accomplishment of that great *desideratum*. It is surely superfluous to enter into a serious confutation of an opinion unsupported by any evidence, and diametrically opposite to all known facts, and all previous probabilities—not to mention positive declarations.

“If merely to come in, he thus went out,

“The way he took was strangely round-about.” POPE.

A short time before the resignations in question were determined upon, the following dialogue *is said* to have passed between the king and Mr. Dundas, occasioned by certain unwelcome suggestions from the minister to the monarch:—

K. “I hope I am not pledged to any thing further in favor of the Romanists?”

Mr. D. “Your majesty is not absolutely *pledged* to any thing further; but certainly the Irish catholics do hope, from your majesty’s goodness, for a further relaxation of the restraining laws yet in force; and your majesty’s servants will think it right, humbly to recommend to your majesty a liberal and indulgent attention to their united and dutiful petitions.”

K. “But how can I grant these claims, consistently with my coronation-oath?”

Mr. D. “The coronation-oath was taken by your majesty in your executive, not your legislative capacity; and could only be meant to bind your majesty to act conformably to the laws actually subsisting, and so long only as

state of the nation. On this occasion lord <sup>BOOK</sup> Grenville acquainted the house, that his majesty's <sup>XXXV.</sup> servants, not being able to carry into effect a <sup>1801.</sup>

“ they should continue to subsist; for the legislature, of  
“ which your majesty is an essential part, cannot by any  
“ act limit its own power.”

K. (*angrily*). “ None of your Scotch metaphysics, Mr.  
“ Dundas!”

In the month of September, 1801, Mr. \* \* \*, a gentleman of great eminence in the political and literary world, being on a visit at the beautiful seat of Mr. Dundas, in the Highlands, the ex-minister talked much, in his usual and characteristic strain of good-humor and urbanity, on the subject of politics. Among other things he observed, “ How great was the uncertainty of history, and how often the truth was missed by carrying refinement too far! For instance,” he said, “ future historians would never believe the resignation of himself and his colleagues to have been occasioned solely by the misunderstanding which had taken place in the cabinet relative to the question of catholic emancipation, which was, however, a most indisputable fact; but would suspect and suppose some deep mystery and secret collusion, arising from causes totally foreign and remote from such as had really occurred.” It is probable, however, that there will be no difference of opinion among future historians, as to the causes of this resignation, which, after all, are of very subordinate moment in the scale of general history; the grand lessons deducible from which, have very little connexion with matters of this description, belonging rather, indeed, to the memoirs of a court than to the annals of a nation, and serving chiefly for the gratification of historical curiosity. Those events are invariably most important which are from their nature most certain and most public.

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measure which they deemed essential to the tranquillity and prosperity of the empire, had tendered to his majesty the resignation of their several employments, and he was graciously pleased to dispense with their services. The period, his lordship observed, during which he and his colleagues had been in office, had been critical beyond example, and the country had been threatened with dangers greater than any to which it had ever before been exposed. The CONSTITUTION, however, was still ENTIRE: and it was his consolation, as well as that of all his colleagues, to reflect how much their services had contributed to the escape which this country had made from the evils which threatened it.

In consequence of the present unsettled state of things, lord Darnley consented to postpone his motion to the 20th of March; on which day the earl of Radnor moved that the house should be called over; but this was rejected, after a warm debate, by a majority of fifty-four to twenty-three peers.

The house of commons having resolved itself into a committee of ways and means, on the 18th of February Mr. Pitt appeared for the last time in the character of chancellor of the exchequer. One hundred and thirty-five thousand seamen, including 30,000 marines, had already been voted for the service of the year; also,

of regular land forces, cavalry and infantry, 193,187 men. The number of militia, including fencibles, but exclusive of the numerous volunteer corps of Great Britain and Ireland, amounted to 109,461. And the aggregate of sea and land force maintained by the public, appeared to be no less than 437,648 men, without including the Indian or colonial establishments, which must raise the whole number to considerably more than half a million. For the support of this mighty force, and other contingencies, the sum of 42,197,000*l.* was stated to be wanting; of which the proportion to be defrayed by Great Britain amounted to 37,870,000*l.*; of this, about 12 millions and a half were provided for in different modes. The annual taxes were, as usual, stated at 2,750,000*l.*—the duty on exports and imports, 1,250,000*l.*—surplus of the consolidated fund, 3,300,000*l.*—produce of the income-tax (interest, &c. deducted), 4,260,000*l.*\*—sums not issued for subsidies, &c., 560,000*l.*—lottery, 300,000*l.* To make up the deficiency, Mr. Pitt proposed a loan of 25,500,000*l.*, to be funded in the old mode;—the whole of the interest to be charged upon new and perpetual taxes, to the amount of about 1,800,000*l.*; for the

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Loan for  
25,500,000*l.*

\* It was subsequently stated by Mr. Addington at four millions, being six millions short of the original estimate.



**BOOK** income-tax was now sunk so low as to make  
**XXXV.** it impracticable to mortgage it further, with-  
 1801. out absorbing almost the whole of its pro-  
 duce. So that Mr. Pitt continued just long  
 enough in office to announce with his own  
 mouth the final extinction of his "solid system  
 of finance." The terms of the loan were, to grant  
 175*l.* stock, 3 per cent., for every hundred pounds  
 paid into the exchequer.

State of  
 the Irish  
 finances.

Mr. Corry, chancellor of the Irish exchequer,  
 stated the present debt of Ireland to amount  
 to thirty-six millions; more than thirty of which  
 had been contracted since the commencement of  
 the war. This debt bore an interest of 1,696,000*l.*;  
 above one million of which was remitted to En-  
 gland; and a sinking fund, upon the same prin-  
 ciple as that of England, was established for the  
 liquidation of the capital. The supplies neces-  
 sary for the current year would be something  
 more than seven millions; of which he proposed  
 to borrow the sum of 2,500,000*l.* This was in-  
 corporated with the English loan, though charged  
 to the separate account of Ireland.

Martial  
 law con-  
 tinued in  
 Ireland.

On the motion of lord Castlereagh, the act for  
 establishing martial law in Ireland was continued  
 for three months—the lord-lieutenant being, agree-  
 ably to the provisions of it, empowered to declare  
 any counties, baronies, &c., out of the king's  
 peace at his discretion. This dangerous exten-

sion of authority was strongly objected to, and opposed: but, according to the eloquent and affecting representations of a great majority of the Irish members in both houses, it appeared to be but too necessary; and it was still further prolonged before the close of the present session.

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The routine of parliamentary business went on as usual during the illness of the king; but his majesty having now happily recovered, the appointments of the new ministers were announced in the accustomed and regular form; and on the 17th of March Mr. Addington was sworn into his high office as first lord of the treasury with the chancellorship of the exchequer annexed; and Mr. Pitt was divested of that power which he had exercised, in times the most eventful and important, for the long period of seventeen years; during which the character of this minister was as fully developed, as clearly discriminated, and as strongly marked, as that of any statesman who ever directed the councils of Britain. His early declaration, on the removal of lord North, and the advancement of lord Rockingham to the station of first minister, "that he would not accept of any subordinate situation," exhibited at once the extent and the irregularity of his ambition. In proportion as his pretensions were high, his manners were haughty. Instead of the generous feelings and noble enthusiasm of his fa-

Character  
of Mr. Pitt.

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ther, he discovered a disposition selfish, cold, and artful; and it was quickly seen that he possessed no quality of youth but its presumption. In his conduct there was never found that fearless simplicity, that dignified candor, which are the genuine offspring of an elevated mind, and the true criterion of real wisdom. At no time did he display that commanding foresight which marks a superior intellect, or that controlling prudence which knows how to avert impending mischief. At no season did he endeavour to stem the torrent of public prejudice, or to make the people calm and wise when they were inflamed and ignorant. The stream of public opinion he submitted diligently to watch; and suffered himself rather to be carried away with it, than to aim by arduous efforts to direct its course where wisdom or patriotism might suggest. The mind of the nation, under his auspices, made no advances: on the contrary, its movement was uniformly retrograde. The errors of the public he labored to convert to his own advantage, not to correct at the hazard of his power. He was the attentive observer of times and seasons, not the beneficent and enlightened instructor of nations. His eloquence, for which he was deservedly celebrated, was chiefly characterised by what rhetoricians call *amplification*. He possessed in perfection all the modes and subtilties of reasoning, and was

copious, even to the brink of verbosity. He had the faculty of speaking much and saying little; and, when silence was impracticable, he knew how to make language subservient to all the purposes of taciturnity. His solemn avowals were clothed in impenetrable darkness; and his explanations were calculated equally to elude the vigilance of the watchful and the curiosity of the inquisitive. The connexion between the means and the end appeared seldom intimate in his thoughts, and was rarely either defined in his words or exemplified in his conduct. The plans, therefore, which he designed, although prosecuted with courage, constancy, and vigor, almost invariably failed in the execution. It is remarkable, that, during the seventeen years of his administration, no one act of patronage was extended to literature, to the sciences, or the arts.

That spirit of violence which had so long actuated the proceedings of the late administration, suffered no abatement to the very last moment of their political existence. On the 21st of January Mr. secretary Dundas, by letter, apprised the lords of the admiralty, “that it was his majesty’s pleasure to revoke the indulgence granted to the French fishermen; and that they and their boats should be henceforth subject to capture—advices having been received that these fishermen were under requisition, and that even

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Indulgence  
granted to  
the French  
fishermen  
revoked.



BOOK those who had been released from prison, in or-  
XXXV. der to be sent home, under the express condi-  
1801. tion of not serving again, were comprised in that requisition. It was his majesty's further pleasure, that all those set at liberty on their parole be required to return into this country; and that those among them who shall neglect to obey these orders, shall be made to suffer all the rigors of the laws of war, in case they should again be made prisoners while serving the enemies of his majesty." A copy of this letter was transmitted to M. Otto on the 29th of January; and he immediately apprised M. Talleyrand of this measure—the true motives of which he declared himself unable to conjecture—at the same time expressing his fears, that, from the intentional delay in the communication of the order, a great number of unfortunate persons must have fallen victims to it. M. Otto also addressed, upon this occasion, a most able reply to the English government, stating his "astonishment that mere apprehension and conjecture should have been made the ground of such a procedure, without any complaint, formally or previously offered, and much less any refusal of justice on the part of the French government. He deprecated the effect of a measure hostile to a peaceable class of people for the most part aged, invalids, or children,

who were consequently incapable of hurting the enemies of their country; and whose simplicity of manners and industrious habits could not give any umbrage. Those," he says, "who have submitted to the English government the reports on which its late determination is founded, cannot therefore have any other view than to add to the numerous subjects of irritation which a protracted war has produced between the two nations."—This act of provocation awakened the highest degree of resentment in the mind of the first consul; and instructions were forthwith transmitted to M. Otto, to declare to the British government, "that he could no longer remain in a country, where not only every disposition to peace is abjured, but where the laws and usages of war are disregarded and violated;—but that, the first desire of the French government having always been to soften, as much as possible, the horrors of war, that government cannot, on its part, think of making the poor fishermen victims to the prolongation of hostility: it will therefore abstain from all such reprisals; and, on the contrary, it has given orders for all French ships, armed for war or cruising, to leave the occupation of fishermen uninterrupted." Such and so striking was the contrast exhibited by the two governments!

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But the prudence of M. Otto foreseeing that an amelioration might take place in the English councils, in consequence of the changes in contemplation, he postponed his departure till the new ministers had taken upon them the actual management of public concerns: and a favorable omen of the better spirit which now predominated in the national councils very early appeared, in the notice transmitted to M. Otto on the 3d of March, of the suspension of the late order respecting the French fishermen; and, in the sequel, the dispute was happily and silently adjusted.

Embargo  
on all Rus-  
sian, Swe-  
dish, and  
Danish  
ships.

But a far more flagrant, though perhaps not in its tendency a more fatal, proof of the disposition of the late ministers to involve the nation, as it were, beyond all redemption, and to stake its very existence on the result of the quarrel, appeared in the order of council, dated the 14th of January, for laying an embargo on all Russian, Swedish, and Danish vessels in the British ports, of which several hundreds were actually seized and sequestered. So that, far from harboring any intention of resigning the government for the sake of effectuating the great object of peace, as some refining politicians dreamed, those daring and desperate ministers seemed rather inclined to extend and aggravate the horrors of

this odious war to the utmost of their power, in order, if possible, to deter and affrighten others from undertaking the future conduct of it.

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The letter of lord Grenville, addressed to the Danish and Swedish ambassadors, announcing this unexpected measure, at the same time asserted, that the object of the northern confederacy was to enforce a new and injurious code of public law against Great Britain, first introduced in the year 1780, and since completely given up. To which the minister of Denmark, count Wedel Jarlsberg, replied, "that the principles of the northern powers, respecting the sacred rights of neutrality, had never been abandoned:" and he formally protests against proceedings of so hostile a nature. He nevertheless, agreeably to the pacific and conciliatory policy of the Danish court, expressed his wishes "that he could still be the instrument of an explanation calculated to do away injurious doubts, and to prevent incalculable consequences to the interests of the reciprocal powers."

The answer of the Swedish minister, baron Von Ehrenswärd, was couched in much stronger and more indignant terms. He declares, "that so unexpected an event must be received with astonishment by his Swedish majesty, who is not only unconscious of having given his Britannic majesty the least cause of complaint, but, on the



BOOK XXXV. 1801. contrary, was entitled to have demanded indemnification for repeated aggressions. He protests against the procedure of the English court, which," he says, "can no otherwise be considered than as a designed and premeditated declaration of war on the part of England." He treats with contempt the amicable professions of the court of London, so inconsistent with the tenor of its actions; and refers to the former subsisting subjects of complaint respecting *first*, the detention of the convoy; and, *secondly*, the affair at Barcelona.

The allusion, in the former of these expressions, is to the famous case of the Swedish merchant-ship *Maria*, which was taken in the English Channel, sailing in company with other vessels under convoy of a Swedish frigate, having naval stores on board; and which was subsequently condemned, with the cargo, by a judgement of the high court of admiralty, pronounced June 11, 1799; but the legality of which had been uniformly and indignantly denied by the Swedish government.

Dreading the power of Prussia, to which the electoral dominions of the king would be, at any time, an easy prey; and hoping, against all probability, to detach that kingdom from the northern confederacy by an empty show of complaisance, the English ambassador at Berlin, lord

Carysfort, was directed by the British government to address a note to that court, January 27, containing grievous complaints of the recent renewal of the convention of 1780, and announcing the measure of the embargo, "as a pledge against the hostile attacks which were meditated against the rights of his Britannic majesty."—The ambassador expresses "the conviction of his sovereign, that he may implicitly rely on the friendship of his Prussian majesty." And he disclaims the supposition, that "his Prussian majesty has entered, or can enter, into the confederacy, to support by force principles in common with other powers whose hostile views against his Britannic majesty have been openly proved."—And in a second note or memorial, presented February 1, the ambassador informs the court of Berlin, "that the connexion between the extraordinary violence committed upon the person and property of his majesty's subjects, and the conclusion of a hostile confederacy, which the emperor of Russia has formed for the express and avowed purpose of introducing those innovations into the maritime code which his Britannic majesty has ever opposed, has at length produced a state of open war between Great Britain and Russia."

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Far from being softened by the compliments, and much less intimidated by the implied threats,

BOOK of the court of London, count Haugwitz, the  
XXXV. Prussian minister, in his reply, dated February  
1801. 12, informs lord Carysfort, "that his Prussian  
majesty cannot see, without the utmost grief and  
concern, the violent and hasty measures to which  
the court of London has proceeded against the  
northern naval powers. He declares the con-  
vention of St. Petersburg to be founded in jus-  
tice and moderation; and it had since been de-  
termined, that it should not be prejudicial to  
those treaties which had been before concluded  
with any of the belligerent powers. Had En-  
gland awaited this confidential communication,  
she might have avoided those intemperate mea-  
sures which threaten to spread still wider the flames  
of war. Never were measures," says the Prus-  
sian minister, "more incontestably defensive  
than those of the court of Copenhagen. The  
British government has in the present, more  
than in any former, war, assumed to itself the  
sovereignty of the sea; and has arbitrarily formed  
a maritime code which it is extremely difficult  
to reconcile with the true principles of the law  
of nations. It exercises, over friendly and neu-  
tral powers, a usurped jurisdiction, which it  
maintains to be just, and endeavours to repre-  
sent as an indefeasible law, sanctioned by all the  
tribunals of Europe. The neutral powers have  
made the strongest remonstrances and protes-

tations: but experience has shown, that these are generally without effect. It is not therefore surprising, that, after so many and repeated injuries, they should have had recourse to a measure which may prevent them in future. The maritime alliance, as it has been consolidated, will lead to this salutary object; and the king makes no difficulty to declare to his Britannic majesty, that he has found in it his own principles—that he is intimately convinced of its necessity and utility; and that he has formally acceded to the convention which was concluded between the courts of Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, on the 16th of December last. His majesty is therefore among the number of the contracting powers; and, as such, is obliged not only to take a direct part in all events which may interest the affairs of the neutral states, but he is bound to support that convention by such vigorous measures as the course of circumstances may require.—Only by the recal and entire taking off the embargo can things be restored to their former state; and England must judge whether she will consent to afford the neutral powers this means of proceeding to the overtures which they are ready to make.”

Such was the substance of the answer dictated by the wisdom and equity of the Prussian monarch, and such the perplexing and perilous di-



BOOK XXXV. lemma in which the blind and obstinate rashness  
 1801. of the British ministers had unfortunately involved their country.

On the 23d of February, count Wedel Jarlsberg, in pursuance of express orders from his court, declared, in a note addressed to the new secretary of state for foreign affairs, lord Hawkesbury, "that his Danish majesty was deeply affected at seeing the good understanding which has hitherto subsisted between Denmark and England, suddenly interrupted by the adoption of a measure as arbitrary as injurious on the part of Great Britain. The nature of his Danish majesty's engagements with the court of Petersburg has been solemnly declared to be only defensive; and it is inconceivable how general principles, conformable to every positive obligation, and modified according to the stipulations of treaties, could be justly considered as attacks on the rights or the dignity of any state whatever. The prompt cessation of proceedings hostile to the interests of Denmark, is a circumstance to which his majesty still looks forward with the confidence he has ever wished to entertain with regard to his Britannic majesty."

On the 4th of March the ambassador renewed, in earnest terms, his demand, "that the embargo on Danish vessels should be taken off," To

which lord Hawkesbury answered, "that the king's sentiments would be fully explained to the Danish government by his majesty's chargé-d'affaires at Copenhagen." BOOK XXXV.  
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On the same day M. Ehrensward addressed a note to lord Hawkesbury, in which he reproaches the British government for having "determined to commence a war for the subjection of the sea." He says, "that his Swedish majesty has been induced to believe, that the formal alliance of several powers, acting upon the same principles, would more effectually tend to convince the court of London of the validity of those principles, than by any one power renewing those reclamations which have hitherto been made in vain." The ambassador complains of "the absolute denial of justice in many instances: but his Swedish majesty has sought no revenge: he wishes only to procure that security for his flag to which it is entitled. In consequence of this sentiment the undersigned is empowered to declare, that the British court shall acknowledge the rights of Sweden; that it shall do justice with regard to the convoys detained in 1798, as well as respecting the violence offered to the Swedish flag at Barcelona; and, above all, that it shall take off the embargo which has been so unjustly laid on the Swedish ships. And should the conciliatory intentions with

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which the present note was dictated, prove fruitless, it is his majesty's opinion, that the presence of the undersigned at the court of London will no longer be of any advantage."

Lord Hawkesbury, in his reply (March 7), declares, "that his Britannic majesty had already repeated his fixed and unalterable resolution to maintain those established principles of maritime law which have been found, by the experience of ages, best calculated to afford equal security to the just rights and interests, as well of neutral as of belligerent powers.—The embargo on Swedish vessels, under actual circumstances, can be considered in no other view than as an act of just and necessary precaution, which will not be revoked so long as the court of Stockholm continues to form a part of a confederacy, which has for its object to impose by force on his majesty a new system of maritime law, inconsistent with the dignity and independence of his crown and the rights and interests of his people."

In consequence of this answer, M. Ehrensward forthwith quitted the kingdom. The presents usually made to foreign ministers at their departure being from personal respect offered to him, he refused the acceptance of them, saying, "that, at the moment in which he had to announce to his fellow-citizens nothing but losses sustained by the injustice of England,

he would not leave it in the power of any one to say that he himself had received any benefit in that country.”

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Thus WAR, it may almost be said against all Europe, was declared by Great Britain, with the view of establishing a right at the best of a very doubtful nature, and the importance of which seems to have been extremely exaggerated. The origin of the claim maintained by England is indeed very ancient. About the end of the 12th century, the free states of Italy, then possessing nearly the exclusive commerce of the south of Europe, in conjunction with certain cities of Catalonia and Arragon, promulgated a maritime code, known by the name of IL CONSOLATO DEL MARE, which immediately attained to high reputation, and was almost universally regarded as the maritime law of Europe. By an article of this famous constitution it was enacted, that a neutral cargo should be safe on board an enemy's ship; but that an enemy's property found on board a neutral vessel should be considered as lawful prize—the captor paying the amount of the freight to the ship-owner: and this right of confiscation evidently implied (and was indeed altogether null unaccompanied by) the right of search.

For several centuries this was the acknowledged basis of maritime jurisprudence in all the



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western and southern parts of Europe: but in process of time, Holland, gaining the ascendancy in the commercial world, and being deeply interested in the question, her merchants having engrossed the carrying-trade of Europe, endeavoured to establish the opposite principle, that free bottoms make free goods; or, as it was then technically expressed, "*Le pavillon neutre couvrir la marchandise*"—saving always the case of goods *contrebande de guerre*. And the Dutch government so far succeeded in their attempt as to obtain from France this concession in their favor, in the commercial treaty concluded A.D. 1662; and from England in that of 1668, renewed in 1674.

It can scarcely be supposed, however, that other neutral states would not claim what was thus gratuitously granted to Holland, especially as the general current of treaties between nation and nation, from this period, relaxed more or less from the rigor of the ancient law. The northern powers in particular, who had never recognised the authority of the Italian code, insisted on various occasions with great energy upon the rights of neutrality; and, during the seven years' war, the Danish counsellor Hubner, who was much employed in the difficult negotiations which took place on the subject with the belligerent powers, published a celebrated treatise on the rights of

the neutral flag, which has been ever since re-  
 garded by those nations as decisive of the que-  
 stion, so far as relates to the exemption from  
 search claimed by those vessels which are under  
 the protection of a regular and authorised con-  
 voy \*.

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The practice, nevertheless, of all belligerent powers was very different from the theory of the neutral ones. Disputes occasionally ran very high; still there was, upon the whole, good sense and moderation sufficient remaining to prevent matters from coming to extremity: but, while this essential difference subsisted, the LAW of NATIONS, supposed so clear and incontrovertible, was, on the contrary, very difficult to ascertain. England, from the rapid increase of her naval and commercial power, was, beyond any other nation, interested to maintain the ancient constitution; but, depending upon that superiority which she had acquired, she exercised her rights, real or assumed, with such haughtiness and severity in her various wars, more especially in that which commenced in 1775, generally styled the American war, that the empress of Russia, whose influence in the north of Europe was unbounded, revived a project, of which

\* SCHLEGEL On the Visitation of Neutral Vessels under Convoy, p. 12.

BOOK the primary author was Frederic the Great of  
 XXXV. Prussia, for establishing and securing, by the in-  
 1801. tervention of an armed force, the rights of the  
 neutral powers. This was carried into effect by  
 the famous convention of the ARMED NEUTRA-  
 LITY, concluded at Petersburg A.D. 1780.

The original parties to this convention were Russia, Denmark, and Sweden. Prussia and Naples soon afterwards acceded to it. France, Spain, and Holland, formally expressed their approbation of the principles on which it was founded. The ordonnances subsequently published by Austria, Portugal, Venice, Tuscany, &c. were consonant to the spirit of it; and Great Britain herself answered the notification of Russia in an equivocal manner; considerably modified her instructions, and appeared ultimately to yield in silence to the necessity. The law of nations has rarely, if ever, been promulgated in a mode so clear and decisive. Whatever might have been formerly the case, it was, from the date of this convention, and the recognition of its principles by all the potentates of Europe, the king of Great Britain excepted, absurd and even ludicrous for England to pretend that the law of nations was still in her favor. Ought the obsolete constitution of the CONSOLATO to be held up as a decree irrevocable, indefeasible, and sacred? or could any provisions, enacted in a re-

mote age by the petty commercial states of Italy, BOOK XXXV.  
 be with more propriety considered as a stan- 1801.  
 dard for the observance of the existing kingdoms  
 and empires of Europe, than a convention in  
 which all the powers of Christendom, England  
 excepted, were more or less parties?

But, independent countries possessing no proper authority over each other, it must be acknowledged that England was not obliged to submit to this novel constitution, *merely* because it had now become the law of nations. For, if this law was unjust in its own nature, or destructive of the welfare and essential interests of Great Britain in particular, she had undoubtedly a right to resist it. With regard to the natural injustice of this convention, the fact itself, of the ready and universal concurrence it obtained, is sufficient evidence that it was deemed highly beneficial to the *world*, and to the general interests of civil society as now constituted. And in regard to the incompatibility of its principle with the *essential interests* of Great Britain—for nothing less could, in the eye of reason, justify resistance on her part—it does not appear that, by the most vigorous enforcement of her rights as a belligerent power, the countries against which she has successively waged war have been prevented from exerting their whole strength and energy in the contest; or that



BOOK more than a temporary inconvenience, at most,  
XXXV. has in any case resulted from it to the enemy.

1801. As long as any nation has money or commodities to give in exchange for the articles she stands in need of, she will by some means or other be supplied with them. Even in respect to arms and ammunition, articles confessedly contraband, and liable, by universal acknowledgement, to confiscation, it is probable that no nation has ever long felt the want of them from the operation of any laws of mere positive prohibition. That the seizure of innoxious mercantile property, belonging to an enemy, on board neutral vessels, is not deemed conducive to the attainment of any great national object, is demonstrable from the law which permits and authorises the insurance of that species of property; and the practice is evidently continued from motives not higher or more dignified than those of avarice or revenge.

Supposing, however, the convention of 1780, recently revived, to be both unjust in itself and materially injurious to this country, the grand practical question remained, *viz.* how far it might be expedient for Great Britain to attempt to establish her rights by force, in opposition to a combination the most powerful perhaps which the world had ever seen? France, Spain, Holland, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia,

against England alone, were fearful odds. It was not pretended that the powers of the north, Russia excepted, had any wish or intention to attack England offensively. The convention of Petersburg was merely defensive; affording consequently an opportunity to Great Britain to yield for a time to the pressure and exigency of circumstances, without making any degrading concessions, or renouncing an iota of her real or pretended rights. On the contrary, the object of the new war into which Great Britain was plunged by those ministers who had now abandoned the helm, was no other than to compel the combined powers of the north to a renunciation of *their* claims—the validity of which all the world, Great Britain excepted, now openly or tacitly admitted.

But even were the counter-claims of Great Britain, and her ability to support them, absolutely incontrovertible, the necessity of the case required nothing further than to persist in acting upon the same principle she had hitherto done, and to employ force only to overcome force. To carry fire and sword into the bosom of those countries, in other respects amicable, and who differed from England only upon this critical question, was a barbarous and unheard-of extravagance. The new ministers, however, had their sentiments on this point been adverse from those of their pre-

BOOK  
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1801. decessors, which does not appear, could not, on their first entrance into office, avoid acting in some degree in conformity to the propelling force of that powerful impulse which had already been imparted to the general system.

The CONVENTION of STEYER (signed December 25) had stopped the progress of that torrent of destruction which seemed to threaten the emperor with immediate and inevitable ruin; but it left him almost at the mercy of France. On that event, repaired immediately to Paris, invested with full powers, count Cobentzel, the Austrian negotiator at Luneville, a man of great talents and equal candor, high in the esteem and confidence of the archduke Charles, and the avowed political antagonist of Thugut. To the frank and explicit proposal of count Cobentzel to the first consul, with whom he had four years before concluded the treaty of Campo Formio, Bonaparte answered in terms of dignified moderation: "The left bank of the Rhine shall be the boundary of the French republic; she makes no pretension to the right bank. The interest of Europe does not permit the emperor to pass the Adige. The independence of the Helvetic and the Batavian republics shall be ensured and guaranteed. Our victories add nothing to the pretensions of the French people."—Joseph Bonaparte, brother to the first

consul, being appointed plenipotentiary on the part of France, the negotiation was transferred to the place originally named—the conditions of peace being, as it is reasonable to suppose, rather dictated than discussed, though the moderation of France was upon the whole conspicuous. After a short interval, a treaty was signed, February 9, 1801, which will be ever famous in history under the name of the treaty of Luneville.

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Treaty of  
Luneville.

By this treaty the Rhine was made the boundary of the French republic, from the point where it leaves the Helvetic to that where it enters the Batavian territory—the mountains of the former, and the morasses of the latter, forming two grand defences or bastions as it were of the eastern frontier of France; the river extending between them as a curtain. Dusseldorf, Ehrenbreitstein, Philipsburg, the fortresses of Cassel, Kehl, and Old Brisac, on the right side, are restored to the empire, under the condition of remaining in the state in which they shall be found at the time of the evacuation. The Italian territory, ceded to the emperor by the treaty of Campo Formio, is confirmed, and the Adige made the boundary between the emperor and the Cisalpine republic—the navigation being declared common to both. The grand-duke of Tuscany renounces his dukedom in favor of the



BOOK XXXV. infant duke of Parma; it being stipulated that he should obtain in Germany a full equivalent for his losses in Italy. The emperor engages to cede the Brisgau to the duke of Modena, as an indemnification for the loss of the Modenese;—also the Frickthal and county of Falkenstein to France. The princes of the empire who are wholly or partially dispossessed of their dominions by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France, shall be indemnified in the bosom of the empire, conformably to the principles established at Rastadt, and the arrangements which, according to those bases, shall be further determined. Lastly, the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, and Cisalpine republics was expressly recognised and guaranteed by the two contracting powers.

The first great and striking difference between the present treaty and the preliminary articles signed at Paris in the month of July preceding, by count St. Julien, consists in the cession of Tuscany. The second is the total omission of any condition of indemnity to the emperor for his losses in Germany; which, by the former treaty, he was to receive in Italy: and that treaty also decided that such indemnity shall be equal in value to the archbishopric of Saltzburg and that part of Bavaria situated on

the right bank of the Inn \*. THIS was the price <sup>BOOK XXXV.</sup> which the emperor was compelled to pay for <sup>1801.</sup> the friendship of Great Britain during the last six disastrous months. For, though the first consul declared that France would advance no new pretensions in consequence of her recent victories, it was determined in another mode to make his imperial majesty suffer the penalty of his obstinacy, or, to speak more properly, the obstinacy of his ally; whom the emperor now found to be not merely a broken reed, but a spear on whose sharp and blood-stained point the most enthusiastic credulity could no longer rest for support.

The treaty of Luneville was in a short time <sup>Convention</sup> followed by a convention, concluded at Madrid, <sup>between</sup> France and <sup>Spain.</sup>

\* The SIXTH article of the preliminaries signed by count St. Julien at Paris July 28, is literally as follows:—"The indemnities which his imperial majesty the emperor and king is to have in Germany in virtue of the secret articles of the treaty of Campo Formio shall be taken in Italy; and therefore it shall be reserved until the definitive treaty to agree on the position and the quota of the said indemnities. Nevertheless it shall be established as the basis, that his imperial majesty the emperor and king shall possess, beside the country which had been granted to him in Italy by the treaty of Campo Formio, an equivalent to the possessions of the archbishopric of Salzburg, the rivers of the Inn and the Sabra, and the Tyrol—comprising the town of Wasserburg on the left bank of the Inn, with a circuit of 3000 toises—and the Frickthal, which he cedes to the French republic."

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 1801. March the 21st, between the duke of Alcudia, prince of peace, on the part of Spain, and Lucien Bonaparte, brother to the first consul, on that of France; agreeably to which, his catholic majesty guarantees the eventual renunciation of the duchy of Parma by the reigning duke in favor of the French republic; in lieu of which the grand-duchy of Tuscany is assigned to the son of the duke of Parma, with the title of king of Etruria. The isle of Elba, on the coast of Tuscany, is ceded to France; and the principality of Piombino, a part of the grand-duchy, but subject to Naples, is given as an indemnification to his Etrurian majesty. Lastly, the king of Spain formally cedes the colony of Louisiana to France. So that the latter obtained, in this circuitous mode, a sufficient compensation for the forbearance and moderation which she had politically displayed in the treaty of Luneville.

Treaty between France and Naples. On the 28th of March was signed at Florence a peace between the French republic and the king of the Two Sicilies; agreeably to which his Sicilian majesty engages to shut the ports of Naples and Sicily to all ships of war and merchantmen, Turkish and English, until the conclusion of a definitive peace, or termination of differences, not only between France and those powers, but between England and the powers of the north, and particularly Russia. He moreover cedes the portion

belonging to him of the isle of Elba to France, and confirms the cession of Piombino to Tuscany. He agrees to pay the sum of 500,000 francs as an indemnification to the French who have suffered from the disorders in the Neapolitan dominions, and grants a free pardon to those of his subjects who have been expatriated for acts relating to the residence of the French in the kingdom of Naples; and promises that all persons now in custody for their political opinions shall be immediately set at liberty.

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Such were the conditions on which peace was granted by the first consul to the Sicilian monarch; and, hard as they may seem, had not the emperor Paul, from a congeniality of disposition and sentiment, rather than from any political motive, displayed a very particular interest in his behalf, they would probably have been far more harsh and severe.

In the month of December the baron de Sprengporten had been nominated by the czar as his minister to the first consul. He was succeeded early in the present year by a splendid embassy, at the head of which was count Kalitchef, who was received at Paris with the highest distinction. The queen of Naples, a daughter of the great Maria Theresa, had repaired in person to Petersburg at the close of the preceding autumn to implore the protection of the emperor, whose

Embassy  
from Russia to the  
first consul.



BOOK XXXV. pride was doubtless gratified by employing his mediation in favor of the royal suppliants.—Amid  
1801. the caprices and follies of the reigning monarch, the genius of the Russian government preserved on the whole the powerful and determined impulse given to it by Peter the Great. Early in the present year an imperial ukase was promulgated, declaring, “at the earnest prayer,” as it is loftily expressed, “of the prince Heraclius, sovereign of Georgia, and the inhabitants of Georgia themselves, oppressed with various calamities, that country united with the empire of Russia, to the interest of which they are henceforth required to pay an unlimited devotion.” This transaction must unquestionably have excited the bitter chagrin of the Ottoman Porte; whose pride was at this period also most sensibly wounded by the refusal of the admiral of the Russian fleet, lying at anchor in the canal of Constantinople, to return to the Crimea till a certain sum was paid which he alleged to be due from the Turks for the maritime aid of the Russians. He even threatened hostile measures against the city of Constantinople; and the grand-seignor at length found it prudent to yield to the demand of his too powerful ally. But, amidst these external triumphs, rumors of some great political convulsion, or catastrophe, about to take place in Russia—a country fertile in revolutions—

were confidently circulated; and the throne of the emperor was by many perceived, or imagined, to totter under him. BOOK  
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Soon after the conclusion of the treaty of Luneville, the first consul, in a message sent by him upon that great occasion to the three constituted assemblies of the legislative body, the tribunate, and conservative senate, thus expressed his sentiments in relation to England: "Why is it that this treaty is not a treaty of general pacification? This was the wish of France. This was the constant object of the efforts of its government. But all its efforts have been in vain. Europe knows all that the British ministry have done to prevent the success of the negotiations at Luneville. In vain did an agent, authorised by the government, declare to them, on the 9th of October 1800, that France was ready to enter into a separate negotiation with them. Its declaration was answered only by a refusal, under the pretext that England could not abandon her ally. Since that period, and after that ally had consented to treat without England, this government seeks for other means of postponing peace, which is so necessary to the whole world. It violates a convention consecrated by humanity, and makes war on FISHERMEN! It advances pretensions contrary to the dignity and the rights of all nations. All the commerce of

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Asia and its immense colonies are no longer sufficient to satisfy its ambition. It is necessary that all the seas should be subjected to the exclusive sovereignty of England! It arms against Russia, Denmark, and Sweden because Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, have by treaties mutually guaranteed their sovereignty, their independence, and their flags. The powers of the North, unjustly attacked, have a right to rely on the assistance of France. The French government will, with them, avenge an injury common to all nations, without at any time forgetting that it ought to contend only for peace and the happiness of the world."

English  
fleet sails to  
the Baltic.

Previous to the resignation of the late ministers of Great Britain a powerful fleet had been equipped for the Baltic, consisting of eighteen ships of the line, with a proportionate number of frigates and smaller vessels. This fleet, commanded by the admirals Hyde Parker and Nelson, sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th of March, and on the 22d anchored at Anholt, an island in the Cattegat, about three leagues from the coast of Jutland. On the 20th Mr. Vansittart had arrived from London at Copenhagen, vested with the powers of a plenipotentiary extraordinary. He demanded that Denmark should secede from the northern alliance; that a free passage through the Sound should be

granted to the English fleet ; and that the Danish merchant ships should no longer sail with  
convoy. These terms being rejected, Mr. Vansittart, and the resident, Mr. Drummond, received passports to return home. The situation of Denmark at this moment, pressed by the opposite and mighty powers of Russia and Britain, was truly critical and arduous. Never was her navigation so extensive, or her commerce so flourishing, as at the present æra. The Danish merchants had amassed wealth to a degree hitherto unknown in that country. A state of affairs so prosperous she was unwilling to exchange for a war with England ; but basely to secede from the confederacy to which she had so recently become a party, would expose her to indelible disgrace. In this dilemma, she chose that alternative which appeared the least of the two evils ; and, at the risk of her dearest interests, and even of her safety, she resolved to preserve inviolate the national faith and honor.

All the necessary preparations for attack having been made, on the 27th admiral Parker sent a message to the governor of Cronenburg Castle, to demand “ whether he had received orders to fire upon the British fleet as they pass into the Sound, as he must deem the firing of the first gun a declaration of war on the part of Denmark.” In reply, the governor informed the



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1801. admiral "that he was not at liberty to suffer a fleet whose intentions were not yet known, to approach the guns of the castle."

Nothing in the northern parts of Europe, perhaps even in the southern, scarcely the Hellespont itself, presents a prospect equal to the channel of the Sound. On the coast of Denmark appears an uninterrupted succession of rich and verdant plains, woods, meadows, fields, and gardens, embellished with elegant villas and superb mansions; while the Swedish shore exhibits corn-lands, pastures, and lofty hills, forming a bold and picturesque scenery. The fortresses of Elsinour, Cronenburg, and Helsingburg, magnificently bound the view; and the sea, beautifully transparent, divides the opposing countries like some vast and majestic river.—The British fleet found very little difficulty in passing this famous strait. It was fired on by the castle of Cronenburg, which it bombarded in return, though at a great distance; as the English ships sailed as near as possible to the Swedish coast, which offered no molestation. At length was discovered the extensive plain of Copenhagen—its port filled with vessels—and its cultivated environs. On the side next the sea, the city, crowned with its Gothic towers, presents itself in all its grandeur. The number of inhabitants exceeds 80,000. It contains the princi-

pal fortress of the country, the fleet, the marine BOOK XXXV.  
 arsenals, the university, the national museum, 1801.  
 and a great variety of public edifices of every  
 kind. The houses are handsome, the streets  
 broad and well paved; and everywhere appear  
 the signs of comfort, wealth, and prosperity—  
 the result of a wise, enlightened, and pacific ad-  
 ministration of government continued for a long  
 series of years; during which the councils of Den-  
 mark had been uniformly friendly or even partial  
 to Britain, with whom she was connected by the  
 most intimate ties of interest, affection, and al-  
 liance. Such was the city which the evil genius of  
 Britain now pointed out as the object of a hos-  
 tile and furious attack from the British navy!

On approaching the harbor of Copenhagen Battle of Copen- hagen.  
 it was perceived that the Danes had made very  
 formidable dispositions. Before the city was  
 stationed an armed flotilla, consisting of ships  
 of the line, galleys, fire-ships, and gun-boats.  
 These were flanked and supported by two tre-  
 mendous batteries, mounting eighty-eight pieces  
 of cannon, on the Crown Islands, and a third on  
 the isle of Amak. A division of twelve ships of  
 the line, led by admiral lord Nelson, began the  
 attack about ten o'clock on the morning of the  
 2d of April, and a most dreadful engagement  
 ensued, which lasted for at least four hours;  
 at the end of which both fleets exhibited a

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1801. shocking and melancholy spectacle. Those English ships which lay exposed to the fire of the Crown batteries were miserably shattered; and the *Edgar*, *Monarch*, and *Isis*, alone sustained a loss of 455 men. Upon the whole, nearly a thousand lives were sacrificed in this attack, including the captains *Mosse* and *Riou*. The carnage on board the Danish ships was supposed to be much greater, but their firmness was unshaken and admirable. Never had the Danish valor, in the brightest periods of their history, shone out with more distinguished lustre; and eighty years of uninterrupted peace showed in a striking manner how unnecessary it is that a nation should engage in frequent wars for the mere purpose, as some have falsely and foolishly supposed, of keeping up a martial spirit \*. Lord Nelson, perceiving at length the Danish floating batteries to be almost disabled, and their fire to slacken, adopted the resolution of writing a note with his own hand to the prince of Denmark, representing the expediency of a cessation of hostilities, and stating that if this were denied he should be under the necessity of destroying the floating batteries now in his power, with the brave men by whom they were defended. An immediate armi-

\* Switzerland also had exhibited a recent and noble instance of this important truth.

stice was indeed no less necessary to the English than the Danes; for three of the largest ships at this time lay aground, exposed to the destructive fire of the land batteries. The prince acceded to the proposition with facility; and lord Nelson, going on shore in person, was received by the gallant and generous enemy with the loudest acclamations. And that great naval commander declared on his part, that of all the numerous engagements to which he had been witness, this of to-day was the most terrible. An armistice was soon agreed upon, and a notice of six hours stipulated in case of the renewal of hostilities \*.

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\* In the official account transmitted to England by the commander-in-chief, sir Hyde Parker—son of the famous veteran who fought the Dutch so heroically on the Dogger Bank twenty years before, and who was subsequently lost in his passage to the East Indies—he laments that “the sort of attack, confined within an intricate and narrow passage, excluded the ships particularly under his command from the opportunity of exhibiting their valor.” This, however, did not fully appear to the satisfaction of the public; and on his return from this expedition he met with a very cold and indifferent reception from the court. On this occasion the following pasquinade made its appearance :

“Two thirds of CÆSAR’S boasted fame,  
Thou, NELSON, must resign;  
I came, I saw, was PARKER’S claim,  
To conquer only *thine*.”



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The Swedish fleet at Carlsrona left that port March the 31st, but was prevented by contrary winds, as it was said, from joining the Danes. Surmises were indeed entertained that the Swedish government was more eager to incite the Danes to actual hostilities than to take any part in the consequences of them. On the 19th of April the British fleet, now consisting of twenty-five ships of the line, appeared off the entrance of Carlsrona; and the admiral acquainted the governor, that, the court of Denmark having concluded an armistice with Great Britain, he was directed to require an explicit answer from the king of Sweden relative to his intention of adhering to, or abandoning, the hostile measures he had taken in conjunction with Russia. To which requisition an official reply was returned, "that his Swedish majesty would not fail to fulfil the engagements entered into with his allies; but that he would not refuse to listen to equitable proposals for the purpose of regulating the matters in dispute."

The termination of the contest is not, however, to be attributed either to the bloody and problematic victory gained at Copenhagen, or to the dread of a similar attack upon Carlsrona; but to an event which had recently taken place, and which was calculated to produce an almost instantaneous revolution in the politics of the

North. In the night succeeding the 22d of March the emperor Paul, who had played so versatile and extraordinary a part on the political stage from the period of his accession to the throne of Russia, was found dead in his bed; and on the day following his eldest son, the grand-duke Alexander, was, amidst universal and unbounded transports of joy, proclaimed emperor of all the Russias. The most interesting and authentic particulars which have transpired respecting this important event are succinctly these :—

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Death of  
the emperor  
Paul.

The oppression and caprice of Paul's government had left him no friends. The latter of those qualities was perhaps still more fatal to him than the former. The favorite of to-day knew that he might be the victim of to-morrow. A considerable time previous to his death a project had been formed to force him to abdicate the throne, and retire far from the seat of government. About the middle of March the emperor is said to have signed a warrant for the imprisonment of the empress and his two sons Alexander and Constantine. Of this the princes were confidentially apprised, and at the same time urged to assent to the scheme of abdication. Without acceding formally to the proposition, the ministers were left at liberty to pursue such measures as were necessary for the safety of the empire. On

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this a meeting was held of the great officers of state and chief nobility who were privy to the conspiracy ; and a resolution adopted, to carry their design into execution that very night. Proceeding in a body to the palace, they ascended the grand stair-case, and made their way to the bed-chamber of the emperor. On entering the apartment, they perceived, to their astonishment, that the bed was empty. The emperor, who had some obscure intimation of a plot to dethrone him, and had lived a considerable time in a state of constant alarm, on hearing an unusual noise, had leaped out of bed, and was, after a short search, discovered standing behind a screen. The instrument of abdication was immediately presented to him, to which his signature was peremptorily required. He at first hesitated and trembled ; but, recovering his spirits, had recourse to entreaties and promises. On which count Zubof, knowing the danger of delay, reiterated the first demand with severe threats and reproaches. A scene of confusion and violence ensued ; and the emperor at length received a blow on the head, which brought him senseless to the ground. When it was certain that he was dead in consequence of repeated strokes, the body was replaced on the bed ; and in the morning the emperor's physician was called in, who certified that his imperial majesty had during the night

been carried off by an apoplexy.—To delineate the character of this odious prince at length, would be a very superfluous task. It is sufficient to say that it was composed of every folly combined with almost every vice. The only palliation which it seems to admit, arises from the presumption that he discovered, on different occasions, evident indications of mental derangement; but, whether that species of insanity under which he was supposed to labor, originated in any other causes than pride, passion, and almost habitual intoxication, is a problem which history will scarcely descend to investigate.

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The prepossession in favor of youthful princes at the commencement of their reign, is pleasing and natural: but the conduct of the emperor Alexander, who was no less amiable in his person than gracious in his manners, was such on his accession as to charm the grave and the wise no less than the gay and the unreflecting. In the proclamation published on the first day of his reign, he declares his intention of governing the people committed to his charge agreeably to the model and example of the late august empress, his grandmother, Catharine the Great. In the space of three days only from this period he issued an ukase virtually relinquishing all claim or title to the island of Malta, and appointing Count Soltikof to exercise “the functions of vicar

Auspicious  
change in  
the politics  
of Russia.



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of the grand-master of the order of St. John of Jerusalem, till a general chapter of the order can be convened, who shall proceed to the election of a grand-master worthy to preside, and capable of restoring to the order its ancient constitution."

In conformity to other public edicts or ukases, all prisoners of state were set at liberty; the late laws relative to *contraband* were abolished; the tariff of 1782 was restored; the English seamen were released from confinement; all societies and clubs were, once more, freely allowed; the importation of books and literary productions of every sort was again permitted. The regiments were ordered to bear their old names, and the former regiments of guards to be re-organised. Every person, whether native, foreigner, or exile, shall freely enter into, or quit, the Russian dominions without any molestation or difficulty on the frontiers, &c. In short, all the absurd and pernicious innovations of Paul were at once rescinded, and all things restored to the state and condition in which they were left by the late empress, Catharine the Great.

Had it not been for the seasonable and fortunate incident of the death of Paul, which seemed to open a fair prospect of the termination of the incipient war, it must soon have become extremely serious, and have operated in a manner highly detrimental to the interests of

Great Britain. The mouths of the Elbe, the Vistula, the Weser, and the Ems, lay within the precincts of those territories of whose neutrality the king of Prussia was the principal guardian. The policy of the court of Berlin was distinguished by a union of prudence with vigor; and the influence and authority of the Prussian monarch in the north of Germany was not inferior to that of the emperor in the south. He had now rights to maintain as a great maritime power, and he was impelled equally by motives of honor and of interest to support the views of the northern confederacy.

On the 30th of March his Prussian majesty published a royal declaration, enumerating in perspicuous language the several steps which had been taken to effect an accommodation with the court of London on equitable terms, and the violent measures which, on the other hand, had been adopted by that court in order to enforce her unjust pretensions. "From all these events," says the declaration, "it appears that the court of London has no inclination to desist from her inadmissible demands, and accept the proposed means of amicable conciliation. His majesty the king of Prussia, therefore, feels himself compelled, in conformity to the obligations he has contracted, to take the most efficacious measures in support of the convention attacked,

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King of  
Prussia  
seizes on  
the electo-  
rate of Ha-  
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and to retaliate for the hostile proceedings against it: for this purpose, he will not only shut the mouths of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems, but likewise take possession of the states belonging to the king of England as elector of Brunswick Lunenburg, situated in Germany."

These formidable threats the Prussian monarch hastened to carry into execution; and, his forces immediately entering the electoral dominions, on the 3d of April a convention was signed between the king of Prussia and the regency of Hanover, in conformity to which a great part of the electoral troops were disbanded, and the fortresses delivered up to his Prussian majesty, who, on his part, engaged to guarantee to the electorate its ancient constitution, and to protect the property and the persons of the inhabitants.

Nearly at the same time, and doubtless in concert with the court of Berlin, prince Charles of Hesse, a field-marshal in the Danish service, and father-in-law to the hereditary or "crown prince," was commissioned, at the head of 15,000 Danish troops, to take possession of the city of Hamburg, in order, as was declared by a notification published at the Exchange of Hamburg April 3, to stop the British navigation and trade to the Elbe. Strong representations were at first made by the senate of Ham-

burg against this procedure; but the prince declaring that he would be satisfied with the possession of the gates and walls, without requiring any troops to be quartered in the city, the regency determined to submit to the pressure of circumstances, and no interruption of the public tranquillity took place. Many English vessels however, which refused, from an obstinate incredulity, to accelerate their departure, were forcibly detained; and this great mart of nations was now no longer open for the admission of British merchandise.

On the 20th of March the earl of Darnley revived his motion of inquiry into the state of the nation. This produced a very warm debate; in the course of which lord Grenville took upon him to affirm that no possible advantage could result from such inquiry—that it would only tend to realise danger, and open a door to harassing speculations. On the other hand the marquis of Buckingham, head of the house of Grenville, declared himself in favor of a committee of inquiry; because former committees had been productive of much good. His lordship said the present administration did not possess the confidence of the country; and, instead of increasing alarm, he thought a compliance with the motion now made the only means to remove it.

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Second  
motion of  
inquiry in-  
to the state  
of the na-  
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The earl of Carlisle also was an advocate for the inquiry, upon the ground of a mystery in our situation which ought to be cleared up. This was denied by lord Grenville, who was not aware, as he professed, of any thing mysterious in the present state of affairs. The present ministers had entered into office as public men ought to enter—with a view of rendering service to their country, and, consequently, credit to themselves.—This discordancy of sentiment among friends and brothers caused some amusement; but, on the subsequent division of the house, lord Darnley's motion was rejected by a majority of 115 to 28 peers.

The same subject was discussed in a most able manner, March 25, in the house of commons, in consequence of a motion by Mr. Grey similar to that of the earl of Darnley.

In support of the proposition of inquiry the honorable mover observed that the present was the first war in which no part of the conduct of government had been investigated—surely it could not be alleged because no error had been committed. We were now in the ninth year of the war with France, and threatened with a war against all the maritime states of Europe, if not actually involved in it. We had added 270 millions to our national debt, and above seventeen millions to our annual taxes. We found ourselves

opposed to France, which was now extended in territory beyond the hopes of her most sanguine friends, increased in population, and supported by all the states of the north. We were opposed to her with diminished means, exhausted strength, and stript of every ally. Was it not then incumbent upon the representatives of the people, to enter into a serious inquiry as to the means most likely to restore to us security and happiness? The right honorable secretary had often declared, that he wished the war might be strictly scrutinised, and that every part of it he would defend year after year, month after month, nay, hour after hour. The opportunity had now arrived, and this gentleman would eagerly embrace it if his protestations were not empty boasts.—After a clear and comprehensive view of the events of the war, Mr. Grey hesitated not to ascribe the numerous misfortunes and failures of it to the incapacity of ministers, as the grand and leading cause. Where on an immense and varied scale of operation every thing miscarried, it was not, he thought, uncandid to judge by events; and investigation, on a subject of such importance, was not merely to censure old ministers, but to instruct new. We were assured that the latter were desirous of peace: he hoped the report was true; but it ought not to be forgotten that they had sup-

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1801. ported the measures and applauded the sentiments of that honorable gentleman (Mr. Pitt) who thanked Heaven for the failure of the negotiation at Lisle.

Mr. Dundas then rose, and in a long and labored speech attempted the defence of the measures of the late administration, and of the conduct of the war, his own department, in particular. He made a pompous enumeration of the islands and colonies which had been conquered, of the naval victories which had been gained, and the ships of war which had been taken; and scrupled not to represent the present war as far more triumphant than that conducted with such acknowledged brilliancy and success, under the auspices of the earl of Chatham.—In the course of his speech he introduced a very interesting anecdote relative to the resignation, in the month of April of the preceding year, of sir Charles Stuart, an officer of the highest reputation, who had been appointed to proceed, with a division of the troops in the Mediterranean, to Malta, and endeavour to expedite the reduction of that island. In order to clear himself from any imputation upon the subject of that resignation, Mr. Dundas read to the house the following extract from the letter of general Stuart, which announced his intention:—"Although I have freely submitted these professional

remarks to you on the difficulty of reducing La Valetta by siege, I trust you will do me the justice to believe that neither the circumstances I have stated, the reduction of the force first proposed, or the inferiority of the objects now in contemplation, comparatively with those originally designed, make me for one instant wish to relinquish the danger, or honor, of the undertaking; but the same point of honor—the good of this country, and I may add the humanity which gives rise to these feelings—renders it impossible for me to obey the particular instruction concerning the introduction of a Russian force into Malta.”

“Such, in his own words,” said Mr. Dundas, “is the ground on which he resigned the command; and I cannot on this occasion avoid remarking, that whilst we are accused of acting with insincerity towards Russia, the circumstance which led to this resignation is a strong proof how anxious his majesty felt to offer to that power, though bound to it by no positive engagement whatever, *a participation in the advantages of that conquest*, in case Russia had remained faithful to her alliance, and to the bonds of amity then subsisting between her and this country\*.”

\* What was meant by the phrase so characteristic of the tergiversation and duplicity of the late ministry—a *participa-*



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Towards the close of his speech, Mr. Dundas explicitly stated the difference of sentiment relating to the catholics of Ireland to have been the cause of the late ministerial resignation, in which his majesty had been graciously pleased to acquiesce; and it was with heartfelt satisfaction he perceived that the talents, the character, and the virtues of their successors, had entitled them to the confidence of their sovereign.

Lord Temple, eldest son of the marquis of Buckingham, supported the motion of inquiry, which he thought necessary, in order to ascertain the cause and extent of the evils of our present situation; and he conceived the house called upon in duty to institute it. He professed the greatest

*tion in the advantages of that conquest*—cannot easily be conjectured. That the emperor Paul, to whom, amid all his vices, no suspicion of deceit attached, conceived that the English government had by agreement assigned to him the eventual possession of Malta as the reward of his services, is indubitable; though, agreeably to the Machiavelian policy of Mr. Pitt, it may be true that no positive promise was made. The emperor's claim to the grand-mastership of the order was virtually recognised by allowing sir Home Popham to accept of the *honor of knighthood* conferred upon him by his imperial majesty in that capacity, and which was afterwards ostentatiously recorded in the London Gazette. By the resolute refusal of sir Charles Stuart to consent to the admission of Russian troops into Malta, it appears how much that gallant officer conceived the honor and interest of Great Britain sacrificed by so disgraceful a concession.

respect for the new chancellor of the exchequer; but as for the administration of which he was at the head, it was a thing made up of "shreds and patches"—of men unknown and inexperienced, who, whatever might be their talents, had not hitherto been in circumstances to evince them; and this, his lordship said, was not a moment to make experiments.

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Mr. Pitt held, on the other hand, language of a widely opposite tendency. He observed, that the present ministers were called, indeed, to a new situation, but they were not new to the house and to the public, or to the love and esteem of both. Mr. Pitt then launched into a splendid eulogium on the merits of Mr. Addington, lord Hawkesbury, and the earl of St. Vincent. He asked the gentlemen of the opposition, if they knew any one among themselves superior to the noble secretary—saving, indeed, one person, unnecessary to name, whose transcendent talents made him an exception to almost any rule. Mr. Pitt combated the supposition that a committee of inquiry could be of the least use, because nothing which could be there disclosed would afford more information than was already laid before parliament. It would cast no light whatever on the catholic question, and as little on the causes of his resignation, and that of his colleagues. All he should say was, that though

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he wished to submit the catholic question to parliament, such objections occurred as clearly to evince that it was impossible for him to bring the measure forward as a minister. These were the words he chose to use, and no admissions or denials should be extorted from him. With respect to any of the other objects of inquiry referred to in the speech of the honorable mover of it, no enlargements or repetitions were needed. It was therefore sufficient to remind gentlemen, that if they were convinced their former opinions were wrong, they would do right to say so; but it was scarcely fair to expect that all which had already been answered and *exploded*, should raise doubts in any mind which had weighed and decided, merely because it was collected in one speech that night.—He then passed to the contest with the northern powers, and expatiated on the necessity of resisting any encroachments on our maritime rights *now*, lest we should lose the best opportunity which ever did or might occur of vindicating them! The confederacy of Petersburg, he declared to be founded on a jacobinical principle, adopted, in the true spirit of the French revolution, by four sovereigns for their own advantage, but by which the civilised world was to be overturned, and which was particularly levelled against the rights and properties of Englishmen, who would, how-

ever, spend their last shilling, and shed their last drop of blood, rather than give up their independence and barter their honor.

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Mr. Fox at length arose, and in an admirable speech, breathing the genuine spirit of political wisdom, delivered his sentiments in support of the motion. Adverting to the comparison instituted by Mr. Dundas between the successes of the present and those of the seven years' war, this great orator indignantly exclaimed, "Was, then, the present war undertaken for the purpose of destroying the commerce or the colonies of France? Are the splendid reveries which we indulged at the commencement of it, sunk down to the capture of ships, and of tropical settlements? You have taken islands—but you have laid the house of Austria prostrate at the feet of France. You have aggrandised the power of which you threatened the subversion, beyond the wildest dreams of former ambition. You had all the great states of Europe for your allies against France—What is become of them?—all that you have not ruined, are your determined enemies. Where are the neutral powers?—every one of them leagued with France for your destruction. Could all this be chance?—No; it is the true succession of effect to cause—it is the legitimate issue of your own system.

"But the war of the seven years, we are exult-



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ingly told, had its reverses and failures.—True; but let it be remembered that those reverses were instantly followed by inquiries. It has been reserved for the present war, though the most disgraceful in its external, and the most wretched in its domestic consequences, of any that this country ever waged, to be the ONLY WAR in which this house never saw any grounds for retrospect or revision: and the ministers just retired from office are the ONLY MEN ever possessed of the powers of government in this country; who never, even in a single instance, yielded to any inquiry.

“The parliamentary inquiries which ensued upon the failures alluded to, far from embarrassing the operations of government, or unnerving its energies, were followed by a series of unexampled successes. On the loss of Minorca in particular, a person for whose memory I entertain the deepest gratitude and love, then one of the king’s ministers, far from *resisting*, was the most eager in *insisting* upon inquiry. But the right-honorable gentleman anxiously asks, ‘Will this house, by going into the proposed inquiry, disgrace its former votes?’—I answer, Yes, certainly, if this house will save the country. In that house of commons which was the early scene of the honorable gentleman’s ‘exploded opinions,’ the same question was

asked; but, sir, they *did* disgrace their former votes, and by so doing they did honor to themselves, and saved their country. That parliament was a retracting and a recanting parliament. Bitter as it was, the draught was swallowed; and I have no hesitation in saying, that this house, if desirous to rescue the country from the perils in which it is now involved, must tread in the footsteps of its predecessor of 1782, and renounce the right-honorable gentleman and his system together.”

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On the subject of the Irish catholic claims, Mr. Fox declared that he would grant them, “not merely because this concession is expedient, but because it is just. Catholics, in his opinion, had rights as well as protestants—not resting upon light or frail grounds, but forming the very basis and foundation of our civil system. And if it be true that Irish disloyalty is so rooted and universal that military despotism alone can make that country habitable, it would be against the experience of the world that such a wide and deadly disaffection could or ever did exist in any nation on the globe, except from the faults of its governors. They who can find reason for all this in any supposed depravity of the Irish people, totally misunderstand their character. The Irish may have their faults like others: they may have a quick feeling of injury, and not be

BOOK very patient under it; but I do affirm, that, of  
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 1801. all their characteristics, there is not one feature more predominant, from the highest to the lowest order, than gratitude for benefaction, and sensibility to kindness. Let impartiality, justice, and clemency, take place of prejudice, oppression, and vengeance, and you will not want the aid of martial law, nor the terror of military execution. I call upon any really candid man to deny, if he is able, upon his honor and conscience, that the system of lord Fitzwilliam, if timely adopted, would have prevented those dreadful scenes of havoc, murder, and devastation, which have since desolated the country. Let it for ever be remembered, that with all the industry which has been employed in making up the reports of the Irish lords and commons upon these subjects, not a vestige of evidence appears, but the direct contrary, that any approach was made to seek assistance from France, or that even the most distant idea of separation from, or setting up for independence of, this country, was entertained in Ireland, until every petition for peaceful redress of grievances was spurned and rejected."

In considering the grounds of the present contest with the northern powers, Mr. Fox divided the question into three parts—1. Free bottoms making free goods—2. The contraband of war.

—3. The right of search under convoy. The “neutral principle” was, he said, branded by the right-honorable gentleman as jacobinical, in like manner as the university of Oxford had formerly declared the doctrine which placed the present royal family on the throne, as ‘tending to atheism.’ But whether jacobinical or not, its origin is certainly of greater antiquity than the French revolution, being as old as the middle of the last century, and having had for its patron and propounder no less a republican than Frederic the Great. The next assertor of the neutral system, was that zealot of jacobinism, the late empress of Russia. As to the *first* branch of the question, Mr. Fox had no hesitation to say, as a general proposition, that “free bottoms do *not* make free goods.” If the commerce of a power at war, as well as the materials of offence, could be legally carried on by a neutral, the benefit of maritime preponderance would be wholly lost. Between the two extremes, of a neutral pretending to the right of supplying one belligerent with all the means of mischief to another, and a belligerent insisting upon an universal right of search in all cases, the general interest of the commonwealth of nations finds the true equitable medium, as the numberless treaties between the different states of Europe sufficiently demonstrate.—2. *The contraband of*

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BOOK XXXV. }  
 1801. *war*, Mr. Fox asserted to be the mere creature of convention: the very articles which are declared contraband with one power, being “innocent commerce” with another. “In the treaty with Holland, A. D. 1674, naval stores are expressly declared to be free wares and commodities: and no one can be ignorant how that country availed itself of all its privileges, either of natural right or of treaty, during the war which was terminated at Aix-la-Chapelle, as well as that which succeeded it in 1756. Throughout these wars Holland carried every neutral right to its utmost extent of exertion. Did all this exertion disable this country from crippling the marine of France during these contests? If this concession to so industrious, active, and indefatigable a race as the Dutch (the general carriers of Europe), produced neither facilities to France, nor injury to us, let me ask, if there be a prudent man on earth who would have provoked extremities with Russia about a point which, in the hands of the Dutch, was absolutely nugatory as to all those dangers which the propensity to this war has discovered and magnified.

“With respect to the third point—the matter of *search—that*, under sound and discreet limitations, is certainly a right of belligerents; but pushed to extremity it becomes, like many other rights, a gross wrong. As to the claim of

convoy, beyond all doubt if the privilege of BOOK  
convoy were abused in protecting the trade of XXXV.  
an enemy, that would be a very fit subject of re- 1801.  
presentation. The northern powers seem to  
have been fully aware of such a possible fraud,  
and there is nothing of this sort which, in my  
opinion, remonstrance and reason were not ca-  
pable of settling. It is not search upon lawful  
or urgent suspicion, so well provided for in dif-  
ferent treaties, that makes any part of the pre-  
sent question; it is the unqualified assumption  
of an universal right of searching in all possible  
cases; or, in other words, of subjecting the com-  
merce of the world to vexatious and harassing  
interruptions, without distinction. This is the  
grievance; and I ask, would you endure such  
treatment yourselves from any state upon earth?  
Suppose the king of Spain at war with Algiers—  
a British fleet of merchantmen in the lawful  
pursuits of trade, though convoyed by a squa-  
dron of English men of war, would, according to  
these arguments, be liable to be stopped and  
ransacked by the meanest cutter in the Spanish  
navy. Such must be the fate to which your  
own maxims would expose you, unless you  
frankly acknowledge that you have one measure  
for yourselves, and another for the rest of the  
world.

“Notwithstanding all the heat of party at the

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æra of the American war, not a breath of blame did the opposition cast upon the ministers of those days for their discreet and measured conduct respecting the confederacy at that period formed by the neutral powers. In nothing were the honorable gentleman and myself, then acting together, better agreed than in general censure of that administration. In this case, however, we murmured not a word; for, without conceding any necessary point, we thought their discretion in that instance saved this country from a war with the northern powers; and our naval history from that period vouches, that their caution did not ‘sacrifice the sources of our maritime greatness.’ That administration did not revolt the feelings of Europe by sending its fleets to a feeble power, to carry by force what it might obtain by argument; nor did it follow the example of capricious despotism, in laying embargoes upon Danish and Swedish property in British ports. These improvements in diplomacy, these encouragements to commerce, have been reserved for the right-honorable gentleman. Upon the whole of this business, what is the obvious inference, but that those who fancy some strange interest in this dreadful trade of war, seeing jacobinism and all other pretexts for its duration become inefficacious, or disgusting, have

manœuvred to associate with the national enthusiasm in favor of its navy a point in which its real interests are but little involved, and have fallen, as it were, upon this lucky question in good time to rouse the expiring energies of the country into new offers of lives and fortunes?"

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The new minister, Mr. Addington, closed this memorable debate by a speech well calculated to confirm the esteem and conciliate the confidence of the country. After a modest apology for accepting the office which he now filled, and in which a sense of duty and allegiance alone had directed his conduct, he expressed his hope that the house would extend to him and his colleagues that degree of confidence which might be constitutionally reposed in persons duly appointed by his majesty, unless it were precluded by antecedent character and conduct.—He then commented on all the leading points in dispute between Great Britain and the northern powers, and finally gave it as his decided opinion, that the RIGHT for which we contended was vital and fundamental; at the same time expressing his earnest wish that it should be exercised temperately, in proportion as it was asserted firmly—and with as little vexation as possible to the interests and feelings of all the maritime states.—On the subject of peace and war, it had been asked, how it was possible that



BOOK the restoration of peace could be expected from  
 XXXV. those who had rejoiced at the failure of the ne-  
 1801. gotiation at Lisle. He would only say, that *he*  
 had never expressed any such sentiment; and  
 he could truly aver that he had never enter-  
 tained it. The question must be one of terms,  
 and of terms only. He meant not to cast any  
 imputation upon the sincerity of the French  
 government, but he was sure it would be justly  
 discredited by the advancement of any claims  
 that might be inconsistent with the security and  
 honor of this country.—Respecting catholic  
 emancipation, he deprecated whatever might  
 have the appearance of intolerance and pro-  
 scription. No restraint ought to be imposed  
 upon any who dissented from the established  
 church, but what was necessary for its security;  
 and dissenters of all descriptions might rest as-  
 sured that they were regarded in no other light  
 by government than as truly valuable members  
 of the community.—He concluded with pro-  
 fessing that he occupied no party ground, and  
 wished no confidence that was not constitutional.

On a division of the house, Mr. Grey's motion  
 was rejected by a majority of 291 to 105 voices.

Under the present lenient administration, the  
 Habeas-Corpus suspension and Sedition acts had  
 been suffered quietly to expire. But on the 1st  
 and 2d of April, a variety of papers, sealed up,

were presented to the house by the chancellor of the exchequer in pursuance of his majesty's command, and being referred to a secret committee of twenty-one persons, a report was made by them on the 14th of the same month, from which it appeared that divers seditious and treasonable machinations were still carrying on by wicked and disaffected persons.—“ Within a few weeks past,” to adopt the words of the report, “ and to the latest period to which the information received by your committee can apply, their activity has been great and increasing, in the metropolis and in other parts of the kingdom. Every effort is employed that can tend to disturb the public tranquillity; and recent intelligence has been received from different quarters, which justifies your committee in believing that at this moment the immediate object of the disaffected is to endeavour, by a sudden explosion, to avail themselves of the interval which may still take place before those laws can be renewed. The dangerous system of a secret confederacy, under the obligation of an unlawful oath, which prevailed in Ireland and afterwards extended itself to Great Britain, has been revived, with additional precautions for the purpose of eluding detection and of ensuring concert, secrecy, and dispatch: and it appears to be in agitation suddenly by these means to call

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BOOK numerous meetings in different parts of the  
 XXXV. country at the same day and hour, to an extent  
 1801. which, if not prevented, must materially endanger the public peace; and that among the persons most forward for instigating these criminal proceedings, are some of those who had been detained under the suspension of the Habeas-Corpus act, and who have been recently released from confinement."

Habeas-  
 Corpus sus-  
 pension  
 and Sedi-  
 tion acts.

Bills were in consequence of this report immediately introduced for reviving the two late acts. Mr. secretary Pelham expressed his hope that the house would believe they would not again have recourse to severe measures without absolute necessity. The suspension of the Habeas-Corpus act was always to be lamented, but it became occasionally a measure of national precaution and safety, and always laid upon ministers additional responsibility.

The chancellor of the exchequer acknowledged his regret and disappointment, for he had hoped and believed the remnant of disaffection to be so small, that the measures of prevention adopted by former parliaments would have been wholly unnecessary. But he now felt that necessity; not because, abstractedly speaking, disaffection had increased—but because the spirit of malignity derived strength from public calamity. The measures in question he had never

thought of without anxiety, knowing that every restraint upon the public was justifiable only from necessity; and he hoped, when that necessity ceased, parliament would be more ready to remove such restraints, than now to impose them.

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The two bills were vigorously, though unavailingly, opposed in their progress through both houses, on the ground of the existing laws being fully adequate to the purpose of repressing and punishing the crimes of sedition and treason. Such was the opinion, however, entertained by the public at large of the candor and integrity of the new minister, that the reputation of his administration suffered nothing in consequence of a measure evidently adopted by him with regret and reluctance.

A bill which excited much greater offence was soon after introduced, at the urgent recommendation of the secret committee, by the attorney-general, sir Edward Law, “for indemnifying all persons concerned in securing, imprisoning, and detaining individuals, under the suspension of the Habeas-Corpus act, since the 1st of February 1793.” Various precedents were adduced of bills of indemnity passed on sundry similar occasions since the revolution—viz., in the years 1694, 1715, 1746, and 1780;—and the present bill was asserted to be a necessary measure of protection; and, without such indemnity, govern-

Indemnity-  
bill passed.



BOOK XXXV. ment would be debarred from acting with vigor and effect on any emergency. "Could the house,"

1801. it was asked, "justly refuse indemnity to ministers who had succeeded in saving the constitution? Those who rejected the reports of the different and successive committees as mere fabrications, might, and indeed ought, to oppose the bill in question; but those who were convinced of the truth of the facts stated in them, must at once see, and would readily recognise the rectitude of the measure."

On the other hand, it was strongly contended that the precedents adduced in vindication of the present bill were by no means in point. The bills of indemnity alluded to had passed subsequent to periods of open rebellion, insurrection, or detected conspiracy, and the retrospective operation of them was short and recent. But the present bill extended to the monstrous term of eight years back, during which a treasonable conspiracy had been affirmed, but had never been proved to exist; nor had any one person implicated in it suffered the legal penalties of guilt. The true name of the bill was, "A bill for the protection and encouragement of secret accusers." In states deprived of their liberties, and oppressed by their laws, such practices had prevailed. In the Annals of Tacitus they might be found, but not in the British history. What

had made the English administration of justice the wonder of the world?—because it was done *foribus apertis*, and the accuser and accused are confronted. Shall so great a power be entrusted to ministers as had been exercised by them under the successive suspensions of the Habeas-Corpus act, and their responsibility at length end in a bill of indemnity? The present bill establishes a SYSTEM of secret accusers, thus adopting the worst parts of the worst governments. Why not fairly avow the object, and confess that this government could be no longer conducted otherwise than by the adoption of the principles of the most degenerate states? What could that decision be called but iniquitous, which first pronounces on the guilt of individuals, without allowing them to be heard in their defence, and then deprives them, when released from their dreary dungeons, of the necessary means of vindicating their character, or regaining any degree of consideration or respect in society?

After long and vehement debates, the bill passed through both houses by nearly the accustomed majorities.

A vacancy having recently occurred in the representation of the borough of Old Sarum, the celebrated Mr. John Horne Tooke was returned as one of the members for it: but no sooner had he appeared in his place, than lord Temple

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Clergy in-  
capacita-  
tion act.

gave notice that he should object to the validity of the election, on the ground of the ineligibility of persons in holy orders to sit in that house; and on the 6th of May the noble lord accordingly moved, that a new writ be issued for the borough of Old Sarum. After an ingenious and learned discussion of the question, it was superseded, on a division of 94 to 53 voices, by the order of the day; the chancellor of the exchequer declaring his intention of bringing in a bill for the purpose of removing all doubts respecting this point, and for declaring the clergy ineligible to the house of commons. The bill of incapacitation was in a short time introduced; but so far were the framers of it from wishing to offer any indignity to the gentleman who was the accidental occasion of the measure, that a clause was expressly inserted to limit its operation and effect to future parliaments. The deportment of Mr. Tooke in the house was, indeed, so perfectly decorous, as rather to create a prepossession in his favor, than any prejudice against him. Of the propriety of the bill itself, which passed by great majorities through both houses, there can be no rational doubt. As a matter of fact, it is certain that for centuries the clergy had been almost universally considered as incapable of sitting in the house of commons: and, regarding the question in a theoretical view, as

the members of the clerical body are represented, or supposed to be represented, in convocation, they can have no right to be represented in parliament likewise. But a far better reason for declaring or enacting this ineligibility is, that, of all the various classes of men, the clergy of all denominations have made the worst use of power whenever it has been entrusted in their hands. "Clergymen," says the great and good lord Clarendon, "understand the least, and take the worst measure, of human affairs, of all mankind that can read and write." Had it been once ascertained that the clergy possess a legal right to sit in the house, a most dangerous infusion of bigotry and malignity might, with infallible certainty, have been eventually expected; but confined within their proper province of teaching good morals on just principles, the clergy are no doubt a body of men highly respectable and useful.

On the 28th of May lord Hawkesbury, in pursuance of a message from the king, moved that the sum of 300,000*l.* should be granted to Portugal by way of subsidy. His lordship remarked, that this was not a subsidy intended to encourage offensive, but merely to enable an old and faithful ally to maintain defensive operations, till a peace could be made on terms consistent with her honor—his majesty having

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Subsidy to  
Portugal.



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thought it right to absolve the court of Lisbon from all engagements not to enter into a separate treaty.—This was objected to only on the ground of its being an aid utterly inadequate to the occasion, at a moment when the hostile armies of France and Spain were upon the borders of her territories; and it was deprecated as a sort of bribe advanced to Portugal, to induce her, against her judgement, to continue the present contest at the risk of her existence: upon which Mr. Pitt, in his characteristic language, thus expressed himself:—"We do not desire Portugal to brave danger; but we say, if for their own sake they think it more wise, more manly, more dignified, and more safe, to meet the danger rather than to agree to unknown concession, indignity, and insult, then Great Britain will be true to her engagements: and though we absolve them from their promise to us, we will not make this absolution a mask for our avarice or our pusillanimity, as long as they have spirit and courage enough not to compromise with an oppressive and perfidious enemy." The motion was then put, and carried without a division.

A plan, originating with his royal highness the commander-in-chief, for establishing, in the vicinity of the metropolis, a military college on the noble model of the *écoles militaires* in France, being recommended to the house by a

message from his majesty, delivered and enforced by the secretary at war, Mr. Yorke, was approved and carried into effect by an act of legislative generosity and munificence.

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On the 12th of June, Mr. Dundas rose for the last time in the house of commons, for the purpose of exhibiting a general statement of the revenues and pecuniary concerns of the East-India company, the principal management and control of which had been so long committed to him. On this occasion, as on *all* the former, he drew a most flattering picture of their situation and prospects. He admitted indeed, as he had invariably done, from year to year, that the debt of the company had increased; and he estimated the present addition at something more than 1,200,000*l*. But then the net increase of the assets abroad amounted to about 1,300,000*l*.; so that the honorable company was richer since the last statement by about 90,000*l*. The first part of this very elaborate speech consisted of long details of debts, investments, assets, charges, revenues, surpluses, deficits, sales, loans, customs, goods sold and unsold, &c., appearing probably to the generality of his hearers somewhat dry and intricate; but he made ample amends in the latter part of it, which was addressed wholly to the imagination, and consisted of a succession of gay and

Statement  
of India  
affairs.

BOOK splendid visions, representing that amazingly  
'XXXV. prosperous state of the company's affairs which  
1801. would infallibly take place at some future but  
uncertain and remote period; with a view to  
the acceleration of which, he *recommended*,

“ 1. An arrangement abroad, so that a full million from the surplus of the revenues should, at the commencement of such arrangement, be applicable to the purchase of investments.

“ 2. That the investments from India and China should amount, at prime cost, to four millions annually in equal proportions.

“ 3. That, during the first four years from this time, the company should avail themselves of the power they already had under the act for augmenting their capital stock to the extent of two millions, at the rate of half a million annually, which it was supposed would realise one million sterling.

“ 4. That the additional money so raised should be applied exclusively to the liquidation of the present Indian debt at interest.

“ 5. That the extinction of this debt, now calculated to amount to fourteen millions sterling, should be carried on at the rate of one million annually till it was reduced to 4,500,000*l.*; at which amount it might be thought expedient to keep it stationary. The gradual reduction of the debt would add to the surplus of the re-

venues by the diminution of the interest; and in the year 1809 the sum of two millions sterling might be applied to the investments. The application of the surplus, thus increasing from year to year, would of course lessen the demand of India upon the home-treasury; *so that the balance of CASH could not fail of increasing to an IMMENSE AMOUNT!*"

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The resolutions moved by Mr. Dundas passed with little opposition in the house; but they were, as to the tenor and substance of them, attacked soon afterwards in a very formidable printed tract; the author of which was well known to be a gentleman conversant beyond any other person in the affairs of India, and who had, during the government of Mr. Hastings, occupied, with distinguished reputation, a seat in the supreme council of Bengal. A brief extract from this pamphlet may, it is presumed, not be unacceptable.

“ In June 1801, Mr. Dundas says, ‘ the Indian debt is *now* calculated to amount to fourteen millions sterling.’ The account signed by Mr. Wright says, that on the 30th of April 1800 it exceeded fourteen millions and a half, exclusive of thirty-four lacks and a half of debt subscribed in India the preceding year. In the estimates for the succeeding year, ending in April last, credit is taken in Bengal for the produce of notes



BOOK and bills to be issued, and of loans to be nego-  
 XXXV. tiated, to the amount of 193 lacks of Sicca ru-  
 1801. pees, and at Bombay for 20 lacks—all which, re-  
 duced to current rupees, amount to 24,568,000,  
 or 2,456,800*l*. Then, taking the services of the  
 current year, ending in April next, to require  
 the assistance of loans to the same amount, the  
 whole Indian debt ought not to be stated at less  
 than current rupees 195,540,000, or nineteen  
 millions and a half sterling. The ensuing year,  
 from April 1802 to April 1803, ought to be con-  
 sidered as a year of war, in point of expense,  
 because it is not possible that the military esta-  
 blishments can be materially reduced before the  
 end of it, or that they can be provided for with-  
 out a new loan for the service of that year.  
 They who know any thing of the fallacy of esti-  
 mated disbursements and receipts, and how con-  
 stantly the former exceed and the latter fall  
 short of the estimate, will not think it unreason-  
 able to presume, that in April 1803, supposing  
 all arrears liquidated, the Indian debt must  
 amount to twenty-two millions at least. Mr.  
 Dundas says, ‘that, at the renewal of the char-  
 ter, the IDEA was to reduce the debt in India to  
 two millions.’ In eight years the result of this  
 IDEA is a REAL not an IDEAL debt of twenty mil-  
 lions. And on this foundation, ‘he rests in con-  
 fidence that they will not disregard his parting

advice.'—Now what is his advice?—why, to pay their debts, which he has understated, in India only, to the amount of six millions. Undoubtedly, he who meets his difficulties with resolution, who reduces his expenses, and pays his debts as fast as he can, takes the only wise and effectual course for retrieving his affairs and re-establishing his credit. Retrenchments, economy, and long perseverance in a right direction, will certainly produce beneficial effects—that is, gradually, and in time, *not speedily*, and if no external embarrassment intervenes. At present we are at a great distance from any real surplus of Indian revenue applicable to investment. As to that remote and fortunate period, when it will be practicable as well as '*wise*, after the example of other Indian powers, to have a depôt of treasure in your coffers in India, to the amount of three or four millions sterling, to meet any sudden emergency, and to save you the necessity of having immediate recourse to large loans,' the present generation have nothing to do with it: the millennium of the saints is just as near at hand. Before he talks of deposits of treasure in India, he ought to have exhibited a fund of net proceeds in England, to make good the payment of 500,000*l.* a year to the exchequer for the use of the public, on which condition the charter was renewed, but of which only 500,000*l.*

**BOOK** has been paid since the 1st of January 1793; so  
**XXXV.** that on this account four millions will be due to  
1801. the public on the 1st of January 1802."—Such, when we descend from the fairy fictions of romance to the sober truth of history, appears to have been the real state of facts in relation to the affairs of the honorable company, when Mr. Dundas resigned the administration of India, which he had conducted with great self-applause for the term of seventeen years.

The session of parliament was terminated by commission on the 2d of July (1801). In allusion to the great question of peace or war, the lords-commissioners were directed to express his majesty's sentiments in the following well-chosen terms:—"The brilliant and repeated successes of his majesty's arms by sea and land, important as they are in their immediate consequences, are not less satisfactory to his majesty's mind, as affording fresh and decisive proofs of that vigorous exertion, undaunted valor, and steady perseverance, which distinguish the national character, and on which the chief reliance must be placed for respect abroad and for confidence and security at home. Events so honorable to the British name, derive at the present moment peculiar value, in his majesty's estimation, from their tendency to facilitate the attainment of the great object of his unceasing solicitude,

the restoration of peace on fair and adequate terms." BOOK  
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In this most desirable and difficult work the new ministers had, for some time past, been assiduously engaged, though, unfortunately, with ability little proportioned to their zeal. 1801.

So early as the 21st of March, four days only subsequent to the official appointment of lord Hawkesbury as foreign secretary, that minister addressed a note to M. Otto; stating, "that he had received the commands of the king, to communicate to the French government the dispositions of his majesty immediately to enter on negotiation for the restoration of peace; and to declare that his majesty is ready to send to Paris, or to any other suitable place, a minister fully authorised to give every necessary explanation, as well as to negotiate and *conclude*, in the name of his majesty, a treaty between this country and France." Negotia-  
tion with  
France re-  
specting  
peace.

The motives which prompted this overture, in itself so explicit, were of the most ambiguous kind; and, as it might equally result from the most magnanimous or the most pusillanimous disposition, the conduct of the negotiation could alone determine the genius which actuated the new administration. If frank and noble, it would display itself in proposing at once terms of peace differing little from those which it would



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1801. finally accept; and—without having recourse, even in case of total disappointment, to language in the least degree indecorous, and much less to invidious reflexions, either personal or national—in breaking off the negotiation the moment it was perceived that an overture, so capable of being misapprehended, was not met by a correspondent disposition on the part of the enemy.

On the other hand, if this advance proceeded from a too eager and impatient desire of peace, without any disposition to make the necessary sacrifices in order to obtain it, the negotiation would commence with extravagant demands, which must inevitably lead to tedious and unpleasant discussion, degenerating by degrees into peevishness and ill-humour; and at length, from the too predominant solicitude for peace, terms would, perhaps, be submitted to, considerably short of what might have been obtained by an opposite mode of procedure. But, as an infinitely worse consequence, the restoration of peace would, after all, not be accompanied by the restoration of amity: the same characteristic littleness, selfishness, and jealousy, still prevailing, would merely convert a state of open warfare into a hollow and precarious truce.

The first consul, who, doubtless, saw clearly the advantage given him in the negotiation by

this premature overture, from men whose talents he knew well how to appreciate, returned (12th Germinal), through the medium of M. Otto, a very cold reply, signifying his constant love of peace, and expressing his lively satisfaction that the British cabinet was *at last* disposed to put an end to the misery which, for eight years, had desolated Europe—and he proposed that the negotiation should be preceded by a suspension of hostilities, or at least that a previous understanding should take place on the basis of the peace. To this note lord Hawkesbury made a courteous answer; but, as to the proposition of an armistice, the English minister truly says, that the difficulties attending it, “are of a nature to render them insurmountable; or, at all events, to occasion considerable delays:” but, in relation to the other alternative, his lordship engages, “that an immediate, full, and confidential communication should be made to M. Otto; and that he himself will, in a few days, receive the necessary powers to bring this important business to a very prompt termination.”

At the first conference, 14th Germinal, the English minister, notwithstanding these specious words, “endeavoured,” according to the French account, “to bring forward all the ancient pretensions of his court,” *i. e.* probably to

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proceed upon the plan of the *status quo*, or the reciprocal restitution of all conquests made from the commencement of the war by all the belligerent powers \*. However this might be, at the second conference, lord Hawkesbury gave a signal proof of the spirit by which the English court was actuated, by offering to restore all the conquests made by England on the allied powers, *excepting* Trinidad, Martinico, Malta, Ceylon, Tobago, Demerary, Essequibo, and Berbice, on condition that the French shall evacuate Egypt; that the Cape of Good Hope be declared a free port; and that the house of Orange shall receive an entire indemnity for the loss which it has suffered in its property. Also, M. Otto was informed by lord Hawkesbury, that, "if authentic information should be received, previous to the signature of the preliminaries, of the evacuation of Egypt by the French troops, or of a convention concluded to that effect, his majesty will not hold himself bound to subscribe to the above conditions in all their extent:"—an implied menace, which, when annexed to terms so degrading, could not fail to excite the liveliest indignation.

The first consul ordered citizen Otto to be in-

\* Vide *Official Papers*, published at Paris, A.D. 1803, p. 37.

formed, "that he could not consider these first propositions of the English minister but as a means to gain time—that there was no question of discussing them seriously—that there was some difference between the 5th and the 9th year of the republic—that he would consent only to an honorable peace, founded on a just equilibrium of the different parts of the world; and that, under such a view of things, he could not leave in the hands of England countries and establishments of such considerable weight in the balance of Europe as those which she demands\*."

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After such an offer, and such a reply, it is not wonderful that the negotiation should fall into a state of languishment, or rather of total suspension, from which it was at length awakened by a note, presented May 29, by M. Otto, to lord Hawkesbury, stating, "that two months had passed away without being able to fix the basis of a pacification so important to the two nations and all Europe." The note proceeds to declare, "that the pretensions and respective interests of the two powers are not of a nature to be affected by the fate of forces employed upon the Nile or the Tagus;" and the French minister, in the name of his government, requests, that the

\* Official Papers, published at Paris, p. 39.



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1801. propositions which his Britannic majesty may think proper to adopt for the establishment of a definitive and general peace, may be communicated to him in writing—adding, that France will admit of no condition incompatible with the honor and dignity of the republic.

In answer to this note, lord Hawkesbury somewhat superfluously enlarges upon the great moderation of his majesty, “who is so far from being influenced by any view of ambition and aggrandisement, that he would most willingly abandon all the conquests which have been made by him during the present war, on condition that the powers of the continent should recover the situation which they possessed before the commencement of hostilities in 1792.” But, upon this ostentation of moderation, it is obvious to remark, that the acquisitions of France were infinitely more valuable than those of England, and contributed much more to the real increase of her power. And, as France is the only nation in Europe from which danger to England can be apprehended, it would certainly have been extremely advantageous to the latter, if the general restitution of conquests, alluded to by the English minister, could by any means have been effected: so that the boast of disinterestedness, in making such a proposition, must, to the French government, have appeared

perfectly ridiculous: And, instead of transmitting to M. Otto, conformably to his request, a definitive project of pacification, lord Hawkesbury refers merely to former proposals, such as had already been indignantly rejected. He concludes, however, with saying, "that if the French government has any propositions to make; different from those that have been mentioned, and which, in its judgement, may conduce to peace, his majesty is ready to give them the highest consideration."

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This answer was calculated only to create new embarrassments. The propositions of the English court were so remote from those which the French government was disposed to accept, that the first consul felt himself reduced to the disagreeable dilemma, either of breaking off the negotiation altogether, or of offering such terms as the English government would not with temper discuss. The reply, transmitted by M. Otto, June, 14, discovered evident symptoms of dissatisfaction and ill-humour on the part of the French government. It denies that any sincere disposition to peace is visible in the propositions presented by lord Hawkesbury. "Can the court of London," asks the French negotiator, "if it is sincere in its wishes for peace, and now that the allies are concentrating their means against it, pretend to preserve conquests

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which she owes only to the disorders of the French revolution, and the efforts of the coalition? Nevertheless, it is acknowledged, that the great events which have happened in Europe, and the changes that have taken place in the boundaries of the great states of the continent, might authorise a part of the demands of the British government; but how can it demand as an *ultimatum* the keeping of Malta, of Ceylon, of all the countries conquered from Tippoo Saib, of Trinidad, Martinico, &c.? The undersigned is authorised to demand of lord Hawkesbury, if, in case the French government should accede to the arrangements proposed for the East Indies by England, and should adopt the *status ante bellum* for Portugal, his Britannic majesty would consent that the *status ante bellum* should be re-established in the Mediterranean and America?"

The situation of affairs in Portugal becoming at this period extremely critical, M. Otto, on the 15th of June, presented a second note, in which he declares, "that the first consul leaves the fate of this country to the British cabinet, who is called upon to decide it by its answer to the last propositions which it has received; *viz.* if it will admit the *status ante bellum* for Portugal as an equivalent for the *status ante bellum* for America?"

The rejoinder to this vexatious and perplexing demand, resulting from a situation of things which a more prompt and decisive conduct respecting the negotiation would wholly have precluded, was delayed on the part of the English cabinet no less than ten days; and, most unfortunately, when produced, it proved to be a very weak and querulous one. It affirms once more, “ that his majesty has already proved the moderation of his pretensions by the demands contained in the propositions sent to M. Otto. It cannot be doubted that his majesty, in preserving every thing he has gained by his arms in the course of this war, does not overbalance the extent and importance of the acquisitions and influence of France on the continent. In reply to the specific demand of M. Otto, lord Hawkesbury says, “ that in order to restore the *status ante bellum* in the Mediterranean, it would be necessary not only that the integrity of the Ottoman empire should be secured, but also that the French government should evacuate the county of Nice and all the states of the king of Sardinia; that the grand-duke of Tuscany should be re-established; and that the rest of Italy should recover its independence. If that cannot be, and that France is to preserve a part of the influence which she has lately acquired in Italy, his majesty is legitimately authorised

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 1801. to keep the island of Malta; to protect the commerce of his subjects; and to watch, at least, over the interests of Great Britain in that part of the world.

“The proposition mentioned in the second note on the *status ante bellum* in America, as a compensation of the *status ante bellum* as relative to Portugal, appears to be unjust. The undersigned, in his note of the 14th of April, has already regulated the concessions that his majesty intended to make to France and her allies, with a view to assure to Portugal and the Ottoman Porte the *status ante bellum* on the re-establishment of peace. But although his majesty is disposed to make every reasonable concession for the advantage of his allies, it cannot be expected that he will consent, for their sake, to make sacrifices which will be incompatible with the security of his kingdoms. Independent of all considerations of this nature, the proposition is in itself liable to objections, since the *status ante bellum* for Portugal cannot in any way be equivalent to the *status ante bellum* for America. His majesty has made very important conquests in that part of the world, not only from France, but Spain and Holland. It cannot, therefore, be expected that his majesty will restore all the conquests that his arms have made from several powers in America, as a compensation for the

*status ante bellum* in Portugal alone. Besides, <sup>BOOK XXXV.</sup> it must be observed, that the *status ante bellum* 1801. in America could not be produced by the restitution of the conquests which his majesty has made there, without *calling*\* for a compensation to Great Britain for the acquisition that France has made of the Spanish part of St. Domingo." The English minister at length concludes these observations with stating, "that he has nevertheless been directed by his majesty to give an additional proof of the care he takes of the interests of his allies, and of his desire to bring the negotiation to a happy conclusion. For this purpose the undersigned is authorised to promise, that when the French government shall have acceded to the propositions already made by his majesty respecting the East Indies and the Mediterranean, and if it consents also that his majesty shall keep in America Martinico, Tobago, Demerary, Essequibo, and Berbice, his majesty will add to what he has already granted the *status ante bellum* for Spain in consideration of the *status ante bellum* for Portugal, and conclude peace on these conditions."

This paper was framed in such a manner as to afford scope for endless altercation, when the question to be decided upon was the most plain

\* With the same effect as Glendower could "CALL spirits from the vasty deep."

BOOK and simple imaginable. Undoubtedly, when  
 XXXV. two nations are at war and wish for peace, the  
 1801. most obvious modes of agreement are the *status ante bellum* and the *uti possidetis*. But in the present case it was an absurd expectation that England should conclude peace on the first, or France and her allies on the last, of these principles. The question was, merely, whether a medium satisfactory to both parties could be devised. Certainly neither complaints and reproaches, nor ostentatious boasts of moderation, could in the least degree advance this desirable end; but, on the contrary, as every thing of this nature tends more or less to irritation, they would by an able negotiator have been carefully avoided. In relation to France and her allies, England was undoubtedly the victorious power; but, though victorious, she was, by the desertion of divers of the potentates in conjunction with whom she had commenced the war, and still more by the extreme imbecility of those allies which remained, reduced to a perilous and critical situation; so that France had a right to assume a high tone in the negotiation, and to require from England the relinquishment of the far greater part of her conquests. But if England thought that France presumed too much on her present advantages, it would have been an infinitely preferable mode of proceeding, to

break off the negotiation by a civil and dignified declaration to this purpose, rather than by the repetition of arguments which could produce no good effect, especially when conveyed in language peevish and petulant, to prolong a tedious and unavailing discussion. The assertion of lord Hawkesbury could not indeed be controverted, "that were his majesty to retain all the acquisitions he had made in the course of the war they would not over-balance"—he might have said counter-balance—"the acquisitions made by France." But to infer from thence, or to insinuate, that England ought to be allowed to keep possession of the whole, was puerile and extravagant. In such a case everything depends upon the relative situation of the two parties; but there existed no analogy between the situation of France and the powers of the continent at the time peace was severally concluded with them, Austria more particularly, and the situation of France and her allies in the present moment in relation to England; and France had, therefore, a very good and incontestable right, both in equity and policy, to declare that peace between the confederacy, of which she was the head, and Great Britain must be regulated upon very different principles\*. As the court of London,

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\* In the course of the negotiation it was remarked by a person of high rank in the political world to M. Otto, "that



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 1801. however, still thought fit to insist upon her original demands, with the single exception of Trinidad, which she was willing, in her great moderation, to exchange for the kingdom of Portugal, there seemed at this period little probability of attaining what the speech from the throne at the close of the session had styled "the great object of his majesty's unceasing solicitude."

Convention between Great Britain and Russia.

At a very early period after the accession of the Russian emperor, Alexander, that young monarch transmitted a royal declaration to sir Hyde Parker, signifying to that commander "his acceptance of the offer made by the British court to his illustrious predecessor, to terminate the disputes which threatened with a war the north of Europe, by an amicable convention;" at the same time stating his resolution not to act but in conjunction with his allies. This proposition, when communicated to the court of London, was embraced with eagerness; and lord St. Helens, whose great diplomatic talents had remained too long unemployed, was named ambassador to the court of St. Petersburg on this

Great Britain was unquestionably entitled to such an increase of territory as would serve as a counterpoise to the acquisitions of France." M. Otto replied, "You have the empire of India." "But for this," said the remarker, "we are not indebted to France."—"Nor," said M. Otto, "are we indebted to you for the boundary of the Rhine."

important occasion. In the full persuasion of a speedy and amicable accommodation, the embark-  
goes on both sides were taken off, and the Danish  
troops removed from the city of Hamburg.

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The Russian minister count Panin, and the British ambassador lord St. Helens, being actuated by a congenial spirit of candor and sincerity, and guided by that superior sagacity which disdains all cavil, and removes all jealousy, after a very short negotiation, concluded and signed at Petersburg June 17 N. S. a convention which will ever remain an invaluable monument of diplomatic wisdom; and may justly serve as a basis on which the future law and practice of nations respecting the rights of naval neutrality shall be founded.

The points conceded by Russia to Britain were, I. That enemy's property embarked on board neutral ships shall be liable to confiscation: II. That the right of searching merchant ships, even navigating under convoy of a ship of war, shall be recognised: III. That no ship of war with a convoy shall, on any pretext whatever, resist by force the detention of a merchant vessel by a belligerent ship of war: IV. That to entitle any vessel whatever to be considered as the property of the country whose flag it bears, the captain of the ship and at least half the crew must be people of that country, and the

BOOK XXXV, papers and passports in due and perfect form :  
 V. No direct commerce carried on in neutral

1801. vessels from the colonies to the mother country of an hostile power, or *vice versa*, shall be considered as entitled to the privileges of neutrality : VI. These stipulations shall be regarded as permanent, and shall serve as a constant rule to the contracting powers in matters of commerce and navigation \*.

From these concessions it might seem that Russia had relinquished all that she had previously contended for ; but this was far from being the case, the points conceded by Britain to that power being equally important, and not less equitable. I. It was agreed not to comprise in the definition of enemy's property the merchandise of the produce, growth, or manufacture of the countries at war, which should have been acquired by the subjects of the neutral power, and should be transported on their account : II. That arms and ammunition only shall be considered as contraband ; and that all other articles, and consequently naval stores, shall pass freely under the protection of the neutral flag : III. That no port shall be regarded as blockaded, except where, by the disposition of the blockading ships, there is an evident danger in entering :

\* Vide ARTICLES of the CONVENTION III. 2. IV. 1. V. VII. III. 2. and Declaration Explanatory VIII.

IV. That the right of searching merchant ships navigating under convoy shall not extend to privateers or letters of marque, but only to vessels belonging to the royal navy: V. Every ship unjustly detained shall receive a full compensation for all the losses and damages occasioned by such detention; and the commander of the belligerent vessel shall further be liable to punishment for every act of violence he may have committed, according as the nature of the case may require: VI. The subjects of the neutral power are to enjoy the same advantages and facilities in their commerce with a belligerent power as are enjoyed by the most favored nations, and particularly by the United States of America\*.

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\* Vide articles III. 2. III. 3. III. 4. IV. 1. V. III. 2. and Declaration Explanatory. A formal complaint made by Mr. Rufus King, ambassador from the United States of America, in the preceding month of March, of depredations on the American commerce, was officially referred to the king's advocate-general, who, in his report (March 16), declared "that it was *now* distinctly understood, and had been repeatedly decided by the high court of appeal, that the produce of the colonies of the enemy may be imported by a neutral into his own country, and may be re-exported from thence even to the mother country of such colony. And, in like manner, the produce and manufactures of the mother country may in this circuitous mode legally find their way to the colonies. Perhaps the mere touching in the neutral country to make fresh clearances may properly be considered as a



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The object of this celebrated convention, as expressed in the preamble of it, was not merely an equitable arrangement of recent differences, but an INVARIABLE DETERMINATION OF PRINCIPLES respecting the RIGHTS of NEUTRALITY. And the subordinate regulations of the treaty being in exact conformity to the spirit of wisdom and equity which dictated the reciprocal concessions, it may justly be looked up to by all nations, in all ages, as a standard and model of excellence, and—so far as human fallibility will with propriety admit of the expression—of perfection.

The armistice between Great Britain and the northern powers being prolonged for the purpose of obtaining the concurrence of Sweden and Denmark to this convention, those powers became principals in the same by formal acts of accession—that of his Danish majesty being dated October 23 (N.S.) in the present, and that of his Swedish majesty March 30 in the following

fraudulent evasion, and is in effect the direct trade. But the high court of admiralty has expressly decided that landing the goods and paying the duties in the neutral country breaks the continuity of the voyage; and is such an importation as legalises the trade, although the goods be re-shipped in the same vessel and on account of the same neutral proprietors, and be forwarded for sale to the mother country or the colony.”

year; and, in both instances, with an express saving in respect to the differences which resulted from the nature of the treaties and engagements subsisting between England and the Scandinavian powers. On the last occasion the Swedish ambassador at Petersburg was distinctly informed by the count de Kotschoubey, the Russian secretary of state, "that as the motives which had occasioned the late revival of the system of the armed neutrality were now happily done away, that system is considered by this court as completely annulled and abandoned\*." BOOK XXXV.  
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A large body of British troops, which had been for a considerable time stationed in Portugal, and which had hitherto sufficed for the defence of the country, having been recently withdrawn, the court of Madrid published a declaration of war against that of Lisbon, dated the 3d of March (1801);—stating the grounds of the measure to be the obstinate refusal of the latter to ratify the treaty which she had concluded with France in 1797, by which Portugal agreed to separate itself from England, and, as a pledge of its fidelity, to suffer its ports to be garrisoned by Spanish troops;—that she had afforded protection in her ports to the fleets of England, and had assisted them in the exercise of their hosti-

\* Vide dispatch of lord St. Helen's, April 2, 1802.

BOOK XXXV. lity against France and Spain: and his catholic  
 1801. lic majesty affirmed that “the French republic  
 would long since have carried its victorious arms  
 into the Portuguese provinces, if his fraternal  
 affection for the most faithful queen and her  
 august children had not suspended the blow.”  
 A much more probable and obvious reason, how-  
 ever, might be assigned for this exemplary for-  
 bearance, *viz.* that by admitting a French army  
 into Spain, in order to attack Portugal, he would  
 expose himself no less than his neighbour to the  
 risk of eventual subjection. A counter-declara-  
 tion was issued by the court of Lisbon, exhort-  
 ing, in magnificent language, the Portuguese  
 nation, “which could resist the Romans, conquer  
 Asia, make great discoveries by sea, shake off a  
 foreign sceptre, and recover and maintain her  
 independence, to recall to her mind the honora-  
 ble annals of her history.” Some faint show of  
 resistance by deeds succeeded this pride and  
 pomp of words; and the prince-regent joined the  
 army in person.

Invasion of  
 Portugal  
 by the Spa-  
 niards.

The Spanish forces, consisting of about 35,000  
 men, commanded by the duke of Alcudia, en-  
 tered the province of Alentejo on the 20th of  
 May; from which time all was rapid progress on  
 the one part, and precipitate retreat on the  
 other. By the 6th of June the Spaniards had  
 reduced Elvas, Campo Major, Arronches, and,

in a word, all the strong places and magazines of Alentejo, and driven the Portuguese beyond the Tagus. On that day preliminaries of peace were signed between Portugal and Spain at Badajoz; the principal conditions of which were, 1st, That the ports of Portugal should be shut against the English: 2dly, That the city and territory of Olivenza, part of the province of Alentejo, situated to the east of the Guadiana, should be ceded to Spain, and that river in future become the boundary of the respective kingdoms: and, 3dly, That the limits of the two Guianas should be determined in future by the river Ariwari.

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Treaty of  
Badajoz.

From the hastiness of this procedure it is evident how much the court of Madrid dreaded the assistance of their allies the French, who, having collected an army at Bourdeaux, had already begun their march into Spain by way of Bayonne. On being informed of the conclusion of the separate treaty between the two crowns, the first consul expressed great displeasure. He intimated to his catholic majesty that the loss of Trinidad would be the probable consequence of the acquisition of Olivenza; and he ordered the French army under general Le Clerc to continue its march towards Portugal. On the 28th of June, having actually entered that kingdom, the French commander invested the city and fortress



BOOK of Almeida in the province of Beira, from that  
 XXXV. position menacing both Oporto and Lisbon.

1801. The duke of Alfoens, who commanded the feeble  
 French in-  
 vasion of  
 Portugal. army of Portugal, occupied a strong post at  
 Abrantes, on the Tagus; and the court of Lis-  
 bon in vain solicited supplies of men, money,  
 and arms, from Great Britain, adequate to the  
 emergency of the occasion. The French, who  
 had no motive for urging matters to extremity,  
 willingly hearkened to overtures of pacification;  
 and, after a negotiation of some length, a treaty  
 was concluded and signed at Madrid, through  
 the *mediation* of his catholic majesty, September  
 29 (1801); in conformity to which the ports of  
 Portugal were to be open to all vessels of war  
 and trade belonging to the French republic and  
 her allies, and shut, during the continuance of  
 the war, to those of England; the citizens of  
 France were to be admitted to all the privileges  
 enjoyed by the most favored nations; and, by a  
 very important article, the boundaries of French  
 and Portuguese Guiana were in future to be de-  
 termined by the river Carapanatuba, which  
 flows into the river Amazon, about a third of a  
 degree of north latitude above Fort Macapa.  
 In other words, the French dominion in South  
 America was extended from the Atlantic Ocean  
 to the river of the Amazons; and the founda-  
 tion of a vast empire was silently and secretly

Pacifica-  
 tion of Ma-  
 drid.

laid, under the specious color and pretext of ascertaining a disputed boundary.

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The naval transactions of the present year which remain to be recorded, are very memorable. The grand naval and military armament under the command of sir Ralph Abercrombie, after leaving Cadiz, rendezvoused at Malta in the month of November (1800); and sailing from thence December 10, they arrived on the 28th at Marmorice, on the coast of Caramania, a province of Asia Minor. At Marmorice the land forces were put on shore and refreshed; and here, embayed in a secure and spacious harbor, environed with lofty mountains, affording the most beautiful and magnificent scenery, they were detained by contrary winds and unfavorable weather no less than eight weeks. At length the fleet left Marmorice on the 22d of February, and came in sight of Alexandria on the 1st of March, anchoring the next day in the bay of Aboukir.

Expedition  
to Egypt.

The sea ran high and boisterous, so that the disembarkation could not be effected till the 8th: and though the enemy were fully aware of the attempt, and had every advantage on their side, the troops, with admirable intrepidity, under the conduct of sir Sydney Smith, made good their landing, exposed as they were to a terrible cannonade of grape-shot and musketry. On the

BOOK 12th the whole army moved forward, and came  
 XXXV. within sight of the French camp, situated on an  
 1801. eminence, with the right extending towards the  
 canal of Alexandria, and the left to the sea. On  
 the next morning the enemy's lines were at-  
 tacked with the greatest vigor; and, being un-  
 able to maintain their ground, the French re-  
 tired, after a severe conflict, to the fortified  
 heights, which form the principal defence of  
 Alexandria; and the fort of Aboukir surrendered  
 to the English.

Battle of  
 Alexan-  
 dria.

After gaining these advantages, the army took  
 a position four miles from Alexandria, having  
 the sea on the right, and the lake of Aboukir  
 on the left—the Pharos of Alexandria, with the  
 city itself, and the celebrated columns called  
 Pompey's Pillar and Cleopatra's Needle, being in  
 full view. Here they remained, till, on the 21st  
 of March, an hour before daylight, the French,  
 now commanded by general Menou, who had  
 recently arrived from Grand Cairo, quitting their  
 strong defensive station, unexpectedly attacked  
 the British camp with nearly their whole col-  
 lected force, amounting to about 13,000 men—  
 that of the English, exclusive of the other posts  
 occupied by them, being computed at about the  
 same number. A feint was first made on the  
 left wing of the English; but, immediately  
 afterwards, a real and most serious assault took

place on the right, under general Lanusse. General Ramphon at the same time charged the reserve, consisting of the forty-second or royal regiment of Highlanders, and the twenty-eighth, under general Moore, an officer of distinguished merit, together with a brigade composed of Germans and other foreigners. The French having partially succeeded in turning the right of the English, a bloody and furious combat took place on the flank and rear of that wing. Early in the engagement sir Ralph Abercrombie was dangerously wounded in the thigh by a musket ball; but continued giving his orders with coolness and perspicuity during the whole action. The French cavalry under general Roize charged impetuously in column, sustained by a strong body of infantry and a great number of men mounted on dromedaries; but they were repulsed by the steady valor of the English—the French infantry being thrown into dangerous and irreparable disorder. A second charge of cavalry was then rashly commanded by general Menou; though it was observed to him, that this was not the moment for a charge, and that they would be cut to pieces without rendering any service. General Roize, with the principal officers under his command, grievously felt the error they were obliged to commit; but they conducted themselves like brave men, furious



BOOK with despair at being vainly sacrificed. General  
 XXXV. Roize, in the gallant performance of his duty,  
 1801. was himself killed, with many other distinguished  
 officers; and the French cavalry were completely  
 routed, broken, and almost destroyed\*. A par-  
 ticular corps, to which the appellation of the  
 “Invincible Legion” had been given by general  
 Bonaparte, from their heroic conduct at Lodi  
 and other places during the Italian campaigns,  
 were engaged in close action with the High-  
 landers and foreign brigade, by whom they were  
 finally discomfited with great slaughter, and the  
 INVINCIBLE STANDARD taken. The French army  
 being likewise foiled in a desperate attempt  
 to penetrate the centre of the English, general  
 Menou at length thought it expedient to order  
 a retreat; which was executed with little moles-  
 tation, under cover of the opposite hills lined  
 with cannon: but they left a prodigious number  
 of dead and wounded on the field of battle,  
 amounting, as was supposed, to between three  
 and four thousand men; amongst whom were  
 the generals Lanusse, Roize, and Bodet: general  
 Ramphon had his horse shot under him, and his  
 clothes pierced with balls. The loss of the En-  
 glish was upwards of 1400 men. Sir Ralph  
 Abercrombie did not retire from the field till the

\* State of Egypt, by General Reynier, p. 270—71.

victory was decided, though fainting from weakness and the effusion of blood; and it being unfortunately found impossible to extract the ball, that heroic officer, after languishing a few days, expired on board the Foudroyant on the 28th of March. His successor in the command, general Hutchinson, in his official dispatch of the 5th of April, expresses his regret for this catastrophe in the most pathetic terms. "But," says he, "it is some consolation to those who tenderly loved him—that as his life was honorable, so was his death glorious. His memory will be recorded in the annals of his country; will be sacred to every British soldier, and embalmed in the recollection of a grateful posterity."

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Death of  
sir Ralph  
Aber-  
crombie.

Thus terminated an arduous military service of forty-six years. In sir Ralph Abercrombie, the great qualities of the general were rendered more impressive by the simplicity and integrity of the man. He never, amid the conflicts of the field, lost sight of the only true and legitimate end of war—the security of the violated rights of society; and his undaunted courage was only one of the features of that character which was equally distinguished by patriotism and humanity.

About the beginning of April, a Turkish fleet with troops on board arrived in the road of Aboukir; and, being joined by a detachment

BOOK under colonel Spencer, the whole armament pro-  
XXXV. ceeded to Rosetta, the castle of which, com-  
1801. manding the navigation of the western branch  
of the Nile, together with the town, surrendered  
on the 19th of that month to the arms of the  
allies.

Leaving a numerous garrison in Alexandria, whither general Menou himself retired, the remaining part of the French army, under general Le Grange, fell back on Rahmanieh. As the enemy retreated towards Cairo, general Hutchinson, after straitening the quarters of the French in Alexandria, by cutting the canal and letting the waters of the sea into the ancient bed of the lake Mareotis, determined to follow them in person, in order to cover the army of the grand-vizier again advancing from Syria, and to secure a junction with a powerful reinforcement of troops from India, momentarily expected to arrive by way of the Red Sea. The history of this Egyptian campaign, subsequent to the victory of the 21st of March, is that of an almost uninterrupted series of successes. On the 9th of May the important post of Rahmanieh, situated on the Nile where the canal of Alexandria terminates, was abandoned by the French almost without resistance. On the 14th a valuable convoy, destined for Alexandria, was intercepted by the English general coming down

the canal of Menouf, which connects the Damietta and Rosetta branches of the river. On the 17th a foraging corps, consisting of 600 men of the enemy's best troops, mounted on camels, were surrounded and made prisoners near the banks of the Nile. On the other side, the forts of Leslie and Bourlos, in the vicinity of Damietta, were evacuated at the approach of a division of the army of the vizier; and the garrisons, together making about 700 men, embarked on board five small vessels, four of which were captured and carried into Aboukir Bay; so that the number of prisoners taken since the memorable battle of Alexandria did not fall short of two thousand men.

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On the abandonment of Rahmanieh, the enemy made a wonderful march to Gizeh, and immediately crossed the river to Boulac. On the 16th of May they advanced, under the conduct of general Belliard, chief in command at Cairo, to the attack of the army of the grand-vizier, which, directed by the superior skill of major Holloway, a British officer of engineers, had encamped in an advantageous situation at Belbeis. A desultory engagement of some hours ensued, and the French were finally repulsed with the loss of 300 men; and, soon after this unexpected victory, the vizier was joined by a formidable body of Mamelouks, under the orders of Osman.



BOOK XXXV.  
 1801. Bey, the successor of Murad Bey, who died in the preceding month of April. Murad Bey was a man of distinguished ability, as well as of heroic valor. Doubtful as to the event of the English invasion, he appears to have carried on, with great address, and with true oriental deceit, separate negotiations with the contending powers, and to have given to each the strongest assurances of attachment and fidelity. He was held in the highest veneration by his companions in arms, the Mamelouk chieftains and soldiery, who, on his death, breaking his weapons over his tomb, declared no other person worthy to wield them. Osman Bey Tambourgi, his successor, seeing the confusion to which the affairs of the French were tending, determined openly to join the party of the English and Turks\*.

After a necessary and unavoidable delay of some weeks, for the purpose of procuring provisions, and bringing up the heavy artillery, the British and Ottoman armies moved towards Grand Cairo nearly in the same direction, but on opposite sides of the river; and on the 21st of June general Hutchinson invested Gizeh, on the left bank of the Nile, which separates it from Cairo, while the vizier took a position nearly

\* Vide sir Robert Wilson's History of the Expedition to Egypt, Appendix—Also General Reynier's State of Egypt, p. 315.

within cannon-shot of that metropolis, on the opposite quarter. On the 22d the enemy sent out a flag of truce, and informed the British commander that they wished to treat for the evacuation of Cairo, and of the forts thereunto belonging. After a negotiation of some days, articles of capitulation were signed (June 27), agreeably to which, the troops in garrison, under general Belliard, consisting of about 10,000 men of all descriptions, were to be conveyed to the French ports in the Mediterranean, with their arms, artillery, and effects, within fifty days from the date of the ratification. Men of letters and naturalists accompanying the army were permitted to retain their papers and collections: and it was stipulated that general Menou might avail himself of these conditions for the surrender of Alexandria, provided his acceptance of them was declared within ten days of the date of the communication.

Thus was the city of Grand Cairo delivered up to the British and Ottoman armies, almost without an effort on the part of the French for its preservation. The fortifications of this capital of Egypt, though imperfect, were difficult of approach; they were defended by 360 pieces of cannon, and the strength of the garrison seemed to bid defiance to an assault. The council of war which deliberated on the measure was com-

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BOOK XXXV. posed of eight generals, four of whom (La Grange, Robin, Duranton, and Bron) voted against it; 1801. and Dupas, who had the government of the citadel, positively refused to obey the first commands of general Belliard, declaring that he had orders from general Menou to defend that fort to the last extremity. It has been also observed, that as the Nile generally rises to its highest elevation in the beginning of August, the end of July would have been the latest moment to which an army could remain in the neighbourhood of Cairo without danger \*. On the other hand, general Belliard, in his official narrative, states "that the city was ill supplied with provisions, that ammunition for the artillery was scarce, and that the French lines of circumvallation could not be defended against an assault, on account of their immense extent, and the weakness of several points †." On the part of the English, nevertheless, to use the words of the commander-in-chief, general Hutchinson, "this was a long and arduous service, from the intense heat of the weather, the difficulty of procuring provisions, and still more from that of navigating the river, and bringing up the heavy artillery at this season of the year, when the bar of the Nile at

\* Wilson's History, p. 158-9.

† Official Letters, June 21st—29th.

Rosetta is frequently impassable for many days together." And both in the plan and execution of this memorable march into the interior of Egypt, the judgement, firmness, and perseverance of this able and excellent officer were uniformly and strikingly exhibited.

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Scarcely was the capitulation signed, when the Indian army under general Baird, consisting of 5000 regular troops and 2000 Sepoys, appeared on the banks of the Nile. The fleet which conveyed them from Asia left Ceylon on the 18th of February, and, touching at Bombay on their passage, after a voyage of twenty weeks landed the forces at Cosseir. The navigation of the Red Sea was found both difficult and dangerous: two of the transports were lost, and many others damaged. The soundings frequently did not exceed four or five fathoms, though it was in some places found unfathomable. After staying a short time at Cosseir, they crossed the desert of Thebes, and in ten days arrived at Gennat, on the banks of the Nile, four hundred miles from Cairo. The route of the army had been through long and dreary defiles, amid barren rocks, without a particle of herbage. The joy excited among the soldiers at the sight of the river, is beyond description. The army marched along the banks of the Nile from Gennat to Kenneh, whence, July the 28th, they embarked in boats for

Arrival of  
the Indian  
army under  
general  
Baird.



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1801. Cairo, which (though the distance is above 300 miles) they reached, through the rapidity of the stream, in a few days. After halting at Cairo for some weeks, in order to recover and refresh the men, exhausted with fatigue, they again embarked on the Nile for Rosetta, where they arrived on the 31st of August, and encamped in the beautiful vicinity of that city. Though these troops were not brought into action, there can be no doubt that the expectation of their arrival contributed to hasten the determination of general Belliard. The martial spirit of the conqueror of Seringapatam was eminently conspicuous in the conduct of this expedition; and it was remarked that the appearance of the men, their health and their vigour, were not in the smallest degree injured or impaired by the hardships and privations they had so long sustained.

General Menou, far from appearing to approve of that article in the capitulation of Cairo, agreeably to which he might have surrendered on the terms acceded to by general Belliard, strengthened the fortifications around Alexandria, and talked of defending himself as long as one stone remained upon another. He had even the presumption to declare, in his official dispatches to the French government, "that he would never capitulate at Alexandria"—promising "to bury himself beneath the ruins of the city."—"He,"

as it is sarcastically remarked, "who makes such engagements in the face of Europe, should know how to keep them\*." General Menou, indeed, did not yet despair of receiving the reinforcement destined for Egypt, under the care of admiral Gantheaume: but that officer, after remaining forty-eight hours almost in sight of Alexandria, was obliged to bear away on being discovered by the English fleet; and by great good fortune, and after undergoing many hazards, he made his way back in safety to Toulon. The operations of the besieging army commenced on the 17th of August, when the first parallel was begun at the distance of 1200 yards: and during the night a flotilla was embarked on the lake Mareotis, with a body of troops under general Coote, who effected his landing to the westward of Alexandria, and immediately invested the strong castle of Marabout, situated at the entrance of the harbour of Alexandria, on the side of the Desert; which fortress capitulated on the night of the 21st. On the east side of the town; the heights were, with slight resistance, stormed and occupied by the generals Craddock and Moore. A sortie was soon after attempted by the garrison, who charged resolutely with fixed bayonets, but met with an unexpected reception

\* General Reynier's "State of Egypt," &c., p. 335.

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Surrender  
of Alexan-  
dria, and  
final con-  
quest of  
Egypt.

from colonel Spencer, who, with very inferior force, drove them back with great loss under the walls of the city. Other successes followed: and on the morning of the 26th, four batteries were opened on each side of the town against the intrenched camp of the French, which did great execution; and on the evening of the 27th, general Menou requested an armistice, in order to prepare articles of capitulation, which, after some difficulties and delays, were signed on the 2d of September, nearly on the same terms with those concluded by general Belliard. The garrison consisted of upwards of 8000 soldiers and 1300 sailors; to which when the whole of the civil department and artificers were added, a grand total appeared of 11213 persons\*.

Thus was completed, in six months, the conquest of Egypt by the English. Considering the great losses sustained by the French during that interval, it may with certainty be inferred, that, at the time of the enemy's landing, they did not muster less than 25000 regular troops in Alexandria, Cairo, and the various other stations occupied by them in that country. They were troops eminent for courage and discipline, inured to the climate, and accustomed to victory. The reduction of Egypt, then, by a

\* Wilson's History of the Expedition to Egypt, p. 215.

force confessedly inferior, in so short a time, BOOK XXXV.  
 seems a phenomenon not easily to be accounted 1801.  
 for. General Menou appears to have been a man of an active and sanguine, but not of a clear or comprehensive mind; and he has been with great show of justice blamed for not sufficiently concentrating his force, and suffering himself to be beaten in detail. In a council of war convened by this commander previous to the surrender of Alexandria, he delivered his sentiments, as reported in the French accounts, in the following terms:—"The capitulation of Cairo has irrevocably decided the fate of Alexandria. In fact, Cairo ought to have held out ten weeks longer than it did. In that case, Alexandria might have supplied itself with provisions—the fortifications might have been completed—diseases would have destroyed the enemy—and the French would have preserved Egypt."—"The actions of general Menou, to sum up the whole, by no means corresponded with his magnificent boasts; and he had little reason to censure general Belliard for not holding out ten weeks, when he himself signed a capitulation in scarcely more than as many days \*."

\* Although the celebrated publication of general Reynier, "STATE of EGYPT after the Battle of Heliopolis," abounds with the most false and invidious representations respecting the English expedition, the exertions of the English soldiery,



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Treachery  
of the  
Turks.

No sooner did the prospect of recovering Egypt present itself to the Ottoman Porte, than a secret design seems to have been formed to

and the conduct of the English generals; yet justice must be done to the military sagacity which so severely censures the dispositions, and arraigns the plans, of the French commander-in-chief. "General Menou," says this able officer, "had constantly deceived himself, repelling advice that came to him from various quarters, as to the nature and true object of this expedition.—Some of the generals endeavoured to convince general Menou of the necessity of promptly concentrating the army near Aboukir. They urged, that the vizier would not move till he was certain of the success of the English; that there would be time to defeat the English, and to march to Salahieh, before the vizier could reach that place; that even in case the vizier, by more rapid movements, should obtain some success, his troops would be easily dispersed when they learned the defeat of their allies; that, in a word, by dividing the army it was continually exposed to disasters."—In a letter written by general Reynier to general Menou, dated from Cairo, March 4, these ideas are enforced with great ability. "At the time of the landing of the Turks at Aboukir," says general Reynier, "Bonaparte left at Belbeis and Salahieh no more than a hundred men, a very few troops at Damietta, and a very small garrison at Cairo: he concentrated the army to march to Aboukir. Our situation is similar, and we ought to make like dispositions."—Instead of replying to his arguments, general Menou, in a short and peremptory note, ordered general Reynier "to depart without delay for Belbeis—assuring him that he should not be left ignorant of any thing, but that all should be provided for."

Immediately subsequent to the battle of the 30th of Ventose (21st of March), general Reynier repeated to the com-

change the government of the country, so long exercised by the Mamelouks, and to establish in its room the usual mode of provincial admi- BOOK  
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mander-in-chief, that the heights of Nico formed an improper position for the army: he urged, that the insulated detachments would be cut off one by one, unless recalled to the main body; and he proposed to leave sufficient garrisons in the citadel of Cairo, at Alexandria, and at forts Julian and Lesbeh, and to concentrate the army at Rahmanieh, to watch a favorable opportunity to attack the English, when they should quit their position to attack Alexandria or Rosetta. But general Menou fancied that every proposition tending to concentrate the army, had the evacuation of Egypt for its object. "While that commander was at Cairo," says his keen antagonist, "he would not believe that the English could debark. When he was at Alexandria, he endeavoured to persuade himself that the vizier would not march; that the English would undertake nothing; that, while he should be before their army, they would neither dare to quit their position, nor send detachments against Rosetta; and that they would speedily reembark."

On the 23d of Germinal (April 13), general Reynier wrote a second letter to general Menou, strongly urging him to take a better position for the defence of Alexandria, and recalling to his recollection the unfortunate consequences resulting from his uniform and systematic neglect of the advice so repeatedly offered to him. The English were now established at Rosetta, and the vizier's army had passed the Desert. "When none of the enemy's measures," says this officer, "are foreseen, and a general divides his own forces, he is almost certain to be beaten."—It was, indeed, a long time before general Menou would give credit to the report that the English had captured Rosetta and occupied it in force. He

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nistration by pachas. To the beys, however, the grand-vizier held out the most unequivocal promises that their authority should be restored on the expulsion of the infidels; and soon after the surrender of Alexandria, seven of these Mamelouk chiefs were invited to hold a conference with the capitan-pacha, on the necessary arrangements for this purpose. They were received with hospitality and respect; and the pacha engaged them further to accompany him on board his own ship, on a visit of ceremony to the British commander; but on going into the boats prepared for them, divers indications of some dangerous design occasioned a sudden recollection of the warnings given them by general Hutchinson, never to trust themselves in the hands of the Turks; and they demanded to be re-conducted to the shore. This being peremptorily refused, the beys, grasping their arms, began to

said "he would order any man to be shot who should affirm it;" and he destined a slight detachment of 800 men only to retake that city. A similar force was dispatched to the important station of Rahmanieh, on which general Reynier made a final effort to convince general Menou "that it was not by successive small detachments, but by concentrating the army, that the enemy's progress could be checked. But all his representations being fruitless, he determined to go to Alexandria, and remain there," as he says, "a mere spectator of the unfortunate events which he could not but foresee."—STATE OF EGYPT, by General REYNIER, pp. 233, 275, 284, &c.

use force. A conflict ensued, in which four of the chiefs (among whom was Osman Bey, the successor of Mourad) were killed, and three wounded—several of the boatmen shared the same fate. The grand-vizier at the same time attempted to secure as many of the beys as he could by force or fraud. Some fell into his hands—others made their escape into Upper Egypt.

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General Hutchinson, apprised of this perfidious procedure, ordered the troops under arms, remonstrated severely with the grand-vizier and capitan-pacha, and reclaimed, in a menacing tone, the wounded beys, the bodies of the slain for honorable sepulture, and the chiefs, also, who were in the power of the vizier. The capitan-pacha maintained that the suspicions of the beys were without foundation, and excused his own conduct, from the orders that had been sent, both to himself and the grand-vizier, from the Porte, which was well assured that it never was the intention of the court of London to take any part in the internal regulations or government of Egypt, but, after the expulsion of the French, to leave the Ottomans to establish there what form of government they should think proper. Although general Hutchinson did not, and probably could not, controvert this reasoning, he demanded with inflexible firmness the freedom of the beys, which was at length granted; but, in



**BOOK** the sequel, an intestine and bloody war broke  
**XXXV.** out between the Turks and the Mamelouks,  
 1801. who, notwithstanding the inferiority of their  
 numbers, gained great advantages over the  
 Ottoman power.

Reduction  
 of the Da-  
 nish and  
 West-India  
 isles.

On the western side of the Atlantic, the naval  
 power of Britain retained its wonted and resist-  
 less superiority. In the month of March ad-  
 miral Duckworth made an easy capture of the  
 Swedish island of St. Bartholomew, and the  
 Danish isles of St. Thomas and Santa Cruz, which  
 were of course restored to those powers when  
 the subsequent accommodation took place. The  
 islands of St. Martin and Eustatius (the French  
 garrison being previously withdrawn from the  
 latter) were also reduced nearly at the same  
 time, and with the same facility. The valuable  
 island of Madeira, likewise, during the invasion  
 of Portugal by France, was seized and garri-  
 soned by the English.

In the East Indies, Ternate, the chief pos-  
 session remaining to the Dutch of the Moluccas,  
 was conquered (June 1801), after a siege and  
 resolute resistance of fifty-two days, by the arms  
 of the East-India company.

Considerable success, also, attended the Bri-  
 tish arms in the Mediterranean. Admiral sir  
 James Saumarez, one of the most brave and  
 skilful officers in the British navy, commanded

a squadron of ten ships of the line, which block-<sup>BOOK XXXV.</sup>  
aded the port of Cadiz. Receiving intelligence <sup>1801.</sup>  
that three French line-of-battle ships and a frig-  
ate were lying at anchor in the road of Algezi-  
ras under cover of the batteries on shore, he  
conceived the bold design of attacking them in  
that situation. Proceeding with a superior  
force and favorable breeze on the morning of  
the 6th of July, in the sanguine hope of cap-  
turing the French ships, on a sudden the wind  
failed, and the English could not, with every ef-  
fort, engage the enemy in a regular or close  
action. The Hannibal, captain Ferris, also, in  
bearing up, unfortunately took the ground in a  
position where she lay exposed to a tremendous  
fire from one of the batteries on land. Admiral  
Saumarez made an attempt to silence the bat-  
tery, by running his own ship between the  
Hannibal and the shore: but this manœuvre not  
succeeding, and being himself only three cables'  
length from another battery, he was finally  
compelled to desist from his enterprise, leaving,  
to his inexpressible chagrin, the Hannibal a prey  
to the enemy: captain Ferris, however, did not  
strike till he had lost, in killed and wounded, 143  
men.

The French seemed much elated with this ad-  
vantage, which their public prints magnified into  
a great naval victory—three of their ships of war

BOOK XXXV. having, as they pretended, beaten five of the English: and the attempt being thought to border upon temerity, the want of success cast a momentary shade over the reputation of the admiral, who was ardently impatient to avenge the insult.

Victory  
obtained  
by sir J.  
Saumarez.

The three French ships were reinforced, two days after the battle, by five Spanish line-of-battle ships, and a French ship of seventy-four guns, besides three frigates, and their late prize the Hannibal. With the utmost diligence the English squadron repaired their damages, and put to sea on the 12th of July; and, though now much inferior in force, the *Pompée* being altogether disabled from joining, the admiral determined to obstruct the passage of the enemy's fleet to Cadiz. Late in the evening he observed them to have cleared Cabareta point, and immediately bore after them. The action did not begin till eleven, but it was then most tremendous. On the admiral's own ship (the *Cæsar*) coming up to attack the *Royal Carlos*, a three-decker, on board of which the Spanish admiral, don Moreno, had hoisted his flag, she was perceived to have taken fire; and the flames soon communicating to another three-decker, the *San Hermenegildo*, both of 112 guns, they blew up in a short time with a dreadful explosion. The *San Antonio*, of seventy-four guns, struck her colors to the Su-

perb; and, in the darkness and confusion of the action, the Spanish ships fired furiously into each other, doing themselves almost as much damage as they received from the English. It blew excessively hard during the night; and in the morning the enemy were out of sight, making their way in a most shattered condition to Cadiz.

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When the French troops entered Tuscany in October 1800, the English then resident at Leghorn, under the conduct of Mr. Grant, vice-consul at that port, took refuge in the isle of Elba; and having received from the squadron cruising off that coast under sir John Borlase Warren, the necessary supplies, with a reinforcement of 300 soldiers and artillery-men, they established themselves in the fort and harbour of Porto-Ferrajo. Four hundred Corsicans, and about an equal number of Neapolitans and other military adventurers, joining them, formed all together a considerable garrison, the command of which devolved on an officer of equal spirit and ability, lieutenant-colonel Airey. It was quickly invested on the land side, by an army of five or six thousand men; and batteries being raised, the town was bombarded, and attempts were twice made to storm the fortress. The garrison, however, not merely repelled the different assaults, but made a sally on the besieged,

Gallant defence of  
Porto-Ferrajo.



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and destroyed the batteries. The besieging army was reinforced, the batteries re-constructed; but the garrison still defended themselves with equal vigor and success. At length, after the lapse of many months, Porto-Ferrajo was anew summoned to surrender, in the name of the KING of ETRURIA, with a promise of amnesty: but governor Grant sent for answer, that he acknowledged no authority in Tuscany except that of grand-duke.

In the month of September this year, admiral Warren made an attempt, by landing a considerable body of troops, to relieve the brave garrison, and reduce the island; but, after an obstinate engagement, the English were overpowered by numbers, and compelled to retreat. This event, far from discouraging the garrison, incited them to new efforts, and in a subsequent sally they forced the French intrenchments, and drove the enemy from their advanced posts with great effusion of blood; and this extraordinary defence began justly to attract great attention and admiration.

Threats of  
invasion.

During the whole of the present summer, the French government, chagrined at the failure of its projects from the Red Sea to the Baltic, menaced England with loud and continued threats of invasion; and three different camps were formed opposite to the English coast—one near Ostend

—a second between Gravelines and Dunkirk—BOOK XXXV.  
and a third at Boulogne. Naval preparations were also carried on with great activity along the Dutch and Flemish shores, as well as those of France, and the combined fleets of France and Spain, which lay in the harbour of Brest, amounted to no less than fifty-two sail of the line. 1801.

These hostile demonstrations were viewed, both Heroism of the British nation.  
by the government and the people of England, without any sensation of terror: yet no precaution was omitted which might contribute to the public safety. The whole kingdom seemed animated with the spirit of patriotism, combined with that of military ardor; and every one placed a just confidence in the national courage and resources. About the end of July a circular letter was issued by the secretary of state, lord Pelham, to the lords lieutenants of counties, communicating the intelligence “that the naval and military preparations, carried on in the ports and on the coasts of France and Holland, had of late been pursued with increased activity; and signifying his majesty’s earnest wish that the several corps of volunteer cavalry and infantry, throughout the kingdom, might be kept in a state of immediate service.” This royal and paternal request was obeyed with the utmost alacrity. Field-days and reviews became common in

BOOK every district, and almost in every parish: the  
 XXXV. whole country assumed a military air, and an at-  
 1801. titude not merely of defence, but of defiance.

Strong piquet guards were mounted all along the coast—frigates and advice-boats stationed at the proper places—while a chain of English vessels of war stretched along the whole extent of the Channel, at a small distance from the Gallic shore; and the gallant admiral Nelson was invested with the supreme command of this vast armament.

Attacks on  
 the flotilla  
 at Bou-  
 logne.

But a system altogether defensive is dispiriting in its own nature, and was justly deemed unworthy of the magnanimity of the British nation. The coasts of France were kept in a state of constant alarm by the vigilance of the naval commanders, and many partial successes obtained; and scarcely could the vessels of the enemy move from port to port, with the utmost caution, but at the risk of capture. Boulogne was regarded as the chief point of rendezvous; and at this place the French had collected a numerous flotilla of gun-boats and other armed vessels, for the professed purpose of transporting their troops across the Channel. At the very moment when it might be supposed that they deemed their project ripening for execution, lord Nelson sailed from Deal, and arriving off Boulogne August 3, anchored about four miles from the

land. At break of day, next morning, the English fleet, standing close in shore, began to throw bombs and shells into the town and harbour. BOOK  
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In the course of the day much damage was done to the vessels in the port of Boulogne; ten being disabled and five sunk. Though this success was far from decisive, lord Nelson remarked, in his official dispatch on this occasion, "it would serve to convince the enemy that they could not come out of their harbours with impunity."

Estimating lightly a victory unaccompanied with the renown arising from more active exertion, the admiral formed the design of bringing off that portion of the French flotilla, now moored in the front of Boulogne, to the number of twenty-five armed ships. On the evening of the 15th August, the English vessels, ranged in four divisions, were ordered to storm the French line of boats, brigs, &c. defended by long poles, headed with spikes of iron, projecting from their sides, and with a strong rope-netting up to the lower yards; moored head and stern across the harbour with iron chains; containing each from 150 to 200 soldiers; under the protection also of land batteries and musketry from the shore. Captain Parker of the *Medusa*, who commanded one of the divisions, closed with the enemy soon after midnight; but the precautions previously taken baffled all the



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efforts of the English; and a terrible discharge from the gun-boats, &c. either killed or wounded two-thirds of the crew of the *Medusa*. The other divisions, though the attack on their part was made with the utmost intrepidity, suffered extremely from the constant fire kept up by the enemy, of grape-shot and small-arms; and the vessels which were boarded in the course of the conflict could not be carried off, after cutting the cables, being all fastened together with chains. At length it was found that they were engaged in an impracticable attempt; and the boats were withdrawn about three o'clock in the morning, after sustaining a very serious loss. Among the mortally wounded was the gallant captain Parker, who died shortly afterwards extremely beloved and lamented.

Lord Nelson, leaving the different French ports still blockaded, immediately returned to the Downs; and, notwithstanding this mischance, his popularity in the navy rather seemed to increase than diminish, in consequence of the extreme and unintermitted attention which he paid, on this occasion, to the aid and comfort of those

Prelimi-  
naries of  
Peace  
signed.

who had suffered in the late action. But, while they were burning with fresh enthusiasm, and eager to distinguish themselves by new exertions, the joyful and astonishing intelligence was announced, that preliminaries of peace had been

signed between Great Britain and the French republic. BOOK  
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Although it was well known that discussions relative to peace had taken place between the two governments, the public opinion augured ill of the success of the negotiation: and indeed lord Hawkesbury's letter to M. Otto of the 25th of June appeared to set every idea of accommodation at a great distance. Almost three weeks elapsed before an answer was returned by the French government; and it noticed the offers of the court of London merely to express the indignation excited by them. "Can it be believed," says the minister, M. Otto, "that the French people are reduced to such a sad extremity as to sign a disgraceful peace? If, after eight years of a war which has caused so much blood to be shed, after so many assurances of *moderation*, so many reciprocal protestations, the French people see themselves obliged to continue the war, is it to be doubted that it will find in its constancy, its population, and its strength, the means of repairing the losses which its allies and itself have only in part restrained; *occupied* by treasons, by the consequences of the revolution, and the efforts of continental nations?"

The reply of lord Hawkesbury, dated July 20, after repeating the vain boasts of his former

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1801. letters, respecting the justice and moderation of his majesty, which, he says, must appear evident to all the world; and deploring that the same spirit is not discoverable in the French government, and expressing the surprise which he felt at the rejection of proposals so equitable; concludes at last by demanding “that the French government will distinctly state to what part of the propositions of his majesty its objections apply; and that it will communicate, with the same frankness which has marked the conduct of his majesty, the conditions which, after a general consideration of circumstances, it may judge proper, to conduct the negotiations to a prompt and happy conclusion.”

M. Otto without delay made a rejoinder, couched in language extremely cold, and approaching to contempt. He declares “that the French government is forgetful of nothing that may lead to a general peace, because it is at the same time the interest of *humanity* and of the *allies*. It is for the king of England to calculate if it is equally for the interest of his politics, his commerce, and his nation.” M. Otto then states, in exact conformity to the proposition made by him many weeks before, that England shall keep Ceylon; adding, in explicit terms, “that Egypt shall be restored to the Porte—that Minorca shall be given back to Spain—that Malta

shall be restored to the order—that the Cape of Good Hope and the other conquests of England shall be restored to the allies: as to Martinico in particular, France will never renounce her right to it. Nothing now remains,” says the French minister in a tone somewhat haughty, “for the British cabinet, but to manifest the part which it will take; and if these conditions cannot satisfy it, it will be proved in the face of the world that the first consul has neglected nothing, and that he has evinced his disposition to make every kind of sacrifice, to re-establish peace, and to spare to humanity the tears and blood which will be the inevitable consequences of a new campaign.”

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Lord Hawkesbury's answer to the above note was delayed till the 5th of August, and it exhibited a singular medley of complaint and concession. “His majesty,” the minister says, “had every right to expect that the unreserved and moderate propositions to which he was disposed to accede, for the re-establishment of peace, would have been favorably received by the French government, or, at least, that in the plan of pacification which was offered there would have been no essential difference. His majesty is convinced that no reasonable objection can be made by the French government to the substance of the conditions which he has proposed:



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he had therefore a right to expect that every proposition that might spring from it should be conformable to those principles which had been acknowledged, as those were which appear in his last communication.—The undersigned flatters himself that the French government will be guided by the same principles, and that the success of the negotiation will not be frustrated by a demand, on its part, of restitutions which the relative situations of the belligerent powers would not allow, and which its own example, in regard to its conquests, does not give it any right to expect, and which his majesty does not consider as according with those principles on which alone an honorable and permanent peace can be concluded.

“ In this view his majesty is disposed to give a new proof of his moderation and sentiments; and *he does not make any difficulty in declaring*, that, if the French government will admit of a reasonable arrangement relative to the East Indies, in conformity to the principle which has been acknowledged as the true basis of the negotiations, his majesty is ready to enter into further explanations relative to the island of Malta, and desires seriously to concert the means to form an arrangement which will render it independent both of Great Britain and France.”

It was doubtless with an agreeable surprise that the French government received the intelligence of this concession; for, after the relinquishment of Malta—without any distinct or specific equivalent—it could not be supposed that the English cabinet meant in the sequel seriously to contend for Martinico or any other of the French possessions acquired by British valor in the course of the war. With regard to “a reasonable arrangement relative to the East,” France had already consented to the cession of Ceylon, and England to the restitution of the Cape: and Spain held, in virtue of the treaty of Badajoz, an ample pledge for the restoration of Trinidad, or a full compensation for that valuable settlement. Minorca was included in the original plan of restitution; and the isle of Elba, the third grand maritime station now possessed by Great Britain in the Mediterranean, was given up implicitly and silently, as of too little importance for specific mention. In a word, as England had now yielded the point which above all others she was most likely and seemed most disposed to contest, no insuperable difficulty could be supposed to remain in the way of peace. But if lord Hawkesbury had, at the outset of this negotiation, made more moderate demands, and assumed in the progress of it a more firm though less lofty tone, it is highly probable that peace

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BOOK might have been concluded upon a much more  
XXXV. satisfactory basis; especially if the negotiation  
1801. had been conducted with such ability and address as to have excited in the government of France the pleasing hope that the destructive, inveterate, and causeless animosity of England against her, could by any means have been converted into sentiments of amity and good will.

After this great concession on the part of England, *made*, to adopt the words of lord Hawkesbury, *without any difficulty*, though not till the negotiation had run to a tedious length, the discussions were resumed, and tended rapidly towards a favorable conclusion. M. Otto informed lord Hawkesbury, by a note dated 24th Thermidor, (August 11,) that he did not delay a moment to communicate to his government that which he had received of the 5th of August. "It is," said that dexterous negotiator, "with the sincerest satisfaction that the first consul perceives, in the last communication of the British government, that the negotiation begins on its part to assume a character calculated to inspire confidence, and to afford the prospect of a termination to those evils which are the inevitable consequences of a war of so long duration. His Britannic majesty having consented that the island of Malta and its dependencies should be

placed in such a position as to belong neither to France nor to England, the sole obstacle is removed which the arrangements respecting the Mediterranean still continued to offer. And as to America—his majesty having declared that he is not influenced by any view of ambition and aggrandisement—it is impossible not to remark that the ancient possessions of his majesty in that quarter have their central point in Jamaica, an extensive and opulent colony, strong from its position, but rendered impregnable by the accumulated works which render it superior to all attack; consequently the ancient possessions of his majesty in America do not require to be augmented, in order to their consolidation or to assure their means of defence. Nevertheless, the French government will not put the peace of the world in balance with the possession of an island but of secondary consequence to France and its allies, and which has been conquered by the arms of his Britannic majesty.”

The cession of Trinidad being thus virtually secured to England as a compensation for the acquisition of Olivenza by Spain, nothing of magnitude, long to impede the conclusion of the preliminary treaty, seemed to remain. Another effort was however made, in these circumstances, by lord Hawkesbury, to retain the island of Martinico, or at least to obtain something, though of



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inferior value, by way of exchange. In a note, addressed August 14, therefore, to M. Otto, the English minister declares, “that, if the possession of Martinico by his majesty be considered by the French government as an insurmountable obstacle to the return of peace, his majesty may be induced to renounce his just pretension in this respect, on condition that the French government will consent to the following alternative: In the 1st place, That his majesty may keep, in the West Indies, the islands of Trinidad and Tobago; and, in this case, Demerary, Essequibo, and Berbice, shall be free ports. 2dly, That his majesty shall retain possession of St. Lucia, Tobago, Demerary, Essequibo, and Berbice.”

This note occasioned some discussion: and France being desirous to spare his catholic majesty the mortification of ceding the island of Trinidad, in which case Portugal might doubtless have preserved the district of Olivenza, the first consul was induced—“contrary to the immovable basis which had been so long established in France, that the peace ought not to cost any personal sacrifice to the republic”—to offer Tobago and Curaçao in lieu of Trinidad; for, as to the cession of Martinico, the French government would not deign to hearken even for a moment to the mention of a proposition so degrading. But

the English government refused to depart from its demand of Trinidad\*.

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On the 7th of September a long conference took place between the two ministers, in which the substance of the preliminary articles was finally arranged. The most remarkable difference which arose on this occasion related to the article stipulating the integrity of the kingdom of Portugal. For lord Hawkesbury proposing to substitute, for the word kingdom, the words "territory and possessions of her most faithful majesty," citizen Otto refused to consent to the alteration, as it might weaken the arrangements made at Badajoz respecting the limits of Guiana.—Agreeably to the minute genius and narrow views of the English cabinet, lord Hawkesbury still continued to exert some faint efforts to gain the island of Tobago from France, in addition to Trinidad, as well as to prevail that Demerary, Essequibo, and Berbice should be declared free ports—concessions which the utmost firmness, combined with the greatest address, could alone hope to obtain. But, by their weak and wavering conduct, the English ministry incurred the mortification of a peremptory, not to say imperious, declaration, on the part of the French government, as communi-

\* Vide Official Papers, published at Paris, p. 57.

BOOK cated from M. Talleyrand to M. Otto 24 Fruc-  
 XXXV. tidor (September 11), "that, if the proposi-  
 1801. tions in question were sustained, they would  
 destroy all that the dispositions announced on  
 the part of the English government, and which  
 they had given room to hope for, and to have seen  
 the salutary work of peace immediately termi-  
 nated. For, in fine," says this minister, "it is not  
 when it has ceded all that is compatible with its  
 honor that a government can suffer new sacri-  
 fices to be torn from it; and the first consul,  
 treating in the name of the French people, will  
 never subscribe to conditions in which the honor  
 of the nation is compromised. It is prescribed  
 to you, citizen, to give a formal assurance of it."  
 M. Otto was also charged to add verbally to  
 this declaration, "that the first consul having  
 gone as far as honor would permit him, there  
 was no room to hope that he would make one  
 step more."

In the reply, September 22, to this *ultimatum*  
 on the part of France, lord Hawkesbury con-  
 sents that the limits of French Guiana shall be  
 extended to the river Ariwari, *provided* that the  
 integrity of all the states of her most faithful  
 majesty in Europe be maintained. He also re-  
 nounces the pretensions of his Britannic ma-  
 jesty respecting the settlements of Demerary,  
 Essequibo, and Berbice: but, persisting in the

indulgence of a lingering and evidently unavailing hope as to the third point of difference, this nobleman, in the style rather of a petitioner than a negotiator, says, "From the disposition that his majesty has shown to get rid of every other difficulty, he cannot suppose that the French government will raise a new obstacle on the possession of the island of Tobago. It is an ancient property of his crown; the people are almost entirely English colonists; and it is not of any value or interest to France."

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This feeble and humble attempt being rejected, no doubt with disdain, by the French government, the preliminary articles of peace, fifteen in number, were at length signed, on the evening of the 1st of October (1801), by the two ministers plenipotentiary.

Conformably to the tenor of these articles, his Britannic majesty agreed to restore to the French republic and her allies all the possessions and colonies conquered by the British arms during the war—the island of Trinidad and the Dutch possessions in Ceylon excepted. "The port of the Cape of Good Hope shall be open to the commerce and navigation of the two contracting parties, who shall enjoy therein the same advantages. The island of Malta, with its dependencies, shall be evacuated by the troops of his Britannic majesty, and restored to the



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order of St. John of Jerusalem. For the purpose of rendering this island completely independent of either of the two contracting parties, it shall be placed under the guarantee and protection of a third power, to be agreed upon in the definitive treaty. Egypt shall be restored to the Sublime Porte, whose territories and possessions shall be preserved entire, such as they existed previously to the present war. The territories and possessions of her most faithful majesty shall likewise be preserved entire. The French forces shall evacuate the kingdom of Naples and the Roman territory. The English forces shall in like manner evacuate Porto Ferrajo, and generally all the ports and islands which they may occupy in the Mediterranean, or in the Adriatic. The republic of the Seven Islands shall be acknowledged by the French republic. The fisheries on the coasts of Newfoundland, and in the Gulf of St. Laurence, shall be restored to the same footing on which they were before the present war. And, finally, plenipotentiaries shall be named on each side, who shall repair to Amiens for the purpose of concluding a definitive treaty of peace in concert with the allies of the contracting parties."

Fortunately for the ministers, the desire of peace was so great that few persons were inclined very severely to scrutinise the articles of

this preliminary treaty. The intelligence that peace was concluded, diffused through the nation the most sincere and cordial satisfaction.

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The public were well aware that France was made great by the war, and not by the peace; respecting the specific conditions of which they displayed almost a frigid indifference. Even judges of a far superior class, knowing the difficulties with which ministers had to contend, confiding in their good intentions, and weary of a senseless and ruinous contest, seemed willing to view the errors and omissions of this treaty with extreme indulgence. It was thought, indeed, extraordinary virtually to transfer the possession of Porto Ferrajo to France, without securing either Malta or Minorca to England. It was believed that abler negotiators might at least have obtained the restitution of the island of Tobago, which England was under the necessity, in very different circumstances, of ceding to France by the treaty of 1783. But, above all, it excited astonishment, not altogether unmixed with indignation, that no regard whatever was paid, in this preliminary treaty, to the interests of the ancient and unfortunate ally of England, the king of Sardinia; the integrity of whose dominions had been at the commencement of the war guaranteed by Great Britain, who had even engaged, by a positive convention with that

BOOK power, not to conclude any peace with France  
XXXV. till Savoy was restored. This omission, how-  
1801. ever, they hoped might be rectified by some  
provision of the definitive treaty. But the un-  
skilful and irritating mode in which the negotia-  
tion had been conducted on the part of England,  
was at this time not at all known; and conse-  
quently it was little suspected that the restora-  
tion of peace was not likely to bring with it the  
most distant return of amity.

On the 12th of October the ratification of the first consul was brought to London by colonel Lauriston, one of his aides-de-camp, who was welcomed with loud and universal acclamations; and the event was celebrated in both countries by every public demonstration of joy. The count D'Artois, then anxiously waiting in London the issue of the negotiation, and other emigrants of distinction, acknowledging this treaty as the utter extinction of their hopes, and dreading the arrival of a French ambassador, retired precipitately to their former asylum in the city of Edinburgh; where that gay and dissolute prince had long resided in the gloomy state suited to his fallen fortunes, occupying the antiquated and melancholy apartments of the palace of Holyrood House; where he had no doubt sufficient leisure to reflect on the strange vicissitude of things, and the analogous calamities of

that famous and unfortunate family which had once inhabited this regal mansion.

A general review of the principal miscellaneous occurrences of historical moment in Europe, during this eventful period, may properly close the varied narrative of the present year.

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Transactions on  
the continent.

When the negotiations were renewed at Luneville, subsequent to the fatal defeat of Hohenlinden, the first consul insisted that the emperor should treat not only for himself, but for the empire, conformably to the example of the emperor Charles VI. at the treaties of Baden and Rastadt. In vain did the count Cobentzel urge that no such powers were granted by the diet in the present as in the former instances: the chief consul, justly suspicious of the consequences of protraction, absolutely refused to conclude with the emperor in his royal capacity merely. And the treaty was at length signed, without any special authority from the diet of the empire, by count Cobentzel, according to his instructions from the court of Vienna, as plenipotentiary of his imperial majesty in his capacity of emperor as well as king; engaging that it should be ratified by the diet in the space of thirty days.

Immediately consequent to this very unusual if not unprecedented exercise of power, the emperor addressed an apologetical letter to the



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diet, dated February 21, in which he excuses his own conduct in terms the most handsome and respectful to the princes of the empire; stating the urgent necessity of the case, "from the consideration of the melancholy situation in which a considerable part of Germany now is; and that of the still more unhappy fate with which the superiority of the French threatens the empire, should peace be longer deferred." The diet, on their part, with cheerfulness and deference acquiesced in these reasonings; expressing "their gratitude to the chief of the empire for the patriotic zeal he had shown in that negotiation;" and, not only did that assembly ratify the treaty of Luneville, but, by a subsequent *conclusum*, dated April 30, they entreat and empower his imperial majesty "to take upon himself the adjustment of all the objects which by that treaty were reserved for particular arrangement," only communicating the result to the diet in order to its final decision and ratification.

Wise conduct of the court of St. Petersburg.

In the month of April, while the question of peace and war between Great Britain and Russia was still doubtful, the new emperor Alexander, through the medium of his ambassador at Paris, count Kalitchef, made very pressing instances to the first consul to reinstate the king of Sardinia in the possession of the dominions which he had enjoyed previous to the irruption of the French ar-

mies into Italy, conformably to the engagements entered into by France with the late emperor. BOOK  
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He even went so far as to declare, that, if this demand was not acceded to, there could be no restoration of harmony between the two countries. 1801.  
And in the beginning of May the ambassador requires a specific answer, "whether the French government intends to keep its promise concerning the integrity of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the re-establishment of the king of Sardinia in his dominions?" To this requisition M. Talleyrand replied, in terms civilly evasive, "that the first consul was disposed to do every thing that might be pleasing and agreeable to the court of Russia; and that this end would have been attained sooner, if the negotiations with England, the situation of affairs in Italy and Egypt, and the war with Portugal, had not thrown certain invincible obstacles in the way of the business."

Though there is no reason to doubt the sincerity and good-will of the court of St. Petersburg in relation to the kings of Sicily and Sardinia, it was an object of far superior importance, in her estimation, to avoid embroiling herself anew with either of the two great belligerent powers, France or England. On the one hand, therefore, immediately subsequent to the conventional pacification with the latter, the empe-

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ror issued an edict, not only commanding the property of the British merchants, which had been sequestrated during the late reign, to be restored, but that, for such effects as had been irretrievably alienated, a full equivalent should be granted to the respective proprietors. And on the other hand, nearly at the same time, a circular letter was transmitted by that court to all its diplomatic ministers and agents, informing them “that negotiations for the purpose of establishing a reconciliation with France were in train,” and enjoining them “to testify on all occasions to the ambassadors of the French government that respect which is usual between the ministers of powers that are in good understanding with each other.” Such was the wisdom and moderation by which the counsels of Russia, under the auspices of the present sovereign, were conducted!

State of St.  
Domingo.

In July the important intelligence was received by the government of France from Toussaint Louverture, the famous negro chief and ruler of St. Domingo, that a central assembly had been convoked, and a constitution framed by the members of it, for the future government of that island—“a constitution which,” he says, “promises happiness to the long-suffering inhabitants of this colony, and which he has transmitted to the first consul for his approbation;

at the same time announcing, that, on account of the non-existence of all law, and the necessity there was for the suppression of anarchy, he had acquiesced in the demand of the central assembly to put this constitution in force, as a mean of sooner producing its future prosperity." This constitution seems indeed to have been dictated by an earnest desire to promote the happiness of the people for whom it was designed, and to have been well adapted to their circumstances; and it exhibited, upon the whole, the features of civil and religious freedom. Toussaint informs the first consul "that it was received with transports, which no doubt would be reiterated when it should be returned to them with the sanction of GOVERNMENT." Under the veil of this language of respect and deference, it was nevertheless evidently perceivable that an independent republic was established in St. Domingo. The first consul, however chagrined, was upon this occasion compelled to temporise; but the sanction solicited by Toussaint was never sent.

The elector of Cologne (who also held the bishopric of Munster), uncle to the emperor, dying about this time, the king of Prussia signified to the court of Vienna, and likewise to the chapters of Cologne and Munster, "his request that no new election might be proceeded upon;



BOOK but that, on account of the great existing embar-  
XXXV. rassment, the archbishopric and bishopric do re-  
1801. main vacant for the present ;” adding, that “ if  
such election should nevertheless *be* proceeded  
upon, he would be obliged to declare the same  
null and void.” This was seconded by a decla-  
ration of M. Bacher, minister of France at the  
diet, now sitting at Ratisbon, that the French  
government would support with all its power  
the determination of his Prussian majesty ; and  
requiring that “ all appointments to ecclesiastical  
dignities and possessions, and especially the  
election of a new elector of Cologne and bishop  
of Munster, be deferred till the indemnifications  
for the hereditary princes shall be definitively  
determined.”

The emperor, however, prompted rather by  
pride than policy, encouraged and *authorised* the  
two chapters to proceed to the respective elec-  
tions at the usual time, and in the accustomed  
form ; agreeably to which the archduke Anthony,  
a younger brother of the emperor, was chosen to  
fill the vacant sees. This event was formally no-  
tified by the court of Vienna to that of Berlin ; his  
imperial majesty at the same time declaring,  
“ that the course of the accomplishing of the in-  
demnities by means of secularisation would not  
be altered from personal consideration or secon-  
dary views ; and that the late election of the

archduke would not have the smallest influence on the conduct of the high imperial court ; in fine, that the government of those sees would in the mean time be continued in all respects in the same manner as if they were vacant.”

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The good sense and moderation of the king of Prussia induced him to appear satisfied with this explanation ; and, in his reply, he applauded the wise resolution of the emperor to postpone the further steps which one or both of the chapters might wish to adopt with respect to the election of the archduke.

The business of the indemnities proceeded very slowly and heavily. About the end of the summer, a *conclūsum* passed the diet, appointing an extraordinary deputation, consisting of eight members, four of the catholic and four of the protestant religion, “to co-operate, on the part of the states of the empire, in the work of peace.” And to this deputation were given “full and unlimited powers to examine, treat, and regulate, in concert with the French government, the objects which, by the 5th and 7th articles of the treaty of Luneville, were reserved for a particular arrangement.” This *conclusum* was ratified by the emperor, with strong expressions of commendation—the former mode of negotiating, agreeably to the usual forms, experiencing, as

BOOK XXXV.  
 1801. he expresses it, “powerful and multiplied obstacles:” and his imperial majesty was probably far from being eager to take the entire responsibility of this arrangement upon himself. But the negotiation appeared still to languish; and a more energetic interposition was too evidently necessary to bring so complex and difficult a business to a final decision.

—Of Switzerland—

By the 11th article of the treaty of Luneville, the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics, was expressly recognised; and “the right of the people who inhabit them, to adopt what form of government they pleased.” With a view to carry into effect this inestimable privilege, a convention of the Helvetic cantons was, in the month of September (1801), held at the city of Berne. This assembly, composed of very dissonant materials, determined, after vehement debate, upon certain articles, as the basis of a new constitution, importing, that the Helvetic republic formed only ONE state—that there was only ONE right of Helvetic citizenship, and no political rights of citizens relative to distinct cantons. The senate possesses, together with the proposal of laws, the direction of the general measures of government by the medium of an executive council; the diet to assemble ordinarily on the first of Fe-

bruary every year, and to consist of deputies from all the cantons in proportion to the population.

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This plan of government was, however, extremely odious to the lesser or democratic cantons; and no fewer than sixteen members of the convention, deputies from Uri, Schweitz, and Underwald, seceded entirely from that assembly; upon which account the proceedings of the convention were, by a decree of the ancient Helvetic legislative body, dated from Berne, October 28th, declared null and void. And the seceding deputies transmitted—by the hands of Aloys Reding, a distinguished democratic leader, and who had signalised his courage in repelling the first invasion of the French—to the first consul, a letter vindictory of their conduct; and the sentiments of which breathe all that passionate attachment to their own forms of government which has ever distinguished the free citizens of democratic states. “Deprived of all resources,” say they, “the three cantons of the Helvetic confederacy, Uri, Schweitz, and Underwald, feel too strongly the absolute necessity of a constitution founded on the simplicity and economy of their ancestors, not to signify to you, citizen first consul, the ardent desire which they have of preserving, as much as possible, that which the fathers of liberty have founded, and which, du-



BOOK XXXV.  
1801. ring nearly 500 years, has constituted the happiness of their children. Europe knows with what firmness and with what devotion, out of all proportion to their strength, the descendants of TELL have struggled for its preservation. The diversity of worship, manners, education, customs, wants, and many other circumstances, render a uniformity of administration impossible; and the attempt could not fail totally to destroy us. It is absolutely necessary that our boundaries should be marked, and that we should have a particular administration, in order to maintain the purity of our religion and morals, and to re-establish that economy which is so necessary to our political prosperity. This is the general wish of the people of Uri, of Schweitz, and of Underwald, who make it known to us in a request signed by 3600 citizens out of 3800, which this last canton contains. Citizen first consul, one word from you would render impotent those ambitious individuals who have influence only in proportion as they impress the idea that they are supported by France. We request this word with confidence, persuaded that it can neither be your intention, nor for the interest of France, to increase the misfortunes of a people who have already suffered so much, and who desire only tranquillity and repose."

The first consul listened with attention to this

application. He is even said to have made a <sup>BOOK XXXV.</sup> positive declaration to Aloys Reding, that the democratic cantons should enjoy their ancient <sup>1801.</sup> laws. In consequence of this powerful intervention, some very important modifications of the existing form of government were resolved upon; and what appeared a satisfactory accommodation took place; conformably to which a certain number of magistrates of both parties were admitted to the chief offices of the state—Aloys Reding being himself appointed president of the senate. To the grief, however, of the friends of liberty throughout Europe, who held in veneration the heroes of Morgarten, Sempach, and Morat, and to whom the very name of Switzerland was dear, the calamities of that devoted country had not yet attained to their destined period.

Nearly at this time very considerable changes, <sup>—Of Hol-</sup> and, probably, improvements, were made by the <sup>land.</sup> Batavian government in its existing constitution, no doubt with the approbation, if not the previous suggestion, of France, but apparently also with the willing concurrence of the people, to whom they were formally presented for acceptance. Conformably to the present model, the republic was divided into eight departments, corresponding to the ancient provinces, and the *generality*, or acquired territory. The government

BOOK was vested in a regency consisting of twelve  
 XXXV. members; one member to be annually chosen  
 1801. from a list of four persons nominated by the  
 departments conjointly, and transmitted by them  
 to the regency, which shall reduce the names  
 to two;—the legislative body finally appointing  
 one of these to the vacant seat. The mem-  
 bers of the regency shall vacate their seats in  
 rotation, one in each year, on the 1st of No-  
 vember. The legislative body shall consist of  
 thirty-five members, to be chosen by the active  
 citizens of the several departments. The laws  
 must be proposed by the council of regency to  
 the legislative body, and discussed by a commit-  
 tee of twelve, chosen by a plurality of voices for  
 the term of session ordinary or extraordinary;  
 and the members of the legislature pronounce on  
 the projects presented to them by a simple ne-  
 gative or affirmative. Such is the outline of a  
 constitution, upon the merits and demerits of  
 which, time and experience only can satisfac-  
 torily decide.

In the autumn of this year, a treaty of peace  
 was signed between France and the elector-pa-  
 latine of Bavaria, who had been ever secretly at-  
 tached to the French interest, justly apprehen-  
 sive, agreeably to the policy of his ancestors, of  
 the Austrian power and insatiable passion for  
 aggrandisement, to which that electorate seemed

obviously and incessantly in danger of being made the sacrifice. "Convinced that it is her interest to prevent the Bavaro-Palatine possessions from being reduced to a state of weakness, the French republic," by this treaty, "engages to use all its influence, and all its means, to obtain for the electoral-palatine house a territorial indemnity, situated as well as possible for its convenience, and equivalent to the losses of every kind which have been the consequence of the present war."

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Immediately subsequent to the signature of the preliminaries of peace with Great Britain, the first consul hastened to conclude a treaty with the Ottoman Porte, which was signed at Paris, October the 9th, by the French minister Talleyrand and Esseyd Ali Effendi, formerly ambassador from Turkey, but who had been detained as a hostage at Paris some years, and was now again recognised in his diplomatic capacity to answer the present purpose. The tenor of this treaty was very advantageous to France, which was restored by it to all her pristine rights of commerce and navigation, and also to a full participation of those privileges which might in future be granted to the most favored nations.

Treaty of  
peace be-  
tween  
France and  
Turkey.

At the same period, a formal treaty of peace was also signed between France and Russia; another between Spain and Russia; by which the



BOOK political and commercial relations of the respec-  
 XXXV. tive countries were re-established as before the  
 1801. war.

Concorda-  
 tum.

Another treaty, or convention, of a nature equally singular and important, and which had been for several months past under discussion, was finally concluded and signed on the 10th of September, between his holiness pope Pius VII. on the one part, and Bonaparte, first consul of the French republic, on the other. The object of this convention, which obtained the appellation of a *concordatum*, was the re-establishment of the Roman-catholic religion in France; not indeed in that mode or form in which it had subsisted under the monarchy, but in a modest and humble guise, adapted to present circumstances, and to the feelings and wishes of the French nation—a great majority of whom were attached to the catholic doctrines, though perhaps not properly papists in the strict or rigid sense of the word. The sovereign pontiff, who had long since regarded France as sunk into the depths of heresy and infidelity, thought scarcely any concessions too great to make on this occasion, for the purpose of reclaiming and recovering this great country to the profession of the true faith, and of receiving back so many millions of erring souls into the bosom of the church.

The principal articles of this concordatum were as follow: "That a new division of the French dioceses should be made by the holy see, in concert with the French government;" or, in other words, that the present republican division should be confirmed—his holiness also engaging to require of the ancient or titular French bishops, for the good of the church, a resignation of their respective sees. "That the chief consul should present, within three months after the publication of the pope's bull, to the archbishops and bishops of the new division. His holiness shall confer canonical institution according to the forms established in France before the *change of government*. The future nomination also to be vested in the first consul.

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"The bishops shall have the appointment of the parish-priests;—their choice nevertheless shall not fall but on persons approved by government.

"The bishops may have a chapter in their cathedral, and a seminary for their diocese, without endowment from the government.

"His holiness engages not in any manner to disturb the alienated property of the church.

"The government shall grant a suitable salary to bishops and parish-priests; and shall enable French catholics, who are so inclined, to dispose of their property for the support of religion."

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A consular edict was at the same time published, containing further regulations respecting the catholic church, as connected with the policy of the state. It enacts,

“ That no bull, rescript, decree, provision, &c., from the court of Rome, even if it should relate to individuals only, shall be received or promulgated without the authority of the government.

“ That no individual, assuming the character of nuncio, legate, vicar, &c., shall be allowed to exercise his functions but with the consent of government.

“ The decrees of foreign synods, or even of general councils, shall not be published in France previous to the examination and sanction of the government.

“ No national or diocesan synod, no deliberative assembly, shall be allowed without the express permission of government.

“ Recourse shall be had to the council of state in every instance of abuse on the part of superiors and other ecclesiastical persons.”

SUCH was the ecclesiastic constitution established by the *concordatum*; in which, it may be remarked, that there can be found no LORD bishops, no translations, no crown livings, no pluralities, no non-residence, no sine-cures, no wealth, no pomp, no power. The national church, thus

reduced to a condition of almost primitive low-  
 liness, boasted no haughty or absurd ALLIANCE BOOK XXXV.  
 with the state; but was regarded merely as an 1801.  
 institution meriting the protection of the civil  
 power, and permitted to exist for purposes use-  
 ful and beneficial to the public.

In order further to humble the pride of the Ro-  
 man church, two other religions—*viz.*, that con-  
 tained in the Confession of Augsburg, or the Lu-  
 theran; and that professed by the reformed, or  
 Calvinists—were also established, upon nearly a  
 footing of equality, at the same time and by the  
 same authority; none of these decrees, however,  
 being carried into effect till subsequently con-  
 firmed and ratified by the decision of the legis-  
 lative body. The churches of the Confession of  
 Augsburg were empowered to hold local con-  
 sistories, inspectional, and general consistories,  
 according to the customs and regulations of the  
 churches of Augsburg. It is, however, wisely  
 decreed, that the general consistory shall not be  
 permitted to assemble without the consent of the  
 government, and unless in presence of the pre-  
 fect or sub-prefect, and after a notification of the  
 subjects intended for discussion; also, that no doc-  
 trinal decision, or formulary, under the title of a  
 Confession, or any other title, shall be published, or  
 become a subject of instruction, before its publi-  
 cation has been authorised by the government;



BOOK and the council of state is empowered to take  
 XXXV. cognisance of all the plans which may be formed  
 1801. by their ministers, and of all the dissensions  
 which may arise among them. No provision is  
 indeed made by the government for the support  
 of the protestant churches: but the liberty of en-  
 dowment is extended to them in common with  
 the catholics—the property belonging to them  
 confirmed, as well as the oblations established by  
 usage and by positive regulations.

Three colleges, or public seminaries of educa-  
 tion, are to be erected, under the sanction of the  
 government, for the use of the protestants—two  
 in the east of France, for the Lutherans; and the  
 third at Geneva, for the reformed, or Calvinists.

Thus three distinct religions were recognised  
 and established by the state; the members of  
 which were all equally entitled to exercise every  
 function, and to hold every office, military or  
 civil, not excepting that of the first-consulship  
 itself;—and an express provision is even made  
 in the *concordatum* for the supposed case of a  
 protestant being elected to the chief magistracy  
 of the republic.

As to those persons who were not compre-  
 hended in the different denominations of catho-  
 lics, Lutherans, or Calvinists, no notice whatever  
 was or could properly be taken of them in the  
 several edicts or decrees now promulgated for

the purpose of conferring particular privileges or immunities on the different churches recognised and established by the state; but persecution, and indeed all positive restraint, being abolished, and all citizens declared by the constitution equal in the eye of the law, the various sects of dissidents were entitled to the protection of the government, not in virtue of any "Act of Toleration"—which is only an exemption from legal penalties, and therefore implies the existence of persecuting laws—but by the infinitely preferable mode of abrogating those laws which create the disgraceful *necessity* of toleration.

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Immediately consequent to the signing of the *concordatum*, the pope addressed a pontifical brief to the archbishops and bishops of France, notifying to these venerable fathers, "that still greater sacrifices remained to be added to those by which they had so gloriously distinguished themselves."—"The preservation of the unity of the holy church," says the sovereign pontiff, "the re-establishment of the catholic religion in France, demand a new example of virtue and of greatness of soul in you, which may teach all nations that the holy zeal with which you burn for the church, has for its object the advantage of the church and not of your order. Your ecclesiastical seats are voluntarily to be resigned; and the same must be given up freely into our hands.

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It is requiring much of you, venerable brethren ; it is, however, equally necessary, both that we should make this demand, and that you should comply with it, for the purpose of re-establishing order in France. We feel, indeed, how much it must cost your hearts to abandon those flocks which are so dear to you, to the safety of which you have given so much attention, and which, even in your absence, have been the object of your most tender solicitude : but the more bitter the sacrifice, the more agreeable will it be to God."

His holiness proceeds to enforce this apostolic injunction with many cogent arguments ; recalling to their recollection the noble example of almost three hundred African bishops, who offered at once to abdicate their sees, if such abdication would tend to remove the schism of the Donatists ; and quoting, from the writings of the great St. Austin, and the illustrious Gregory Nazianzen, who resigned, from similar motives, the bishopric of Constantinople, passages very apposite to his purpose. And the pontiff concluded a very interesting and affectionate epistle, discovering, upon the whole, strong sense and much goodness of heart, by "conferring on them his apostolic benediction, as a pledge of his paternal love."

A great majority of the prelates thus addressed

very laudably complied with a requisition made by such high authority: but the archbishop of Narbonne, and thirteen other bishops resident in London, unanimously determined, at a meeting held by them on the occasion, to refuse the abdication demanded of them; and, in a respectful letter addressed to the holy father, they state their reasons for this act of ecclesiastical disobedience; which was the more remarkable, as these prelates had, on former occasions, been distinguished for principles leading to unlimited spiritual submission: but their feelings, and not their principles, were at the present moment unfortunately predominant.

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The last treaty concluded by France, in the course of this blessed year of pacification, was that signed towards the close of it with the dey of Algiers, by which the French nation were restored to their former privileges in Africa; and it was declared that Frenchmen cannot be detained as slaves in the kingdom of Algiers, in any case or under any pretext whatsoever.

The affairs of the French republic, considered in respect both to its external and internal relations, appeared to be in a highly prosperous state, when the legislative body was, agreeably to the forms of the constitution, convened at Paris on the 1st Frimaire, Nov. 21st (1801); which event was announced by the discharge of can-



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non. At noon, M. Chaptal, minister of the interior, preceded by two messengers of state, entered the hall of the assembly. "This day," said he, "citizen legislators, you enter these august walls amidst the acclamations of a happy people. What an auspicious moment, to open the temple of the laws, is that in which nations, united in amity, and consoled for the past, have shut the temple of Janus!"—"After a painful and glorious struggle of twelve years," said the president of the assembly, M. Dupuis, in reply, "the moment is at length arrived in which peace has crowned the efforts of the French, and established the republic on a basis never to be shaken—a peace which shall unite in the bands of friendship two great nations already engaged to each other by mutual esteem."

The counsellors of state, Thibaudeau, Dumas, and Berenger, were then ushered into the hall; the first of whom, in the name of the executive government, addressed a most eloquent speech to the assembly, containing a grand and interesting display of the situation and prospects of the republic. After various flattering representations, the orator proceeded to delineate the state of the important colony of St. Domingo. "At St. Domingo," said he, "some irregular acts have given alarm for its allegiance. The government has not chosen to see, under

equivocal appearances, any thing but that ignorance which confounds names and things, and usurps when it thinks it is only obeying: but an army and fleet, which are preparing to set out from the ports of Europe, will soon have dissipated all these clouds, and St. Domingo will return entirely under the laws of the republic.

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“Batavia reproached her political organisation with not having been conceived for her. At length the Batavians have adopted a new constitution. Government have acknowledged that constitution; and it was their duty to acknowledge it, because it was the will of an independent people.

“Helvetia has afforded, during the year nine, the spectacle of a people torn by parties, each of those parties invoking the power, and sometimes the arms, of France. Our troops have received orders to return to our territories: four thousand men alone still remain in Helvetia, by the wish of all the local authorities. The first consul has said to them, ‘remember the courage and virtues of your fathers. As an example to the people of Europe, preserve liberty and equality to that nation which first taught them to be free and independent.’ These were but counsels, and they were coolly heard: Helvetia remains without a pilot in the midst of storms.

“Piedmont forms our 27th military division;

BOOK and under a milder *régime* forgets the miseries  
XXXV. of a long anarchy.

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“ After the treaty of Luneville, France might have fallen with her whole weight upon Naples, and punished the sovereign for his violation of treaties ; but the government thought themselves revenged as soon as they possessed the power of being revenged.

“ Great discussions have taken place at Ratisbon upon the execution of the treaty of Luneville. If the republic still takes part in those discussions, it is only as guarantee of the stipulations contained in the 7th article of the treaty, and for the purpose of maintaining a just equilibrium in Germany.

“ Peace has been signed with Russia; and nothing will hereafter disturb the relation of two great nations, who, with so many reasons for loving, have none for fearing each other, and whom nature has placed at the two extremities of Europe, to be the counterpoise of the north and the south.

“ Finally, the preliminaries of peace with England have been ratified.—It was in Portugal that Spain was to find a compensation for the cession of Trinidad. The Spanish minister ratified separately the treaty of Badajoz. From that time the loss of Trinidad to Spain was to be predicted ; from that time England removed out of

the negotiation every thing that could suppose the restitution of it possible. England refused, with the same inflexibility, the restitution of Ceylon. France supported the interest of her allies with as much strength as her own, but she was forced to stop at the point in which all negotiation became impossible.—In the whole course of the negotiations, the present administration of England have shown a frank desire to put an end to the miseries of war. The English people have embraced peace with enthusiasm: the hatred of rivalship is extinguished—the emulation of great actions and useful enterprises will alone remain.—The government have made it their ambition to replace France in her natural relations with all countries. They will make it their glory to maintain their work, and to perpetuate a peace which shall constitute their own happiness as well as the happiness of humanity.”

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In conformity to the intimation given in this speech, the first consul, not without the secret assent of England previously obtained, caused a great armament, with a numerous body of land forces on board, to sail before the end of the year from the port of Brest to the island of St. Domingo, under the command of general Le Clerc, who had married the sister of general Bonaparte. On his arrival, that commander was directed to publish a declaration from the



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first consul to the inhabitants of St. Domingo, in which they are called upon to rally round the captain-general. "Whoever shall dare," says this declaration, "to separate himself from the captain-general, will be a traitor to his country, and the indignation of the republic will devour him, as the fire devours your dried canes."


General Le Clerc also carried from the chief consul a letter addressed to Toussaint L'Ouverture, and penned with great art—in the mildest and most flattering terms endeavouring to persuade him to recognise the supremacy and submit to the authority of the mother country, and to receive general Le Clerc in the capacity of governor of the island. After many compliments and acknowledgements of his great services, the first consul says, "The constitution you have formed, though comprising many good things, contains others which are contrary to the dignity and the sovereignty of the French people, of which St. Domingo forms but a part." And towards the conclusion of this epistle, he exhorts Toussaint "to make known to the people of St. Domingo, that, if liberty be to them the first of wants, they cannot enjoy it but with the title of French citizens; and that every act contrary to the interest of the country, the obedience they owe to the government and the captain-general, who is the delegate of it, would

be a crime against the national sovereignty, which would eclipse their services, and render St. Domingo the theatre of a wretched war, in which fathers and children would massacre each other." The result of this enterprise belongs not to the history of the present year.

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In the estimation of those who believed France to be capable of existing and of flourishing under a free system of government, Bonaparte was a tyrant, guilty of the heinous crime of enslaving, and, by a combination of fraud and force, holding in the bonds of oppression millions of his fellow-men and fellow-citizens. To others, who conceived the French nation to be, from the operation of moral and political causes, unable to subsist under any constitution founded on the basis of popular liberty, the first consul appeared in a light far more favorable. They observed that his power was neither exercised with wanton caprice, nor unemployed for the public advantage. He had restored the energy of the laws and the influence of religion: he had re-established the finances of the nation, and paid the most diligent attention to the improvement of its manufactures and its commerce: he patronised both the sciences and the arts, and expended great sums in the embellishment of the capital, and other works of public ornament or utility: he discou-

Character  
of Bona-  
parte.

BOOK XXXV. 1801.  raged whatever was loose in morals or frivolous in manners: he displayed constancy and sincerity in his friendships, gravity and solidity in his occupations, moderation and decorum in his amusements. In a word, he discovered all the qualities of a great, and many of the virtues of a good, sovereign: and the vast empire, of which he was the animating principle, prospered eminently under his wise and vigorous administration.

In the month of November, and not till then, the king of Prussia yielded to the pressing instances of the court of London, and withdrew his troops from the electorate of Hanover, where he had probably determined that they should remain during the continuance of the war. They were maintained for the space of eight months at the expense of the electorate. But the discipline of the Prussian army was meritorious and exemplary; and the policy of the monarch of Prussia, on the whole, appeared firm, steady, and laudable.

Election of  
Mr. Jefferson  
to the  
presidency  
of the Ame-  
rican states.

At the close of the preceding year, Mr. Jefferson was, after a violent and long-protracted struggle, elected president of the United States of America, in the room of Mr. Adams; and, on the 9th of March, 1801, he made to the two houses of congress, upon his first entrance on his high office, a most admirable speech, in which

he stated, with luminous energy, the principles upon which he proposed to act, and which, in his view, constituted the basis of all just government. “About to enter, fellow-citizens,” said this enlightened statesman, “on the exercise of duties which comprehend every thing dear and valuable to you, it is proper you should understand what I deem the essential principles of our government: equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political—peace, commerce, and honest friendship, with all nations; entangling alliances with none—the support of the state governments in all their rights—the preservation of the general government in its whole constitutional vigor—a jealous care of the right of election by the people—a mild and safe corrective of abuses, which are lopped by the sword of revolution where peaceable remedies are unprovided—the supremacy of the civil over the military authority—economy in the public expense—the sacred preservation of the public faith—encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid—the diffusion of information, and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of public reason—freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and freedom of the person, under protection of the habeas-corpus, and trial by juries impartially selected. Should we wander from these

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BOOK principles in moments of error or of alarm, let  
XXXV. us hasten to retrace our steps, and regain the  
1801. road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and  
safety." Of the success of his efforts, notwithstanding his strong conviction of the rectitude of his principles, the new president entertained, however, a becoming distrust.—“ With experience enough,” said he, “ in subordinate offices, to have seen the difficulties of this, the greatest of all, I have learned to expect that it will rarely fall to the lot of imperfect man to retire from this station with the reputation and favor which bring him into it.”

In consequence of Mr. Jefferson's public disapproval of those measures of the late president which, as the present chief magistrate and many other of the wisest men and the best patriots in America thought, had a direct tendency to involve the United States in the calamities of war upon very insufficient grounds, he underwent much obloquy from the adverse party, as a democrat, Jacobin, and partisan of France. The equity and sagacity which distinguished his administration, nevertheless, in a great degree silenced the voice of faction ; and, on the ensuing meeting of congress, at the close of the year, he was enabled, in his first communication to the legislature, to express “ the pleasing persuasion he entertained that the great body of citizens

would cordially concur in honest and disinterested efforts, which have for their object to preserve the general and state governments in their constitutional form and equilibrium; to maintain peace abroad, and order and obedience to the laws at home.”

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*SESSION of Parliament 1801-2. Address voted with Unanimity. Violent Debate on the Preliminaries of Peace—also on the Convention with Russia. King's Debts a sixth time paid. Claim of the Prince of Wales, as Duke of Cornwall. Death of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland—of the Duke of Bedford—of Lord Kenyon. Sir John Mitford succeeds to the Chancellorship of Ireland. Mr. Abbot chosen Speaker of the House of Commons. Negotiation for a definitive Treaty at Amiens. Bonaparte elected President of the Italian Republic. Definitive Treaty signed. Observations on the Treaty of Amiens. Income-tax repealed. State of the National Finances. New Taxes imposed to the Amount of four Millions. State of the Irish Finances. Bank-restriction-bill continued. Motion of Censure on the late Administration, by Sir Francis Burdett. Motion by Mr. Nichol for an Address of Thanks to the King for the Removal of Mr. Pitt. Vote of Thanks to Mr. Pitt moved and carried. The Anniversary of his Birth-day celebrated. Debate on the Definitive Treaty. Motion by Mr. Canning for preventing the Importation of Negroes into Trinidad. Remarkable Address of the new Speaker to the King. Dissolution of Parliament. Elections favorable to the Whigs. Transient Interval of Satisfaction and Repose. New Causes of Difference between Great Britain and France. Angry Discussions between the two Governments. State of Affairs in France. Ratification and Celebration of the Concordatum. Bonaparte declared First Consul for Life. Important Alterations in the Constitution. Mr. Fox visits Paris. Dis-*

*astrous Expedition to St. Domingo. Abdication of the King of Sardinia. Piedmont united to France. Critical Situation of Malta. Civil Dissensions in Switzerland. Armed mediation of France. Impolitic and clandestine Intrigues of the British Ministry. Final Pacification of Switzerland. Resentment of the First Consul at the Conduct of the Court of London. State of the Batavian Republic. Treaty of Alliance between France and the Ottoman Porte—and with the Dey of Algiers. Ambassador from France arrives in London. Plot of Colonel Despard. Protracted Discussions respecting the Germanic Indemnities. Their final Settlement. Concluding Reflexions.*

THE second session of the imperial parliament was opened on the 29th of October, 1801, by the king in person, who in his speech announced the favorable conclusion of the negotiation begun during the last session of parliament. He declared his satisfaction that the difference with the northern powers had been adjusted by a convention with the emperor of Russia, to which the kings of Denmark and Sweden had expressed their readiness to accede. "The essential rights," said his majesty, "for which we contended, are thereby secured; and provision is made that the exercise of them shall be attended with as little molestation as possible to the subjects of the contracting parties." He then proceeded to state that preliminaries of peace had also been ratified between himself and the French republic; and he trusted that this important arrangement,

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Session of  
parliament  
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BOOK  
XXXVI. whilst it manifested the justice and moderation  
1801. of his views, would also be found conducive to  
the substantial interests of this country, and honorable to the British character.

Address  
voted  
unani-  
mously.

In the house of peers the address was moved by lord Bolton (formerly Mr. Orde), who observed that it was a magnificent triumph for England to make a peace in the very midst of her conquests, from the frozen seas of the north to the Pillars of Hercules, and from Africa to the remotest shores of Asia and America. His lordship contrasted, very unnecessarily, on this occasion, the conduct of Great Britain with that of Germany, which he styled "disunited, parricidal, and treacherous." Our allies, he said, had in an evil hour *chosen* to desert us, and we had been left to fight the battle for ourselves; but the struggle was glorious, and the termination happy. At the period when the peace was made, it was evident that the integrity of Europe could not be preserved: had this been possible, it would have been effected by the power of Great Britain.

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Si Pergama dextrâ

Defendi possent, etiam hâc defensa fuissent. VIRGIL.

The duke of Bedford, in a speech which contained much censure of the late, and praise of the present administration, declared his cordial

concurrence in the address, which was carried without a dissentient voice.

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In the house of commons Mr. Fox expressed the same sentiments of approbation respecting the peace, in which he was warmly seconded by Mr. Pitt. On the other hand, Mr. Windham, the late secretary at war, professed his entire disapprobation of the preliminaries recently signed with France, and avowed himself to be a solitary mourner in the midst of the public rejoicings upon that event. In signing the peace, he thought that his honorable friends, the present ministers, had signed the death-warrant of the country.

Mr. Sheridan adverted to the language in which Mr. Pitt had spoken of the terms of the peace as glorious and honorable—in which he could not agree. It was, in his opinion, a peace of which every one was glad, but no one proud: it was such a sort of a peace as might be expected after such a sort of a war—a war the most pernicious in which this country had ever been engaged; and the peace was perhaps as good as any minister could make, considering the circumstances in which we were placed. The motion was finally carried with the same unanimity as in the upper house.

On the 3d of November the subject of the preliminaries was taken formally into considera-

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tion by the lords, and a decided opposition to the terms of the peace expressed by the earls Spencer, Caernarvon, and Fitzwilliam, the marquis of Buckingham, lord Grenville, and the bishop of St. Asaph. It was defended by the lord chancellor, the duke of Bedford, the earls of Moira, Westmoreland, and St. Vincent, lords Hobart and Pelham, and the bishop of London. On this occasion lord Nelson avowed it to be his opinion, that Malta was, in a naval and political view, of trivial consequence, being at too great a distance from Toulon to watch the French fleet from that port. In time of peace it would have required a garrison of 7000 men, and a much larger in time of war, without being of any real utility to us. The island of Minorca also (though in the vicinity of Toulon) his lordship declared to be of no importance as a naval station; neither did he consider the settlement of the Cape as of any great value. The war had, indeed, been long; but he believed his majesty had seized the first opportunity of making peace, the conditions of which, he was convinced, were the most advantageous that could be procured in the existing circumstances.

The house at length divided, when there appeared for the address, as moved by ministers, 114—against it, 10.

On the same day a similar address was moved

in the house of commons; when the peace was fiercely assailed by Mr. Windham, Mr. Thomas Grenville, and lord Temple. Mr. Pitt said that it was his misfortune to differ from those with whom it had been his happiness to live in habits of the strictest friendship. He did not pretend to state that this peace fully answered all his wishes; but the government had obtained the best terms they could; and they were such as could not be rejected without incurring the imputation of continuing the war without any adequate necessity. He spoke highly of the value of the conquests we had retained—Ceylon and Trinidad: and though he would not depreciate the importance of Malta, he thought it, compared with the Indies, but a secondary consideration. It appeared to him sound policy rather to place Malta under the protection of a third power, capable of defending it, than, by retaining it ourselves, to mortify the pride and attract the jealousy of the enemy. He asserted that the resources of the country ought not to be lavished away in continuing a contest with the certainty of an enormous expense, and when it was by no means clear that we might not ultimately be obliged to sit down in a worse relative situation than the present. He would not occupy the attention of the house by going back to the origin of the war; but, peace being

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BOOK restored, forbearance of language and terms of  
 XXXVI. respect were proper.

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Mr. Fox expressed his cordial concurrence in the address. Upon the whole, and in reference to situation and circumstances, he regarded the peace as both safe and honorable. A glorious peace he could not style it; for such a peace could be the result only of a glorious war. He confessed himself not one of those who deemed Trinidad or Ceylon preferable to Malta; but, by insisting on Malta or the Cape, either the war would have been prolonged, or a loss of national dignity sustained by making the concession on our part from compulsion; for these were points which France, he was convinced, would never have yielded \*. He commended ministers in not having sought to delude us by the jargon of their predecessors; by senseless assertions of the French being now on the verge, and now in the gulf of bankruptcy. They justly considered France as a great and formidable foe, in treating with whom, they had wisely tempered firmness of conduct with moderation of tone. As to

\* It appears, from these passages of Mr. Fox's speech, that this great statesman ascribed to ministers much more wisdom than they were entitled to claim; for in fact they did (as appears from the state-papers since published) insist for a long time upon Malta, and at last gave it up most ungraciously, and on mere *compulsion*, without any equivalent;

the real object of the war, Mr. Fox confessed that he always understood it to be the restoration of the house of Bourbon. Not that it was the *sine qua non*: but he contended that the late ministers had avowed it with confidence, prosecuted it with perseverance, and relinquished it with reluctance. Not having been able to obtain their end, it was now allowed that the nation must content itself with gaining its secondary purpose. But what rational person has ever deemed even this secondary purpose to be attained by the acquisition of Ceylon and Trinidad? Who could have thought that ministers, who had for a series of years entertained such grand and magnificent designs, should at last content themselves with Ceylon in the east, and Trinidad in the west, wrested from Holland and Spain, by way of indemnity for the past, and security for the future against the ambitious projects of Gallic aggrandisement in Europe?

The terms of the treaty were, on grounds analogous to those argued upon by Mr. Pitt, zealously defended by lord Hawkesbury and the other members of administration; and the house, justly weary of the war, was easily impressed by the reasonings of ministers in favor of the peace.

thus sacrificing the national interest no less than the national dignity, from a palpable want of address and ability.

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The chancellor of the exchequer concluded the debate with some judicious and conciliatory observations. He remarked that the duty of negotiation commenced when all hope of continental aid in checking the power of France was at an end. We had closed the contest on our part with honor. But he acknowledged it to depend upon the wisdom of government, whether this peace should be a blessing or a misfortune to the country. He could only say, as it had been made sincerely, it should be kept faithfully. No encouragement should be given to any person in this realm to subvert the present government of France; and a line of conduct ought to be pursued, not of suspicion and jealousy, but of prudence and circumspection: and it would be necessary, he added, "to provide means of security never before known in times of peace." The motion was then agreed to without a division.

—Also on  
the con-  
vention  
with Rus-  
sia.

The convention with Russia occupied the early attention of parliament. On the 13th of November, the articles of the treaty being laid before the house of peers, the earl of Darnley moved an address of thanks and approbation to the throne. This was vehemently opposed by lord Grenville, who condemned the treaty in almost every particular; and, from the tenor of his lordship's remarks upon it, nothing could be

more evident than that an accommodation with Russia and the other northern powers never could have taken place under his inauspicious administration, whatever might have been the duration of it. The question was put, and agreed to without a division.

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On the same day a similar address was moved in the house of commons; on which occasion lord Hawkesbury with frankness and candor observed, "that the treaty did enough: it substantiated our rights—it respected those of our adversaries; and, without arrogating more superiority than was meet, contained an ample recognition of all that was essential to us as the first maritime power on the globe."

Mr. Grey declared that he regarded the convention in question as a judicious compromise, and he felt by no means disposed to enter minutely into a consideration of the terms. He had no difficulty in affirming, that, till the dispute with the northern powers was settled, peace with France was unattainable: and, on the whole, though he would not say that the measures to which we had resorted at the commencement of the dispute were then justifiable, he rejoiced too sincerely in its termination not to give the address of thanks his cordial support. The motion was violently opposed by lord Temple and others of the Grenville con-



BOOK XXXVI. *nexion*, but ultimately passed, as in the upper house, without a division.

1802.  
King's  
debts a  
sixth time  
paid.

Soon after the Christmas recess, February 17, 1802, the chancellor of the exchequer called the attention of the house to certain papers before them, relative to the civil list, by which it appeared that the civil government was again deeply in arrear; and a committee was appointed to examine the accounts now presented to the house. In the course of the discussion, Mr. Manners Sutton, solicitor to the prince of Wales, advanced a claim of right on the part of the prince against the crown, or rather the public, for the amount of the revenues of the duchy of Cornwall, received during his minority, and applied to the uses of the civil list, which must otherwise have been supplied from other sources. The aggregate of the sums so received, on an accurate estimate, appeared to be little less than 400,000*l*.

Mr. Fox declared strongly in favor of the equity of this claim, but admitted that the sums voted for the payment of the prince's debts ought to be deducted from the balance accruing to the prince. Mr. Fox maintained that the parliament was the proper place for discussing the question relative to the claim, if any doubts could subsist upon this head; and that it ought to be decided without delay. Mr. Sutton, how-

ever, declined bringing this matter before the house till the question respecting the civil list was disposed of.

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On the 29th of March the report of the committee was taken into consideration; when it appeared that an enormous debt of no less than 990,000*l.* had been contracted since Mr. Burke's famous reform-bill had taken place, exclusive of the arrears discharged in the years 1784 and 1786: and moreover, that, during the whole of Mr. Pitt's administration, the provisions of that bill had been altogether neglected. After long and warm discussion, this vast sum was voted by the house: but the chancellor of the exchequer allowed that measures ought to be taken to prevent in future any such accumulation of debt; though he was far from deeming the present arrear any proof of profusion or of mismanagement on the part of ministers, considering the number of years which had elapsed since the last application of this nature.

On the 31st of March Mr. Manners Sutton brought forward, and in a very learned and ingenious speech established to the satisfaction of a great proportion (probably of a great majority) of the members present on this occasion, the legal claim of the prince of Wales to the arrear of the revenues arising from the duchy of Cornwall; and he concluded with moving for

Claim of  
the prince  
of Wales, as  
duke of  
Cornwall.

BOOK the appointment of a committee to inquire  
 XXXVI. what sums were due to his royal highness from  
 1802. that quarter.

The chancellor of the exchequer professed to consider it as inconsistent with his duty to concur in the motion. As to the legal question, he did not pretend to decide upon it; but he thought the discussion ought not to be entertained in that house. If it appeared in proof that no application for redress, supposing the wrong to exist, could be made elsewhere, it would then be time enough to apply to that house. He then moved the order of the day, which, after a long debate, was carried by a majority of 160 to 103 voices.

Death of  
 the lord  
 chancellor  
 of Ireland--

The commencement of the present year was signalised by the deaths of several distinguished persons. On the 28th of January expired, after a long and painful illness, John Fitzgibbon, earl of Clare, lord chancellor of Ireland. This nobleman possessed, from situation and character, a powerful ascendancy over the affairs of that country at a most critical period. His mind, acute by nature, was neither expanded by science nor softened by the elegancies of literature. Decided in his ideas, irritable in his temper, and imperious in his deportment, he disdained all dissimulation; carrying his point rather by an imposing earnest-

ness, than by the aid of studied or regular argument. In his senatorial capacity he was voluminous and confident, though by no means eloquent. BOOK  
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His speeches were distinguished by a coarse and sarcastic virulence. Vehement, acrimonious, and personal, he never scrupled sacrificing the dignity of his station to the gratification of his passions. His prejudices were ardent, and determined the course of his public life; throughout which he appeared the systematic enemy of religious freedom, and the habitual advocate of civil oppression. It has been said of him, that his tongue never uttered any counsel but what was cruel and unjust. All concession and conciliation on the part of government he deemed weakness; seeming to know no other method of governing than coercion, and believing, probably, no other practicable. The panegyrists of this nobleman must be found among those alone of his own party: the patriot, the statesman, and the philosopher, will emulously disclaim him.

A most striking contrast to this odious portrait was exhibited in the character of the duke —Of the  
duke of  
Bedford— of Bedford, who, after an illness of a very few days' duration, died at the family mansion of Woburn-abbey, March 2d, having not yet completed the thirty-seventh year of his age. The grief for his loss might be styled national. Although he had taken the most decided part in



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1802. opposition to the measures of the late administration, his clear and sound judgement led him to reject without hesitation all the novel extravagances which at once endangered and disgraced the cause of liberty : but, with a just and noble pride, he regarded himself as the hereditary defender of the constitutional freedom of his country. In private life the manners of this distinguished nobleman were in the highest degree mild and courteous ; and his friends, comprehending a very wide circle of persons eminent in every department, were attached to him with even an enthusiastic affection. Though exposed from his earliest years to all the fascinations of the gay and fashionable world, he trod with guarded and cautious steps the dangerous region of pleasure ; and soon turning his attention to higher and nobler objects, his character gradually mellowed and matured, till at length his ruling passion seemed to be the advancement of the general good ; though, far from courting applause in performing his varied acts of beneficence, he almost “ blushed to find them fame.” At a period of life when the nation looked up to him with a just and affectionate confidence, as the faithful guardian and protector of its rights and privileges for a long succession of years, he was snatched away by a stroke as sudden as it was fatal. In fine, it was

his end and aim, to adopt the words of the Ro-  
 man historian—"discere a peritis, sequi opti-  
 mos, nihil appetere jactatione, nihil ob formidi-  
 nem recusare \*." BOOK XXXVI.  
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A third personage, who departed this life —Of lord  
Kenyon.  
 nearly at the same period, was the chief justice  
 of England, lord Kenyon. This noble judge,  
 to speak of him with the freedom of history,  
 was a man of very narrow views and limited  
 capacity; bigoted, irascible, and avaricious; but  
 honest, upright in his intentions, very learned  
 in his profession, and impartial in his admini-  
 stration of public justice. His parliamentary  
 talents were of little estimation; but his judicial  
 attainments were great; and upon them alone  
 he sought to build his fame. He was succeeded  
 by the attorney-general Law, a man of ability,  
 and son of the celebrated bishop of Carlisle,  
 created, on his promotion to the chief-justiceship,  
 a peer of the realm, under the title of lord Ellen-  
 borough.

The earl of Clare was succeeded by sir John  
 Mitford, speaker of the British house of com-  
 mons, who, exclusive of his great professional  
 reputation, was advantageously distinguished  
 by being the mover of the act of toleration in Sir John  
Mitford  
succeeds to  
the chan-  
cellorship  
of Ireland.

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Mr. Abbot  
chosen  
speaker of  
the house  
of com-  
mons.

favor of the English catholics. Upon him the title of lord Redesdale was conferred; and the chair of speaker was filled by Charles Abbot, esq. a lawyer of eminence and activity in business, and who had the merit of possessing an intimate acquaintance with the forms, usages, and customs, of the house.

The long interval of time which had now elapsed since the preliminaries of peace were signed, excited in the minds of many persons no little apprehension lest some serious obstacle might arise to prevent the conclusion of the definitive treaty. So far back as the month of October, the marquis Cornwallis had been nominated ambassador to negotiate that treaty with the plenipotentiaries appointed by the French, Spanish, and Batavian governments; the city of Amiens being fixed upon as the place of congress. Lord Cornwallis arrived at Paris in November, and held divers conferences in that capital with M. Talleyrand, minister for foreign affairs, and Joseph Bonaparte, brother of the first consul, well known as an able and candid negotiator. No facilities, however, towards a final arrangement seemed to be obtained by these previous discussions. When the congress opened, the progress of negotiation was extremely slow: the ground appeared to be

fought by inches; and the French government, meantime, prosecuted openly and boldly its plans of continental aggrandisement.

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In the month of December, 1801, a grand CONSULTA assembled at the city of Lyons, consisting of no less than four hundred and fifty persons, convoked by authority of the existing and provisional government of the Cisalpine republic, and apparently chosen from the most respectable of her citizens. The object of this meeting was to determine upon a permanent constitution for the new republic. About the beginning of the new year (1802), the first consul, arriving in person at Lyons, was received with every mark of public honor and applause; and his popularity with the bulk of the French nation appeared not to have suffered the least diminution.

A committee of thirty members was appointed to prepare the business; and on the 25th of January the new plan of government was presented to the assembly, and received their unanimous and immediate sanction. An essential part of this plan was to vest the supreme magistracy in the hands of the first consul, who on the following day, repairing to the hall of the Consulta in regal state, formally declared his acceptance of the honor thus conferred upon him. His speech to the assembly was made in

Bonaparte  
elected  
president  
of the Ita-  
lian repub-  
lic.



BOOK the Italian language; and he apologised for the  
XXXVI. step he had now taken, by a statement of the  
1802. services he had rendered them—being indeed the  
former and founder of the new republic—and  
more particularly urging, what was indubitably  
a strong and striking fact, that no person could  
be found among themselves who had sufficient  
claim on the public opinion, who was inde-  
pendent enough of local attachment, or had  
conferred upon his country such obligations as  
to merit so transcendant a reward.

The appellation of the Cisalpine was changed  
by acclamation to that of the Italian republic,  
of which the first consul was declared PRESIDENT  
for ten years. Bonaparte named for vice-presi-  
dent, citizen Melzi D'Eril, a man held by all  
parties in the highest estimation: and the whole  
of this important transaction being completed,  
the first consul returned (January 31) to Paris.

The constitution provided for the Italians was  
extremely analogous to that of France. A be-  
neficent civil government was established  
among them, which, so far as a very short and  
limited experience can evince, appears well cal-  
culated, and has hitherto happily sufficed, for  
maintaining the peace and restoring the pros-  
perity of the country; and as to political liberty,  
it was neither understood nor desired by the  
mass of the people. The chief proof of mode-

ration given by Bonaparte on this occasion, was his permitting the constitutional regulation, that the appointment of the vice-president should be irrevocable during the presidency of him by whom he was appointed.

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The first act of the Italian republic was to issue a declaration, dated Milan, February 6 (1802), stating, in perspicuous language, the motives which influenced their late proceedings, and vindicating the president of the republic from the charge of exorbitant ambition in his acceptance of the government. "At the present period," says this declaration, "Venice belongs to the emperor. With regard to Naples, the family-compact no longer exists. The Italian republic therefore must compensate both of these losses. In the system of Germany, Poland Turkey and Sweden united themselves with France. Poland is no more. It has been employed to augment the power of our neighbours. Turkey, a prey to civil war, is just able to retain the consistence necessary to continue to exist. The acquisitions which Russia has made in Poland, the degree of civilisation and power to which that state has attained, and time which changes every thing, have left the descendants of Charles XII. no real weight in the affairs of Germany. The accession which France has acquired in the four departments of the Rhine does

BOOK not compensate the accessions which her neigh-  
 XXXVI. bours have made by the partition of Poland.

1802. Had France been obliged to acquiesce in the division of that country, without obtaining as a compensation either Belgium or the four departments of the Rhine, she would have ceased to be what she has always been, A POWER of the FIRST RANK."

Finally, adverting to the extraordinary increase of the power and riches of Great Britain, this declaration remarks, "That Tippoo Saib, like Poland, has disappeared from the system of India, and his territories have gone to increase the immense possessions of the English."

Also, in an official dispatch from M. Talleyrand to M. Bacher, chargé d'affaires of France at the diet of Ratisbon, a plausible apology is made for the step recently taken by the first consul. "The treaty of Luneville," he observes, "had consecrated the existence of the Cisalpine republic; but it was there spoken of rather as about to exist than as actually established. The wisest citizens of that republic, reflecting on the diversity of elements of which they were composed, became convinced, that, to prevent the injurious effects which might arise from the rivalry, the pretensions, and the animosities of their fellow citizens, it was necessary to call in the aid of the ascendancy of a foreigner, who

should be superior to those passions, and who would not by his conduct give rise to disorders which might not only disturb the tranquillity of the Italian republic, but trouble the repose of Europe. It was from a deep impression of these circumstances that they felt themselves bound to represent to the first consul, that their country ought, in the first moments of its political existence, to be secured in its independence, guarded against the dangers with which it might be threatened, and wisely directed in the choice of means for its future preservation.—Such, citizen, is the result of the convocation of the Italian Consulta at Lyons.”

These general reasonings cannot by impartial judges be pronounced destitute of force. It is absurd to expect that France will not avail herself of the means of aggrandisement she possesses, as well as other powers: and it is certain that her recent conquests were necessary to enable her to keep pace with the acquisitions of her rivals. From the conclusion of the treaty of the Pyrenees to the æra of the grand alliance formed by king William, Europe was indeed exposed to far greater hazard from the ascendancy of France, under the ambitious and despotic dominion of Louis XIV., than she is in actual circumstances from any designs that can be harboured by the lofty and aspiring genius of the first consul.



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France, however, from the period of the administration of cardinal Richelieu, has invariably, and with great reason, been the object of political apprehension: and it is no doubt consonant to the established principles of sound policy, for Great Britain to embrace every fair opportunity of resisting her aggrandisement. But the application of this grand maxim requires, in order to produce its intended effect, the knowledge, judgment, and talents, of a great statesman. For a precipitate or unseasonable interference will but aggravate the mischief it purposes to remedy.

It must be owned that the great opprobrium of the preliminary treaty, open as it appeared to many forcible objections, was the total abandonment of the interests of the house of Savoy, related, no less than that of Orange, by ties of blood and friendship, to Great Britain; with the additional obligation of the specific and comprehensive guarantee solemnly granted by the English government at the commencement of the war. Allowing, and it would indeed have been the height of folly to have disallowed, the *validity* of the proceedings at Lyons, a fit opportunity now occurred to insist upon the restitution of the principality of Piedmont to the king of Sardinia, as a balance to the additional authority vested by the Consulta in the first consul. In

this, England would have been powerfully seconded by Russia and other courts. But the advancement of Bonaparte was, so far at least as the public could judge, viewed by the British government with great coldness, and no mention whatever appears to have been made of it at the congress.

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Soon after the establishment, in its new form, of the Italian republic, the territory of the Valais, long subject to the dominion of Switzerland, was finally detached from the Helvetic confederacy, and declared a free and independent state; the act of recognition being signed by the ministers of the French, Italian, and Helvetic governments. This could only be regarded as another accession to the power of France. The country of the Valais is enclosed between two vast chains of mountains gradually diverging from Mount St. Gothard, and terminating near the eastern extremity of the lake of Geneva. Through the entire length of this deep and sequestered vale flows the majestic stream of the Rhône, which occasionally, like the Nile, "redundant o'er his summer bed," inundates the land to a wide extent, enriching and fertilising the soil wherever it diffuses its copious and refreshing waters. The command of this country, which divides Lombardy from Switzerland by an immense barrier of rocks, could no otherwise be regarded

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as of importance by the first consul, than from the direct communication it affords between France and the Italian republic: for he was not yet secure of retaining the intermediate province of Piedmont; an invaluable acquisition, of which the permanent possession probably exceeded the most sanguine hopes he had formed at this period.

Another remarkable fact connected with the history of the negotiation in question is, that the convention of Madrid, dated the 21st of March 1801, by which Louisiana, Parma, and the isle of Elba, were ceded to France, was never publicly divulged till more than three months after the signature of the preliminary treaty. But these important cessions materially altering the relative situation of England and France, the former was certainly entitled to demand some additional advantage in the definitive treaty. It was rather too much to expect, that, of the three great maritime stations which England held in the Mediterranean, she should resign one to Spain, another to France, and the third to its ancient possessors, without any equivalent. But such was the apathy of the English ministers, that either no discussion took place upon this subject, or no advantage whatever was derived from it. After long and tedious delay, the definitive treaty was signed by lord Cornwallis, Jo-

Definitive  
treaty  
signed.

seph Bonaparte, the chevalier D'Azara, and M. Schimmelpenninck, on the 25th of March.

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The principal point gained by England in the course of the negotiation, was the concession made by France respecting the treaty concluded by that power with Portugal, at Madrid, almost at the same moment in which the preliminary articles were signed between Great Britain and France at London. By that treaty, the limits of French Guiana were extended to the Orellana, or river of the Amazons; and the free navigation of that mighty stream would, doubtless, in time have proved of infinite importance to the establishment of the Gallic power in South America. But by the definitive treaty, the first consul consented that the river Arawari, to the north of the Orellana, should constitute the future boundary between the two countries. On the other hand, the cession of the district of Olivenza, contrary to the obvious meaning of that article of the preliminaries which declared "that the territories and possessions of her most faithful majesty should be preserved entire," was confirmed to Spain.

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Observations on  
the treaty  
of Amiens.

The article respecting Malta, framed by the court of London, was guarded by so many minute and studied precautions, as to exhibit, in a striking view, the hostile spirit of distrust and suspicion subsisting in the midst of the reciprocal



BOOK XXXVI. 1802. professions of peace. By the fourth regulation under this article, it is expressly stipulated, “ that the forces of his Britannic majesty shall evacuate the island and its dependencies within three months from the exchange of the ratifications, or sooner if possible. At that epoch it shall be given up to the order in its present state, provided (1st), that the grand-master or commissaries fully authorised, according to the statutes of the order, shall be in the island to take possession; and (2dly), that the force which is to be provided by his Sicilian majesty, as is hereafter stipulated, shall have arrived there.”

Conformably to this article, regarded both by France and England as one of the most important in the treaty, the absolute surrender of the island to the order of St. John is clearly and unequivocally engaged for by the latter, on the two conditions annexed. But by the sixth regulation, it is likewise agreed, that the independence of the isles of Malta, of Gozo, and Comino, as well as the present arrangement, shall be placed under the protection and guarantee of France, Great Britain, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia. It is, however, obvious to common sense, that the contracting potentates of the treaty of Amiens could never intend to insert into that treaty any article which it was utterly out of their power to execute. It is equally clear

that they could not compel Austria, Russia, and Prussia, to become guarantees and protectors of the order of St. John. It is therefore certain, that, in any fair and rational construction, this clause or provision of the treaty could mean no more, than that the above-named potentates, in common with France, Spain, and Great Britain, shall, *if they will*, become guarantees of the independency of Malta; or, as it is in the thirteenth regulation (inserted apparently to preclude all dispute) explained and expressed, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, *shall be invited* to accede to the present stipulations." But does any article, clause, or regulation of the treaty, pretend to say that the restitution of the island shall not take place unless or until such guarantee is obtained?—No: on the contrary, the fourth regulation of the article in question positively declares, as we have seen, that it *shall* be given up at the end of three months upon the two conditions subjoined.—Would not France have rejected with scorn any proposition tending to make the surrender of the island to depend upon the will or caprice of Russia or Austria; KNOWING how much both these powers were at the present period under the influence of Great Britain? This may be disputed by that miserable class of politicians who seek only for subterfuges; but it would be an insult to the un-

BOOK XXXVI. understanding of any man of plain sense and common honesty, seriously to argue the question.

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But supposing the most perfect original rectitude of intention on the part of the British government—which indeed it would seem harsh to doubt—and that the guarantees of the great powers above mentioned were easily obtainable, had not both ancient and modern experience fully evinced the total inefficacy of guarantees, excepting so far as they happened, when the execution of them was called for, to correspond with the views and interests of the guaranteeing powers? Was not the independence of Poland, of Sardinia, of Venice, guaranteed by the most solemn treaties, and by all the great powers of Christendom? And have not all those states in a few years vanished from the map of Europe?—Why, then, so much solicitude for a thing of so little value?

In reference to the specific guarantees required on this occasion, it may be remarked, that Spain was manifestly and entirely under the control of France; that Prussia was a power, which, conformably to the fixed and obvious rules of her policy, would be anxious to maintain an amicable correspondence with France; that Russia was too potent, and placed at too great a distance from France, to entertain any serious apprehensions from the growth of her power; that

Malta was not to her a subject of much interest or importance; and divers of the stipulations relative to the new arrangement, particularly the introduction of a Maltese *langue* into the order of St. John, were known to be displeasing to her, and contrary to the engagements she had entered into with the knights of that order. Austria was the only power who upon this, and indeed upon all other occasions, could be expected fully and cordially to enter into the views and interests of Great Britain. But without any guarantee, if that degree of amity, which good policy evidently and invariably requires, actually subsisted between the courts of London and Vienna, the latter would never want sufficient inducements to comply with whatever it would be reasonable for the former to ask. But even Austria, depressed by a series of disasters, might not deem Malta an object of adequate consequence to justify a renewal of the war. If importance nevertheless could be attached to the guarantee of any power, it must be to that of the emperor of Germany; and there would certainly be no difficulty in obtaining it. But it would have been a far wiser, as well as more dignified, procedure, for Great Britain, in the existing circumstances, to have taken upon herself the protection and guarantee of the order, magnanimously declaring to France, that Malta was equally un-

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der her safeguard as if that island were an appendage of her empire; and that she would not require, though not unwilling to accept, any additional security.

The intelligence of the conclusion of the definitive treaty was, notwithstanding all previous jealousies, received both in France and England with much satisfaction, and celebrated with great rejoicings: and though the articles of the treaty were framed with little political ability, it was hoped and believed by dispassionate and intelligent persons, that those who had sense enough to make the peace would have prudence enough to preserve it.

Income-tax  
repealed.

On the 29th of March—*i. e.* as soon as the signature of the definitive treaty was known in England—the chancellor of the exchequer, to the great joy of the nation, gave notice of his intention to repeal the odious and oppressive tax imposed by the late minister, styled the income-tax. Mr. Addington acknowledged the burden of the tax to be very grievous; but, had the war continued, the state of the national finances, he fairly said, would not have allowed of a repeal. But the tax was originally proposed as a war-tax; and it had never been in contemplation with him to continue it beyond the necessity which had created it.

On the 5th of April the minister brought for-

ward his plan of finance for the year. A more arduous task no person occupying his station ever had to encounter. The income-tax had been mortgaged by Mr. Pitt for the sum of 56,445,000*l.* (three per cents.) for which the present minister, in consequence of the repeal of this tax, was obliged to make provision. The loan for Great Britain he stated at twenty-three millions, which he funded in the following manner: 65*l.* three per cent. consolidated annuities; 60*l.* three per cent. reduced annuities; and 6*l.* 19*s.* 3*d.* *deferred stock*, the interest of which was to commence in the year 1808, when annuities to the amount of 500,000*l.* would revert to the government—making in the aggregate the sum of 30,351,375*l.* The capital in the different funds, created by the conversion of eight millions and a half of exchequer bills into stock, previous to the Christmas recess, was 11,138,062*l.* For every 100*l.* thus converted, 50*l.* was granted in the four per cents., 50*l.* in the three per cents., 25*l.* in the five per cents., and one shilling and ninepence long annuity. The aggregate sum, for which interest was to be provided, appeared to be no less than 97,934,137*l.*; and the amount of the interest itself was stated at 3,162,000*l.* To defray this enormous demand, very heavy additional duties were imposed on beer, malt, and hops. A considerable increase also of the as-

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State of the  
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New taxes  
imposed to  
the amount  
of four mil-  
lions ster-  
ling

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essed taxes took place; and the last article to which the minister had recourse, was a tax on imports and exports, being a modification of the convoy duty. The produce of the new duties combined, he estimated at four millions; an excess which compensated for the deficiency of divers of the taxes imposed in the course of the war. In the progress of the business of revenue, the chancellor of the exchequer proposed and carried into effect several important alterations in the sinking-fund bills of Mr. Pitt. The last or new fund, provided for liquidating the debt contracted since the year 1786, was much larger than the original fund established for the liquidation of the old debt contracted prior to that period. The old fund moreover was originally made disposable by parliament so soon as it amounted to four millions. These two funds the minister proposed to consolidate, and to perpetuate till the whole of the debt both old and new should be completely liquidated. The original fund had now risen to 2,534,187*l.*, and the new to 3,275,143*l.*, making together 5,809,330*l.*

The old debt at this time amounted to something more than 198 millions; about 40 millions having been redeemed, exclusive of 18 millions transferred to government and virtually annihilated, as an equivalent to that portion of the land-tax which had been purchased. The

new debt amounted to nearly 340 millions, something more than 20 millions having been redeemed by the operation of the new fund. The whole of the existing funded debt, including the loan of the present year, and deducting the amount of the land-tax redeemed, was consequently about 520 millions; the interest of which amounted to the vast sum of 17 millions and upwards. This amazing debt would, nevertheless, by the wonder-working operation of the sinking fund appropriated to its liquidation, supposing that fund improved at the average interest of four per cent. only, be completely discharged in the comparatively short period of thirty-four years.

On concluding his speech upon this occasion in the house of commons, the minister made use of the following remarkable words: "When I look back to the conduct of this house and of the country, to their united wisdom and vigor for the last nine years, it is with pride and satisfaction. When I look forward to the prospect before us, it is with hope. I trust, that, by a prudent and vigilant œconomy, we shall be able to provide effectually for the expenses of the country. I think, *if we are enabled to preserve the blessings we enjoy*, we shall effect it by a fixed determination not to interfere with any other

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country, but to be prepared always to vindicate our independence, and to maintain our honor. Such a system will, I feel confident, afford us a prospect of many years of tranquillity and repose. The period of animosity, I hope, has ceased; but vigilance, prudence, and precaution, must survive animosity. Jealousy is no longer necessary, but caution must be preserved. This conduct will give us the fairest claim to merit, and the best chance to retain the blessings which we actually possess." Such was the seasonable and satisfactory declaration of the person now at the helm of affairs; and as far as words could go, the nation had good reason to congratulate itself upon the wisdom of the new minister.

State of the  
Irish fi-  
nances.

Mr. Corry, chancellor of the exchequer for Ireland, soon afterwards brought forward the supplemental business of finance relative to the revenue of that kingdom. It appeared from his statement, that the debt of Ireland had risen, in the last ten years, from 2,300,000*l.* to 36 millions, paying an interest for the most part of six per cent. He stated the deficiency of ways and means, when compared with the supplies, at 1,660,000*l.*; which sum he proposed to raise by loan, in addition to a former loan of two millions, which the contractors for the English loan had

agreed to furnish upon the same terms. Mr. Corry proposed several new taxes necessary to defray the interest of these new loans, which were agreed to; not, however, without some poignant animadversions from several of the Irish members, who represented the state of the country as very critical and alarming.

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On the 9th of April, the English minister, Mr. Addington, moved for a bill to continue, till the 1st of March 1803, the restrictions on payment in specie at the bank, which was carried with little opposition. Indeed, in actual circumstances, this was a measure not so much of prudence as of necessity; and it remains a disgraceful problem, whether it will ever be expedient, or even possible, to remove this ignominious restraint caused by the rash and criminal presumption of the late minister.

Bank-restriction bill continued.

A vote of censure on the former administration was, on the 12th of the same month, formally moved by sir Francis Burdett. But as a vote of censure upon them by the present house of commons would virtually have been a vote of censure on itself, there was little propriety in the motion; and it afforded no chance of success. Moreover, as a twelvemonth and upwards had now elapsed since their resignation, which was evidently an event lamented by scarcely any

Motion of censure on the late administration by sir Francis Burdett.

**BOOK** one, it seemed almost ludicrous to bring forward  
**XXXVI.** at this late period a direct charge against them.

1802. But, being brought forward, it was necessary for those who had supported their measures to exert themselves in their defence. And they not only were provoked to bestow high panegyrics upon the members of that administration, but lord Belgrave moved, as an amendment to the motion of sir Francis Burdett, "that the thanks of this house be returned to his majesty's late ministers for their eminent services, in the exertions they made to preserve to us unimpaired, the blessings we enjoyed during the whole of the late contest." The speaker having suggested the irregularity of this proceeding, the motion of amendment was, at the request of Mr. Pitt himself, withdrawn; and the original proposition was negatived by a vast majority of 246 to 39 voices.

Motion by  
 Mr. Nichol  
 for an address of  
 thanks to  
 the king  
 for the removal of  
 Mr. Pitt.

A motion yet more strange and absurd was made on the 7th of May following, by Mr. Nichol, for an address to his majesty thanking him for the removal of the right honorable William Pitt from his councils. This again awakened, and in a much higher degree, the zeal of Mr. Pitt's partisans and adherents both in and out of the house; a very vehement debate ensued, the result of which afforded them

and him a second triumph. Lord Belgrave, as before, moved an amendment expressive of the high approbation of that house respecting the character and conduct of the late minister and his colleagues.

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Mr. Fox declared himself unable to vote either for the original motion, or for the amendment. He could not vote thanks for the dismissal of the late minister, till the dismissal itself was ascertained. It was alleged by Mr. Pitt and his friends, that he was not dismissed, but that he voluntarily resigned from inability to realise his plan of catholic emancipation. If so, nothing, in his opinion, during the seventeen years of Mr. Pitt's ministerial life, "became him like the leaving of it." The motion of lord Belgrave was at length carried by a great majority; and also a second motion, by sir Henry Mildmay, that the thanks of the house be given to the right honorable William Pitt. These injudicious attacks on Mr. Pitt seemed for a short time even, in some measure, to revive his pristine popularity. His birth-day was celebrated in the city with great ostentation; earl Spencer, late first lord of the admiralty, presiding in the chair, who, in his exuberant admiration of Mr. Pitt, gave as a *toast* to the company met to celebrate this *auspicious day*, "The PILOT who WEATHERED the STORM," forgetting that the

Vote of  
thanks to  
Mr. Pitt  
moved and  
carried.

The anni-  
versary of  
his birth-  
day cele-  
brated.



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Debate on  
the defini-  
tive treaty  
in the  
house of  
lords:—

storm was not weathered till this political Pali-  
nurus was thrown overboard \*.

On the 13th of May, after various preludes, came on in both houses the grand debate relative to the definitive treaty. It was opened in the house of peers by lord Grenville, who acknowledged that the unfortunate treaty in question having been ratified by his majesty was now irrevocable. He wished only to point out the perils which impended, and the means of safety which yet remained. Ministers, his lordship said, had made no attempt at weakening the power of France on the continent; but by the concessions they had made, they had given France the power of weakening us in our colonial possessions. Our right of sovereignty in India was not recognised, and the Cape of Good Hope was ceded to Holland, or in fact to France. In the West Indies we had ceded Martinique and our other conquests, and facilitated to France the recovery of St. Domingo. In the Mediterranean we had dispossessed ourselves of Malta, Minorca, and even the isle of

\* ————— liquidas projecit in undas  
Præcipitem, ac socios nequicquam sæpe vocantem.

VIRG.

Headlong he fell, and, struggling in the main,  
Cry'd out for helping hands, but cry'd in vain.

DRYDEN.

Elba, which France coveted as the means of excluding us from Leghorn. Whatever the valor of the British army had won, the incapacity of a British ministry had lost. He asked whether the advantages of such a peace preponderated over the disadvantages of the war? If the war was renewed, it would be renewed with every possible disadvantage. Scarcely in three glorious campaigns could we expect to regain by the sword what we had ceded by the pen. If the peace continued, the omission, in the treaty of Amiens, of the renewal of all ancient treaties, would be found productive of the most alarming consequences. His lordship concluded a most severe and elaborate investigation of the terms of the treaty, by moving that an humble address should be presented to his majesty, acknowledging his majesty's prerogative to make peace or war, but suggesting the dangerous situation in which the country was left by the late treaty; and which, testifying the zeal of the house to support his majesty in the maintenance of his just rights, should express its solicitude for such an establishment in future, as might be compatible with the existence of a naval and military force adequate to the dangers of the country, &c.

The motion of lord Grenville was warmly supported by lord Caernarvon, who confessed

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“that, with the highest respect for the virtues of those who composed the present administration, he had never confided in their talents or experience. The moment they had taken the helm, they had pressed into their service a noble lord, beloved indeed, but ill fitted for the invidious task of coping with men old in craft, adepts in duplicity, regardless of principle, and unpractised in virtue\*. Under negotiators so unequal, some disadvantages were inevitable; yet the preliminary articles disappointed even the least sanguine: but by the definitive treaty, concession was heaped on concession, disgrace added to disgrace.” And his lordship declared the motion of his noble friend the only possible corrective of the misconduct of those ministers who had pledged the country to a peace which consulted neither its honor nor its safety.

The articles of the treaty were defended by the lords Hobart and Pelham, the lord chancel-

\* Such was the indecent language, which, authorised by the highest examples, soon descended into vulgar use from the date of the treaty of Amiens. All Europe, however, will testify, that Joseph Bonaparte, the chevalier D’Azara, and M. Schimmelpenninck were not characters answering to this description. Yet there are those who pretend to wonder that offence should be taken at this unprecedented abuse of the freedom of speech in parliament; and at the still greater license, which, from the æra when peace and amity were nominally restored, characterised the effusions of the English press.

lor, and the earls of Westmoreland and Roslyn; the last of whom acknowledged the definitive treaty to be inadequate to our successes. Sensible, however, of the necessity of supporting his majesty in the engagements he had formed; and conscious of the impropriety of certain expressions in lord Grenville's address; his lordship said he must, for the first time in his life, vote against his noble friend \*. The motion was finally negatived by a majority of 122 to 16 voices.

In the house of commons, Mr. Windham moved an address similar to that of lord Grenville in the house of lords; which he enforced in a speech of great length, distinguished more by its subtilty than its eloquence, and more by its eloquence than its force of argument. Mr. Windham said, "that the colossal power of France resembled nothing that had existed since ancient Rome. In ten years the French had acquired more than the Romans had ever achieved in half a century. On the map of Europe, two nations only stood erect; and of these, the one from distance more than strength. There was no single power which could enter the lists

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—And in  
the house  
of com-  
mons.

\* It appeared from the statement of lord Hobart on this occasion, that Great Britain, in the course of the war, had captured or destroyed no less than seventy-seven ships of the line belonging to the enemy, one hundred and forty-four frigates, and a multitude of smaller vessels.



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with France. In the first conflict it would be crushed by her tremendous mace. It was indeed by some supposed, that though Europe should be wrecked, we at least might take to our boat and escape. But by the spectre of French power we should still be pursued. In Asia, in America, it would follow close, scaring us with its gorgon aspect. Mr. Windham asserted that we had given away two continents. It was obvious that the object of France was universal empire, while we had reposed supinely with blind confidence and security. He insisted with great truth, *that the COUNTRY had NEVER been well aware WHY it was at WAR.* The country was not sufficiently impressed with the dangers of the peace, because it had never been sufficiently alive to the character of the war. From its very commencement it had been carried on with an incessant cry for peace": and he here launched out into a violent invective against the opposers of the late war. "With regard to the peace, the bond," he said, "was signed, and we were under an obligation to adhere to it; but he thought the predictions of evil from the aggrandisement of France, if not immediately fulfilled, must eventually be verified."

The terms of the peace were strenuously defended by lord Hawkesbury. "At the juncture," his lordship said, "at which the present

administration entered on negotiation with the French government, it was not practicable that any treaty of peace should remedy the disorders of the continent. It was enough for Britain to secure her own interests, and those of her allies. As to the question how far the intermediate events would have justified the government in refusing to conclude a definitive treaty on the basis of the preliminaries," he observed, "that with the first intimation received by this government of the new constitution of the Italian republic, they had heard of its acceptance by the courts of Vienna, Berlin, and Petersburg. Under these circumstances, was it incumbent upon us to continue the war on the account of the Italian republic? The cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, was another ground of complaint. That province had originally been a French colony, having been ceded by France to Spain after the treaty of 1763. The value of it was at present nearly nominal. As a naval station, New Orleans was unimportant; and the vicinity of Louisiana to the United States of America was calculated rather to diminish than to augment the attachment of that country to France. The non-renewal of ancient political treaties by the present, his lordship denied to be a defect. Formerly, in all treaties of peace it had been customary to renew the preceding

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treaties. In the present war no continental power had done so; consequently, if we renewed former treaties, *we* alone should be bound, while other nations were free. The treaty of Westphalia, to which all subsequent treaties for a long period had reference, was now no longer in force; and it would have been highly impolitic in us to sanction the recent encroachments of France, and the dismemberment of the Germanic empire, by a formal accession to the treaty of Luneville. With regard to commercial treaties, it had been found in present circumstances impracticable; but it was absurd to suppose, that either our commercial rights, such as cutting logwood in the Bay of Honduras, or our rights of sovereignty in any part of the globe, particularly in India, depended upon these renewals.

“Malta,” his lordship said, “had been avowedly occupied with the intention of restoring it to the order of St. John. The introduction of a Maltese *langue*,” he contended, “was a just tribute to the brave conduct of the inhabitants. The guardianship of Malta having been declined by Russia, it was placed under the protection of Naples, a country yet more interested in its security. His lordship reminded the house of the advantages accruing to this kingdom from the acquisition of the Mysore, and the destruction

of a power in India, the natural ally of France, BOOK XXXVI. and the inveterate foe of Britain. Both in the 1802. East and West Indies our possessions were augmented, and our colonies had rapidly increased in value. In regard to the permanence of the peace, he was willing to admit and to deplore, that in the present state of the world any peace was insecure; but the precarious tenure on which this blessing was to be holden, was no reason for rejecting it. France had renounced her revolutionary principles, and resumed the old maxims of politics and religion. After the preceding convulsions, a good government was scarcely to be expected; an ameliorated government was, however, gradually forming from the ruins of revolutions. Had France remained under the Bourbons, she would have been equally our rival—under all governments her ambition would have been the same. Finally, his lordship observed, that we had emerged from a dangerous war, with our resources and credit unimpaired; and that it was improper to waste them in an unavailing continuance of the contest, or to exhaust by fruitless efforts the strength and spirit of the country.

The debate was prolonged to a very late hour by the speeches of a great number of the members—the lords Temple and Folkestone, Mr. Thomas Grenville, and others of that party, passion-



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ately inveighing against the terms of the peace, which were on the other side calmly defended by divers of the old, or whig opposition, though on a ground considerably different from that taken by the ministers.

Mr. Addington made a speech nearly in unison with that of lord Hawkesbury. He candidly admitted, however, that the treaty of Amiens had never been regarded by him as a subject of exultation; but he trusted that the honor of the country remained unsullied. The territorial acquisitions of France could not, he acknowledged, be viewed without regret; and that the state of Europe was far from being such as we could regard with satisfaction. "But," said the minister, "is it given to us to redress that grievance? We ought to reserve our strength for future occasions, when it might be put forth with a prospect of success; and not waste it, as it must have been in this case, without any chance of advantage."

Mr. Sheridan closed the debate with a speech of great animation. He remarked that the discussion of the necessary, though disgraceful, treaty of peace, furnished the best defence of the conduct of those who had uniformly opposed the war. For his part, he supported the peace because he was convinced that ministers could obtain no better. Their predecessors had left

them to choose between an expensive, bloody, fruitless war, and a hollow perilous peace. For the attainment of what object, or purpose, Mr. Sheridan asked, did we go to war? To prevent French aggrandisement—Have we done that?—No. We were at least to rescue Holland—Is that accomplished?—No. But the recovery of Flanders and Brabant we pronounced the *sine qua non* of peace—Are they recovered?—No. Then come SECURITY and INDEMNITY—Are they obtained?—No. The late minister told us that the example of a jacobin government in Europe, founded on the ruins of a holy altar, and the tomb of a martyred monarch, was a spectacle so dreadful and infectious to Christendom, that we could never be safe while it existed, and could do nothing short of our last effort for its destruction. For these fine words, which had at last given way to “security and indemnity,” we had sacrificed near 200,000 lives, and expended three hundred millions of money—and had gained Ceylon and Trinidad! As it was not unusual upon great occasions to confer new appellations as well upon things as persons, he proposed that our two acquisitions should in future be named SECURITY Island, and INDEMNITY Island. He admired the splendid talents of the late minister, but he had misapplied them in the government of the country. He had augmented

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our debt, diminished our population, abridged our privileges, and had done more to strengthen the power of the crown at the expense of the constitution, than any minister who had ever conducted the affairs of this country.

The house at length divided on Mr. Windham's address; when an immense majority appeared in favor of the treaty, and of the amendment proposed by lord Hawkesbury, of 276 to 20 voices.

On a general review of the debates relative to the peace, it may be remarked, that the opponents of the ministry laid a very undue stress upon the non-renewal of the ancient treaties. The first article of the treaty of Amiens, declares peace and friendship to be restored between the contracting powers, and prohibits any act of hostility whatever by sea or by land, for any cause or under any pretext. How then could Great Britain be interrupted in the enjoyment of any right, either of commerce or of sovereignty, which she actually possessed, without a gross and positive violation of the treaty? Any attack of an hostile nature must undoubtedly proceed from an hostile disposition, such as no renewal of ancient treaties could preclude or restrain. But the refusal of England to accede to the treaty of Luneville, which superseded all the ancient treaties; or to recognise the newly

established republics of Italy, under the pretence stated by lord Hawkesbury, “of not sanctioning the recent encroachments of France;” was manifestly and highly impolitic, because it showed that Great Britain retained the wish without the power to subvert the existing order of things. Peace, therefore, could not be accompanied by amity; nor had Great Britain, in such circumstances, any reason to expect that France would grant any facilities to the English commerce, or suffer, so far as she could find the means of prevention, any interposition on the part of England respecting the affairs of the continent; or, in a word, that England would be regarded by her in any other light than that of a concealed, or rather of an *avowed* and inveterate, adversary. For it unfortunately appeared in a very short time, and by very decisive proofs, to be the absurd policy of the present administration, notwithstanding the termination of open hostilities, to treat France in all other modes as an enemy; at the same time most ridiculously expecting that France should conduct herself in relation to Britain in all respects whatever as a friend.

The last discussion of importance which came before the house, was occasioned by a motion (May 27) of Mr. Canning, a zealous adherent of Mr. Pitt, for an address to the throne, requesting that no negro should be suffered, under the

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Motion by  
Mr. Can-  
ning for  
preventing  
the impor-  
tation of  
negroes in-  
to Trini-  
dad.



BOOK XXXVI. present circumstances, to be imported into the island of Trinidad; and that a plan of regulations be framed for promoting the future cultivation and improvement of that island, in the manner least likely to interfere with the wish expressed by this house for the gradual diminution and ultimate termination of the African slave-trade, &c.

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The chancellor of the exchequer declared that the motion of Mr. Canning was such as he could not at this time assent to; nor did he see how the question, as it related to Trinidad, could be separated from that of the general policy of the slave-trade. He acknowledged that every sentiment and feeling of his mind went to the abolition of this infamous traffic; but this could only, in his opinion, be accomplished by a system of regulations, and the gradual effect of moral causes. He said that able surveyors had been actually appointed by government to report the state of Trinidad, and previous to such report he hoped that parliament would come to no decision: after which he should wish to see a committee of that house appointed to take into consideration the whole of the African slave-trade, by which means he trusted that more would be effected than by any partial discussion. In the mean time he pledged himself, that no grants should be made that would enable the grantees

to set up any claims, on their part, precluding <sup>BOOK XXXVI.</sup> parliament from doing any thing which to its wisdom and discretion should seem meet. On this <sup>1802.</sup> explanation Mr. Canning, with the approbation of Mr. Wilberforce, withdrew his motion—the latter declaring himself satisfied with the personal declaration of the chancellor of the exchequer, believing that he was sincere, and anxious to act up to his professions.

On the 28th of June, being the last day of the session, the new speaker presented, according <sup>Remarkable address of the new speaker to the king.</sup> to ancient usage, the money-bills to his majesty, on which occasion he made a speech which excited no very favorable ideas of his political principles. After expressing in customary language “the heart-felt gratitude with which the house acknowledged his majesty’s paternal goodness and wisdom in terminating a war just and necessary in its origin, conducted with energy, sustained with fortitude, and signalised by splendid triumphs,” he adverted to the state of the public burdens, delivering his sentiments in the following terms:—“At a time when their attention has been directed to these considerations, it has given the HIGHEST SATISFACTION to your majesty’s faithful commons, to relieve those pressing demands which the general difficulties of the times had cast upon the provision assigned by parliament for the support of your majesty’s

BOOK household, and the honor and dignity of your  
 XXXVI. crown. For this country has not now to learn  
 1802. that its monarchy is the BEST and STRONGEST  
 SECURITY for its LIBERTIES, and that the splendor  
 of the throne reflects lustre and dignity upon the  
 whole nation."

It had hitherto been uniformly understood by those adherents of the constitution who considered it as founded upon the principles of liberty, that the HOUSE OF COMMONS, the REPRESENTATIVES of the PEOPLE, to whom the right of election was now about to revert, and not the crown, was the "best and strongest security" for the permanence of those principles; and a public relinquishment of that high and peculiar distinction from the speaker of the house, actually addressing the throne, seemed to those who had not forsaken the ancient though not yet wholly obsolete maxims of whiggism, a concession equally disgraceful and unwarrantable. From the tenor of this address it might be inferred, that the pecuniary embarrassments of the crown were a just ground of exultation and applause; and the whole speech formed a curious contrast to the famous address of sir Fletcher Norton to the sovereign on a similar occasion, five-and-twenty years before.

Dissolution  
 of parlia-  
 ment.

On the 29th of June, 1802, the parliament was dissolved by proclamation; and the minister,

Mr. Addington, with laudable impartiality, avoiding any interference in the ensuing election, the choice of the nation (now recovering from its political delusions) fell almost uniformly, wherever any contests took place, upon men of independent and constitutional principles.

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Elections  
favorable  
to the  
whigs.

Mr. Windham, in particular, was superseded at Norwich by Mr. William Smith, notwithstanding the great local interest of the former, and that the latter founded his claims merely upon his public character and parliamentary conduct. In the county of Middlesex sir Francis Burdett was returned, after a very violent conflict, in the room of Mr. Mainwaring; who had rendered himself supremely obnoxious to the majority of the electors, by his vindication of the system of arbitrary imprisonment, and of the barbarous behaviour of Aris, keeper, or in the new phraseology GOVERNOR, of the jail lately erected in Coldbath-fields, commonly known by the appropriate appellation of the English Bastile.

At this period, a lively sensation of satisfaction, unknown for a long series of years, appeared to be diffused throughout the nation; and sanguine hopes were entertained that peace and prosperity would, under the auspices of the present administration, be firmly and permanently established. The penetrating and prophetic spirit of Mr. Fox alone—perceiving but too plainly notwith-

Transient  
interval of  
satisfaction  
and repose.



BOOK standing the difference in the personal charac-  
XXXVI. ters of the present and the late ministers, that  
1802. the general system of government had undergone  
no real change—foreboded that this halcyon  
season would prove of transient duration. In  
his address to the electors of Westminster on  
again offering himself to their choice, he alluded  
to his desire of retirement from public life,  
from which he was diverted by the deference he  
paid to the sentiments of many respectable per-  
sons among them; but he fairly declared his own  
opinion, “that the character of the next parlia-  
ment would not be at all different from the last;  
and according to the judgement he had formed of  
that assembly, the principles of national policy,  
liberality, humanity, and justice, were with them  
as nothing—the will and pleasure of the court,  
every thing.—That our general situation was  
improved by the peace, and the disposition to  
amity which appeared to prevail both in France  
and England, he most readily admitted; but,  
had the king’s servants peremptorily refused  
that peace which had excited such universal joy  
—if they had rejected those very terms which  
had been approved by a majority almost unex-  
ampled in the annals of parliament on such an  
occasion—he asked whether it was a calumny on  
the late house of commons to say, that the con-  
duct of the ministry would in that case have been

equally sanctioned by their decided approbation. While the influence of the crown was known to be so overwhelming and irresistible, Mr. Fox intimated that his abstaining from a regular attendance in parliament could not be very severely condemned;" and he expressly declared in the conclusion of this address, "that if he felt any anxiety for their suffrages on the present occasion, it was not for the sake of sitting in parliament, but as a proof that the city of Westminster continued to him that kindness and esteem which it had been the object of his life to deserve, and his happiness so long to have enjoyed."

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During the interval between the signature of the preliminary articles and the definitive treaty, the English who resorted in great numbers to France were received with distinguished marks of civility by the first consul, who seemed to indulge the flattering but delusive hope that permanent peace and amity with Great Britain was about to be established \*. But on the con-

\* An intelligent traveller who published about this period an account of his "Excursion to Paris," tells us, "that the first consul received, on the 15th of Ventose (March 7), at his levee, the individuals of each respective nation with great ease and dignity. When it came to the turn of Mr. Jackson, the British resident, sixteen English were presented; and after Bonaparte," continues the narrator, "had spoken to five or six of us, he said with a smile which is peculiarly his

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New causes  
of differ-  
ence be-  
tween  
Great Bri-  
tain and  
France.

clusion of the definitive treaty the prospect almost instantly began to cloud. A deluge of abuse issued all at once from the English press, and more especially from the English newspapers, those in particular known to be under the immediate influence of government, against the person, character, and conduct, of the first consul; of which for a considerable time no notice was taken in France, but which was at length retaliated by very severe and satirical paragraphs in the *Moniteur*, the official journal of the French government.

Notwithstanding the recent treaty of peace and amity, the French princes were permitted to appear as formerly at the court; whither many, also, of the *ci-devant* French bishops and nobles, were accustomed to resort decorated with the insignia of the ancient orders. Other persons justly obnoxious to the French government, met also in England with a very indulgent reception; particularly one GEORGES, supposed to have been

own, and which changes a countenance usually stern into one of great mildness—‘ Je suis charmé de voir tant des Anglois ici. J’espere que notre union sera de longue durée. Nous sommes les deux nations les plus puissantes, et les plus civilisées, de l’Europe. Il faut nous unir pour cultiver les arts, les sciences, les lettres, enfin pour faire le bonheur de l’espèce humain.’—Mr. Jackson made no reply, and of course no one else could say any thing.”

deeply concerned in the *infernal* assassination plot against the first consul. This made the subject of a verbal complaint by M. Talleyrand to the English resident at Paris, in a conference which took place on June the 3d. The French minister said that the conduct of the English government in this respect had affected so strongly the first consul, and it was in fact so calculated to prevent that system of cordiality which he was anxious to see established, that it was incumbent on him to express his wish that his majesty's government might be disposed to remove out of the British dominions all the French princes and their adherents, together with the French bishops, and other French individuals whose political principles and conduct must necessarily occasion great jealousy to the French government. He observed that the protection and favor which all the persons in question continued to meet with in a country so close a neighbour to France, must alone be always considered as an encouragement to the disaffected here, even without those persons themselves being guilty of any acts tending to foment fresh disturbances in this country; but that the government here possessed proofs of the abuse which they were now making of the protection which they enjoyed in England, and of the advantage they were taking of the vicinity

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1802.  
Angry discussions  
between  
the two governments.



BOOK of their situation to France, by being really  
XXXVI. guilty of such acts—since several printed papers  
1802. had lately been intercepted which it was known  
they had sent, and caused to be circulated in  
France, and which had for object to create an  
opposition to the government. The French  
minister added, that he thought the residence of  
Louis XVIII. was now the proper place for the  
rest of the family, and that he (the resident)  
might add this suggestion in his report to the  
English ministry. In the course of the con-  
ference M. Talleyrand intimated that the delay  
of general Andreossi, who had been nominated  
ambassador to the court of London, in proceeding  
to the place of his destination, was occasioned  
by the circumstances he had mentioned, and  
which would acquire a great addition of force  
if they should exist when he was present \*.

In return, lord Hawkesbury authorised the  
resident to declare in the king's name, "that his  
majesty would certainly consider it inconsistent  
with both the letter and spirit of the treaty of  
peace between him and the French republic, to  
encourage or countenance any projects that  
might be hostile to the present government of  
France. He is sincerely desirous that the peace  
which has been concluded, may be permanent,

\* Official papers printed at London, A. D. 1803.

With these sentiments, he certainly expects that all *foreigners* who may reside within his dominions, should not only hold a conduct conformable to the laws of the country, but should abstain from all acts which may be hostile to the government of any country with which his majesty may be at peace. As long, however, as they conduct themselves according to these principles, his majesty would feel it inconsistent with his *dignity*, with his honor, and with the common laws of hospitality, to deprive them of that protection which individuals resident in his dominions can only forfeit by their own misconduct. The greater part of the persons to whom allusion has been made, are living in retirement; and his majesty has no reason whatever to suppose, that since the conclusion of peace, they have availed themselves of their residence in England to promote any designs injurious to the government of France\*."

A reply like this, to a complaint of so serious a nature as that made by the French government, may be regarded as a most egregious error, laying the sure foundation for future mischief.—1st. It unfairly confounded the case of France, the government of which was recent, and exposed to dangerous attacks, with that of

\* Official papers, London.

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1802. other governments, which were under no similar apprehensions; and the French emigrants, although known to entertain the most inveterate animosity to the existing government of France, were coldly mentioned under the general denomination of *foreigners*, all of whom were equally entitled to the protection of the English government.—2dly. After the positive assertion of M. Talleyrand, that the first consul possessed undoubted proofs of the machinations of these persons against his government, it was an intolerable insult in lord Hawkesbury to declare, “that his majesty has no reason whatever to suppose that they were engaged in any designs injurious to the government of France.” Had the reply of this minister been penned in the spirit of amity, it would have no doubt admitted the propriety of removing those individuals, at least, from the dominions of his majesty, against whom such proofs should be produced.—3dly. Although it would have been unquestionably a very improper condescension on the part of the British government to comply with the request of the French minister in its full extent, and which in all probability was not in the least expected by the first consul; yet the KING’S DIGNITY certainly did not require him to receive with marks of distinction the exiled princes and nobles of France at his court, a mode of conduct

from which France had in the similar and memorable instance of the house of Stuart, carefully refrained when at peace with England: still less did that DIGNITY require him to treat with peculiar indulgence, persons who were watching and waiting every opportunity of embroiling the two countries, and of renewing the horrors of war. And least of all did this DIGNITY, upon which, during the present reign, such great and unprecedented stress has been laid, render it incumbent on the British government, to allow the publication of pamphlets and papers by these emigrants, breathing the most rancorous spirit of hatred and revenge against the person and government of the first consul.

At the end of the following month (July), a specific complaint was made in writing by M. Otto to lord Hawkesbury, of a publication of this nature, written by one Peltier; accompanied by a demand of punishment for such an abuse of the press, and violation of the laws of nations. And he observed, at the same time, "that the reiterated insults of a small number of *foreigners*, assembled in London to conspire against the French government, produce the most unfavorable effects on the good understanding between the two nations." Instead of directing an immediate prosecution of one of the grossest libels ever promulgated, lord Hawkesbury contented



BOOK himself with coldly, if not insultingly, notifying  
 XXXVI. to M. Otto, "that he had thought it his duty to  
 1802. refer the article in question to his majesty's attorney-general for his opinion, whether it is or is not a libel according to the law of England; and whether it is such a libel as he would, under all the circumstances, recommend for prosecution \*."

Could lord Hawkesbury have forgotten, or could he suppose that the French government had forgotten, the prosecution instituted at the express command of government, against the publisher of a newspaper, for a libel against the late emperor of Russia—a pretended libel, which no one, not even the prosecutors of it, seriously believed to be such, and which the Russian government had never made the subject of complaint? After such provocations it is no wonder that the misunderstanding subsisting between the two nations became daily more serious.

On the 17th of August another, and still graver remonstrance, was made by M. Otto in a note to lord Hawkesbury, stating, "that by the first article of the treaty of Amiens, the two powers agree to afford no protection, either directly or indirectly, to those who should cause prejudice to any of them. But the greatest of

\* Official papers, London.

all injuries, doubtless, is that which tends to debase a foreign government, or to excite within its territories civil and religious commotions. BOOK  
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And the most decided of all protections is that which places under the safeguard of the laws, men who seek not only to disturb the political tranquillity of Europe, but even to dissolve the first bonds of society. The undersigned minister must moreover observe, that this is not a question respecting some paragraphs, which, through the inadvertence of an editor, might have been accidentally inserted in a public print—but it is a question of a deep and continued system of defamation, directed not only against the chief of the French republic, but against all the constituted authorities of the republic—against the whole nation, represented by these libellers in the most odious and degrading terms. It has even been remarked, that many of these prints contain an appeal to the French people against the government and fundamental laws of their country. If these observations apply to the English writers who, for these three months past, have deluged the public with the most perfidious and unbecoming publications, they are still more applicable to a class of foreign calumniators, who appear to avail themselves of the asylum offered them in England, only for the purpose of the better gratifying their hatred

BOOK against France, and undermining the founda-  
XXXVI.  
1802. tions of peace. It is not merely by insulting and  
seditious writings, evidently published with a  
view to circulation in France; but by other incen-  
diary papers, distributed through the maritime  
departments, in order to excite the evil-disposed  
or weak inhabitants to resist the execution of the  
CONCORDATE; that these implacable enemies of  
France continue to exercise hostilities, and to  
provoke the just indignation of the French go-  
vernment and people. Not a doubt exists of  
these writings having been composed and circu-  
lated by Georges, and by the former bishops of  
France. These men can be no longer considered  
but as rebels both against political and religious  
authority; and after their reiterated attempts to  
disturb the good understanding between the  
two governments, their residence in England  
militates openly against the spirit and letter of  
the treaty of peace." M. Otto concludes this in-  
teresting note by saying, "that he has received  
especial orders to *solicit*, 1st. That his majesty's  
government will adopt the most effectual mea-  
sures to put a stop to the unbecoming and sedi-  
tious publications with which the newspapers and  
other writings printed in England are filled.

"2d. That the individuals mentioned in the  
under-signed minister's letter of the 23d of July  
last, shall be sent out of the island of Jersey.

“ 3d. That the former bishops of Arras and St. Pol de Leon, and all those who, like them, under the pretence of religion, seek to raise disturbances in the interior of France, shall likewise be sent away. BOOK XXXVI.  
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“ 4th. That Georges and his adherents shall be transported to Canada, according to the intention which the undersigned has been directed to transmit to his government at the request of lord Hawkesbury.

“ 5th. That in order to deprive the evil-disposed of every pretext for disturbing the good understanding between the two governments, it shall be recommended to the princes of the house of Bourbon at present in Great Britain, to repair to Warsaw, the residence of the head of their family.

“ 6th. That such of the French emigrants as still think proper to wear the orders and decorations belonging to the ancient government of France, shall be required to quit the territory of the British empire.”

In justification of these demands M. Otto referred not merely to the treaty of Amiens, and the repeated assurances of amity given by the English to the French government, but to the great attention of the former in times of internal fermentation, to remove from the territory of a neighbouring power, those who might endanger



BOOK the public tranquillity. "Whatever," says M. Otto,  
XXXVI. "may be the protection which the English laws  
1802. afford to native writers, and to other subjects  
of his majesty, the French government knows  
that foreigners do not here enjoy the same pro-  
tection; and that the law known by the name  
of the alien act, gives the ministry of his Britannic  
majesty an authority which it has often exercised  
against foreigners whose residence was prejudi-  
cial to the interests of Great Britain. The first  
clause of this act states expressly, that any order  
in council which requires a foreigner to quit the  
kingdom, shall be executed under pain of impri-  
sonment and transportation. There exists, there-  
fore, in the ministry, a legal and sufficient power  
to restrain foreigners without having recourse to  
courts of law; and the French government,  
which offers on this point a perfect reciprocity,  
thinks it gives a new proof of its pacific inten-  
tions, by demanding that those persons may be  
sent away whose machinations uniformly tend to  
sow discord between the two people. And it is  
too well acquainted with the conciliatory dispo-  
sitions of the English ministry, not to rely upon  
its efforts to disperse a faction, equally the enemy  
of France and England \*."

Instead, however, of manifesting any of "the

\* Official papers, London, p. 40.

conciliatory dispositions" so complaisantly ascribed to the English ministry, or complying with any one of the requisitions of M. Otto, lord Hawkesbury, declining the discussion altogether with that able and candid negotiator, transmitted instructions to the English resident at Paris, to enter into explanations with the French government on the several points to which it referred. And in a very long letter of instructions, his lordship expatiated largely and ostentatiously (probably for the first and last time in his life) on the nature and privileges of the English constitution, and particularly on the freedom of the press. And he says, "I am sure you must be aware that his majesty cannot, and never will in consequence of any representation or any MENACE from a foreign power, make any concession which can be in the smallest degree dangerous to the liberty of the press, as secured by the constitution of the country. This liberty is justly dear to every British subject\*." But it ought to be remarked—1st. That the note of M. Otto contained a *solicitation* only for the limitation of this licentious freedom, unaccompanied by a single expression that could by any possibility be construed into a *menace*.—And 2dly, That evidently aware of the nature of the

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\* Official papers, London, p. 43.

BOOK XXXVI.  
1802. English constitution, and of the difficulty which government might feel in complying with this request as it related to the English publications, he lays the chief stress on those of the French emigrants, who were beyond all question under the immediate control of the executive power; and whose tracts, written in the French language, with the express design of being circulated in France, were in the view of the French government of far more importance than the libels of the English news-writers and pamphleteers.

As no redress, however, could be obtained, except by the institution of a legal process, which could not with decency be refused, against Peltier, and who was after many delays tried and convicted, though never brought up for judgment, or in any way punished for his offence, the French government at length adopted the obvious and necessary resolution of prohibiting the importation of English newspapers, almost all of which were continually filled with coarse disgusting abuse, and most malignant misrepresentations. "The English journalists pretend," says a French writer, "that the privilege of insulting foreign governments, is the most sacred of their rights, and the exercise of it the most holy of their duties. They pretend that to exact of them reason, and failing reason something of delicacy or good nature, or in lieu of this a little

decency, is to impose a contribution upon them BOOK XXXVI. which they are not in a condition to pay, and 1802. which is not stipulated for by the treaty of Amiens!"

This being the state of things between the two countries, it cannot be the subject of wonder that the mercantile world should be wholly disappointed in its expectation of an advantageous treaty of commerce with France, which by a different conduct on the part of the English government, might no doubt have been obtained with the utmost facility. But far from any concession of this nature, the maritime laws and regulations established by the directory, and framed in a spirit the most hostile to Great Britain, were rigorously enforced; while on the other hand, under pretext of sending commercial agents to the different ports of Great Britain and Ireland, the French government endeavoured to obtain such information respecting the soundings of the harbours, the nature of the defences, &c., as might be eventually of use in case of a future rupture, of which the indications were now but too plainly discernible. The secret correspondence between these agents and the French minister being discovered by an intercepted letter, they were immediately ordered to withdraw from the king's dominions; but a decorous excuse was found for this singularly obnoxious act of power by al-



BOOK XXXVI. 1802. leging that the privilege of sending authorised commercial agents or consuls could not be permitted except to those nations with whom a commercial treaty actually subsisted\*.

\* This harshness was without doubt perfectly justifiable in point of right, but the policy of it appears, all circumstances considered, extremely doubtful. The intercepted letter in question, was written 26th of Brumaire, 11th year (*i. e.* November 17, 1802), by M. Talleyrand, to citizen Fauvelet, commercial agent or commissary at Dublin, containing, among a great number of interrogatories merely commercial, the two following obnoxious requisitions:—"11. You are required to furnish a plan of the ports of your district, with a specification of the soundings for mooring vessels.—12. If no plan of the ports can be procured, you are to point out with what wind vessels can come in and go out, and what is the greatest draught of water with which vessels can enter therein deeply laden?" As to the popular clamor of *treachery* raised against the French government on this occasion, it is scarcely necessary to remark, that every government will endeavor to obtain, by every means in their power, such information as they deem of importance; and had agents from the English government been permitted to reside at Boulogne or Cherbourg, &c. they would have thought it no doubt a laudable service to transmit to their employers specifications of the same nature.

It is material to observe, that at the moment when these instructions were given to M. Fauvelet, there existed in the mind of M. Talleyrand, a very strong apprehension of an approaching war with England; but at the period when the French commercial agents were dismissed, the English ministry had decided in favor of peace. In this state of things new efforts would undoubtedly be made to accomplish the great ob-

Nor did the countenance given to the French princes and their adherents imply by any means, what the French government was ready to infer from it. Such a mode of conduct was, indeed,

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ject of a commercial treaty with France; and in order to facilitate this purpose, it might have been expedient to accept the excuses of M. Talleyrand, who alleged, "that the information was intended for the completion of a work in the nature of that entitled 'The Balance of Commerce.'"—*Vide* p. 217, part II. of Correspondence.

As the pretext was not admitted, no favorable disposition on the part of France could be excited; and the attempt to gain every thing, and to yield nothing, was evidently extravagant and hopeless. But the resolution of the English ministers to maintain the peace, was itself the result not of any principle of good faith, and much less of amity, on their part, but merely of inability to renew the war with the most distant prospect of success, and the hostile mind was manifest on all occasions. That it was the original purpose of the first consul to conclude a commercial treaty with England, plainly appears from the letter of M. Otto to lord Hawkesbury, Correspondence, part II., p. 212, as follows:—

"MY LORD,

"His Britannic majesty's government having often manifested to me a desire to concert some particular arrangements for the establishment, or the maintenance, of several relations of commerce between the two nations, I have the satisfaction to inform your excellency, that the first consul, penetrated with the same sentiments, and having a particular desire to consolidate the relations of friendship so happily re-established between the two nations, has determined to send without delay to London, citizen Coquebert Montbret, who has lately re-

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calculated to excite the highest jealousy and distrust in the mind of any person placed in the dangerous post of pre-eminence which Bonaparte now occupied. But the good faith of the king of England had never *yet* been violated, and these unfavorable appearances were the result not of any formed design, or even of any very evil intention, but merely of pride, prejudice, personal dislike, and extreme impolicy.

State of  
affairs in  
France.

In the beginning of February, 1802, the period arrived for the re-election in France of a fifth of the members of the legislative body and the tribunate. During the preceding session it appeared, that the authority of the first consul was by no means so absolute in those assemblies as had been generally supposed: and the civil code presented for their acceptance was, in consequence of the formidable opposition which it was destined to encounter, withdrawn by him

sided at Amsterdam with the character of commissary general of commerce. He has received orders to repair to London, as soon as possible, to co-operate with me on every thing relative to this important negotiation; and I am particularly directed to assure the British government, that the first consul desires to conduct it promptly to a termination mutually advantageous.

“I have the honor to be, &c.

“OTTO.”

“*Portman-square, May 23, 1802.*”

not without some indications of chagrin and re-  
 sentiment. In his concluding message (Decem-  
 ber 29, 1801), the first consul declared, "that it  
 was with regret the government found them-  
 selves obliged to postpone to another period,  
 laws expected by the nation with so much in-  
 terest. But they were convinced that the time  
 was not yet arrived when these great discussions  
 might be carried on with that calmness and unity  
 of intention which they required." This censure  
 was, perhaps, not unfounded; but the first con-  
 sul might have learned, from the practice of the  
 constituent powers of the British government,  
 among other salutary lessons, the dignified de-  
 corum, which invariably avoids ascribing, even  
 in those cases wherein they differ, improper mo-  
 tives of action to each other. The chief oppo-  
 sers of the plan proposed by the executive go-  
 vernment were, however, excluded by the vote of  
 the senate at the period of re-election; among  
 these, were the distinguished names of Barthe-  
 lemy, Chenier, Bailleul, Daunon, Garat, Isnard,  
 &c.; and the ensuing session fully proved that  
 the consular power and influence were not less  
 than regal.

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The famous convention, known by the appel-  
 lation of the CONCORDATE, concluded between  
 the first consul and the pope, received, in the  
 month of April, its final ratification from the le-

Ratifica-  
 tion and  
 celebration  
 of the con-  
 cordatum.



BOOK legislative body by a majority of 228 to 21 votes.

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And this great event, in conjunction with the definitive treaty, was celebrated with extraordinary magnificence by a solemn TE DEUM, at the cathedral of Notre Dame, and grand illuminations in the city and vicinity of Paris. Cardinal Caprara, legate from his holiness the pope, was escorted to the Tuilleries by an honorary guard of cavalry, the crosier being borne before him to the palace. In his speech to the first consul, he complimented him in the following words: "The arm that gained battles, and signed peace with all nations, restores splendor to the temples of the true God, rebuilds his altars, and re-establishes his worship." The first consul, in reply, extolled the apostolical virtues of his eminence, and expressed his own satisfaction at this new triumph of Christianity.

At Rome, also, high mass was performed at the church of St. John de Lateran, by the pope in person, on Ascension day, upon the same occasion, accompanied with every possible token of joy and festivity. It was not without reason, that the pontiff, who, scarcely two years before, had been in a state of melancholy exile at Venice, exulted in the unexpected change of his fortunes. This happy alteration was owing, no doubt, primarily to causes wholly independent of his influence; but, secondarily, to his own

excellent understanding and sound discretion, which led him, in defiance of the clamors of religious and political bigots, to accommodate his policy to events and circumstances far above his power to control; by this means preserving the existence, and in some degree restoring the credit, of the papal see, which seemed actually impending on the very brink of perdition. With the sovereign pontiff, the college of cardinals, the members of which had wandered over Europe in extreme distress, seeking in vain for some safe asylum, were reinstated in their thrones and palaces. The aged cardinal of York, in particular, the last heir male of the royal house of Stuart, had been reduced to that lowest stage of political degradation, the acceptance of a pension from the king of England, the possessor of that crown which the cardinal claimed by divine and indefeasible right \*.

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\* In a letter from the cardinal to sir John Hippesley Coxe, dated Venice, February 26, 1800, he acknowledges the receipt of 2000*l.* from lord Minto, ambassador at Vienna, accompanied by a power to draw for the same sum at the end of six months, with affecting expressions of gratitude. "I own to you," says his eminence, "that the succour granted to me, could not be more timely; for, without it, it would have been impossible for me to subsist on account of the irreparable loss of all my income; the very funds being also destroyed; so that I should otherwise have been reduced for the short re-

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Bonaparte  
declared  
first consul  
for life.

On the 6th of May a proposition was made in the tribunate to confer some striking mark of the public gratitude on Bonaparte. This was unanimously carried; and, having received the ready concurrence of the other constituent bodies, the senate, on the 8th, decreed, that this mark of gratitude ought to be the re-election of the first consul for ten years succeeding the term for which he had been already chosen. This

mainder of my life to languish in misery and indigence." And in a second letter, dated May 7th, the cardinal says, "My wishes would be completely satisfied, should I have the pleasure, as I most earnestly desire, to see you again at Frescati."

The good sense and liberality of the reigning pontiff, led him to cultivate the friendship and good will of all the contending potentates so far as circumstances would permit. In a letter, addressed by Pius VII. to sir John Hipposley Coxe, dated Venice, May 10, 1800, he thus expresses himself: "As the above-mentioned glorious sovereign pontiff (*i. e.* his predecessor Pius VI.) has given so many and such manifest proofs of the high esteem he entertained for the generous English nation, and of its magnanimous and just government; and was ever so solicitous to cultivate harmony and friendship; and also to demonstrate to that nation, on all occasions, his most lively attachment; we also, pursuing the same steps, will equally make it our study to preserve, with jealous care, the same reciprocal good intelligence and union; and we will not suffer, as far as lies in our power, that England should find seated in the pontifical chair of Rome another pontiff differing from him who so invariably acknowledged the kindness and friendship that England entertained for him."

honor, however, he declined to accept until it should be sanctioned by the public voice. Registers were accordingly opened in the different departments for inscribing the votes of the citizens on the subject; but, as a full indemnity for this condescension, the question was, in the mean time, materially changed; and, in the new form, it stood—"Shall Bonaparte be elected consul for life?" A second question was in a short time subjoined: "Shall Bonaparte be invested with the power of naming his successor?" Both questions were carried in the affirmative by an immense majority of 3,577,259 citizens, to 9074 who gave their votes against these innovations. In the tribunate one dissentient voice alone was heard; that of the celebrated Carnot. The act of the senate was presented on the 3d of August to the first consul, who expressed, in proper and grateful terms, his acceptance of it. The event was celebrated with great magnificence, and compliments of congratulation were received from all the public bodies; and, in the sequel, from most of the courts of Europe.

In this transaction, although the ambition of Bonaparte appeared unlimited, it could scarcely be said that any thing was done contrary, in the actual circumstances of the country, either to the interest or to the inclination of the people of



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France; who, just recovering from the horrors of anarchy, and terrified with the apprehension of new revolutions, were anxious to support and strengthen the existing government.

About the same period, a sort of new military order of nobility—a “LEGION OF HONOR”—was established by the legislative body in consequence of a law proposed to them, in a florid oration, by Rederer, one of the counsellors of state. The first consul was constituted *de jure* chief of the legion, and president of the grand council of administration of the order; and each individual admitted into it, was obliged to swear that he would devote himself to the service of the republic, and the defence of its government. All military men who had received “arms of honor,” were declared members of the legion; but those also were eligible who had rendered eminent services to the state by their knowledge, talents, or virtues. The legion was divided into fifteen cohorts, which were to be stationary in different quarters of the empire. Each cohort to consist of seven principal officers, twenty commandants, thirty inferior officers, and three hundred and fifty privates. Each principal officer to receive 5,000 francs *per annum* during life; each commandant 2000; inferior officers 1000; and each private 250. Jo-

seph Bonaparte was declared, under the first consul, grand officer of the legion, being elected to that station by a plurality of voices.

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Soon after the new appointment of Bonaparte had taken place, a plan, no doubt previously digested, was brought forward in the senate; and, being immediately adopted, was promulgated to the people as an organic *senatûs consultum*, or act of the conservative senate; in virtue of which considerable changes were made in the constitution, all tending, or at least being supposed to tend, to the strengthening the authority of the executive power. By this act, the second and third consuls are to hold their offices for life, being appointed by the senate on the presentation of the first consul, the third nomination of whom *must* be accepted. Great additional powers were conferred also on the senate, the nomination of whom rests in a great measure with the first consul. “This body, by organic *senatûs consulta*, regulates—1st, The administration of the colonies; 2dly, Every thing not provided for by the constitution; 3dly, It interprets the articles of the constitution. By ordinary *senatûs consulta*, it suspends the functions of juries; proclaims departments out of the protection of the law; determines when persons arrested in extraordinary cases are to be brought before the tribunals; annuls judgements; dis-

Important  
alterations  
in the con-  
stitution.

BOOK XXXVI. solves the legislative body and tribunate; appoints the consuls. A simple majority determines an ordinary *senatûs consultum*; for an organic *senatus consultum*, two-thirds are required. The projects of all *senatûs consulta* are discussed previously by a privy council appointed by the first consul. The first consul nominates fourteen to complete the number of eighty senators, from a list chosen by the electoral colleges. The members of the grand council of the legion of honor are necessarily members of the senate. The first consul may nominate any distinguished persons to the senate, exclusive of those presented by the electoral colleges: the number of senators, however, must not exceed one hundred and twenty. The ministers have seats in the senate, but not votes, unless they be senators.—The electoral colleges of department, composed of members appointed for life, present, at their annual meeting, two citizens, to form the list from which the senate is to be chosen: also, the electoral colleges of circuit, renewable at stated periods, present two citizens, to form the list from which are to be chosen the members of the tribunate. The electoral colleges of department and of circuit, present each two citizens, in order to form a list from which the members of the deputation to the legislative body are to be named. The departments are divided into five

series: the deputations from which are to be renewed in the year to which each series is referred. BOOK  
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The tribunate is to be reduced to fifty members; one-half to be replaced every three years. The legislative body, three hundred in number, and the tribunate, are to be wholly renewed immediately on their dissolution, by the senate."

By this act of the conservative senate, as by the former constitutional act, the most artful and effectual precautions are adopted to exclude all persons disaffected to the existing government from becoming members of any of the public bodies; although the nature of their election, or rather selection, is such as to render it almost impossible that the public functionaries should be other than citizens of great respectability. But by the extraordinary powers now given to the senate, the members of which hold their places for life, the constitution of France has become extremely oligarchical; and, whether the influence and control, possessed by the first consul over that body, in consequence of his privilege of nomination, and his power of occasionally increasing the number of its members, will suffice in the hands of a man inferior in talents to Bonaparte, to balance its immense political weight, is a problem difficult to solve. To depress the authority of the legislative body and the tribunate, founded, however imperfectly, on



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the principle of representation, and to exalt that of the senate, who depended chiefly on his own choice and nomination, was the grand object of this unexpected change, by which political liberty was reduced to the lowest ebb. But the principles on which the civil and judicial branches of the government were administered, appeared upon the whole to be highly favorable to the happiness and prosperity of the community; and there is no reason to believe that the popularity of the first consul sustained any diminution in consequence of this daring and decisive measure.

In respect to religion, the tolerant spirit of the French government laudably and conspicuously displayed itself. Conformably to the report of a society in England, styled the missionary society, published in the course of the present year, it is stated on the authority of divers members of the association, who had been deputed to visit France, "that protestantism, even in the ceded countries, where the Bible was previously prohibited under the penalty of eternal damnation, is not only tolerated, but its worship is public: that Divine Providence has prepared an immense scope for the exertions of Christian benevolence. The protestant cause," say these pious missionaries, "is considered by the present government of France to be favo-

rable to its stability. The apprehension of danger is from the party attached to popery. The government, therefore, is on its guard with respect to the latter, but is well disposed to the former. This is demonstrated by its appointments to stations of political importance, or to offices of magistracy. In one of the departments through which they passed, they obtained an introduction to the prefect, and informed him of their design in coming to France. This great officer entered with much zeal into the subject, highly approved of the measure, strongly recommended the protestants to exert themselves, and promised them a church and a house for the use of the minister whom they might get appointed. The day of superstition is closing, and the religion of Rome seems fast verging towards its fall. It may be added also," these worthy and intelligent reporters tell us, "that the protestant religion would be supported by a considerable portion of the people, who, being friendly to the principles of civil liberty, conceive that a natural alliance subsists between these, whilst that of the papal is supposed to be in hostility thereto\*."

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During the present summer, Paris was visited by a very great number of Englishmen of rank

Mr. Fox visits Paris.

\* Vide REPORT published in the Evangelical Magazine, Nov. 1802.

BOOK and distinction : among the rest, by Mr. Fox ;  
 XXXVI. who was received by M. Bonaparte, and indeed  
 1802. by the whole French nation, with the highest  
 marks of respect and honor. In one of the in-  
 terviews which took place between the first con-  
 sul and that celebrated statesman, the former re-  
 marked “ that the globe might be considered as  
 inhabited by two great nations, the Eastern and  
 the Western ; and that hostilities between any  
 of the powers of Europe must be regarded as a  
 species of civil war.” This was a striking and  
 noble sentiment. Notwithstanding the military  
 triumphs of Bonaparte, his feelings and senti-  
 ments appear indeed to have been invariably pa-  
 cific. With Great Britain in particular, it was  
 well known to be long his earnest though un-  
 availing wish, to establish relations of real and  
 permanent amity ; and, doubtless, Great Britain  
 and France united, may always give law to Eu-  
 rope, and peace to the world.

Disastrous  
 expedition  
 to St. Do-  
 mingo.

Amid the splendor of Bonaparte's high for-  
 tune, he was not without subjects of serious un-  
 easiness. The favorite expedition to St. Do-  
 mingo, upon which such immense sums had  
 been expended, and respecting which such con-  
 fident hopes had been entertained, was found by  
 no means equal to the attainment of the object  
 in view ; which was no less than the subjugation  
 of that great and extensive island, now entirely

in the hands of the blacks and the people of color. At first, however, the French met with flattering success; and the town of Cape Fra-  
çois was relinquished to them by Cristophe, one of Toussaint's generals, who, after an obstinate resistance, on evacuating the place, ordered it to be set on fire, and the forts to be blown up. Port-au-Prince also fell into the hands of general Le Clerc; but Toussaint treated the overtures of the French commander with contempt, and took every precaution to secure a safe retreat into the interior and mountainous parts of the island. Here the obstacles to be surmounted were innumerable. "It would be necessary," says general Le Clerc in one of his dispatches, "to see the country, to form an accurate idea of those difficulties which occurred at every step. I have seen nothing in the Alps to be compared to them." In a series of severe engagements, the French were generally conquerors; but their force was dangerously weakened even by their victories; and the hot and rainy season, so fatal to Europeans, was approaching. But a second negotiation was set on foot by Le Clerc, who was prodigal of promises, and protestations of favor and good-will to the negro chief. "I throw," says he, "a veil of oblivion over every thing that has passed at St. Domingo before my arrival. With regard to yourself, you desire re-



BOOK XXXVI. pose, and you deserve it. I leave you at liberty  
 1802. to retire to whichever of your habitations you  
 please. I rely so much on the attachment you  
 bear to the colony of St. Domingo, as to believe  
 that you will employ the moments of leisure you  
 may have in your retreat, in communicating to  
 me your views respecting the means to be taken  
 to make agriculture and commerce again flourish." Deluded by these shallow professions,  
 Toussaint, invincible in his fastnesses, was per-  
 suaded, by a blind and fatal confidence in the  
 faith of the French general, to sign a capitula-  
 tion (May, 1802), and submit to the authority of  
 the republic. Scarcely had he laid down his  
 arms, and retired to his house at Gonaives, when,  
 on a vague and improbable charge of conspiring  
 against the French government, he was seized,  
 in the midst of his family, about the end of the  
 month, and with them immediately shipped on  
 board a frigate for France, where he was, with-  
 out trial or examination, thrown into prison. But  
 this cruel and unjust procedure did not answer  
 the intended purpose. The negro generals, Dessal-  
 lines and Cristophe, who had also surrendered,  
 justly fearing to share the fate of their unfortu-  
 nate colleague, saved themselves by flight. The  
 insurgents again everywhere assembled; the cli-  
 mate effectually aided their efforts, and general  
 Le Clerc himself at length fell a victim to its

malignity. General Rochambeau succeeded to the command early in November, when a furious and bloody conflict recommenced; in the result of which the negro generals recovered possession of the whole island, excepting a few maritime towns and naval posts, of which the French with extreme difficulty maintained possession, being assailed at once with the sword, disease, and famine; and a country of inestimable value, which, by measures of moderation and conciliation, might, in all probability, have been preserved to France, appeared finally and irrecoverably lost.—Thus the genius of Africa, for the first time in the course of a thousand years, obtained the ascendancy over that of Europe in the final issue of a great military and political conflict; and, as if to render the triumph more memorable, in a conflict with that country which indisputably stands highest in the rank of European powers.

The queen of Sardinia, sister of Louis XVI., and married to Charles Emanuel II., king of Sardinia (then prince of Piedmont) in 1775, died at Naples, March 1802; and, on the 4th of June following, that monarch abdicated his crown in favor of his brother the duke d'Aosta. Emanuel still retained the empty title of king, and retired to the vicinity of Rome, where, in the delightful retreat of Frescati, he might hope to pass the re-

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Abdication  
of the king  
of Sardinia.

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 1802. remainder of his days, absolved from the anxious cares of royalty, in peaceful, though sad and inglorious, obscurity.

The hard fate of the house of Savoy, excited throughout Europe universal compassion; and the total desertion of the interests of that house by England, at the treaty of Amiens, could scarcely be forgiven even by those who were most desirous of peace. It is true, that the Sardinian monarch had renounced his alliance with Great Britain; but this was the effect, not of any want of good faith, but of an irresistible and over-ruling compulsion; and it appeared very strange, that England, who had so officiously and unnecessarily taken upon herself the guarantee of all his dominions at the commencement of the war, should suffer him to be stripped of all at the conclusion of it, without stipulating in his behalf for any indemnification whatever.

Piedmont  
 united to  
 France.

In consequence of the refusal of France to restore Piedmont, we had, indeed, on our part, refused to recognise the new republics of Italy, and the ducal monarchy of Etruria. But this was a mean and petty revenge, tending only to irritation. Had the restoration of Piedmont been firmly and resolutely insisted upon by the ministers who negotiated the treaty, France would scarcely have continued the war for the sake of Piedmont alone. In the proclamation of Bo-

naparte to the Tyrolians, August 1796, he says, BOOK  
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 “ Nature has pointed out the limits of France, by 1802.  
 the intersection of the Alps and the Rhine, in  
 the same manner as she has placed the Tyrol as  
 a line of demarcation for the house of Austria.”  
 Finding, however, that Great Britain was callous  
 on the subject, he ventured, by an organic *senatus  
consultum* issued early in the month of Sep-  
 tember, formally to unite that principality with  
 its appendages—which, previous to the decree  
 of union, had borne the appellation merely of  
 the twenty-seventh military division—to the ter-  
 ritory of the French republic. This important  
 acquisition was, by the same decree, divided into  
 six departments, under the names of the Po, the  
 Doria, the Sezia, the Stura, the Tanaro, and the  
 department of MARENGO; which now sent collec-  
 tively seventeen members to the legislative body.

Such was the termination of the long and fa-  
 mous career of the house of Savoy, which had,  
 for a series of ages, acted a distinguished part on  
 the political theatre of Europe. That illustrious  
 house derived its descent from the emperor  
 Otho III.; whose younger son Berthold was,  
 about the year 1000, appointed by him vice-ge-  
 rent of the empire, and created count of Mau-  
 rienne in Savoy. His posterity having, in the  
 course of a century, acquired the whole of that  
 province, assumed the title of counts of Savoy:



BOOK and Piedmont being conquered about the begin-  
 XXXVI. ning of the fifteenth century, Amadeus VII. re-  
 1802. ceived from the emperor Sigismond, the title of  
 duke of Savoy and prince of Piedmont. Emanuel  
 Philibert, who reigned in the sixteenth  
 century, was one of the most renowned generals  
 of the age. His son Emanuel I. married the  
 daughter of Philip II. king of Spain; and ac-  
 quired, by his able and prosperous administra-  
 tion, the surname of GREAT. By conquest, ces-  
 sion, or marriage, the princes of this house were  
 continually adding to their extent of dominion.  
 At length Victor Amadeus, by the treaty of  
 Utrecht, became king of Sicily; which valuable  
 island, by the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance,  
 he was obliged to exchange for Sardinia. His  
 son Charles Emanuel, in the war of 1733, wrested  
 from the emperor Charles VI., as an enemy, the  
 Novarese and Tortonese; and, in the succeeding  
 war of 1740, he obtained from Maria Theresa, his  
 daughter, as a friend, the Alessandrine, with part  
 of the Vigevanesque and Pavesan. But, by an  
 unlooked for reverse of fortune, the house of Sa-  
 voy, celebrated for a series of able and politic  
 princes, and accounted almost uniformly fortu-  
 nate, lost, almost in a moment, what it had been  
 slowly accumulating for successive centuries: and  
 the protection afforded by England to this family,  
 in the day of its adversity, resembled that of the

oak to the rustic seeking shelter from the storm —it draws down upon his head the lightning of heaven. BOOK XXXVL  
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The three months allotted for the evacuation of Malta had long since passed over. In the month of August, the British government notified to that of France, “that there would be no impediment whatever to the immediate reception of the Neapolitan troops; and that quarters would be prepared for their accommodation; adding that his majesty is most sincerely desirous to see the stipulations of the tenth article of the definitive treaty carried into effect with the utmost punctuality, and with the least possible delay; and complaining that the French minister at St. Petersburg had received no instructions relative to the steps to be taken in concert with lord St. Helens for inviting the emperor to become guarantee of the provisions and stipulations of the article in question.” This appears to have been the first intimation given, that the island would not be evacuated till the guarantee of Russia had been obtained. The fourth regulation of the article relative to Malta was clear and express, that the island should be evacuated in three months, or sooner if possible, PROVIDED the Sicilians appointed to garrison the fortress were arrived, and the grand-master, or commissioners authorised by him, on the spot, to

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take possession. What was to invalidate the force of this important stipulation? By the sixth regulation, it is indeed declared, that the independence of Malta, as well as the whole of the present arrangement, shall be under the protection and guarantee of Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia : but if the accession of all these powers to the guarantee, was really essential to the relinquishment of Malta, would not this very material point have been clearly and distinctly specified? Far from which, it is merely declared, in the first instance, (regulation 6th), that Malta shall be placed under their guarantee ; and, in the second (regulation 13th), by way of explanation, that the powers in question shall be *invited* to accede to it.

In a word, Malta was, both by the spirit and the letter of the treaty, to be evacuated, and surrendered to the grand-master, on the arrival of the Neapolitan force, in three months at farthest, or sooner if possible ; and, as a collateral security merely, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, were to be invited to join the contracting powers of the treaty of Amiens, in the guarantee and protection of its independence, as established by the regulations of the treaty.

The French government, notwithstanding the high offence which it could not but take at the delays and evasions practised by the court of

London, was manifestly reluctant to break the peace so recently concluded, for any cause not affecting the essence of it; and resolved to exert itself with earnestness and effect, to obtain the guarantees of Russia and Prussia, in order to obviate every pretence for future prevarication. But unfortunately the disposition to prevaricate acquired every day new force in the narrow minds of the British ministers, who, being utterly destitute of the genius and comprehension of statesmen, and reluctant to part with a favorite possession, sought, by minute and degrading subterfuges, to put off the evil day, cherishing, probably, the faint and distant hope, that by some new arrangement they might be ultimately suffered to keep, what they began now to think they ought never to have conceded.

Another occasion of mutual jealousy at this period arose, in the conduct of the French government respecting the affairs of Switzerland. The oppression and rapacity of the directorial tyranny had been no where more conspicuous than in that country; but, since the establishment of the consular constitution, the general state of things had undergone, as in France, a great amelioration, more particularly in the proceedings which had taken place subsequent to the treaty of Luneville. Nevertheless the first consul was by no means disposed to deviate from the policy of the directory in respect to

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Civil dissensions in  
Switzerland.



BOOK the establishment of a republic one and indi-  
 XXXVI. visible, under a central government; although,  
 1802. in consequence of the strong and energetic remonstrances of the democratic cantons, he had been induced to promise to their authorised agent at Paris, Aloys Reding, that they should be left to enjoy their ancient laws, and had actually adopted measures highly favorable to their interests and wishes.

But the scene soon changed. The opposite party were determined, if possible, to re-establish their former plan of a government, one and indivisible, dependent necessarily upon France, and destructive equally of the ancient federal rights, and the peculiar privileges of the democratic cantons. After high debates, Aloys Reding, the president, having adjourned the senate, and retired to his house in the canton of Schweitz during the Easter holidays, his opponents, taking advantage of his absence, ejected him and his partisans from their offices (April 17); and, in concurrence with Verninac, the consular minister, published a new constitutional code\*. The democratic cantons, thus duped by fraud

\* M. Verninac, on the next day, declared in writing, "that his government would behold with satisfaction a measure which tended to consolidate the reconciliation of parties." It is certain, that the first consul resented the recent and forcible remonstrances made through the medium of Stapfer, the Swiss plenipotentiary at Paris, against the separation of the Valais

and violence, discovered, as might well be expected, the most decided symptoms of discontent and disaffection; and various disturbances broke out, which were quickly repelled by the intervention of the French force yet remaining in the country.

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Universal tranquillity being at length restored, the first consul declared his resolution to withdraw his troops; which was publicly announced by the executive council, in a proclamation, dated at Berne, July 20 (1802), declaring " Helvetia to be again in the possession of her independence, her national manners, and her ancient liberty; and exhorting the people to sacrifice all those regrets, and all those hopes and desires, which were no longer compatible with the existing order of things." No sooner, however, had the French troops withdrawn themselves, than the democratic cantons, which had with indignation rejected the new code, rose in arms. Receiving daily accessions of force, the insurgents, subduing all opposition, seized the city of Zurich about the beginning of September; and, immediately marching to Berne, compelled the landaman, or head of the newly established re-

from the Helvetic union. Yet the first consul subsequently avowed his disapprobation of the transactions of the 17th of April; over which Verninac had probably not an entire and perfect control.

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1802. public, with his colleagues, to resign their offices, and, with the garrison, retire to Friburg, where they were again attacked. The troops of the Helvetic government, being again defeated, took refuge in the Pays de Vaud. In the mean time Aloys Reding, a man whose talents both military and civil gradually displayed themselves as occasions successively arose, was formally nominated CHIEF of the INSURRECTION.

In these circumstances the principal members and adherents of the new constitution, now re-assembled at Lausanne, had no other resource than to invoke the powerful assistance of France. On the other hand, the leaders of the insurgents established without delay at Berne a provisional government, and deputed a confidential person to Paris, who arrived in that city on the 28th of September, for the purpose of engaging the first consul to suffer the people of Switzerland to settle their affairs among themselves\*. At the same time they issued a proclamation, leaving the inhabitants of the several cantons at liberty to choose and regulate their local governments, and recommending a liberal and rational plan for the regulation of the Helvetic confederacy.

The general diet also convened at this period by the patriots at Schweitz, in a declaration

\* *Vide* dispatch of Mr. Merry to lord Hawkesbury, October 3d.

dated September 30, professed in terms of good sense and moderation, "that, far from wishing completely to re-establish the ancient order of things, the most careful attention will be employed as well in the establishment of the general constitution as in the formation of particular institutions; and care will be taken neither to lose sight of the changes which have occurred in the nature of things, nor of the sentiments which these changes have given birth to." And in a short time the plan of a new federal constitution was agreed upon, which appeared perfectly conformable to the previous professions of this assembly.

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The agent of the insurgents at Paris had instructions to address himself to the ministers residing there, of the principal powers of Europe, and to solicit their interference and assistance in the objects of his mission\*. At first he flattered himself, from the result of an interview with M. Talleyrand, that the first consul would put no obstacle in the way of any arrangement which the Swiss might agree upon among themselves. His surprise was therefore great when a proclamation issued the next day from St. Cloud, by the first consul, addressed to the inhabitants

Armed me-  
diation of  
France.

\* Vide dispatch of Mr. Merry to lord Hawkesbury, October 3d.



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of Helvetia, in which he declared, "that it had been determined by him not to interfere farther in their affairs, but as he neither could nor ought to remain insensible to the misery of which they were the victims, he recalled his determination." "I will," says he, "be the mediator of your differences; but my mediation shall be efficacious, such as befits the great people in whose name I speak." The first consul then commands all hostilities to cease, and requires the senate and each canton to send deputies to Paris to consult with him upon the means of restoring union and tranquillity, and conciliating all parties.

This interference, however, was such as might easily have been foreseen; in fact, notwithstanding the formal recognition of Helvetic independence by the treaty of Luneville, France had never ceased to interfere—at the alternate request, indeed, of the opposing parties—and at the present crisis it was in the highest degree improbable that the first consul would allow a government, established under his immediate sanction, to be altogether subverted by force of arms, without interposing his authority, and displaying again that mediatorial power, which all Europe, and Great Britain in particular, had with such seeming indifference seen exercised so repeatedly since the treaty of Luneville, and even since

the signature of the preliminaries of peace with  
England.

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The confidential agent of the Swiss patriots, who had no objection to the interference of France in their own favor, but who now justly apprehended that it might be employed in behalf of the government over which they had obtained so complete a triumph, wrote in urgent terms to the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian ambassadors at Paris, soliciting them jointly to intercede with the first consul, in order to avert the impending evil; but not one of these ministers would deign to admit him to an audience. From the English resident, Mr. Merry, he met, however, with a much more favorable reception. To this gentleman he stated, that he was not only as yet without a reply from any quarter, but had reason to fear that his prayers would not be listened to by the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian ministers. He therefore conjured the resident to transmit them to his Britannic majesty's government, "from whom alone his countrymen could have a hope of deriving any assistance in the terrible conflict which he *knew* they were determined to stand, and which would only cease by the extermination of every virtuous and brave man in the country." The agent then put into the hands of Mr. Merry a note specifying the various grievances under which the confederated

BOOK cantons suffered from "that colossal power, which  
XXXVI. was now," according to this representation,

1802. "about to overwhelm them." And imploring the aid and protection of Great Britain, he concludes with saying—"We have only men left us; the revolution, and spoliations without end, have exhausted our means—we are without arms, without ammunition, without stores, and without money to purchase them."

In consequence of the communication thus made to the English government, lord Hawkesbury, in a note to M. Otto, expressed the sentiments of deep regret which had been excited in his majesty's mind by the address of the first consul to the Helvetic people. "His majesty," says this minister, "most sincerely laments the convulsions to which the Swiss cantons have for some time past been exposed: but he can consider their late exertions in no other light than as the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people to recover their ancient laws and government, and to procure the re-establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated not only to be favorable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other powers. With whatever regret his majesty may have perused the late proclamation of the French government, he is yet unwilling to believe that

they will farther attempt to control that independent nation in the exercise of their undoubted rights." BOOK  
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At the same time, a respectable and intelligent person (Mr. Moore) was sent by the English government on a wild and hopeless mission to Switzerland, in order to establish a communication with the chiefs of the insurrection; and he was instructed to state to them, "that his majesty entertained hopes that his representation to the French government might have the effect of inducing the first consul to abandon his intention of compelling the Swiss nation by force to renounce that system of government under which they had so long prospered, and to which they appeared to be almost unanimously anxious to return. In this event his majesty will feel himself bound to abstain from all interference on his part; it being his earnest desire that the Swiss nation should be left at liberty to regulate their own internal concerns without the interposition of any foreign power. If, however, contrary to his majesty's expectations, the French government should persist in the system of coercion announced in the proclamation of the first consul, Mr. Moore is directed to inform himself *of the disposition of the people at large*, and also their means of defence; and if they were finally resolved at all hazards to resist the

Impolitic  
and clandestine  
intrigues of  
the British  
ministry.



threatened attempt, then he was to communicate to the Swiss government in confidence, that either in the event of a French army having entered the country, or advancing for that purpose, his majesty would accede to their application for pecuniary succours \*."

More absurd instructions it was perhaps impossible to devise. As for *the disposition of the people at large* to free themselves from the influence, or rather the domination, of France, nothing unquestionably could be stronger; but as to the means they possessed of effecting this purpose, nothing, it was equally clear, could be weaker. And to send an agent to encourage the spirit of insurrection in Switzerland, by promises of pecuniary succours from England, when none of the great continental powers would interfere in her behalf, was blending the grossest folly with the most wanton barbarity; and it could answer, if unfortunately the mission proved successful, no other purpose than to expose the insurgents to the effects of that vengeance, which it was impossible to avert. In such a case, and in such a mode as this, the government of Great Britain, mighty as its power undoubtedly is within its proper sphere of action, could inter-

\* Official papers, London, pp. 58, 59.----Mr. Moore's instructions bore date October 10th.

pose with no more effect than the republic of <sup>BOOK</sup> Ragusa. The incontrovertible proof of the <sup>XXXVI.</sup> truth of these observations is, that, long before 1802. the instructions in question could possibly be acted upon, and even before the *penning* of them by the English minister—such was the profound sagacity by which they were dictated—the object of the French interference was accomplished\*.

\* GREAT BRITAIN is a power, beyond all others, qualified for the province of impartial and dignified mediation. Being an island, she can be little influenced by views of aggrandisement on the continent. Generally speaking, she can receive but trivial injury from her adversaries in comparison with that which she is capable of inflicting upon them. She is possessed of vast pecuniary resources, and is known to be capable of immense exertions. She is zealous as a friend, and formidable as an enemy. There is not, as all history evinces, a nation in Europe, France by no means excepted, which would not much rather rank Great Britain in the number of amicable, than of hostile, powers. Wisely directed, therefore, the mediation of Britain must produce very beneficial and efficacious consequences.

It would, however, be an egregious error for Great Britain to endeavour, by the temptation of enormous subsidies, to induce the continental powers to act a part conformable even to their interests, if foreign to their inclinations; for, in such a cause, they never will exert themselves with vigor. But if they display a spontaneous eagerness to try the fortune of war, then, supposing the occasion to be of sufficient magnitude, Britain may act with the highest effect as the grand support and animating principle of the confederacy. But for Britain to stand forward and *alone* in an attitude of hostility,

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On the 3d of October, general Rapp delivered the mandate of the first consul to the exiled senate, at Lausanne; which body expressed, by acclamation, its most lively gratitude for the consular interposition; and, on the 6th, the patriots of Berne were officially apprised of this proceeding. After a short consultation, they determined to refer the whole to the decision of the diet actually convened at Schwitz. But this assembly justly deemed it inexpedient to attempt any other means of opposition than remonstrances. These were comprised in an official appeal to the first consul (dated October 8th), representing the movements which had taken place in Switzerland, as resulting not from the spirit of party, but from a general sense of the rights and necessities of the Swiss nation—that, far from aiming at any violent innova-

in a continental quarrel, like this of Switzerland, would be at once to afford a proof of her physical and political imbecility.

When king James I. once put on a suit of heavy armour—“Now,” said he, “nobody can hurt me, and I can hurt nobody.” This is in some respects the condition of England. Our insular situation, while it renders us invulnerable, incapacitates us from hurting others, except by naval efforts, and in circumstances where naval superiority can have its full effect. To lament that we cannot rank as a great continental power, would be to quarrel with what necessarily results from the causes of our own security.

tion, the universal wish was peace, and a mild and equal government; and that they had no doubt of arriving at that essential object of social order, the moment their will and their efforts should cease to be fettered. "General first consul," say they, "all Europe admires in you the supreme head of an immense power and empire, which, without doubt, according to your own views, will be directed to the good of humanity. Your magnanimity assures us, that you will not make use of it against a people who only desire what you have made them hope; and who only wish what they believe themselves authorised by yourself to do." Such was the expiring effort of the Swiss patriots, who had made repeated and unavailing applications to the court of Vienna, which refused even to hold any correspondence with them.

On the 12th of October, the council of war also issued a declaration from Basle, expressly disclaiming any intention of resistance.—"Brothers, friends, confederates! Who among us could conceive the thought of measuring ourselves with the numerous and experienced armies of France? No, friends, no: we wish to await peaceably the determination of the first consul. Relying on our conduct, we dare to hope that the first consul of France, who has guaranteed our independence, and who has been



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deceived by false reports, will, as soon as he shall have been informed of the true state of things, take measures which will secure our honor, and the prosperity and independence of our country." The troops of the insurgents were, conformably to this statement, in a short time disbanded; and on the 17th of October the senate resumed possession of Berne.

The diet at Schwitz, more and more sensible how utterly unavailing it were to oppose force to force, declared (October 26) to general Ney, commander of the French army, amounting to 30,000 men, through the medium of Aloys Rending, their president, "that they had taken the resolution of delivering up their powers into the hands of their constituents as soon as the French troops should enter Switzerland, having *never* entertained the design of opposing them by force of arms. Now that the diet is positively informed that the cities of Basle and Berne are occupied by French troops, it no longer delays to dissolve itself; and at the same time they seize this opportunity of declaring to the general, that, agreeably to the instructions they have received from their constituents, which they consider themselves obliged to conform to, they cannot regard the Helvetic government as established, nor alienate the sacred right which their nation possesses, of forming a constitution for

itself—a right which they inherited from their ancestors, and which was confirmed to them by the treaty of Luneville.”

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Two days after this declaration, the diet of Schwitz dissolved itself, conformably to the intimation thus given.

On the 31st of October, Mr. Moore wrote to lord Hawkesbury, from the city of Constance, that he had just received authentic intelligence of the submission of the diet of Switzerland assembled at Schwitz. In consequence of this information, permission was given to the English agent, who came just in time to witness the termination of the business, “to return to England as soon as it might suit his convenience.”

In the midst of these transactions, the French minister for foreign affairs addressed (Oct. 15) a letter to M. de Cetto, resident on the part of the elector of Bavaria at Paris, containing a plausible apology for the conduct of the first consul respecting Switzerland, and stating some material facts tending to his vindication. He asserts, “that it was not till blood had flowed, and Helvetia menaced with a general destruction, that the first consul had interposed his mediation. The continental powers adjoining Helvetia have not contemplated without apprehensions the external effects of a disorder, the *focus* of which was established in that country. In this state of

BOOK XXXVI. 1802. affairs, humanity—the interest of France and of Europe—demanded that the first consul should desist from the determination he had made, not to interfere in the affairs of Switzerland. He has not, however, for one moment ceased to consider, that the most perfect independence ought to be the basis of her constitution. The right of establishing her own organisation acquired by Helvetia, is one of the glorious results of the war which France has sustained against the most powerful armies of Europe, and of the treaties which have terminated it.” Speaking of the “turbulent emigrants,” by whose intrigues he insinuates that the late troubles have arisen, he says, “One may conceive that it will be those persons who will endeavour to spread the belief, that the Helvetic republic may be led by a spirit of imitation to establish with the first consul, the relations which unite him to the Italian republic; but this idea is as far from the expectation of the first consul, as it is opposite to all his determinations; and his formal intention is not to concur in the organisation of Switzerland, but for the purpose of insuring to her an absolute independence.”

This was certainly professing a great deal too much. The “absolute independence of Switzerland” was not, and could not be, agreeable to the views of the first consul; but it by no means

appears that the administration of the government established under his auspices, was in any degree oppressive or tyrannical. In the proclamation of the senate and executive council, issued subsequent to their return to Berne (dated November 13th), after adverting to "the various accusations which a factious hatred had organised against them, they declare, in the face of these accusations, that not one family can be mentioned of whose ruin they have been the cause—*ONE* individual in whose person the right of citizen has been violated. It is, on the contrary, for having been too indulgent, too confident in the justice of their fellow citizens; in one word, too little severe; that they have sustained these reverses. The insurrectional authorities ordered, in the course of four weeks, ten times more arrests, odious inquiries, and measures of rigor of all kinds, than *they* ordered in the course of their existence."

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The constitution of 1802 was nevertheless manifestly not adapted to the genius of the Swiss nation. The small democratic cantons, the most warlike and the most active of the confederacy, were so passionately attached to their own forms of government, that no persuasion, no intimidation, no force, could long induce a submission to any other. Of this great truth the first consul appears to have been, by



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experience, and the evidence of facts, fully convinced. On the 10th of the following month (December 1802), the deputies, fifty-six in number, from the eighteen cantons, constituting the CONSULTA, being assembled at Paris, a letter was addressed to them from the first consul, declaring, "that he will fulfil the obligation he has contracted to re-establish tranquillity in Switzerland—and he relies upon the support of the Helvetic deputies. The three important points to be enforced and established at the present moment, are, 1st. Equality of rights between all the cantons—2dly. Complete renunciation of all family rights, and—3dly. A federative organisation for each canton. He tells them, in plain terms, that the French and Italian republics can never suffer the establishment of a government in Switzerland which shall be mediately or immediately opposite to the interests of France; that it is the duty of the French government to take care that no hostile system be formed in Switzerland, that open frontier of France. And in regard to the final settlement of disputes between themselves, he gives it as his opinion that no party ought to be triumphant."

On the 12th a deputation from the consulta were admitted to a personal audience of the first consul, at St. Cloud; and in the course of

the conference, as reported by the deputation, he explained his intentions very fully and satisfactorily on the subject. "The more I learn," said the first consul, "of your country, the more I am convinced that it cannot with advantage have more than a single government;" but he admitted that "this government must be a federative one. By the representative system the democratic cantons would be subjected to the necessity of payments to which they are unaccustomed. The descendants of William Tell must know neither the restraint of chains, nor the payment of imposts. But, on the other hand, for Berne and the other great cantons, the attempt at pure democracy were absurd. Your different cantons must of necessity have diversities of constitutional arrangement. With three leading exceptions, you must be re-established nearly in the same political order as before. The inequality of rights which subsisted among the old cantons—the relations between sovereign and subject states—with the prerogatives of the patrician families, must be abolished for ever. Under these corrections of the constitutions of the cantons, Switzerland may possess a federative government of effective vigor. Between two powers, in respect to which there is a balance of force and influence, you are safe. Preserve your neutrality, your laws, your political

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tranquillity, your good morals—and your fortune cannot but be happy. Confederative government enfeebles great states, but, by concentrating, invigorates the energies of those which are small. Of your last constitution I cannot approve. A central government cannot be maintained among you without the presence of French troops. Your present government knows this by experience. Its members spoke the voice of patriotism in consenting that the French troops should be withdrawn; but their prudence in that consent was not justified by the events which followed.”

This discourse, so consolatory to the members of the consulta, and to all Switzerland, did not evaporate in mere words. In a few weeks the final act of mediation was promulgated by the first consul, founded entirely upon the principles inculcated in his speech.

Conformably to this mediatorial *decree*, the cantons are divided into three classes—the democratic, the aristocratic, and the new or additional cantons, viz. Argovia, the Lemman, Turgovia, St. Gall, and the Tesin; in the latter of which classes the representative system is for the first time introduced into the cantonal governments. The two former classes are re-established with the excellent and salutary modifications suggested by the first consul, and which the diet

of Schwitz also had, or professed to have, in contemplation. The diet is to assemble every year, in one of the six great towns, in turn. The canton in which it holds its sitting is to be the directorial canton. The avoyer of this canton is to be the landamman of Switzerland. He is to have the charge of all diplomatic negotiations—he is to watch over all the laws and ordonnances of the diet, and also those of the particular constitutions. The diet is to be composed of a deputy from each canton, who is to have full powers limited only by his instructions. The deputies from the nineteen cantons, have thirty-five voices. The cantons of Berne, of Zurich, of Vaud, Argovia, St. Gall, and the Grisons, have three voices each—those of Fribourg, Turgovia, Lucerne, and Tesin, two each—the others, one. The diet is to assemble every year on the first of June; it is to continue its sittings but one month: in that time it may conclude treaties of peace, of alliance, and of commerce, with foreign powers. On comparison, this plan of government will be found extremely analogous to that recently promulgated by the patriotic diet of Schwitz.

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In consequence of the wise and salutary exercise of an arbitrary and usurped authority on the part of the first consul, peace, order, and harmony were in a very short space of time re-established in Switzerland; and although Aloys Red-

Final pacification of Switzerland.



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ing, and other chiefs of the insurrection, were either as a matter of form or a measure of precaution, put under arrest, they were not only released when the decision of the Consulta was declared, but were elected to the highest offices in their respective cantons; and the discretion and moderation of the first consul ultimately prevailed over the spirit of ambition, and the lust of lawless domination.

The unexpected concessions of Bonaparte in this business, have by some been in boastful language ascribed to the steps taken by the English government. It is, indeed, highly probable, that the note of October the 10th, addressed by lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto, and which was very happily and judiciously expressed, had considerable weight, and perhaps produced the declaration of M. Talleyrand, of the 15th of October, to M. Cetto, by which the first consul virtually pledged himself to adopt mild and conciliatory measures. But in proportion as this is admitted, it demonstrates the unwillingness of the first consul to break with England, and his readiness to conform, as far as circumstances would permit, to her views of policy, as long as any hope remained of ultimately securing her friendship. But the last faint glimpses of this hope seem to have entirely vanished from his mind, from the period of Mr. Moore's hos-

tile and clandestine mission to Switzerland, and to have given place to the highest irritation and resentment. BOOK XXXVI.  
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In conclusion it may be remarked, that even if the co-operation of the emperor, after the series of disasters which he had experienced, could, against all policy as well as probability, have been obtained, as England had by a silence of six months virtually acquiesced in the Helvetic constitution of 1802, it would have been a very extraordinary and inconsistent proceeding to have renewed the war with France, in order to prevent its re-establishment. So much in earnest, however, was the English court in this matter, that in the prospect of a revival of the war, instructions were hastily dispatched to the Cape, and other places not yet restored, prohibiting the withdrawment of the British garrisons; but despairing in a short time of the success of their own preposterous projects, the British ministers again dispatched orders to deliver up the settlements thus detained; the delay answering no other purpose than to expose the miserable imbecility of their own policy, and to excite the incurable jealousy, and doubtless, also, the ineffable contempt of the French government.

The mingled emotions of spleen and resentment which at this moment pervaded the breast Resentment of the first consuli

BOOK of the first consul, are fully displayed in an article inserted in the official paper, called the **MONITEUR**, November 1st. It is there stated, that "every line printed by the English Journalists is a line of blood. They loudly call for civil war to the bosom of the WESTERN NATION, happily pacified. Their principal complaints now are the affairs of Switzerland. It should seem as if it would have gratified their passions better that civil war should have convulsed that unhappy country. They invoke the treaty of Luneville, though of all the powers of Europe, the only one which has no right to invoke it on that subject, is England: for she alone has refused to recognise the Helvetic republic. She has equally refused to acknowledge the Italian and Ligurian republics, and the king of Tuscany. England has no diplomatic agents at Berne, Milan, Genoa, or Florence.

The English government cannot complain of what happens in countries whose political existence it does not acknowledge, and with which it does not maintain public relations." In respect to the obloquy thrown out against France and Russia, as the mediators of Germany, this official paper exclaims, "to what an abject state must Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, Bavaria, the houses of Wirtemberg, Baden, Hesse, &c., and the French republic be reduced,

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at the con-  
duct of the  
court of  
London.

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if they could not negotiate, conclude, arrange their boundaries, without the consent of a power which is as much a stranger to those interests as to our diplomatic rights—she who alone refuses to recognise the rights of independent nations upon the seas! The relations of France and England are the treaty of AMIENS, the whole treaty of AMIENS, and nothing but the treaty of AMIENS. The allies, whom the writers of parties who print at London create upon the continent, exist happily, as well as their complaints, only in their disordered imagination. They call aloud for Austrian troops—they assemble and form armies in the Tyrol—but Thugut is no more; and his majesty the emperor well knows, that if the Austrian power has been twice led to the brink of the precipice, it is for having twice delivered itself up to those perfidious instigations. If the king of the Two Sicilies has twice seen his frontiers passed, and his capital in the power of the French—if the elector of Bavaria has twice seen the same scene acted in his states—if the king of Sardinia has ceased to reign in Savoy and in Piedmont—if the house of Orange has lost the Stadtholderate—if the oligarchies of Berne and of Genoa have seen their influence vanish—and Portugal the boundaries of her provinces covered with troops ready to conquer them, have they not all been indebted for it to the alliance



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of England? The peace of Europe is solidly established; but the French nation is not ignorant that it excites a great mass of jealousy, and that for a long time there will be fomented against it dissensions, whether intestine or foreign. It constantly remains, therefore, in that attitude which the Athenians have given to MINERVA, the helmet on her head, and the spear in her hand—nothing will ever be obtained from it by menacing proceedings—fear has no power over the hearts of the brave!”

LOUIS D’AFFRY, a character of the highest respectability, was elected first LANDAMMAN of SWITZERLAND. And while the angry and ill-informed politicians of England were still uttering vehement invectives against the tyranny and oppression of the first consul, a proclamation was published (March 10, 1803) by the chief magistrate of the Helvetic union, addressed to the inhabitants of the nineteen confederated cantons, expressive of the most cordial satisfaction and gratitude. “The first consul of the French republic,” says the landamman D’Affry, “has given an act of mediation which ought to terminate the dissensions, and fix the destiny of Switzerland. That important act, the result of long conferences with men of sagacity, and friends of civil order, is adapted to the wants and the dearest interests of a people whom every thing

invites to the pacific enjoyment of a stable and independent state of things.

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“Five years of broils and convulsions evinced the inconvenience of a government exclusively central. The ancient federal system modified by changes suited to the changes of our circumstances, and to the example of two neighbouring powers, could alone answer the wishes and situations of all the people of Switzerland.

“Providence, the only support of just and virtuous government, seems to have chosen at this period to terminate the ills afflicting our country; and to promise us felicity for the time to come. The new social compact must be executed. Political divisions must of course cease. The passions must be constrained to silence. Only a wise unanimity of wills, a constant tendency to hinder private interests from interfering with those of the public, can give sure success to our new institutions; and only their success can confirm our independence. It will belong to the government of each canton to form for itself laws suitable to the peculiarity of its local circumstances, and fitted to advance its prosperity.”

The independence of the Batavian republic, as well as that of Switzerland, being recognised and finally established by the treaty of Luneville, it was upon that account, and for various

State of the  
Batavian  
republic.

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other reasons, arising from the relative situation of the two countries, a just subject of dissatisfaction to the Batavian nation, and even to the Batavian government, supported as it was in great measure by the power of France, that a considerable body of French troops, amounting to about eleven thousand men, were still stationed in Holland under the title of auxiliaries, and paid and maintained at the expense of the Dutch nation, though a promise had been made by the first consul that they should be withdrawn at the conclusion of the definitive treaty with Great Britain; instead of which a new commander in chief of these auxiliary troops, and a new staff had been recently appointed, and notice given to the government to provide for the pay of the officers. The English resident at the Hague, Mr. Liston, in his dispatch of October 29, 1802, informed lord Hawkesbury, "that the administration appeared disposed to oppose all the resistance in their power to this unexpected extortion."

An express had been sent off to the Dutch ambassador at Paris, charging him to claim in the most urgent terms, the accomplishment of the treaties subsisting between the two republics, and the fulfilment of the repeated and recent promises made by the French government upon this subject. And in case of the failure

of this application, they talk of addressing themselves to the principal powers of Europe who had any share or influence in the conclusion of the peace, to intreat their intervention and good offices, with a view to the maintenance of the independence of the republic.

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Considering the critical situation of affairs between France and England at this period, and the non-execution on the part of the latter of the most essential article of the treaty of Amiens, this obnoxious measure of maintaining a French military force in Holland was, indeed, little to be wondered at. But had Great Britain fulfilled with fidelity and honor the obligations imposed upon her by the treaty of Amiens, such a violation of it on the part of France, would have afforded a just and proper occasion for a firm and energetic remonstrance from the court of London to the French government; especially as the feelings of the Batavian government itself were so far in unison with those of the English nation. Nevertheless to imagine that the Batavian government would for this cause of complaint alone entertain any serious design of separating itself from France, the grand support of the anti-stadtholderian interest in Holland, was an idle and romantic expectation. That government would no doubt be glad to avail itself of the intervention of England and other powers, to



**BOOK** relieve the Dutch nation both from the expense  
**XXXVI.** and the disgrace of maintaining troops whose  
 1802. services they no longer wanted; but the English  
 ministry, instead of an open and dignified inter-  
 position in their favor, contented themselves  
 with carrying on a covert and intriguing corres-  
 pondence at the Hague upon this subject, which  
 proved altogether useless and unavailing, if not a  
 farther cause of irritation and mischief.

Treaty of  
 alliance be-  
 tween  
 France and  
 the Otto-  
 man Porte:

A treaty of peace, commerce, and alliance,  
 was in the course of the summer concluded at  
 Paris between the first consul and the Sublime  
 Porte, by which the free navigation of the Black  
 Sea was permitted to the French flag, and all  
 other advantages conferred, which were granted  
 by the Turkish government to the most favored  
 nation; but no stipulation was inserted by which  
 the privileges conceded to the English were in  
 any degree affected. On the other hand, the  
 French government guarantied to the Ottoman  
 Porte, the integrity of all its possessions.

and with  
 the dey of  
 Algiers.

Soon after the conclusion of this treaty, the  
 first consul sent a powerful squadron to the coast  
 of Barbary, which, casting anchor before the  
 city of Algiers, compelled the dey, whose sub-  
 jects had been guilty of many depredations  
 upon the French commerce, to sign a conven-  
 tion in the highest degree honorable to the  
 Gallic flag, and even to that of the Italian re-

public. In a letter written by the dey to the first consul, he says, "You require me to enter into terms of amity with the Italian republic. At your request I shall respect its flag equally as your own. To the same request from any other person, I would not for a million of piastres have agreed. You have refused the 200,000 piastres which I asked in compensation for the losses I had sustained on your account. Whether you give or with-hold them, we shall equally remain in friendship. Your people are at liberty to come to the coral fishery as soon as they please. Your African company shall enjoy its old privileges. Should any future difference arise, write to me directly and it shall be settled to your wishes. May God preserve you in health and glory!"

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The business of Switzerland being at length disposed of, a fair prospect seemed once more to open of establishing what should at least bear some faint semblance of amity between the two proud and jealous governments of Great Britain and France: and in the month of November, general Andreossi, who had long been nominated on the part of the first consul, as ambassador to England, arrived in London, as lord Whitworth did nearly at the same time on that of his Britannic majesty at Paris.

Ambassa-  
dor from  
France ar-  
rives in  
London.

Plot of co-  
lonel Des-  
pard.

The domestic situation of Great Britain was

BOOK at this period more calm, and the general dis-  
XXXVI. position of the people more composed, than for  
1802. many years past. The policy and temper of the  
present ministry, as far as related to the ma-  
nagement of affairs at home, had been uniform-  
ly mild and conciliatory, and the effect pro-  
duced was wonderful. No sooner did govern-  
ment cease to countenance and encourage  
the irritating and ill-supported accusations of  
disaffection and disloyalty, than every trace of  
animosity seemed to vanish, and all were eager  
to rally round the standard of the constitution.  
In this state of things it excited the strongest  
surprise to hear, that a treasonable plot was dis-  
covered, of which the noted colonel Despard was  
the head. But so adverse was the disposition  
of the present ministers to diffusing through-  
out the nation false and insidious alarms, that no  
one questioned the reality of the fact. Colonel  
Despard and divers of his associates, men of the  
lowest class and of the most profligate charac-  
ters, were apprehended at a public-house in  
Lambeth (November 23), and committed to pri-  
son according to the established forms of law,  
without exciting any extraordinary sensation.  
After remaining the usual term in custody, they  
were brought to trial before a special commis-  
sion, lord Ellenborough being president, Febru-  
ary the 7th, 1803. The attorney-general, who

conducted the prosecution with great candor and ability, in opening the charge made use of the following remarkable words:—"This is a case which appears to excite no concern peculiarly anxious. No political party, no faction, considers its interest as involved in the issue. There is no prejudice on either side—there has been no clamor—the public mind is completely at ease." The principal article of the charge was, that on the 12th of November, at a general meeting of the conspirators, colonel Despard proposed an attack upon the person of the king in his way to the parliament house, declaring, "that his majesty must be put to death! I have," said this remorseless traitor, "weighed the matter well, and my heart is callous." He moreover, on another occasion, added, "that he himself would make the attack upon his majesty, if he could get no farther assistance, with what force he had." The plot extended, also, to the seizure of the tower and the bank, and various other impossible things. After a very fair trial, colonel Despard, and nine of his associates, were at length upon the clearest evidence found guilty, and on the 21st. of the same month, seven of this number (including their leader) underwent the merited sentence of the law. The colonel addressed the populace from the scaffold in a

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mode which only aggravated his criminality, representing himself “as a man who suffered for their sake, and merely because he had been a friend to truth, to liberty, to justice—and an enemy to tyranny and oppression.” And obstinately denying his guilt, he seemed to glory in his punishment.

The conspiracy in which this wretched man was thus deeply implicated, appeared on investigation to be so wild, incongruous, and extravagant, that a charitable doubt arose whether the whole might not have originated in mental derangement; but nothing of this nature was pleaded, or could be inferred from the facts proved in evidence. Colonel Despard was a man of violent and ungoverned passions, of inflexible resolution, of high and visionary sentiments. Having, as it appeared, been refused the compensation he thought, and perhaps justly thought, due to his professional merits and claims, and the victim of chagrin and disappointment, he indulged a spirit of resentment which led him to form dangerous connexions, and to cover, possibly from the first, very culpable designs under the mask of patriotism: but being thrown into prison, severely treated, refused a trial, and precluded from all redress by the act of indemnity, his resentment was converted into the mad-

ness of rage and revenge, which he scrupled not to gratify by engaging in attempts the most criminal and atrocious\*.

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The chief object of the attention of the great continental powers during the present year, was the arrangement of the Germanic indemnities, conformably to the seventh article of the treaty of Luneville. In a matter where so many jarring interests were implicated—where states and princedoms were to be disposed of—where the lesser powers were to be sacrificed to compensate for the losses of the greater, the proceedings were of necessity, no less than from the Germanic habits of procrastination, very slow. In order to bring this complex and difficult affair, and with it the ten years' troubles of Europe to some decisive termination, and not from any views of interest or ambition so far as appears, the emperor of Russia resolved, after a very long interval of time had elapsed in fruitless discussion, to take an active and efficient part, conjointly with France, in the mediation of the existing differences.

Protracted  
discussions  
respecting  
the Ger-  
man in-  
demnities.

\* Colonel Despard, in the course of his imprisonment, repeatedly demanded a trial; and refusing on the expiration of the suspension act to give bail for his appearance, he was at length unconditionally released, as he could no longer be kept in custody without a legal investigation of the charge brought against him.

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On the 17th of July, 1802, the emperor of Germany transmitted a rescript to the diet at Ratisbon, stating the proposal of Russia at the commencement of the present year, to open preparatory negotiations at Paris, and that he himself had in February last given full powers and instructions accordingly. Soon afterwards, however, a convention was concluded without his participation between France and Russia; and it was requested of him to direct the definitive arrangement in consonance with the forms of the Germanic constitution. For this purpose his imperial majesty declares, that he had resolved to convoke the deputation already nominated by a decree of the diet; and he particularly recommended to the attention of the assembly, the indemnity to be assigned to the grand duke of Tuscany.

On the 18th of August the plan of France and Russia was formally communicated to the imperial diet: and upon the whole admitting (and it seems difficult not to admit) the constitutional power of the diet to make so important a change in the interior situation and concerns of the empire, and particularly their legal authority finally to abolish that monstrous anomaly in religion and politics, the temporal government of ecclesiastics; and admitting also, what appears somewhat more questionable, the expe-

diency and propriety of employing a species of mediation so little removed from coercion; it must be allowed that the arrangement now proposed on the part of France and Russia was, upon the whole, founded on principles neither unwise nor inequitable, though in the detail it would doubtless admit of much objection and animadversion.

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The first consul observes in his public declaration, “ that the seventh article of the treaty of Luneville having stipulated that the hereditary princes, whose possessions are comprised in the cession made to the French republic of the countries situated on the left bank of the Rhine, should be indemnified, it has been agreed, that, conformably to what had been decided upon at the congress of Rastadt, this indemnity should be effected by means of secularisation. But though perfectly agreed upon the basis of the indemnity, the states interested have remained so opposite in views with respect to the distribution, that it has hitherto appeared impossible to proceed to the execution of the before-mentioned article of the treaty of Luneville.

“ And though the diet of the empire has named a special commission to direct its attention to this important business, we see by the delays which its assembling meets with, what obstacles the opposition of interests, and the



**BOOK** jealousy of pretensions, place to the making the  
**XXXVI.** regulation of the indemnities the spontaneous  
 1802. act of the Germanic body.

“It is this that has induced the first consul and the emperor of Russia to think, that it became two powers, perfectly disinterested, to afford their mediation, and to offer to the deliberations of the imperial diet a general plan of indemnity, drawn up from calculations of the greatest impartiality, and in which the utmost attention has been directed both to compensate the losses recognised, and to preserve between the principal houses in Germany the balance that subsisted before the war.”

It then proceeds to specify, that to the archduke, grand-duke, in lieu of Tuscany and its dependencies, shall be allotted the archbishopric of Saltzburg, the provostship of Bertolsgraden, the bishoprics of Trent, Brixen, and that portion of the bishopric of Passau which lies on the Austrian side of the rivers Iltz and Inn, except the suburbs of Passau, with a radius of five hundred toises—the said territories to be henceforth incorporated in the circle of Austria.

To the duke of Modena, for the Modenese, the Brisgau and Ortenau.—To the elector-palatine of Bavaria, for the duchies of Deux-ponts and Juliers, with the palatinate of the Rhine, &c., the bishoprics of Passau, Wurtzburg, Bam-

berg, Ausgburg, and a considerable number of cities and abbeys situated in the circles of Suabia and Franconia: BOOK  
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To the king of Prussia, for the duchies of Cleves and Gueldres, &c., the bishoprics of Hildesheim and Paderborn, and that part of the bishopric of Munster on the right side of a line to be drawn from Olphen to Tecklenburg, comprising the cities of Olphen and Munster; also, the right bank of the Ems as far as Lingen; the imperial cities of Mulhausen, North-hausen, and Goslar; the abbeys of Herforden, Quedlingburg, &c.

To the prince of Orange, for the stadtholderate and his other claims and possessions in Holland and Belgium, the bishoprics of Fulda and Corvey, the city of Dortmund, &c.

To the margrave of Baden, for his part of the county of Sponheim, and his seignories in Luxemburg and Alsace, the bishopric of Constance, that portion of the bishoprics of Basle, Spire, and Strasburg, situated on the German side of the Rhine, with the palatinate of the Rhine on the same side of the river; also the cities of Heidelberg and Mannheim, &c.

To the duke of Wirtemberg, for his principality of Montbeliard, and possessions in Alsace, &c., the provostship of Ellivangen, with the imperial

BOOK cities of Weil, Rothweil, Reutlingen, Hail-  
 XXXVI. bron, &c.

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To the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, for St. Goar and Rhinefels, the Mentz territory situated within Ameneburg and Fritzlar, and the village of Holzhausen.

To the landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, for the county of Lichtenberg and its dependencies, the palatine bailiwics of Lindenfels and Olzberg, the duchy of Westphalia, part of the bishopric of Worms, &c., and the city of Friedburg.

To the elector of Hanover, the bishopric of Osnaburg in perpetuity.

One of the three ecclesiastical electorates only to be preserved, *viz.* that of Mentz, the see of which shall be transferred to Ratisbon; the archbishop retaining his dignity of arch-chancellor of the empire; and of his ancient possessions the grand bailiwick of Aschaffenburg, on the right of the Mayne, to which shall be added a number of abbeyes, &c., to make up to him a revenue of a million of florins.

To the margrave of Baden, to the duke of Wirtemberg, and to the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, it is proposed to grant the electoral title.

In fine, the college of cities shall continue to consist of the free and imperial cities of Lubeck,

Hamburg, Bremen, Wetzlar, Francfort, Nuremberg, Augsburg, and Ratisbon; and means shall be adopted to provide, that, in the future wars in which the empire may be concerned, the said cities shall not be bound to take any part; and that their neutrality shall be secured by the empire as far as it shall be recognised by the other belligerent powers.

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On the 21st of August, a very able report was presented by the French government to the conservative senate, in Paris, on the subject of the Germanic indemnities, accompanied by the general plan already communicated to the diet of Ratisbon. This report stated to the senate, "the sincere wish of the French government (solely applied to the affairs of the interior) to be considered as nothing in the regulation of the promised indemnities; and to restrain their influence to the making known frequently how desirous they were of seeing the treaty of Luneville carried into complete effect by the execution of the 7th article. But their representations," according to this statement, "were ineffectual; and more than a year elapsed without their being able to perceive that the least thing had been done towards the distribution of the indemnities. This in-execution of one of the capital stipulations of the treaty of Luneville, left all Germany in a state of uncer-



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tainty; which became daily more embarrassing, because pretensions and intrigues arose, and became stronger in proportion as the indecision in the affair, and in the public mind, became greater. The species of dissolution in which the Germanic body remained, delayed to all Europe the advantages of peace, and might in some respects compromise the general tranquillity. It was then solely to seal the pacification of Europe, and to guarantee the stability of it, that the first consul and his majesty the emperor of Russia determined, by common consent, to interfere, in order to effect, by their mediation, what had been vainly expected from the internal deliberations of the Germanic body. If we examine the plan proposed, we shall see, that, in the execution of a system which has for its principal object the consolidation of the peace of Europe, the attention has been principally directed to the diminishing of the chances of war. It is on this account that care has been taken to avoid all contact of territory between the two powers that have the most frequently dyed Europe with blood by their quarrels; and which, sincerely reconciled, cannot have at present a stronger desire than to remove all occasions of misunderstanding which arise from the relation of vicinity, and which, between these rival states, are never without danger.

“ The same principle, adopted not in its full rigor, but as far as circumstances permitted, has decided the placing of the indemnities of Prussia beyond contact with France and Batavia. BOOK  
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“ From this arrangement Austria will have drawn the immense advantage of seeing all her possessions concentrated.

“ The Palatine house will also have received a stronger and more advantageous organisation for its defence.

“ And Prussia will continue to form in the Germanic system the essential basis of a necessary counterpoise.

“ It may, however, appear, that the house of Baden has received more advantages than the others; but it has been deemed necessary to fortify the circle of Suabia, which is between France and the great Germanic states; and in this, policy was in perfect unison with the disposition of the French government, who could not but see with pleasure an increase of power granted to a prince whose virtues had long obtained the esteem of Europe, and whose conduct had particularly deserved the good will of the republic.”

With the general plan of arrangement determined upon by the mediating powers, Austria had certainly little reason to be dissatisfied, if we compare what, upon the balance of the account,

BOOK and at the close of the most unsuccessful war  
XXXVI. she had ever waged, the imperial house had lost  
1802. with what she had acquired. The Low Countries, with some detached possessions in Suabia, Tuscany, Milan, Mantua, &c. were, beyond all question, inferior in value to that large share of the Venetian territory, of Istria, and of Dalmatia, which the emperor had gained by the treaty of Campo Formio, taken in conjunction with the archbishopric of Saltzburg, and district of Bertolsgaden, in Bavaria, with the bishopries of Trent, Brixen, &c.; all of which enjoyed the incalculable advantage of being contiguous to the grand mass of the Austrian dominions; and, consequently, of being easily and inseparably consolidated with the Austrian empire, and of adding materially to its wealth and resources, instead of requiring the whole power of the empire to be employed in their defence, like the remote and exposed possessions, which, by the chance of war, had fallen into the hands of the enemy.

The chief ground of complaint, was the diminution of the influence of the emperor in the diet; and the decided ascendancy acquired by the protestants, in consequence of the abolition of the two ecclesiastical electorates of Treves and Cologne, and the exaltation of the three protestant potentates of Baden, Wirtemberg, and

Hesse Cassel, to that dignity : by which changes the electoral college exhibited the extraordinary phænomenon of a majority of protestant electors ; Mentz, Bohemia, Bavaria, and Saxony, being opposed to Brandenburg, Hanover, and the three new electorates\* ; so that it appeared by no means a visionary apprehension, that the imperial dignity might at some future time be transferred from the house of Austria to that of Brandenburg.

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Upon the whole, the emperor declared loudly his dissent from the plan of indemnities ; and, on the other hand, Prussia, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and Baden, professed, as they had good reason to do, their entire approbation and acquiescence in it. On the 22d of August the extraordinary deputation of the empire assembled

\* Since the death of Maximilian, elector of Bavaria, A. D. 1778, the number of electors had been reduced to eight. The two houses of the Palatinate and Bavaria were branches of the same stem. Frederic, elector Palatine and king of Bohemia, being, by the emperor Ferdinand II., put under the ban of the empire, A. D. 1618, the electoral dignity was transferred to the duke of Bavaria. But by the treaty of Westphalia, the elector Palatine was restored to his seat in the electoral college : with this proviso, nevertheless ; that, in case of the eventual union of the two branches, the Palatine electorate should be extinguished and absorbed in that of Bavaria : and this union actually took place one hundred and thirty years subsequent to the treaty of Westphalia.



BOOK. at Ratisbon. Baron Hugel, the imperial plenipotentiary, opened the sitting, by declaring the surprise of the emperor at the interference of foreign powers in the concerns of the empire; and he particularly objected to the indemnity assigned by the convention to the grand duke, as wholly inadequate to the losses which he had sustained in Italy; and claimed for his imperial highness, all the ecclesiastical estates, and all the imperial cities in the circle of Suabia, in addition to the territories already allotted to him. In the mean time, and in defiance of consequences, the troops of the emperor had actually taken forcible possession of the city of Passau.

In answer to the claims thus made and enforced, M. La Forest, the French minister at Ratisbon, presented a note to the deputation, September 11, complaining "that the plans of the court of Vienna tended to stretch its territory to the Lech; and would consequently, in their effect, erase Bavaria from the list of powers; but, if the balance of Europe require that Austria be great and powerful, the balance of Germany requires also, that Bavaria should be preserved entire, and sheltered from all ulterior invasion. The undersigned, therefore, is charged to declare to the deputation, that the hereditary states of his electoral highness, as well as the possessions which are destined him

as an indemnity, and as necessary to the re-  
 establishment of the balance in Germany, are na-  
 turally and indispensably placed under the pro-  
 tection of the mediating powers; that the first  
 consul personally will not suffer the important  
 place of Passau to remain in the hands of Au-  
 stria, nor that she shall obtain any part of the  
 territory which Bavaria possesses on the right  
 bank of the Inn; for he considers that Bavaria  
 would no longer be independent, from the mo-  
 ment the troops of Austria should be so near her  
 capital."

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The emperor of Russia and the king of Prussia likewise joined in the most pointed condemnation of the conduct of the emperor, declaring, in the most explicit terms, their determination to protect the interests and rights of the elector of Bavaria.

On the other hand, the baron de Hugel addressed a note (September 26th) to the ministers both of Russia and France, disavowing the ambitious views ascribed to the emperor, and professing "that he had not a thought of procuring for his august brother any part whatsoever of Bavaria, in any other manner than by an arrangement of mutual consent, to the perfect convenience of the elector palatine—that the question regarded the Iser, and not the Lech—the proposition of Austria also leaving a suitable extent of coun-

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try for the purpose of removing Munich from the frontier. And his imperial majesty engaged to surrender the city of Passau to the person to whom it should be legally adjudged by the definitive arrangement." The views of Austria being thus acknowledged to extend to the Iser, on the banks of which river Munich, the electoral capital, is situated, the charge of inordinate ambition was in this note but very imperfectly repelled.

On the 9th of October, a supplemental plan of indemnities was presented by the French and Russian ministers; agreeably to which, the grand-duke was to receive some ecclesiastical possessions, in the circle of Austria, as an addition to his indemnity. The electors of Mentz and Brandenburg, the duke of Wirtemberg, and the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, likewise obtained some additional advantages. This, however, was far from giving satisfaction to the emperor; and the debates continued for many weeks with little intermission.

On the very same day on which the supplemental plan was presented to the deputation of the empire, died the infant duke of Parma; by whose death, conformably to the convention of Madrid, concluded March 21, 1801, the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, were placed at the disposal of France. This created a new

subject of difference; and the emperor remonstrated against this disposition, as contrary to the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, by which the reversion of those possessions, in case of the failure of male heirs in the family of don Philip, was secured to the house of Austria. But the first consul, without regarding this obsolete claim, immediately took possession of Parma, establishing a provisional government in the duchy till the fate of it should be finally determined.

On the 31st of October, the deputation of the diet published a *conclusum* on the subject of the supplemental plan, in which, with many expressions of gratitude and respect to the mediating powers, they declare their acceptance of this plan under certain modifications. In this *conclusum*, and at the instance, no doubt, of the emperor, the *vote* given by the minister of Austria, on the occasion, is inserted at full length. This vote was in fact a memorial very ably framed; and, conformably to the usage of the diet, containing not the vote alone, but the reasons on which it was founded. This declaration states, “that, by the treaty of Luneville, the grand-duke is to be indemnified completely; but this complete indemnity is neither to be found in the first nor the second plan of the mediating powers; whose determinations are acknowledged to have their source in dispositions



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friendly, but not emanating from any strength of right." It refers to the "extremely moderate and conciliatory propositions recently made by the court of Vienna to the French government, as the price which it attaches to the interference and to the friendly propositions of the mediating powers. After this, it has so much the more reason to hope, that these powers will have, by reciprocity, just regards for his royal highness the grand-duke; and that they will please to make, in their plan of indemnities, such modifications as the imperial royal court can agree to. The general state of things is not, beside, sufficiently pressing to cause apprehension of danger in a more mature discussion. ALL EUROPE is tranquil, and wishes to maintain the PEACE."

The emperor, at length, at the twentieth sitting of the deputation (October 26th), gave in his declaration, stating, "that he was willing to take for a *basis* to the *conclusum*, the supplement of indemnity offered by the French government for his royal highness the grand-duke of Tuscany." This seemed to afford some faint prospect of a final settlement.

It is remarkable, that his Britannic majesty, as elector of Hanover, though he had sustained no loss whatever, was almost as clamorous and importunate as the emperor himself in his de-

mand of *indemnity*—advancing various futile and unregarded claims to the bishoprics of Hildesheim and Corvey, &c. ; and, while the plan of indemnities yet remained unauthorised and unadopted by the deputation of the empire, he issued a proclamation, dated Hanover, November 4th, signifying the secularisation of the bishopric of Osnaburg, and its assignment as an hereditary principality to the electoral house of Hanover, and the cession and evacuation of the same by his son the duke of York. “ We take on ourselves therefore,” says this proclamation, “ the government of the said principality of Osnaburg; and require the canons and clergy to acknowledge us as their only sovereign; in which case they may rely on our paternal protection and favor.”

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Although by the accession of the emperor to the plan of indemnity actually presented as the basis of a *conclusum*—which must at least be understood to imply his virtual acquiescence in the indemnities allotted to Prussia and the other principal Germanic powers—the way seemed to be paved to a final pacification and settlement, it was not till the thirtieth sitting of the deputation, on the 22d of November, that a *conclusum* was voted, adopting the general plan suggested by the mediating powers. For the debates were still protracted by the politic pertinacity of the

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settlement.

emperor; whose counsels, now guided with equal firmness and moderation, under the auspicious influence of the archduke Charles, at length succeeded so far as to obtain from the first consul, by virtue of a convention signed at Paris, December 26th, 1802, various new and important concessions. The treaty consisted of seven articles.

I. By the first, the emperor ceded the Ortenau to the duke of Modena, in addition to the Brisgau.

II. The bishoprics of Trent and Brixen were ceded to the emperor in lieu of the Ortenau.

III. The bishopric of Eichstadt, in the circle of Franconia, was ceded to the grand-duke of Tuscany, in addition to his other indemnities.

IV. The emperor engages to employ his influence that the plan of indemnities, as now modified, shall be ratified by the empire.

V. Passau to be evacuated by the troops of Austria.

VI. The first consul will unite with his imperial majesty of the Russias to procure the electoral dignity for his royal highness the archduke, grand-duke, under the title of elector of Saltzburg.

VII. Contains the guarantee of the contracting powers.

His imperial majesty then thought fit to ac-

cede in form to the *conclusum*, of the 22d of November; but various difficulties, of a subordinate kind, retarded the execution of the arrangement, now unanimously agreed upon, till the 28th of April, 1803, when it received the final ratification of the diet, and the constitutional sanction of the head of the Germanic empire.

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Thus was a change effected, greater than had, at any period, taken place on the continent of Europe, since the conclusion of the treaty of Westphalia, which, no less than that of Luneville, was the result of the decided predominance of France. Nevertheless, though the military power of Austria has, in the course of the last two centuries, been almost uniformly found, in repeated conflicts, inferior to that of her great rival, such has been the good fortune of the Imperial house, that the losses she has sustained, on one side, have been amply compensated on the other: and it may, with truth, be asserted, that the comparative strength of Austria, in relation even to France, has suffered no diminution, while the actual extent of her territory and population, and the magnitude of her resources, far exceed those of any former period, since the reign of the emperor Charles V. Her dominions are now better compacted, and more concentrated than ever. They do not touch in any point upon the territory of France; and she cannot, therefore,



BOOK XXXVI. whenever new and unforeseen causes of quarrel arise, be attacked, by the French armies, with the same advantage as formerly; when Austria exhausted her blood and treasure in fruitless attempts, although aided by the concurrent efforts of the maritime powers, to defend the open and distant provinces of Brabant and Flanders.

As to the accusation so commonly brought against France, by those honest but ignorant politicians, whose patriotism consists chiefly in national partiality and national prejudice, and whose mental optics can discern the *mote* but not the *beam*, that the Gallic power has been systematically employed in the disorganisation of Europe, the simple fact is, that both England and France have pursued, and with equal success, their own aggrandisement, according to the circumstances in which they have been respectively placed; Britain with her fleets, France with her armies. And if the same attention be, in future, paid by the powers of the continent to the dreadful arts of destruction, combined with the same contempt of principle, as in the ages, that are past, the organisation of Europe will undoubtedly suffer, in succeeding times, changes similar to those it has already experienced. Who, in fine, ever did, or ever can, declare Europe to be in such a state of security, as to preclude subsequent innovations by the hand of

violence? Treaties cannot bind the ambition of nations; the powerful will oppress the weak; riches will incite the attempts of avarice; the interests of the many will be sacrificed to the selfishness or vanity of the few; and the relative situation of the nations of the globe, will, like the lunar disc, be in a state of perpetual variation.

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## APPENDIX.

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**I**N order to form a just and complete view of the foreign policy of that memorable administration, in and over which Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury possessed the chief direction, it will be necessary, by way of supplement to this history, to pursue the measures adopted by them to their proper and inevitable termination—*viz.* a renewal of the war with France, accompanied with an incalculable increase of national animosity, and of consequent difficulty in negotiating such a peace as would afford a prospect of permanence.

The new parliament met on the 16th of November, 1802. In his opening speech, the king expressed himself in language, respecting foreign affairs, well calculated to keep alive the spirit of uncertainty and anxiety. “In my intercourse with foreign powers,” said he, “I have been actuated by a sincere disposition for the maintenance of peace. It is nevertheless impossible for me to lose sight of that established and wise system of policy by which the interests of other states are connected with our own; and I cannot, therefore, be indifferent to any material change in their relative condition and strength. My conduct will be invariably regulated by a due consideration of the actual situation of Europe, and by a watchful solicitude for the permanent welfare of my people.”

In the debate upon the address, some very severe ani-



madversions took place upon the general policy and conduct of the new ministers. Lord Grenville declared, “that the measures of vigilance and preparation now proposed, were necessary in consequence of a peace in which all concern for the interest of the rest of Europe, and all regard to the honor of this country, were abandoned. Subsequent to the period of signing the preliminaries, ministers had seen the first consul extort new concessions from Portugal contrary to the spirit of his engagements with Great Britain \*. The king of Sardinia had kept his faith with this country inviolate; and yet he was suffered to be stripped of his dominions at a time, when, if the restitution of Piedmont had been insisted on, it would scarcely have been denied. Why did France hesitate to annex Piedmont to its departments till after the conclusion of the definitive treaty, but that she might not preclude herself from that restitution if resolutely demanded? The treaty of Amiens gave Piedmont to France, and with Piedmont the sovereignty of Italy. Martinico, Malta, the Cape;

\* The VIth article of the preliminaries, which stipulates that “the territories and possessions of her most faithful majesty shall be preserved entire,” may be referred either to the state of those possessions anterior to the war, or posterior to the treaty of Badajoz. The omission of the clause, “such as they existed previously to the present war,” inserted in the preceding article relative to Turkey, seemed to imply the latter. But, in the note of lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto, September 22, 1801, it is conceded, that “the limits of French Guiana shall extend to the river Ariwari, provided that the integrity of *all* the states of her most faithful majesty in Europe be guarantied in every respect;” which condition, so far as appears from the official correspondence, was not disputed by France. The censure of lord Grenville, therefore, on this point, was just and well founded.

every thing was resigned ; and do we now presume to remonstrate against the fortune of Parma, or of Switzerland ? It is the want of energy, of plan, of foresight, that subjugates the genius of Britain before the first consul of France. It is as if ministers had conspired with the adversary to bind Great Britain hand and foot. The ruin which they have prepared is upon us."

Upon the same occasion Mr. Windham expressed himself in terms no less energetic in the house of commons. " Destruction was," he declared, " impending over us. Europe might be said to be in ruins. This country seemed to touch the moment of dissolution ; and he thought, upon the present system of amity with France, her fall inevitable. What was become of Holland ? of Genoa, of Switzerland ? of Modena and Parma ? all swallowed up in the inordinate encroachments of the first consul. Germany was no longer Germany ; and England would soon be in the same melancholy situation. In times past, France was formidable with a population of twenty-four millions, but now her power was gigantic and tremendous. He was astonished at the indifference of the honorable gentleman (meaning Mr. Fox), who seemed to have lost his feelings when he spoke of the French revolution. For his own part he must exclaim with MACBETH—

—————Can such things be,  
And overcome us, like a summer's cloud,  
Without our special wonder ? You make me strange  
E'en to the disposition that I owe,  
When now I think you can behold such sights,  
And keep the natural ruby of your cheek,  
When mine is blanch'd with fear.——

He cautioned ministers to weigh well the situation this

country would be in when war comes, which he thought could not be far off; and he believed it was much safer to anticipate the blow than to defer it. That, however, must be left to the responsibility of ministers; but, in his opinion, they ought not to part with any measures or means which chance or circumstances may have left in their hands, even though keeping them should risk an immediate war. We were," he said, "at present in so awful a crisis, that it brought into play all the strongest impulses that could actuate the heart of man. The country could not be saved without the co-operation of the majority of the nation; and he advised ministers to appeal to the high-minded and proud of heart, to those susceptible of an ardent love of their country: and he hoped that the heroic spirit for which England had been so long and so deservedly celebrated would be found much more general than is now supposed. At all events, whether ministers succeeded or not in their efforts to save the nation, they would at least save their characters: they would not go down like the AUGUSTULI, but would show that they dared to adopt those vigorous measures which the danger we saw rising up on all sides, and threatening to overwhelm us, so loudly called for."

In this debate, ministers argued as strongly in favor of peace, as if they had made every effort for its preservation, instead of having exerted, in the recent instance of Switzerland, all the means which they possessed, futile and feeble as indeed they eventually proved, to renew the war on the continent. Lord Hawkesbury declared, "that he could not coincide with those who would have this country the knight-errant, or Draw-cansir, in every case of contest on the continent." He maintained that the interference of France was to be ex-

pected in the affairs of Switzerland. He allowed that this interference had been attended with gross partiality; but nothing had occurred which could warrant a renewal of hostilities. And he assured the house, that no excitement in the first instance, or encouragement in the second, had ever been lent to the people of Switzerland from this country!

Mr. Addington professed himself proud to say, "that at no period of our history had despondency so little to fear, or hope so much to expect. He could truly assert, that if he were to take a retrospect of his past life, and fix on that portion of it which could afford him most gratification, he should always consider the share he had in making the late peace as the most fortunate part of it. He acknowledged the political aggrandisement of France; but it must be something more than the arguments he had then heard which would induce him to think that war would now tend to the reduction of her power." The address was at length voted without a division.

It was reasonably to be expected, as perfectly consonant with the general tenor of their policy, that the Windham and Grenville party, as it was now commonly styled, should appear the zealous opponents of the peace and the severe accusers of the first consul. The concessions made to France by the treaty of Amiens were indeed such, that, if the spirit of amity did not accompany the return of peace, it was impossible not to allow that they were far too great. And the most undeviating wisdom of conduct was requisite, on the part of ministers, to prove to the world, that the sacrifices they had consented to were not the result of intimidation



and pusillanimity, but of moderation and equity. So problematic, however, had been the object, and so petulant the conduct, of administration in the whole of their transactions with France since the peace, imperfectly known as they were to the public at this period, that the most intelligent persons began to augur very disastrous consequences. As long, nevertheless, as ministers professed themselves, from whatever motives, adverse to the mad policy of involving the nation in a second war with the French republic, upon any grounds which had yet been stated, it was necessary to give them every practicable support, in opposition to a furious faction, breathing nothing but threatenings and slaughter.

But what is very remarkable, this sanguinary faction received a great addition of force from a quarter where they had least right to expect it, *viz.* from divers individuals of the old or whig opposition, who had so meritoriously contended against the late system, and who had approved the treaty of peace as the best, or nearly the best, which circumstances would permit the new ministers to obtain from France; but who now, from a puerile and passionate aversion to the first consul, whom they publicly stigmatised and denounced as a tyrant, and usurper, seemed no less eager than the avowed impugners of the peace, to plunge the country into a new war more ruinous and senseless than the former. The most distinguished person of this, by no means small or insignificant, party was Mr. Sheridan, who, in direct contradiction to the sage policy of Mr. Fox, took every occasion of uttering vehement invectives against the government of France, and the person and character of

the first consul, not to be exceeded by the rage of those who were more emphatically, though not more justly, designated by the appellation of the WAR PARTY.

On the 8th of December, Mr. Yorke, secretary at war, proposing an enormous peace-establishment of 130,000 men, Mr. Sheridan supported the motion in a speech which was unhappily not at all in unison with those formerly delivered by him in that house, with such high approbation from the discerning part of the public. "I find," said Mr. Sheridan, "a disposition in some gentlemen to rebuke any man who shall freely declare his opinion respecting the first consul of France. I will abstain from offending them if I can—I say if I can, because I feel that even a simple narrative may be construed into invective. I perfectly agree with my honorable friend (Mr. Fox), that war ought to be avoided; though he does not agree with me on the means best calculated to produce that effect. From any opinion he may express, I never differ but with the greatest reluctance. For him, my affection, my esteem, and my attachment are unbounded, and they will end only with my life.—He (Bonaparte) has discovered that we all belong to the western family. I confess I feel a sentiment of deep indignation when I hear that this scrap of nonsense was uttered to one of the most enlightened of the human race. To this family party I do not wish to belong. He may invite persons if he please to dinner; and, like lord Peter, say, 'that this tough crust is excellent mutton.' He may toss a sceptre to the king of Etruria to play with, and keep a rod to scourge him in the corner: but my humble apprehension is, that, though in the tablet and volume of his mind there may be some marginal note about cashiering the king of Etruria,

yet the whole text is occupied with the destruction of this country. This is the first vision that breaks upon him through the gleam of the morning ; this is his last prayer at night, to whatever deity he addresses it, whether to Jupiter or to Mahomet, to the goddess of battles, or the goddess of reason. He says he is an instrument in the hands of Providence ; I believe he is so—to make the English love their constitution better—to cling to it with more fondness, and to render us determined, with one hand and heart, to oppose to any aggression that may be made upon us, a prompt, resolute, and determined resistance, be the consequences what they may. We ought to meet the hostility of France with a conviction of the truth of this assertion, that the country, which, like us, has achieved such greatness, can have no retreat in littleness—that if we could be content to abandon every thing, we should find no safety in poverty, no security in abject submission. The Bourbons were ambitious ; but it was not so necessary for them to feed their subjects with the spoils and plunder of war ; but I see, in the very situation and composition of the power of Bonaparte, a physical necessity for him to go on in this barter with his subjects, and to promise to make them masters of the world if they will consent to be his slaves. I certainly looked to the rejoicings at the peace as an unmanly and irrational exultation. Is the danger from France diminished by that event ? Russia, if not in his power, is within the sphere of his influence ; Prussia is at his beck ; Italy is his vassal ; Holland is in his grasp ; Spain at his nod ; Turkey in his toils ; Portugal at his foot. I mark him taking positions calculated to destroy our commerce ; I see him anxious to take possession of Louisiana, and to use the

ports of St. Domingo to carry thither our West-India and Jamaica trade. If the French republicans have experienced the mighty force of Britain, they, who have been everywhere else successful, cannot but view the only power the superiority of whose arms they have felt, with warm resentment and sentiments of mortified pride. Look at the map of Europe, and see nothing but France! It is in our power to measure her territory, to reckon her population, but it is scarcely within the grasp of any man's mind to measure the ambition of Bonaparte. Why, when all Europe bows down before him; why, when he has subdued the whole continent, he should feel such great respect for us, I am at a loss to discover. If it be true that his ambition is of that immeasurable nature, there are abundant and obvious reasons why it must be progressive."

This was a speech evidently made for the purpose of being applauded by the VULGAR in every class of life. It had its effect and its reward; but, to better judges, it appeared the brilliant effusion of a political caricaturist, not the calm and deliberate opinion of a wise and able statesman. Upon the whole, notwithstanding the dangerous incentives to hostility thus held out from quarters so opposite, the ministry, despairing of the success of their efforts on the continent, appear to have been at this period sincerely disposed to maintain the peace to which the French government was no doubt at least equally inclined.

The important note of M. Otto, dated August 17, remained without any official answer notwithstanding the promise of the English ministers that they would cause satisfactory explanations to be made at Paris. Meantime, the periodical incendiary papers, in the



French language, printed in London, were circulated with additional activity ; and the plots and intrigues of the emigrants against the existing government of France still continued. “ Persuaded at last,” says the French official narrative, “ that this proceeded not from omission but from system on the part of the British government, the French government sacrificed to peace the resentment which these wretched libels occasioned, and no further mention was made of them. Accordingly, from the month of Thermidor, year X, there was, in the intercourse between the two governments, no mutual complaint, nor any exchange of official documents \*.”

During this interval France, though extremely displeased at the unexpected delays which had occurred relative to the restoration of Malta, does not seem in the least to have suspected that it would be ultimately retained, in gross and direct violation of one of the most solemn treaties ever entered into by the two countries. England was therefore suffered in silence to prosecute her own plans in respect to the evacuation of the island, France occasionally concurring in such measures as were calculated to add facility to this object. An express provision having been made for the surrender of Malta by Great Britain at the end of three months *or sooner if it can be done*, on the performance of two conditions only, 1st, That the grand-master or commissioners empowered according to the statutes of the order, be upon the island to receive possession ; and 2dly, That the Sicilian force should have arrived there : the French government appeared in no haste to apply for the guarantee of the powers who were to be *invited*

\* Official papers, printed at Paris, p. 68.

to accede to the arrangements agreed upon in the treaty of Amiens, though by no means reluctant to join in such applications.

In the beginning of July Mr. Paget, resident at Vienna, having solicited M. de Champagny, the French ambassador, to concur in an invitation to the emperor for the imperial guarantee, it was most readily acceded to; although the ambassador acknowledged that he had received no specific orders respecting the guarantee in question—professing to act entirely from his own knowledge of the intentions of his government. In consequence of this step the emperor's guarantee was without difficulty obtained, and formally signed on the 20th of August ensuing.

On the 3d of August lord St. Helens wrote from St. Petersburg that the French minister there was still without instructions authorising him to join the English ambassador in demanding the guarantee of the court of Russia; but they soon arrived, and in the following month a joint invitation was made by the French and English ministers to the emperor of Russia for that purpose. But an immediate and unreserved compliance with this request could not be obtained. Difficulties and delays, such as might reasonably be expected, took place. In a conference held by the two ministers with the Russian chancellor Woronzof, on the 3d of November, general Hedouville entered into various arguments to induce the Russian government to grant this guarantee, and on the 24th of the same month Russia actually acceded to the arrangements of the treaty of Amiens, including the obnoxious article establishing a Maltese *langue*, on condition that the rights of the king of the Sicilies, as sovereign of the island, shall be recognised,

but admitting that these rights shall not cause a departure from its neutrality as guaranteed by the present act.

On the 31st of August the British resident at Berlin informed lord Hawkesbury that M. Bignon, the French minister, had received instructions from his government, conjointly with him, to invite the king of Prussia to accede to the guarantee of Malta. But this monarch was very justly of opinion that he had nothing to do in this business ; and, after many weeks had passed, count Haugwitz frankly told the English minister “ that Prussia took a very slight interest in the fate of this island, and that the king his master was countenanced in withholding his guarantee by the example of Spain.”

It was indeed evident that the guarantee of Prussia, a power situated at a vast distance from Malta, with which it had no common interest, and possessed no means of communication, was not worth asking previous to the declaration of count Haugwitz, and could not be worth having subsequent to it : and the very mention of the guarantee of Spain as a security to Britain for the independence of Malta, was contemptible and ludicrous. These nugatory and insignificant guarantees were, however, ultimately obtained, yet was not the island surrendered.

Almost at the moment of general Andreossi's arrival in England—an event which had a happy and desirable tendency to re-establish amity, or the semblance of amity, between the two nations—a very remarkable publication appeared from the British press, entitled, “ A History of the Expedition to Egypt.” The author of this book, sir Robert Wilson, was an officer of great merit and gallantry in the Egyptian army, and the narrative contained a very interesting account of the mili-

tary transactions of the British nation in Egypt; comprehending also a very spirited and satisfactory refutation of the numerous calumnies and misrepresentations which disgraced the celebrated publication of general Reynier. But it was extremely to be regretted that a book in many respects so meritorious should unnecessarily abound in the most violent and studied invectives against the first consul, whom it painted in the blackest and most odious colors, without a single relief to the shades of this over-wrought picture. Among a multitude of subordinate accusations two charges stood dreadfully conspicuous. *First*, the massacre of the garrison of Jaffa, *secondly*, the poisoning of his sick and wounded soldiers in the hospital of that city on his retreat from Syria. The former of these was confirmed in a very great degree, though by no means in its utmost latitude, by independent and collateral evidence. The latter, wholly improbable in itself, rested solely upon the testimony of a single individual, whose very name was not made known to the public. This popular publication which was sanctioned by the highest authority, being dedicated by permission to the duke of York, and presented in form to the king, revived with tenfold vehemence the clamor against the first consul, whom it was now the fashion to represent as a prodigy of barbarity and profligacy—and as ranking in the same class with a Nero or a Muley Moloc, with a Cataline or a Borgia\*.

\* One of the most barbarous actions recorded in history is the murder in cold blood of the French prisoners captured at the battle of Agincourt, yet the general character of Henry V. is not that of a sanguinary monster. The cruelties perpetrated after



But intelligent and impartial persons, however they might disapprove of many, and detest some of the actions of Bonaparte, were compelled to ask what beneficial consequences could possibly result from this elaborate exposure of the crimes of the first consul, *supposing* the narrative of them perfectly authentic and accurate in every circumstance. The transactions at Jaffa did not come within the scope of the British expedition to Egypt, and they seemed to be purposely and forcibly introduced in order to exhibit Bonaparte in the most hateful point of view. From this England could derive little advantage even had she been at open war with France; but when peace had been so recently concluded, and the two nations still remained in a state of extreme agitation, resembling the angry swell of the ocean after a storm, the height of indiscretion only could wish to make the war of *words* succeed to that of *swords*, and the fatal effects of this imprudence but too soon and too plainly appeared.

On the 27th of January (1803) lord Whitworth, the British ambassador at Paris, transmitted a dispatch to lord Hawkesbury, containing the report of a conversation with M. Talleyrand, in the course of which the French minister pronounced, after his long silence on this head, a most bitter philippic against the English newspapers, declaring “that the first consul was extremely hurt to find that his endeavours to conciliate had hitherto produced no other effect than to increase

the victory at Culloden were most atrocious, yet were the habits and temper of the duke of Cumberland universally allowed to be mild and beneficent.

the abuse with which the papers in England continually loaded him—the more so, as it came from a country of whose good opinion he was so very ambitious.” Lord Whitworth endeavouring to palliate the offence by alleging the little control which the English government possessed over the productions of the English press, M. Talleyrand, in reply, enumerated the names and supposed connexions of the papers published in London with great precision, and urged “that his majesty’s ministers might so far control those at least which depended upon them as to prevent their inserting that abuse which must be considered as having their sanction.”

Lord Whitworth engaged to report the substance of M. Talleyrand’s complaints to his own court, assuring him, however, “*that nothing could be added to the explanations on this head already given.*”

M. Talleyrand then, by the express order of the first consul, in the most serious manner, required to know what were his majesty’s intentions with regard to the evacuation of Malta. He said that another grand-master would now be very soon elected; that all the powers of Europe, invited so to do, with the exception of Russia, whose difficulties it was easy to remove, and without whom the guarantee would be equally complete\*, were ready to come forward, and that consequently the term would very soon arrive when Great Britain could have no *pretext* for keeping longer pos-

\* Meaning, no doubt, that though it was essential to the treaty to *invite* the powers named therein to join in the guarantee of Malta, it was not essential to the execution of the article stipulating the restoration of that island, that the power or powers so invited should actually accede to the invitation.

session. Instead of assuring the French minister in the language of confidence and cordiality that England would faithfully adhere to the terms of the treaty, lord Whitworth contented himself with saying coldly "that he would report his conversation to the English secretary lord Hawkesbury."

Three days after this conference, with the result of which the first consul had so little reason to be satisfied, a very singular paper appeared in the French official paper called the *Moniteur*, purporting to be a report made to the French government by a colonel Sebastiani, who had been sent a few months before, when differences ran high between England and France, on a mission commercial, political, and military. Sebastiani embarked at Toulon on the 16th of September, 1802, for the East. What the precise motives of the first consul were for publishing this crude and ill-digested composition, equally puerile and pompous, cannot be ascertained. It is possible that he might expect it to counteract, in some degree, the injurious impressions recently made by sir Robert Wilson's book\*. It is possible that he might hope to intimidate the English ministers, and deter them from the thought of renewing the war, by the magnitude of his provisional projects and speculations. It is possible that it was the mere effect of spleen and passion, and intended to show the court of London the contemptuous opinion he entertained of the counsels by which it was governed.

This curious report contained many particulars calculated to give just offence to the English government; if indeed such a medley of inconsistency, vanity, and

\* Vide general Andreossi's note to lord Hawkesbury, March 29.

absurdity, merited any serious notice. The author of it states that he arrived at Alexandria on the 16th of October, and finding the English still in possession, he demanded of general Stuart, agreeably to his instructions, the speedy evacuation of that city. General Stuart, whom he describes with oracular sagacity, on this transient acquaintance, as a man of *mediocre* talents, “told him that the place would be shortly evacuated, but that he had as yet received no orders from his court to quit Alexandria.” He then made a visit to the pacha of Alexandria, and the capitan bey, “who expressed great partiality for the French, and did not conceal that they saw with grief the stay of the English in the country.” On the 20th he set out for Cairo, receiving from the various places and persons visited by him in his route, protestations of attachment to the first consul. On the 26th he arrived at the metropolis, having been met at Boulah by an honorary escort of three hundred cavalry and two hundred infantry, sent by the pacha of Cairo, who, in his subsequent conferences with M. Sebastiani, professed himself penetrated with gratitude for the first consul, engaging to his commercial agents the most friendly reception. In return for which, M. Sebastiani declared “the lively interest which the first consul took in the prosperity of Egypt,” offering, by his express command, the mediation of the French government in order to establish a peace with the beys. But this the pacha declined, saying, “that he had the most positive orders from Constantinople to make a war of extermination upon the beys.”

In an assembly of the principal scheiks of Cairo, the conversation turned upon the interest which the first



consul took in Egypt, on his power, his glory, and on his esteem for the learned scheiks. Their answers expressed an enthusiastic attachment to his person. The inhabitants of Cairo saluted the agent Sebastiani and his suite when passing along the streets. A trivial incident, however, served to prove the futility of these flattering representations. On the 29th, in returning to Fort Dupuy, Mustapha Oukel, one of the chiefs of the city, passing accidentally on horseback, reproached the guides who attended Sebastiani with marching before a Christian, *and above all a FRENCHMAN!* and menaced them with the bastinado after his departure. Having demanded redress of the pacha for this insult, he found that Mustapha was strongly favored and protected by him: and Sebastiani was compelled formally to declare that if reparation was not made he would leave the city and transmit his complaint to Paris and Constantinople. Upon which, Mustapha, at the instance of the pacha, thought proper to ask his pardon. Also, to re-instate himself in the favor of the French agent, the pacha showed him a letter he had just received from general Stuart, who was no doubt apprehensive of the ill effect of Sebastiani's intrigues. "This letter inclosed an order of the first consul dated August 1799, and which recalled to the recollection of the Egyptians that Constantinople was once tributary to Arabia, and that the time was now come to restore Cairo to its supremacy, and to destroy the eastern empire of the Ottomans. General Stuart begged the pacha to consider the spirit of that order, and to judge from it of our attachment and of our peace with the Turks. I was indignant to find that a soldier of one of the most

polite nations of Europe should degrade himself so far as to instigate assassination by means of such an insinuation."

From this preposterous charge of assassination the agent Sebastiani makes a sudden transition to the monks of Mount Sinai, from whom he received a deputation; and, to those of the *Propaganda* at Cairo, who performed a solemn *Te Deum* for the prosperity of the first consul, at which M. Sebastiani assisted.

On the 3d of November, he set out for Damietta, and had the good fortune to meet in his route with none but persons extremely attached to France. "In Egypt," says he, "chiefs, merchants, people, all like to talk of the first consul; all offer prayers for his happiness. All the news which concerns him, spreads from Alexandria or Damietta to the pyramids with astonishing rapidity."

On the 14th, Sebastiani left Damietta, and arrived in five days at Acre. He immediately addressed a letter to Djézzar Pacha, stating, "that peace being concluded between France and the Porte, the relations of commerce should be re-established on the footing they stood on before the war; and that he was charged by the first consul to confer with him on these subjects. I begged of him," says M. Sebastiani, "to answer me in writing if he was inclined to treat with me. In some hours the messengers returned. Djézzar had received them coldly. He expressed his desire to see me personally." Very soon after, the dragoman of the pacha came to conduct the French agent to the palace of Djézzar: the apartment in which he gave audience, had no other furniture than a carpet. He had on one side of him a pistol with four barrels, a small air-gun, a sabre, and a hatchet. "After inquiring," says M. Sebastiani, "as

to my health, he asked me, whether I was not persuaded that our end is pre-ordained in heaven, and that nothing could change our destiny? I answered, that I believed as he did, in predestination. He continued to speak for some time on that subject. He repeated several times, ‘it is said that Djezzar is barbarous; this is false, he is but just and severe.’ Soon after he said, ‘I desire that the commissary you may send, shall reside at Seide, as that is the most commercial port in my dominions. I highly esteem the French. In stature Bonaparte is small, but he is nevertheless the greatest of mankind. I know that he is greatly regretted at Cairo, where they wish to see him again. Djezzar perhaps will soon finish his career not that he is old, as his enemies report’—he then performed some of the manœuvres of the Mamelouks with surprising adroitness and agility—‘but because most likely God will have it so.’ Our conversation was interrupted for some moments by a kind of military music, which he performed in a very agreeable style. The palace of Djezzar is built with much taste and elegance: but at the foot of the staircase is situated a prison; I saw a number of the unfortunate inhabitants. This monster has imprinted the mark of his atrocious character upon every thing within the limits of his power. Djezzar occupies all Palestine, with the exception of Jaffa, where Aboumarak Pacha has been besieged nearly five months by a force of 9000 men.”

M. Sebastiani quitted Acre the 21st of November, and set sail for Zante, where he arrived the 4th of December. Having learnt that the isle and the republic were divided into different parties, he assembled the constituted authorities, and other principal persons, at the house of

the governor. "After having represented to them," says he, "the interest which the first consul took in their welfare, I induced them to lay aside that spirit of party which distracted them, and to wait without passion and in silence the new constitution. These few words were received with enthusiasm; and all of them exclaimed, 'France for ever! Bonaparte for ever!' I do not stray from the truth in assuring you, that the islands of the Ionian sea will declare themselves French as soon as opportunity shall offer itself."

The rest of this famous report consists merely of a statement of the English, Mamelouk, and Turkish forces in Egypt, with those under the command of Djazzar Pacha in Syria. He says, "that a great misunderstanding reigns between general Stuart and the pacha of Cairo—that the Mamelouks are entirely masters of Upper Egypt; and that 6000 French would, at present, be enough to conquer the whole country."

This idle and impertinent report would deserve little attention, were it not for the very serious consequences of which it was almost immediately productive.

In the reply of lord Hawkesbury, dated February 9th, to the last dispatch of lord Whitworth, a new and very surprising scene was opened, threatening a renewal of the war in a more hideous and horrid form, and with an inconceivable increase of rage and animosity. The English secretary sets out with advancing a political maxim, tending to the eventual abrogation of the most sacred positive engagements—*viz.* "that every treaty or convention being negotiated with reference to the actual state of possession of the different parties, and of the treaties of public engagements by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion, if that state of pos-



session and of engagements be so materially altered by the act of either of the parties, as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situation."

According to this unheard of principle, as the affairs of men are in a state of perpetual fluctuation, and every state is making efforts, with more or less success, tending to its own aggrandisement, which must so far *affect the nature* of all preceding compacts, a pretence can never long be wanting to set aside any treaty or convention, and to render nugatory the most solemn national acts. On this ground, the permanence of treaties depends in no degree whatever upon the fidelity with which the conditions contained in them are observed by the contracting parties; but the contract is dissolved as soon as any accession of power is made by one party, which produces any change in its political situation (as every such event must necessarily do) compared with that of the other. Conformably to this false and dangerous maxim of politics, France would have been justified in declaring war against England in 1765, unless a compensation had been made to her for the rich and recent acquisition by the latter of the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa. On the other hand England would have had a right to declare war against Spain unless an equivalent had been obtained by her for Louisiana, ceded to her by France, subsequent to the treaty of 1763. But so far was this maxim from being an acknowledged and necessary inference from a definitive pacification, that it was made an express stipulation of

the treaty of Utrecht, that Spain should not cede any part of her possessions in the West Indies to France. The established plain rule of justice, equity, and common sense is, that every agreement, treaty, or convention, shall be faithfully adhered to by each party until it is departed from by the other.

Lord Hawkesbury hesitates indeed to apply his new-fangled maxim to present circumstances; and declares "that his majesty, desirous of consolidating the general peace of Europe, was willing to have waved the pretensions he might have a right to advance of this nature; and, as the other articles of the definitive treaty have been in a course of execution on his part, so he would have been ready to have carried into effect the true intent and spirit of the tenth article, the execution of which, according to its terms, had been rendered impracticable by circumstances which it was not in his majesty's power to control. A communication to your lordship would, accordingly," says the English secretary, "have been prepared, conformably to this disposition, if the attention of his majesty's government had not been attracted by the very extraordinary report of colonel Sebastiani to the first consul. This report contains the most unjustifiable insinuations and charges against the officer who commanded his majesty's forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter: insinuations and charges wholly destitute of foundation, and such as would warrant his majesty in demanding that satisfaction which, on occasions of this nature, independent powers, in a state of amity, have a right to expect from each other. It discloses moreover views in the highest degree injurious to the interests of his majesty's dominions, and directly repugnant to, and ut-

terly inconsistent with, the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace concluded between his majesty and the French government; and his majesty would feel that he was wanting in a proper regard to the honor of his crown, and to the interests of his dominions, if he could see with indifference such a system developed and avowed. His majesty cannot therefore regard the conduct of the French government, on various occasions, since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, the insinuations and charges contained in the report of colonel Sebastiani, and the views which that report discloses, without feeling it necessary for him distinctly to declare, that it will be impossible for him to enter into any further discussion relative to Malta, unless he receives satisfactory explanation on the subject of this communication."

On the receipt of this fatal letter, big with unknown and mighty mischiefs, Lord Whitworth demanded a conference with M. Talleyrand, in which, recapitulating the arguments of lord Hawkesbury, he appealed to the French minister, whether the report of colonel Sebastiani, exclusive of the personal allusions which it contained, was not of a nature to excite the utmost jealousy in the minds of his majesty's ministers, and to demand on their part every measure of precaution. The ambassador concluded "with the distinct declaration, that it was impossible for his majesty to enter into any further discussion relative to Malta, unless he received satisfactory explanations on the subject of the first consul's views."

M. Talleyrand, in answer, admitted\*, that the jea-

\* Lord Whitworth says, "admitted with an affected tone of candor;" but why should the reality of the French minister's candor in this instance be disputed? and what is the *tone* which distinguishes sincere from affected candor? It is much to be re-

lousy of England, in relation to Egypt, as connected with the British possessions in India, was natural; but he denied that any thing in the conduct of the French government justified the alarm expressed by the ambassador. He asserted, that Sebastiani's mission was strictly commercial; and he expatiated largely on the sincere desire of the first consul to maintain inviolate the peace which had been so lately concluded, adding, that the situation of the French finances was such, that were not this desire of peace in the first consul an effect of system, it would be most imperiously dictated to him by the total impossibility in which this country found itself, of carrying on that extensive state of warfare which even a partial rupture would naturally lead to. And, finally, he desired to know what was the nature and degree of satisfaction which his majesty would require? But this lord Whitworth was obliged to acknowledge that he was not prepared to state. Not suspecting, however, at this moment, the secret determination of the English ministers to retain the island of Malta, in gross violation of the late treaty, and that *no* satisfaction would be accepted, the ambassador answered, in discreet and judicious terms, "that he could not pretend to say by what means the apprehensions raised in England were to be allayed; but that, in the discussion of them, we should be animated solely by a sincere desire to be convinced of the truth of his assertions, since on that depended the peace and happiness of Europe;" adding, "that such was his majesty's sin-

gretted, that, on this and other occasions, the ambassador should discover a disposition to give an odious coloring to simple facts.



cere desire of maintaining peace, that nothing but absolute and unavoidable necessity would ever induce him to deprive his subjects of the blessings which they begin to enjoy."

On Friday the 18th of February the ambassador received a message from the first consul, requesting to see him at the Tuilleries that evening at nine o'clock. At this audience, M. Bonaparte informed the ambassador that he felt it necessary, in the most clear and authentic manner, to make known his sentiments to him, in order to their being communicated to his majesty. He said that it was a matter of infinite disappointment to him that the treaty of Amiens, instead of being followed by conciliation and friendship, the natural effects of peace, had been productive only of continual and increasing jealousy and mistrust, and that this mistrust was avowed in such a manner as must bring the point to an issue. He then enumerated the various provocations he had received from England, placing at the head of them the non-evacuation of Malta agreeably to the treaty of Amiens. "In this," he said, "that no consideration on earth should induce him to acquiesce; and, of the two, he had rather see us in possession of Fauxbourg St. Antoine than Malta." He then adverted to the abuse thrown out against him in the English public papers, but this he said he did not so much regard as that which appeared in the FRENCH PAPERS published in LONDON. This he considered as much more mischievous, since it was meant to excite this country against him and his government. He complained of the protection given to Georges, and others of his description, who, instead of being sent to Canada, as had been repeatedly promised, were permitted

to remain in England, handsomely pensioned, and constantly committing all sorts of crimes on the coasts of France and in the interior. In confirmation of this, he told me," says the ambassador, "that two men had, within these few days, been apprehended in Normandy, and were now on their way to Paris, who were hired assassins, and employed by the bishop of Arras, by the baron de Rolle, by Georges, and by Dutheil; as would be fully proved in a court of justice, and made known to the world. He acknowledged that the irritation he felt against England increased daily, because every wind which blew from England brought nothing but enmity and hatred against him. He now went back to Egypt, and told me that if he had felt the smallest inclination to take possession of it by force, he might have done it a month ago by sending 25,000 men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country in defiance of the 4,000 British in Alexandria. That instead of that garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it was only furnishing him with a pretence for invading it. This he should not do, whatever might be his desire to have it for a colony, because he did not consider it worth the risk of a war, in which he might perhaps be considered as the aggressor, and by which he should lose more than he could gain, since, sooner or later, Egypt would belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish empire, or by some arrangement with the Porte."

As a proof of his desire to maintain peace, he wished to know what he had to gain by going to war with England. A descent was the only means of offence he had, and *that* he was determined to attempt by putting himself at the head of the expedition. But how could

it be supposed, that, after having gained the height on which he stood, he would risk his life and reputation in such a hazardous attempt, unless forced to it by necessity, when the chances were that he and the greatest part of the expedition would go to the bottom of the sea? He talked much on this subject, but never affected to diminish the danger. He acknowledged that there were one hundred chances to one against him, but still he was determined to attempt it if war should be the consequence of the present discussion; and such was the disposition of the troops that army after army would be found for that enterprise. He then expatiated much on the natural force of the two countries. France with an army of 480,000 men (for to this amount it is, he said, to be immediately completed), all ready for the most desperate enterprises; and England with a fleet that made her mistress of the seas, and which he did not think he should be able to equal in less than ten years. Two such countries, by a proper understanding, might govern the world, but by their strifes might overturn it. He said that if he had not felt the enmity of the British government on every occasion since the treaty of Amiens, there would have been nothing that he would not have done to prove his desire to conciliate—participation in indemnities, as well as influence on the continent; treaties of commerce; in short any thing that could have given satisfaction and have testified his friendship. Nothing, however, had been able to conquer the hatred of the British government, and therefore it was now come to the point whether we should have peace or war. To preserve peace the treaty of Amiens must be fulfilled; the abuse in the public prints, if not totally suppressed,

at least kept within bounds, and confined to the English papers; and the protection so openly given to his bitterest enemies (alluding to Georges and persons of that description) must be withdrawn. If war, it was necessary only to say so, and to refuse to fulfil the treaty."

Lord Whitworth appears, in this extraordinary conversation, to have conducted himself with prudence and temper. "He dwelt strongly on the sensation which the publication of Sebastiani's report had created in England, where the views of France towards Egypt must always command the utmost vigilance and jealousy. The first consul, in reply, maintained that what ought to convince us of his desire of peace was, on the one hand, the little he had to gain by renewing the war, and on the other, the facility with which he might have taken possession of Egypt with the very ships and troops which were now going from the Mediterranean to St. Domingo, and that with the approbation of all Europe, and more particularly of the Turks; who had repeatedly invited him to join with them for the purpose of forcing us to evacuate their territory."

What answer the ambassador made to this decisive argument, his report of this conference does not inform us. "With regard to the mistrust and jealousy which had," as the first consul said, "constantly prevailed since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens," lord Whitworth properly and seasonably observed, "that after a war of such long duration, so full of rancor, and carried on in a manner of which history has no example, it was but natural that a considerable degree of agitation should prevail; but this, like the swell after a storm, would gradually subside, if not kept up by the policy of either party; that he would not pretend to



pronounced which had been the aggressor in the paper war of which he complained, and which was still kept up, though with this difference, that in England it was independent of government, and in France its very act and deed." To this the ambassador added, "that it must be admitted that the English had such motives of mistrust against France as could not be alleged against them, and he was going to instance the accession of territory and influence gained by France since the treaty, when the first consul interrupted him by saying, 'I suppose you mean Piedmont and Switzerland: *ces sont des bagatelles*,' and it must have been foreseen whilst the negotiation was pending; '*vous n'avez pas le droit d'en parler à cette heure*.'

Much more conversation passed, of which the ambassador, in his official dispatch, appears to have made a very fair and faithful report. And from the general tenor of it, nothing could be clearer than that the first consul was far from harbouring on his part the most distant idea of re-commencing the war against England, and for the best of all possible reasons, as stated by himself, viz. that he had nothing to gain by it. But, on the contrary, it is evident that he conceived himself in great danger of being again attacked by England as soon as a favorable opportunity offered; and, under this apprehension, he had directed his views to Egypt as to a country which might once more become the scene of military operation. Anxious to avert the impending quarrel, he endeavoured to intimidate the English ministers, whom he certainly regarded as men destitute of energy and capacity, by menaces of invasion. But they had now entirely changed their policy, and were passing from the extreme of tameness to that

of violence; and any attempt to intimidate when the spirit of rivalry and much more of revenge was excited, could only tend to add a new incentive to hostility more cogent than the motives openly avowed—that of demonstrating their contempt of danger, and freedom from the disgraceful dominion of fear.

Lord Whitworth, in the conclusion of his letter, remarks, that the first consul did not, as M. Talleyrand had done, *affect* to attribute colonel Sebastiani's mission to commercial motives only, but as one rendered necessary in a military point of view by the infraction on the part of the English of the treaty of Amiens. This appears unnecessarily invidious. The report itself was published; there could be therefore no intention to deceive. The specific powers with which colonel Sebastiani was invested might be strictly commercial, but he had, without a doubt, a further commission of a general nature, which M. Talleyrand could not mean to deny; viz. to take a military and political survey of the country, and to report the state of it to his own government.

Previous to the transmission of this dispatch, lord Whitworth had another conference with M. Talleyrand, in which an intimation was given by the French minister “that a project was in contemplation by which the integrity of the Turkish empire would be so effectually secured as to do away every cause of doubt or uneasiness, either with regard to Egypt or any part of the Turkish dominions.”

On the 22d of February the annual *EXPOSE*, or view of the state of the French republic, was presented by order of the executive government to the legislative

body. It declares "that the inhabitants of France in the departments recently visited by the first consul, hail with blessings the restoration of peace, and that it is the duty of government to cherish these auspicious dispositions. On the continent every thing," says this official statement, "offers us pledges of repose and tranquillity. A French ambassador is at Constantinople, charged with renewing and fortifying the ties which attach us to a power apparently threatened with destruction, but which it is our interest to sustain, and to support the foundations by which it is upheld. The British forces are still in Alexandria and Malta. The government had a fair right of complaint, but it has received intelligence that the vessels which are to convey them to Europe are already in the Mediterranean.

"The government guaranties to the nation the peace of the continent, and it is permitted to entertain a hope of the continuance of maritime peace. This peace is the want as well as the desire of all nations. For its preservation the government will do every thing compatible with national honor, essentially connected with the strict execution of treaties. But in England two parties maintain a contest for power. One of those parties has concluded peace, and appears desirous of maintaining it. The other has taken an oath of eternal hatred to France—hence that fluctuation of opinion and of counsels which prevails; hence that attitude at the same time pacific and menacing. While this contest of party continues, measures of precaution are what the government is called upon to adopt. Five hundred thousand men ought to be, and shall be, ready to undertake its defence and avenge its injuries.

Strange necessity which miserable passions impose on two nations whom interest and inclination mutually prompt to the cultivation of peace !

“ Whatever success intrigues may experience in London, no other people will be involved in new combinations : the government says with conscious pride *that ENGLAND, single-handed, cannot maintain a conflict against FRANCE !* But we have better hopes, and we believe that in the British cabinet nothing will be listened to but the counsels of wisdom and the voice of humanity.

“ YES, doubtless the peace will daily be more consolidated. The relation of the two governments will assume the character of good-will which is suitable to their mutual interests. A happy repose will bury the recollection of the long calamities of a disastrous war, and France and England, rendering their happiness reciprocal, will deserve the gratitude of the whole world.”

On the publication of this consular address in the English papers, it was reasonable to expect that the just and pacific sentiments contained in it would not prevent the national resentment from being excited by the vain and ill-timed boast that England could not single-handed maintain a conflict against France ; which indeed merited only contempt. But, as if the reputation of England had depended entirely upon the oracles uttered by the first consul, the nation seemed transported with rage and indignation, and the greatest injury could scarcely have caused a more eager thirst of revenge than this supposed insult, which left England the rank of the second power only on the face of the globe ; for, the first consul, in his recent conference with lord Whitworth, and even by implication in the



present address, had allowed Great Britain and France to be the two greatest nations in the world, which, he justly affirmed, they might either by their union govern, or by their strife overturn. The truth obviously is, that in ordinary cases England, by the superiority of her maritime power, will gain considerable advantages over her great rival; and upon this account France has never for ages entered, and never probably will enter, into a war *single-handed* against England without reluctance, but will always be disposed to make concessions to avoid it. On the other hand, if France is forced by the pride and precipitancy of England into a war, she undoubtedly may, by exertions, of which she is very capable, convert the war on the part of England into a war of self-defence, and by serious menaces of invasion she may compel this country to contend for its existence at home, even while the armaments of Britain are conquering sugar islands and spice islands abroad. The military strength of England alone is utterly unequal to any attempt at subduing France; and as she cannot, by her utmost efforts, render the *existence* of that country the object of the contest, her power, though very great, is evidently of a secondary nature

On the 28th of February lord Hawkesbury replied to lord Whitworth's dispatches of the 21st. The English secretary ascribes a far greater importance to the declarations of the first consul than they appear to have deserved: he affirms "that the language used by him has tended to strengthen and confirm the suspicions which colonel Sebastiani's report was calculated to excite." And he complains "that nothing approaching to explanation or satisfaction has been offered by the

first consul in answer to the representations of his majesty on this head." But was this reasonably to be expected when England had nothing more than vague apprehensions to allege of a future violation of the treaty of Amiens on the part of France respecting Egypt; whereas France complained on the justest grounds of a gross and direct violation of the same treaty on the part of England in relation to Malta? France did not, however, as England would probably have done in the same circumstances, refuse all satisfaction, but merely inquired in civil terms what satisfaction was expected, which the English ambassador most strangely and inexcusably was not instructed to declare.

Towards the close of his letter, the English secretary thus expresses himself:—"When it is considered how greatly the dominion, power, and influence of France have of late been extended, his majesty must feel that he has an incontestable right, conformably to the principles on which the treaty of peace was negotiated and concluded, to demand additional securities in any new arrangement which it might be necessary to make, with a view of effecting the real objects of that treaty. And these considerations, sufficient as they might be in themselves to justify the line of conduct *he had determined to adopt*, have received additional force from the views which have been recently and unreservedly manifested by the French government respecting the Turkish dominions, and the islands in the Adriatic, and which have been in a great degree admitted by the first consul in his interview with your excellency."

In the interval between the signing of the preliminary articles and the definitive treaty, it might, indeed,

have been plausibly and even forcibly urged, that England had a right to extend her demands in consequence of the intermediate acquisitions of France. But the definitive treaty having been concluded in and under those circumstances, the claims of England were by every rule of justice, equity, and even common sense, superseded.—No addition whatever had, since that period, been made to the power of France, Piedmont being then hers in possession, and Parma in reversion; no actual violation of the treaty of Amiens was or could be alleged, and vague apprehensions only were stated on the part of the British government.

With regard to the report of Sebastiani, it contained not the most distant trace of any project really concerted for the invasion of Egypt; but it had reference merely to what might be effected in case of an eventual rupture with England. And nothing in the declarations of the first consul, during the interview with lord Whitworth, could possibly be tortured into an avowal of any hostile design against Egypt. On the contrary, he truly stated to lord Whitworth, that if he had felt the smallest inclination to take possession of it by force, he might have done it a month ago; and that the English garrison in Alexandria, instead of protecting Egypt, only furnished him with a pretence for invading it. This, he said, he should not do, whatever might be his desire to have it for a colony." And for this determination he assigned very solid and substantial reasons; adding, indeed, a very distant and chimerical one, viz. "that Egypt would sooner or later belong to France, by the falling to pieces of the Turkish empire." But it was surely neither just or necessary to enter into a war by which the existence of

Britain was to be hazarded, in order to prevent this dream of fancy from being realised. In the view of sober reason it was enough to say, that if an attempt should ever be made on Egypt upon any pretext, or in any circumstances by France, that country should be defended by the whole power of England.

In order, however, to dispel the umbrage that might be taken at this wild and flighty sally, M. Talleyrand was authorised the very next day, and previous to the transmission of the ambassador's dispatches to England, to assure him, "that a project was in contemplation by which the integrity of the Turkish empire would be effectually secured." And with the cordial concurrence of England this might, no doubt, have been accomplished. But the English ministry at this period, far from seeking facilities to effect an accommodation of differences, and probably ashamed of the magnitude of their former concessions, had evidently determined to retain possession of Malta at all events, and were eager to seize upon every pretence to inflame the quarrel. The secretary, lord Hawkesbury, concludes his letter with saying, "that his majesty will consider the communication of such a project as *indicating a disposition* on the part of the French government, to afford him explanation and satisfaction respecting *some of the points* which have been the subject of his representations. But after all that has passed his majesty cannot consent that his troops shall evacuate the island of MALTA, until substantial security has been provided for those objects which, under the present circumstances, might be materially endangered by their removal." Notwithstanding these alarming apprehensions, it was evident to demonstration, that no object would be endangered by the



evacuation of Malta *now*, which would not have been equally endangered by the evacuation of it at the period so clearly specified in the treaty of Amiens, even if it had been possible to have obtained within that term, the guarantee of all the powers mentioned in the treaty. Could it be conceived for a moment that France, when she signed the treaty of Amiens, lost the *desire* of possessing Egypt?—No: it was merely the *design* of converting that country into a French colony which she relinquished; and not a shadow of proof existed that this *design* had ever been resumed. On the contrary, even the report of Sebastiani himself, objectionable as it was in some respects, contained the most decisive evidence, that no one step had been taken by the French government in opposition to the Turkish sovereignty in Egypt. Far from this being true, it appears that Sebastiani, on his arrival at the city of Cairo, declared to the pacha, that peace had been concluded between the French republic and the sublime porte, and the ancient relations of amity and commerce re-established; and instead of taking advantage of the existing troubles, he was expressly charged by the first consul to offer the mediation of France, in order to make peace between the Turkish government and the beys. Moreover, with a view to give all the satisfaction which the nature of the case admitted, the French government now offered to concert measures with England, for preserving unimpaired the integrity of the Turkish dominions. This, however, did not amount to the “substantial security” which his majesty required as the indispensable condition of the evacuation of Malta. And the English ambassador, in answer to repeated and anxious inquiries on the part of the French government upon this head, was

obliged to confess himself absolutely unable to state what the satisfaction, and what the security, demanded by England, really was.

The ensuing dispatch of lord Whitworth, dated March 5th, informs lord Hawkesbury, "that the instructions contained in the last letter had been duly executed, and that he had made known his majesty's resolution respecting MALTA. M. Talleyrand heard him, as he says, with great patience, endeavoring to convince him of the futility of the apprehensions entertained on this subject. That minister admitted that Egypt had been, perhaps it still was, a favorite object with the first consul—but that it was not so much so as to allow him to go to WAR for its attainment." The English ambassador then touching upon the project for securing the integrity of the Turkish empire, M. Talleyrand referred him to the EXPOSE' recently laid before the legislative body, in which was contained the following passage:—"A French ambassador is at Constantinople, charged with renewing and fortifying the ties which attach us to a power which seems to be threatened with destruction, but which it is our interest to sustain, and to support the foundations by which it is upheld." And the project in contemplation appeared to be simply a scheme for a general guarantee of the Turkish empire by those powers who were interested in its safety, of which France, agreeably to its ancient and obvious policy, was indeed the principal, but which might also with propriety comprehend England, Prussia, Spain, and Sweden. This was a suggestion which, in the hands of wise statesmen, was very capable of being improved into a basis of accommodation; and if England had, at this critical moment, contented herself

with declaring that she would retain Malta till this satisfaction and security had been obtained; France, who was evidently anxious to obviate every real ground of apprehension, would probably have acquiesced, and by political skill and address, other advantages (the result of acting in mutual concert and confidence) would doubtless have followed. But the English ministry having already formed the unwise and unjust determination to keep Malta, in gross violation of the treaty of Amiens, the ambassador gave M. Talleyrand to understand, "that this would not be deemed sufficient." Hereupon the French minister repeated the question, "What then is the security which you require, and which the first consul can give?" "This, the ambassador told him, must be the subject of the negotiation on which the English government was willing to enter; and he trusted that the French government would bring into it the same temper, and the same real desire to conciliate, which was manifested by his majesty's ministers."

The negotiation, therefore, according to lord Whitworth's view of the subject, was not yet even begun, and his good sense pointed out that it ought to be conducted in the spirit of equity and conciliation. This declaration seems to have operated very beneficially, for at the next meeting M. Talleyrand was at much pains to convince lord Whitworth, that the first consul, far from wishing to carry matters to extremity, was desirous of discussing fairly, and without passion, a point which he admitted was of importance to both countries. He repeatedly assured the ambassador, that much as the first consul might have the acquisition of Egypt at heart, he would sacrifice his own feelings to the preservation of peace; and henceforth seek to augment his

glory by improving and consolidating the internal situation of the country, rather than by adding to its possessions. This declaration must, doubtless, have been intended as the prelude to some important concessions; and the English ministry had now, to appearance, a fair opportunity of settling this dangerous dispute with both honor and advantage. But without waiting the arrival of this momentous dispatch, they had adopted a measure most rash, absurd, and fatal, by advising the king to send (March 8) a message to parliament, conceived in the following terms:—"G. R. His majesty thinks it necessary to acquaint the house of commons, that as very considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, he has judged it expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution for the security of his dominions; though the preparations to which his majesty refers, are avowedly directed to colonial service, yet as discussions of great importance are now subsisting between his majesty and the French government, the result of which must at present be uncertain, his majesty is induced to make this communication to his faithful commons, in the full persuasion that whilst they partake of his majesty's earnest and unvarying solicitude for the continuance of peace, he may rely with perfect confidence on their public spirit and liberality, to enable his majesty to adopt such measures as circumstances may appear to require for supporting the honor of his crown, and the essential interests of his people."

This resolution to arm even before the negotiation had commenced, and which, when commenced, ought, conformably to the sentiments both of the English ambassador and the French minister, to be conducted in the



spirit of free and amicable discussion, excited in France the utmost amazement, not unmixed certainly with indignation: and in England it was universally supposed to be the result of some urgent, though unknown political necessity, which could alone induce the present leaders of administration, whose pacific, not to say pusillanimous disposition was so well ascertained, to adopt this bold and unexpected measure—and France was already condemned unheard, without justice and without mercy.

Two days only after the presenting of the message, the French ambassador, general Andreossi, made a formal demand, “hitherto delayed in the hope that verbal communications would have been sufficient to have produced satisfactory expositions, by preparing the way for the mutual conciliation of minds and interests,” for the evacuation of Malta; an event which he truly affirms was not made by the treaty, to depend upon the will of the powers invited to join in the guarantee of its independence: and he declares, “that it would be without example in the history of nations, were his Britannic majesty to refuse to execute a fundamental article of the pacification—that very article which, in the drawing up of the preliminaries, was considered as the first, and as requiring to be settled previously to every other point.”

After an interval of five days, lord Hawkesbury returned an answer to this demand, in which he states at great length the grounds on which his majesty, “who was actually preparing to carry the arrangements respecting Malta into execution, had been prevented in his intention by the extraordinary publication of colonel Sebastiani; the representations and complaints to which this publication had given rise, having been wholly dis-

regarded, no satisfaction afforded, and no explanation given."

But lord Whitworth himself had acknowledged that the vague demand by England of satisfaction, must be the object of a negotiation not yet begun. And the French official account of this transaction very properly remarks, "that the moment in which the three months fixed for the evacuation of Malta were on the point of expiring, was the time for stating the grounds on which it was pretended that the evacuation ought to be refused or delayed. Some discussions would then have arisen between the two governments, and however legitimate the pretensions of England may be, she ought doubtless to have employed the means of negotiation, before she appealed to arms\*."

Lord Whitworth, on receiving intelligence of the royal message from the English secretary of state early on the morning of the eleventh, repaired at two o'clock to M. Talleyrand, whom he found "already apprised of it, and preparing, in an agitation he could not disguise, to communicate the news to the first consul." He listened, nevertheless, attentively to the story told by lord Whitworth, who with great prudence but with little success, "endeavored to make him sensible that this measure was merely precautionary, and not in the least intended as a menace"—that it was, in short, "merely a measure of self-security."

M. Talleyrand repeated anew his assurances, that there was no foundation for alarm—that the first consul was pacific—that he had no thoughts whatever of attacking his majesty's dominions, unless forced by the

\* Official Papers, published at Paris, p. 76.

commencement of hostilities on our part ; but that a refusal to evacuate Malta would be regarded by him as such a commencement." At seven o'clock the same evening M. Talleyrand informed lord Whitworth, that he had seen the first consul ; that although highly irritated at the unjust suspicions entertained by the English government, yet he would not allow himself to lose sight of the calamities which the present discussion might entail upon humanity—saying, that if England wished to discuss fairly, he wished the same—that if England prepared for war, he would do the same.

M. Talleyrand then produced a paper, not absolutely official, but a memorandum, which might facilitate the ambassador's communication of the first consul's sentiments. This paper was very ill calculated to alter the disposition of the English government, now manifestly bent on a renewal of the war ; as the object of it was evidently to intimidate, by implied threats, which could only tend to excite additional irritation. It stated, I. That if his Britannic majesty in his message, means to speak of the expedition of Helvoetsluys, all the world knows that it was destined for America, and that it was on the point of sailing for its destination, but in consequence of his majesty's message, the embarkation and putting to sea are about to be countermanded.—II. That if satisfactory explanation was not received respecting the English armament, it was *natural* that the first consul should march 20,000. men into Holland, since Holland is mentioned in the message.—III. That in this case it was, also, to be expected, that an encampment should be formed on the frontiers of Hanover, &c.—IV. Likewise, that the first consul should order several camps to be formed at

Calais, and on different points of the coast.—V. That the first consul, who was on the point of evacuating Switzerland, should be under the necessity of continuing a French army in that country.—VI. It is the natural consequence of all this, that the first consul should send a fresh force into Italy, in order to occupy in case of necessity the position of Tarentum.—VII. England arming and with so much publicity, will compel France to put her armies on the war establishment—a step so important as cannot fail to agitate all Europe.”

Till the following Sunday, (March 13) the ambassador had no means of ascertaining farther the effect which his majesty’s message had produced on the mind of the first consul. “At the court which was held at the Tuilleries on that day,” says lord Whitworth in his dispatch of March the 14th, “he accosted me evidently under very considerable agitation. He began by asking me if I had any news from England. I told him that I had received letters two days ago. He immediately said, ‘And so you are determined to go to war?’ No, I replied, we are too sensible of the advantages of peace. ‘*Nous avons,*’ said he, ‘*déjà fait la guerre pendant quinze ans.*’ As he seemed to wait for an answer, I observed only: *C’en est déjà trop.* ‘*Mais,*’ said he, ‘*vous voulez la faire encore quinze années, et vous m’y forcez.*’ I told him that was very far from his majesty’s intentions. He then proceeded to count Marcoff and the chevalier Azara, who were standing together at a little distance from me, and said to them, ‘*Les Anglois veulent la guerre; mais s’ils sont les premiers à tirer l’épée, je serai le dernier à la remettre. Ils ne respectent pas les traités. Il faut dorénavant les couvrir de crepe noir.*’ He then went his round. In a few minutes he came back to me, and re-



sumed the conversation, if such it can be called, by something personally civil to me. He began again—*‘ Pourquoi des armemens ? Contre qui des mesures de précaution ? Je n’ai pas un seul vaisseau de ligne dans les ports de France : mais si vous voulez armer, j’armerai aussi ; si vous voulez vous battre, je me battrai aussi. Vous pourrez peut-être tuer la France, mais jamais l’intimider. ’* On ne voudroit, said I, ni l’un ni l’autre. On voudroit vivre en bonne intelligence avec elle. *‘ Il faut donc respecter les traités, ’* replied he : *‘ malheur à ceux qui ne respectent pas les traités ! ils en seront responsable à toute l’Europe. ’* He was too much agitated to make it adviseable for me to prolong the conversation ; I therefore made no answer, and he retired to his apartment repeating the last phrase.”

The ambassador concludes with remarking, “ that all this passed loud enough to be heard by two hundred people who were present,” and he expresses a full persuasion, “ that there was not a single person who did not feel the extreme impropriety of his conduct, and the total want of dignity as well as of decency on the occasion.” Undoubtedly, the indecorum of this procedure was very great ; but when the welfare of millions is at stake, questions of decorum must be regarded as of very inferior importance. The first consul was prompted by the warmth of passion and resentment to speak his sentiments rudely and unseasonably ; but the only question of moment is, what those sentiments really were—and it is impossible to affirm, that they breathed the spirit of war, or were adverse to any equitable and intelligible proposal of accommodation.

The notice taken by the ambassador of the strange impropriety which had occurred, was temperate and ju-

ditions. He embraced the first opportunity of stating to M. Talleyrand, "that he had been placed, by the first consul, in a situation which could neither suit his public nor his private feelings; that he went to the Tuilleries to pay his respects to the first consul, and to present his countrymen, but not to treat of political subjects; and that unless he had an assurance from him that he should not be exposed to a repetition of the same disagreeable circumstances, he should be under the necessity of discontinuing his visits to the Tuilleries." M. Talleyrand assured the ambassador, "that it was very far from the first consul's intention to distress him; but he had felt himself personally insulted by the charges which were brought against him by the English government; and that it was incumbent upon him to take the first opportunity of exculpating himself in the presence of the ministers of the different powers of Europe. He assured him that nothing similar would occur."

Although, after a step so decisive as that of the king's message, the ministry ought surely to have been prepared with a *projet*, that France might at least have known what England expected from her by way of satisfaction, matters remained in an almost dormant state till, on the 29th of March, general Andreossi transmitted to lord Hawkesbury an important note; in which, by command of the first consul, he positively denies "that Great Britain was menaced by preparations made in the ports of France and Holland. The first consul has made no preparation. How," exclaims the ambassador, "can his Britannic majesty's ministers have been deceived on facts so evident?—The first consul knows that a great nation can never be terrified. He believes that good policy and the feelings of true dignity ever

inspire the sentiment of esteem for a rival nation, and never the design of menacing her. The second part of his majesty's message consists of another assertion no better founded: his Britannic majesty makes mention of discussions, the success of which is doubtful. What are these discussions?—Can a state of difficulties which leads to an alternative of PEACE OR WAR spring up un-awares, without commencement, without progression, and lead, without distinction, to an appeal to arms, before all the means of conciliation have been exhausted? The first consul places his glory, in an affair of this nature, wholly in being taken in an unprovided state. In lord Hawkesbury's note an opinion is expressed, that the French republic has increased in power since the peace of Amiens. This is a decided error. Since that epoch France has evacuated a considerable territory. The French power has received no degree of augmentation. If his Britannic majesty is determined to make war, he may allege all the pretexts he pleases; he will find few less founded." The ambassador then recapitulates the causes of complaint, on the part of his government, against England; and, in order to put an end to the reciprocation of abuse, he makes a proposal tending, indeed, to show the solicitude of France to maintain a good understanding with England, but utterly incompatible with the genius of the English constitution, viz. "that means should be adopted to prevent, in future, any mention being made of what is passing in France, either in official discussions, or in polemical writings, in England, as in like manner in the French official discussions and polemical writings, no mention whatever should be made of what is passing in England."—"Lord Hawkesbury," the am-

bassador proceeds to state, “mentions an article in a journal containing the report of a French colonel.” An answer on this point, he declares to be neither long nor difficult. “A colonel in the English army has published a work in England, filled with the most atrocious and disgusting calumnies against the French army and its general. The LIES it contains have been contradicted by the reception which colonel Sebastiani has experienced. The publicity of this report was at once a refutation and a reparation which the French army had a right to expect. Egypt has since been restored to the dominion of its lawful sovereign: there remains, therefore, but one object worthy of fixing the attention of the two nations—the execution of the treaty of Amiens, as far as concerns Malta. His majesty has engaged to restore it to the order, and to entrust it to the Neapolitan army till the order should be in a condition to guard it. His majesty will reject all sophistry, every distinction, every mental reservation, which might be offered to him, to put in doubt the force and the validity of his engagement. His Britannic majesty’s equity, his conscience, in this respect, are guarantees for the French republic. Were it otherwise, what means in future would the two nations have for coming to an understanding? Would not all be chaos? This would indeed be adding another calamity to those which have menaced social order. The undersigned is directed to declare, in short, *that the FIRST CONSUL will not take up the defiance given by ENGLAND to FRANCE*; that as to Malta, he sees no subject of discussion, the treaty having provided for every thing, and settled every thing.”

SUCH was the result of the king’s message to parliament. On the 5th of March, immediately previous to



that grossly impolitic measure, lord Whitworth was informed by M. Talleyrand, "that the first consul, far from wishing to carry matters to extremity, was desirous to discuss fairly, and without passion, a point which he admitted to be of importance to both countries." Now, menaced by an hostile declaration, he declares, by his ambassador in England, "that he sees no subject for discussion." Thus it is that rashness and folly perpetually defeat their own purposes!

In lord Hawkesbury's reply the merit of moderation and forbearance is claimed, in abstaining from any detailed observations on the note of general Andreossi. The preposterous, and almost ludicrous complaint, is urged anew, that the French government continue to withhold all satisfaction and explanation on the points on which his majesty has complained; and the general is informed, that "his majesty's ambassador at Paris is instructed to ascertain distinctly from the French government whether they are determined to persevere in this course of proceeding, or whether they are disposed, without delay, to give such satisfaction and explanations as may lead to a final arrangement of differences."

Agreeably to this intimation, a letter was written nearly at the same time (April 4th), by the English secretary, to lord Whitworth, declaring it to be "essential that the subsisting discussions should be brought to an issue—if the French government, evading all discussion, should confine themselves to a categorical demand that Malta should be immediately evacuated; in that case, it is his majesty's pleasure that the ambassador should declare the impossibility of the relations of amity continuing to subsist between the two countries, and the necessity he will be under of leaving Paris within a

certain time. If, on the other hand, they show a readiness to enter into discussion, and to give reasonable satisfaction and explanation, the ambassador is directed to present to them the project of an arrangement, which, under the present circumstances, would meet the ideas of his majesty's ministers, and, at the same time, *entirely save the honor of the FRENCH GOVERNMENT!*"

The project in question consisted of four articles; the first and principal of which imported that the island of Malta should remain in perpetuity with the king of Great Britain. So that a discussion, the professed original object of which was to ascertain how the island of Malta could, with safety to the interests of Great Britain, be restored to the order of St. John, to whom it was acknowledged of right to belong, in the same moment commenced and terminated, by deciding that it should not be restored to them at all, but remain forever the property of England, a power unable to invent even a plausible claim to it; and this *arrangement* is insultingly said to be framed so as to save the honor of the French government. The second article of this project demanded farther that Holland and Switzerland should be immediately evacuated by the French troops. By the third, his Britannic majesty was pleased to *confirm* the isle of Elba to France, and to *acknowledge* the king of Etruria. By the fourth, the Italian and Ligurian were also *acknowledged* by his majesty, PROVIDED an arrangement is made in Italy for the king of Sardinia, which shall be satisfactory to that monarch. The acknowledging of a title and the cession of a province were, it seems, in the view of the court of London, exactly equal in value.

In pursuance of his instructions, lord Whitworth transmitted to M. Talleyrand a note requiring a distinct answer to the demand of satisfaction stated by lord Hawkesbury. In the conference to which this note gave occasion, M. Talleyrand said, “that, in order to proceed regularly, it would be necessary that the French government should be informed precisely what were the objects which had created such uneasiness, and on which it was alleged all explanation had been refused.” But lord Whitworth was as little authorised to state the precise objects of complaint, as the nature of the reparation required. He therefore declined compliance, on pretence that such a specification “could be productive of no advantage:” and the French government was, in a most absurd and unprecedented manner, left at this crisis of the negotiation, to form their own conjectures respecting both. The ambassador, indeed, alleged, in support of this harsh refusal, as harsh a reason, viz. “that it would only serve to provoke such a recapitulation of the system and conduct which France had pursued since the treaty of Amiens, as would have all the appearance of a manifesto; that, if the French government exercised a right of extending its influence and territory, in violation of the spirit of the treaty of Amiens, Great Britain had an undoubted right, if she chose to avail herself of it, to SEEK A COUNTERPOISE.” This position, the ambassador observes, “that the French minister did not seem inclined to dispute;” and it would have been wonderful if he had, considering how cautiously and guardedly the position was worded. But the true question clearly was, whether Great Britain had, in consequence of such *supposed* extension of influence and territory, a right not merely to “seek a

counterpoise," but by force of arms to EXACT an EQUIVALENT from France, though no violation of the treaty was chargeable on the French government, and to commence a new war, in order to obtain more beneficial terms than those she had solemnly acceded to.

As to the main point in question, M. Talleyrand repeated, that the first consul had nothing more at heart than to avoid the necessity of going to war; and that there was no sacrifice he would not make, short of his honor, to obtain this end. "Is there, said M. Talleyrand, no means of satisfying both parties? for, at the same time that the first consul insists, and will always insist, on the full execution of the treaty, he will not object to *any* mode by which you may acquire the security you think so necessary." He then submitted a paper to the ambassador, drawn up in his presence, as affording a proper basis of accommodation, earnestly requiring him to transmit it to England. It is precisely as follows: "The conversation with M. Talleyrand to-day, has led us to this result. Every thing which may tend to violate the independence of the order of Malta, will never be consented to by the French government. Every thing which may tend to put an end to the present difficulties, or be agreeable to the English government, and which shall not be contrary to the treaty of Amiens, the French government have no objection to make a particular convention respecting it. The motives of this convention shall be inserted in the preamble, and shall relate to the respective grievances concerning which the two governments shall think it advisable to come to an understanding with each other."

This was extremely vague, but it served to show that



the French government was disposed to concession ; and if the English ambassador had, in these circumstances, been authorised to make a specific proposal of a moderate nature, it would probably have been attended with very favorable effects. But lord Whitworth seems to have been extremely embarrassed by the strictness of his instructions, which left nothing to his discretion ; and, though numerous indications appear of his entertaining much clearer and juster views of things than the ministers at home, he was unfortunately destined to be the too passive instrument of men egregiously deficient in political discernment and capacity.

Instead, however, of offering to the French government the extravagant *projet* transmitted to him by the English secretary, he consented to receive the paper tendered to him by M. Talleyrand, "chiefly," as he well expresses himself, "in the hope, that if the possession in perpetuity should be rejected," of which he clearly intimates there can be no doubt ; "and, that a temporary possession might be considered as the next best thing, something of this kind might derive from it."

Lord Hawkesbury, in his reply (April 13), appears by no means pleased with this ; and emboldened, no doubt, by the extreme reluctance of France to risk an open rupture, he directs lord Whitworth, without delay, to communicate to the French government the *projet* in question ; "the conditions of which," the secretary says, "appear to his majesty so well calculated to save the HONOR of the FRENCH GOVERNMENT on the subject of Malta ; and, at the same time, hold out to them such important advantages, that the success of the proposition is at least worth trying." But, if this proposition was at

once so honorable and so advantageous to France, what should prevent the immediate and eager acceptance of it? Lord Hawkesbury then goes on to observe, "that the execution of the article relative to Malta, is become impracticable from causes which it has not been in his majesty's power to control. That the greatest part of the funds assigned to the support of the order, and indispensably necessary for the independence of the order, and the defence of the island, have been sequestered since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, in direct repugnance to the spirit *and letter* of that treaty; and that two of the principal powers who were invited to accede as guarantees to the arrangement, have refused their accession, except on the condition, that the part of the arrangement, which was deemed so material, relative to the Maltese inhabitants, should be entirely cancelled."

But to make the restitution of the island to depend upon obtaining the unqualified guarantee of all the powers named in the treaty of Amiens, was a most palpable and disgraceful evasion of the treaty, which expressly stipulated the evacuation of the island at the end of THREE MONTHS, OR SOONER IF POSSIBLE, upon two conditions only; 1st, The arrival of the Neapolitan troops; and, 2dly, The presence of commissioners authorised by the order to receive it. And the invitation to the different powers to guaranty the independency of the island, was most clearly a separate and subsequent consideration.

As to the sequestration of part of the revenues belonging to the order of St. John, by the different powers in whose dominions the lands from which those revenues arose were situated, and which they unquestionably

were as fully competent to effect, as England herself, in ancient times, to apply to other and better uses the revenues of the knights-templars, and other spiritual and military monkish orders, it is certain, notwithstanding the bold assertion of lord Hawkesbury, that the *letter* of the treaty has no reference whatever to the revenues of the order, or makes any provision against the alienation of them; and, to appeal to the *spirit* of a treaty, unsupported by the letter, must necessarily and inevitably introduce the most perplexing confusion and uncertainty into the concerns and transactions of nations. If every thing of importance is not expressly provided for in the treaty, the inconvenience will of course be felt, and it ought to be endured; for no power has a right to repair its ignorance or negligence by forcibly adding a supplement to the treaty of its own framing, by way of rectifying any imperfections or defects. But the treaty of Amiens was chargeable with omissions of infinitely greater moment than the insignificant one in question. It was notorious to the whole world, that the revenues of the order were utterly unequal to the defence of the island—that its independency must rest for support on the mighty power of Britain, and this support was undoubtedly sufficient; but the ministers, now at the head of affairs, were abject suppliants in almost every court in Europe for that aid which they did not need, and could not obtain.

Were it worth while to pursue this despicable subterfuge further, it is obvious to remark, that, even had the revenues of the order been declared unalienable by the treaty, it would not justify Great Britain in converting the island into a permanent appendage to her empire; but merely in retaining it as a pledge till jus-

tice had been done to the order, of which she boasted herself the guarantee and protector.

The second allegation of lord Hawkesbury is no less void of foundation than the first. That puerile statesman took upon him to affirm, that two of the principal guarantying powers of the treaty of Amiens refused their accession, except on condition of cancelling the clause relative to the Maltese inhabitants. But in the declaration signed by the chancellor, count Woronzof, by order of the emperor of Russia, the following stands as the very first condition: I. The acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the order of St. John of Jerusalem over the island of Malta and its dependencies: the acknowledgement of the grand-master, and of the civil government of the order, according to its ancient institutions, with the ADMISSION into it of the NATIVE MALTESE. And in the last article of this declaration, it is specified, that the kings of Spain, Prussia, and Naples, shall be invited to accede to this act as guarantees.

Lord Hawkesbury concludes his letter with some reluctant concessions; the last of which, however, opened a faint and distant prospect of accommodation. "In the 1st place, his majesty would be willing, for the preservation of peace, that the civil government of the island should be given to the order, and the fortifications garrisoned by British troops. 2dly, His majesty might, as an ultimatum, be disposed to consent to an arrangement, by which the island of Malta would remain in his possession for a limited number of years; and to wave, in consequence, his demand for a perpetual occupation; provided, that the number of years was not less than ten, and that his Sicilian majesty could be induced to cede the sovereignty of the island of Lampedosa for a



valuable consideration. If the proposition is admitted, the island of Malta should be given up to the inhabitants at the end of that period; and it should be acknowledged as an independent state. In this case his majesty would be ready to concur in any arrangement for the establishment of the order of St. John in some other part of Europe."

On the receipt of this letter, lord Whitworth exerted himself with fresh alacrity for the laudable purpose of effecting an accommodation; and it appeared a favorable omen, that Joseph Bonaparte, whose conciliatory and beneficent disposition was so well known, was now nominated to conduct the negotiation on the part of the first consul.

After exhausting his arguments, in a conference of two hours with this minister, in support of the two first projects, without gaining the least ground, the ambassador was at length told by the French negotiator, of his own accord, "that he was not without hope that he might be authorised to propose to him the occupation of the fortresses for a term of years." On which lord Whitworth, who was solicitous that this proposal should not originate with himself, told the French negotiator, "that he wished too sincerely to avoid the fatal extremities to which he saw the discussion was tending, not to give any reasonable proposal which might be made on their part, every assistance in his power."

On the evening of the 18th, Joseph Bonaparte assured lord Whitworth, "that a meeting would speedily be appointed, in order to settle the term of years for which the first consul might be induced to consent to the cession of Malta." But he declared, "that, in order to gain his consent to the cession, it would be NE-

CESSARY to hold out the advantages which the British government was willing to offer in return," meaning the acknowledgement of the new governments in Italy. The ambassador told him, "that this offer was made only with a view to the possession of Malta in perpetuity; but, after some conversation, he gave the French minister to understand, "that he would not refuse to admit the demand *sub sperati*, on the condition that the cession should be made for a considerable term of years; that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated, and that a suitable provision should be made for the king of Sardinia."

But the recognition of the Italian and Ligurian republics, on the part of his Britannic majesty, being little more than a matter of form and compliment, it was surely enough to require as an equivalent for such recognition, the evacuation of Holland and Switzerland, and a provision for the king of Sardinia, without the disgusting affectation of admitting the demand *sub sperati* only.

This, probably, gave great offence to the first consul; for the ambassador informs lord Hawkesbury, in his dispatch of April 20th, "that he was sorry to say that no summons had been received by him, or any further notice taken of the business. He therefore desires that he may be furnished with an *ultimatum*; and that, at the expiration of the period allowed for deliberation, he may be authorised to leave Paris."

Lord Hawkesbury, in reply, April 23, intimates that there was no occasion for this reference, and that it is his majesty's pleasure the ambassador *should communicate officially to the French government* that he had gone in point of concession to the full extent of his in-

structions: and that if an arrangement founded upon one of the propositions already transmitted cannot be concluded without further delay, he had received his majesty's commands to return to England;" and *in no case* was he to remain at Paris more than seven days.

Lord Whitworth, in order to obtain the decisive answer of the French government, had called (April 21st) on M. Talleyrand, who, in sullen humor, told him that "no consideration on earth would induce the first consul to consent to the cession in perpetuity of Malta in any shape whatever." The English ambassador then stated his majesty's willingness to wave his pretensions to a possession in perpetuity, and his consent to hold Malta for a certain number of years to be agreed upon, on condition that the French government should not oppose any negotiation his majesty might set on foot with his Sicilian majesty for the acquisition of the island of Lampedosa. Lord Whitworth, in the conversation which ensued, "begged M. Talleyrand particularly to recollect that England was in actual possession of the object, and that therefore every modification tending to limit that possession was in fact a concession on the part of his majesty."

This argument, so nearly allied to an insult, was little calculated, from the mouth of the English ambassador, to mollify the untoward disposition of the first consul. Accordingly, on the next day, M. Talleyrand, having seen the first consul, again declared "that he would on no terms hear either of a perpetual or a temporary possession of Malta: that his object was the execution of the treaty of Amiens; and that rather than submit to such an arrangement as that last proposed, he would even consent to our keeping the object in dispute for

ever, on the ground that in the one there was an appearance of generosity and magnanimity, but in the other nothing but weakness and the effect of coercion; that therefore his resolution was taken, and what he had to propose was the possession we required of the island of Lampedosa, or of any other of the small isles of which there were three or four between Malta and the coast of Africa; that such a possession would be sufficient for the object we had in view, which was a station in the Mediterranean, as a place of refuge and security for any squadron we might find it convenient to keep in that sea."

A third conversation took place on Saturday the 23d of April, but with no material variation; the French minister offering Lampedosa, and lord Whitworth peremptorily requiring the cession of Malta. On the arrival of lord Hawkesbury's dispatch, dated the 23d of April, on the 26th, the ambassador communicated without delay the *ultimatum* of the English court verbally to M. Talleyrand, who desired the ambassador to state the demands of his government in writing; but *this*, lord Whitworth strangely replied, "that he was not authorised to do, and that he would not take the responsibility upon himself." Anticipating, no doubt, the resentment which a refusal so rude and unprecedented must excite in the breast of the first consul, the French minister forcibly but unavailingly urged, "that verbal and fugitive conversations were insufficient for the discussion of such immense interests, in which no expression can be indifferent." He at length, however, consented to receive the verbal notification of lord Whitworth, who desired M. Talleyrand to recollect that Tuesday, May 3, must be the day of his departure.



On the morning of the 29th of April the ambassador was given to understand that he would receive in the course of the day a letter from M. Talleyrand, of such a nature as might be sufficient to induce him to delay for a short time his resolution of departure. The letter not arriving, the ambassador repaired in person at four in the afternoon to M. Talleyrand, to learn whether he had any thing favorable to communicate; and if not, to request passports for himself and family.

M. Talleyrand appeared embarrassed, and said "he could not suppose that lord Whitworth would really go away. *At all events the FIRST CONSUL never would RECAL his AMBASSADOR.*" Lord Whitworth replied "that he was recalled on the *principle* that even actual war was preferable to the state of suspense in which England, and indeed all Europe, had been kept for so long a space of time." *A principle* apparently dictated by the impatience of folly, and equally incompatible with common sense and common humanity. The French minister at parting repeatedly said to the ambassador, "*J'ai encore de l'espoir.*"

Saturday and Sunday passed over, and no letter arrived. On Monday the ambassador went once more to the house of M. Talleyrand, and delivered to that minister a letter containing a formal and positive demand of passports for the next day. "At this he appeared somewhat startled, and lamented that so much time had been lost, but said that enough remained if the ambassador was authorised to negotiate upon other terms." Lord Whitworth assured him "that he had no other terms to propose."

On the same evening the French minister, after having seen the first consul, transmitted an official note to the

ambassador, stating the terms verbally offered as the basis of a convention by the latter, and complaining that the demand made by the government of France, that lord Whitworth would, in conformity to the usage of all ages and of all countries, give in writing what he himself called the *ultimatum* of the English government, had met with a positive refusal.

“ The intentions of the first consul being,” this official paper goes on to state, “ entirely pacific, the undersigned dispenses with making any observations on so new and so strange a manner of treating on affairs of this importance. And in order to give a fresh testimony of the value he attaches to the continuance of peace, the first consul has directed the undersigned to make the following notification in the accustomed style and forms.

“ As the island of Lampedosa does not belong to France, it is not for the first consul either to accede to, or to refuse the desire testified by his Britannic majesty of having this island in his possession.

“ With regard to the island of Malta, as the demand made respecting it by his Britannic majesty, would change a formal disposition in the treaty of Amiens, the first consul cannot but previously communicate it to his majesty the king of Spain and to the Batavian republic, contracting parties to the said treaty, in order to know their opinion : and besides, as the stipulations relative to Malta have been guarantied by their majesties the emperor of Germany, the emperor of Russia, and the king of Prussia, the contracting parties to the treaty of Amiens, before they agree to any change in the article of Malta, are bound to concert with the guarantying powers. The first consul will not refuse

this concert, but it belongs not to him to propose it, since it is not he who urges any change in the guaranteed stipulations.

“ With regard to the evacuation of Holland by the French troops, the first consul has no difficulty in directing the undersigned to repeat that the French troops shall evacuate Holland at the instant that the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens shall be executed in every quarter of the globe.”

The delays on the part of the French government complained of by lord Whitworth were, in all probability, owing entirely to his own inexcusable imprudence in refusing to communicate the *ultimatum* of the English court in writing. “ A mode of proceeding so totally new,” says the French official account, “ the exhibition of a verbal *ultimatum* when the rupture of a formal treaty was in question, excited the greatest surprise, and it was for some days expected that the English ambassador would at last consent to present his propositions in writing; but the French minister applied to him in vain to do so; and no solicitation could induce him to depart from a course which he considered to be irrevocably traced out for him.” But the same official narrative declares “ that the first consul, to give a new testimony of the uniformity of his desire for peace, and after some days spent in fruitless expectation, ordered that the verbal propositions of lord Whitworth should be replied to in the same manner as if they had been regularly made under the official signature of the ambassador\*.”

This was not the only proof of a willingness to fur-

\* Official papers, printed at Paris, pp. 87, 88.

ther concession on the part of the French government. A short time since, the first consul had indignantly declared " that a refusal on the part of England to evacuate Malta would be considered by him as a commencement of hostilities." But it appears that his high and haughty spirit, moderated in all probability by the persuasions of Joseph Bonaparte and Talleyrand, had at length yielded to circumstances. He no longer insists upon the evacuation of Malta. He is willing to refer the question to the other contracting powers of the treaty of Amiens, which was a mere matter of decorum and civility; and to the guarantying powers, who would no doubt be well satisfied that England should retain it for ten or any other term of years. England had in her favor the inestimable advantage of being in actual possession of the prize in dispute; and if the restitution of the island were put off for an indefinite time by consent of France, this afforded strong ground of hope that it might be regarded as put off for ever. It was indeed possible that France might by this overture only seek to gain time, but could not England improve the interval of time so gained equally with France? The whole weight of evidence nevertheless tended to prove that France was in earnest in her concessions, in which case England would have gained every thing; but if she was not in earnest England, by this duplicity, could lose nothing.

In fact delay was clearly the policy of England; for if France was not in the first moments of resentment and passion provoked to go to war for Malta, which she well knew she could not recover by force, it was morally certain she would not involve herself in hostilities upon that account after she had time for cool



reflexion. But the ministers of England had succeeded beyond their own expectation in raising a national clamor against Bonaparte and the French government. And they had been weak and absurd enough to pledge themselves to parliament and to the nation that the negotiation should be brought to a speedy and decisive conclusion. The ambassador, therefore, who was a man not destitute of talents and address, though without the liberty or power to give full and free scope to them, found himself under the necessity of replying (Tuesday, May 3) to the last communication, that it being the object of the king "to relieve as soon as possible the two countries the most interested, and Europe in general, from the state of suspense in which they are placed, it is with great regret he perceives nothing in the note of M. Talleyrand which can correspond with this intention, and consequently nothing that can justify him in delaying to obey the orders of his court."

On the same day, which was that fixed for the departure of the ambassador, another note came from M. Talleyrand, acquainting lord Whitworth that he had a communication to make to him of the greatest importance. He would therefore postpone sending him the passports, and requested him to call the next day at half-past four at the foreign department. The proposition then made was of such a nature as most decisively to evince the extreme solicitude of France to avoid a war with Great Britain on account of Malta, if but a *salvo* was left for her honor. The note delivered on this occasion contains the following remarkable expressions: "After the last communication addressed to his excellency the ambassador, it is more difficult than ever to conceive how a great, powerful, and enlightened

nation can be willing to take upon itself to declare a war which would be accompanied by such heavy calamities, and the cause of which would be so insignificant, the object in question being a miserable rock. The first consul, accustomed for two months to make every species of sacrifice for the maintenance of peace, is ready to consent that the island of Malta shall be placed in the hands of one of the three powers who have guarantied its independency, either Austria, Russia, or Prussia, with a proviso that as soon as France and England shall have come to an agreement upon this article, they shall unite in their requisitions to engage other powers either contracting or acceding to the treaty of Amiens to consent to it."

England had it now manifestly in her power to terminate the dispute both advantageously and honorably by placing this impregnable fortress in the hands of Austria, the great, and in the unalterable nature of things, the everlasting rival of France, and a power so intimately connected with this nation by every tie of interest and obligation, that it must by France have been regarded as a virtual surrender of the island to Great Britain. The moderation and good sense of the ambassador, and his solicitude to avoid, as he expresses himself, "every reproach of precipitation," induced him to refer this proposal to the court of London, though "with no hope whatever of its being accepted as a ground of negotiation," and in direct disobedience of the orders transmitted by lord Hawkesbury.

On Monday, the 9th of May, the final dispatch of the English secretary, dated May 7, was received at Paris. In it he declares to lord Whitworth "that the propositions which have been made on the part of the

first consul, are, in every respect, so loose, indefinite, and unsatisfactory, and fall so short of the just pretensions of his majesty, that it is impossible the French government could have expected them to have been accepted! If his majesty could be disposed to wave his demand for a temporary occupation of the island of Malta, the emperor of Russia would be the only sovereign to whom, in the present state of Europe, he could consent that the island should be assigned; and his majesty has certain and authentic information that the emperor of Russia would on no account consent to garrison Malta. Under these circumstances his majesty perseveres in his determination to adhere to the substance of his third project as his *ultimatum*." A modification is, however, admitted, viz. that the term of years for which England shall be allowed to retain possession of Malta may be inserted in a *secret article*! and if this is not acceded to, the ambassador is peremptorily ordered to leave Paris in thirty-six hours.

Throughout the far greater part of this correspondence no approbation of the conduct of lord Whitworth is expressed, it being evidently deemed too conciliatory; but in the present letter it is covertly censured not without reason for harshness, in the refusal so pertinaciously adhered to by the ambassador to deliver the *ultimatum* of the English government in writing to the French minister. And the ambassador is directed on this occasion to present a note containing the final demands of his majesty.

On the receipt of this dispatch, lord Whitworth wrote to M. Talleyrand to request an interview. No answer arriving, the ambassador the next day (Tuesday 10th) transmitted officially to the French minister the

*ultimatum* of lord Hawkesbury, accompanied by a judicious note of his own, stating the orders which he had just received—"The minister for foreign affairs," he says, "will not fail to observe to what degree his majesty has endeavoured to conciliate the security of his interests with the dignity of the first consul. The undersigned flatters himself that the first consul, doing justice to these sentiments, will adopt, in concert with his majesty, an expedient so suitable for restoring permanent tranquillity to both nations, and to all Europe."

The project referred to was literally as follows :

#### P R O J E T.

I. The French government shall engage to make no opposition to the cession of the island of Lampedosa to his majesty by the king of the Two Sicilies.

II. In consequence of the present state of the island of Lampedosa, his majesty shall remain in possession of the island of Malta until such arrangements shall be made by him as may enable his majesty to occupy Lampedosa as a naval station, after which period the island of Malta shall be given up to the inhabitants, and acknowledged as an independent state.

III. The territories of the Batavian republic shall be evacuated by the French forces within one month after the conclusion of a convention founded on the principles of this projet.

IV. The king of Etruria, and the Italian and Ligurian republics, shall be acknowledged by his majesty.

V. Switzerland shall be evacuated by the French forces.

VI. A suitable territorial provision shall be assigned to the king of Sardinia in Italy.



No answer, after an anxious and fruitless expectation of several hours, being transmitted to the ambassador, he repaired in person about four in the afternoon to the house of M. Talleyrand, and was informed that the minister was in the country; and in a short time the packet, inclosing the *ultimatum*, left at the foreign office, was returned to the ambassador with the same excuse. Mr. Talbot, secretary to the embassy, then took it himself to M. Talleyrand's country residence at Meudon; but was told that the minister was at St. Cloud, and would not be back till late. At length, about one in the morning, a note came from M. Talleyrand, with an apology, stating, that he had been the whole day with the first consul, and requesting to see the ambassador at noon the following day. At this meeting (Wednesday 11th), much conversation passed, and the discussion appears to have been calm and temperate. At length M. Talleyrand asked the ambassador if he felt himself authorised by his instructions to conclude a convention founded on the basis of his project, *viz.* the perpetual possession of Malta to England in return for a consideration. Lord Whitworth told him, "that he was not authorised to enter into any engagement which would make the negotiation one of exchange, instead of satisfaction and security." To this M. Talleyrand replied, "that the satisfaction and security which we required was Malta, and this we obtained; that the first consul could not accede to what he considered, and what must be considered by the public, and by Europe, as the effect of coercion; but if it were possible to make the draught palatable, did the ambassador think himself justifiable in refusing to do so?" Lord Whitworth declaring his determination to abide strictly by his in-

structions, the French minister forcibly contended, "that a counter-project, founded on the basis of giving us what we required, could not be refused a fair discussion." "To this," says the ambassador, "I urged the resolution of his majesty's ministers to avoid every thing which could protract the negotiation. That I saw no other means of acting up to those views than *by making my stand on the project AT ALL EVENTS!*" After much contest, it was agreed, that the proposal should be submitted to lord Whitworth in the course of a few hours; and that he should then determine whether to sign it, to transmit it to England, or to leave Paris\*.

The remainder of the day passed, nevertheless, without receiving any communication from M. Talleyrand. On the morning, therefore, of Thursday (May 12th), the ambassador renewed his demand of passports. But

\* From the speech of lord Hawkesbury, in the house of commons (May 20), it appears that the proposition in question, subsequently and unofficially communicated to lord Whitworth, was to confirm the possession of Malta in perpetuity, or otherwise, to England, on condition that France should be allowed for the same period to possess Otranto and Tarentum—places which she actually occupied at the time the treaty of Amiens was concluded. But this was a proposal more invidious and less eligible than the former, by which France agreed to consign Malta to the keeping of any one of the great neutral powers, Austria, Russia, or Prussia; of which, notwithstanding the predilection of England for Russia, Austria was decidedly the preferable one, for two obvious reasons; 1st, Because her interests are far more closely interwoven with those of England than are the interests of Russia or Prussia; and, 2dly, Because she never can give umbrage to England as a maritime power, which Russia, in the possession of so formidable a naval station as Malta, in the centre of the Mediterranean, might very easily, and in a short time would very probably, do.

they were again delayed for the purpose of rectifying a material error in the last dispatch of lord Hawkesbury, *viz.* "that the emperor of Russia would on no account consent to garrison Malta." And M. Talleyrand, in a note, informs lord Whitworth, "that the assertion of lord Hawkesbury is in complete contradiction to the positive assurances which the first consul has received from Petersburg since his Britannic majesty's message was known there, and which have just been renewed to him by an authentic communication made YESTERDAY by count Marcoff respecting the intentions of his court; and expressing a confident hope, that when his Britannic majesty shall be better informed, he will transmit instructions to his excellency different from those he has received, and communicated in the name of his government."

This was a notification of such importance, that nothing less than the predetermination of lord Whitworth "TO MAKE HIS STAND ON THE PROJECT AT ALL EVENTS," could have induced him to treat it with neglect scarcely distinguishable from contempt. He merely and coldly acknowledged the receipt of it, and again repeated his demand of PASSPORTS. They arrived at five o'clock; and, at nine the same evening, the ambassador left Paris, to the extreme regret and chagrin of the French government, which was manifestly disposed to adopt any expedient that might satisfy the demands of England, and, at the same time, in some degree save the honor of the first consul. Of this, the ambassador was so sensible, that when the prospect of accommodation seemed most fair, and the temporary occupation of Malta had been voluntarily conceded by Joseph Bonaparte, he hinted to lord Hawkesbury, in an-

swer to the repeated and pressing instances of that nobleman to terminate the negotiation without delay, "that were the necessity of expedition less urgent, he might perhaps hope to bring the discussion to even a more favorable issue.\*" And this urgent necessity never appeared to rest on any better foundation than his majesty's anxiety "to relieve the two countries and Europe in general from the state of suspense in which they are placed†"—a low and trivial consideration!

The French official narrative remarks, "that the passports which were demanded by lord Whitworth, with a perseverance that appeared to have been imperiously dictated to him, were sent on the 22d Floreal (May 12th), after three successive messages on his part. The first consul was desirous that he should not leave the territory of the republic without carrying to his government a still more formal manifestation than all the preceding, of the constant disposition of the French government."

With this view M. Talleyrand was directed to transmit to the ambassador, while actually on his journey, a note, dated May 14th, drawn at great length, and in very able terms; a few short extracts from which may not improperly be subjoined.

This interesting paper, in reference, 1st, to the indeterminate and unintelligible demand of satisfaction; and 2dly, to the refusal of the English government to evacuate Malta; and more than this—their peremptory requisition of the immediate and positive consent of the French government to this violation of the treaty of

\* *Vide* letter from lord Whitworth to lord Hawkesbury, April 18.

† *Vide* note from lord Whitworth to M. Talleyrand, May 3.



Amiens, thus expresses the sentiments of the first consul:

“ What could the government of the republic answer to such rude and strange overtures? Nothing but a great love of peace could subdue indignation. To determine upon a calm and cool decision, which might give time for reason and justice to subdue passion, it was necessary to be deeply impressed with the idea, that the numerous victims of the quarrels between governments, have no share in those insults which create their anger. But where is the power of Europe, even were it ready to acknowledge its inferiority, which would submit to the will of another without even a discussion of its rights, and without an appeal to the principles of justice? Where is the power, which, placed as France has been during that discussion, would have submitted to conditions dictated at the commencement of the negotiation, and rather announced by the noise and menaces of war, and preparations for hostilities, than proposed as the means of reconciling the rights and interests of the two states?

“ The undersigned, in making these observations to lord Whitworth, thinks himself entitled to point out, that the moderate conduct of the French administration, during two whole months of offensive provocations, and in spite of the deep impressions it felt from them, ought to make him appreciate the true character of the French government; nevertheless, it was when, by its profound silence upon repeated insults, the government of the French republic had waited in expectation of having some reparation, or at least differences terminated—when, avoiding to prejudge the final result which affairs might take, it evinced the in-

tention and wish only of considering the means which might be proposed to conciliate and satisfy the British government—it was then that VERBALLY, and without consenting to give any written declaration, his excellency lord Whitworth delivered, in the name and by order of his government, on the 6th Floreal, to the undersigned, the following DEMANDS :

“ That England shall retain Malta for ten years :

“ That England shall take possession of the island of Lampedosa :

“ That Holland shall be evacuated by the French troops.

“ His excellency lord Whitworth farther declared, ‘ that these propositions formed the *ultimatum* of his court ; and that, upon refusal to accept them, he had orders to quit Paris in the course of seven days !

“ The undersigned will venture to assert, that there is no example on record of so imperious an *ultimatum*. What ! has war no inconveniences but for us ? Does the English minister believe the French nation so weak, that, at the moment when she is engaged in the most important deliberations, he may consider himself not bound in his intercourse with her government to conform to the usages which are observed by all the governments of civilised Europe ?

“ The first consul, more than any man who exists, knows the evils of war, because, more than any other man, he is accustomed to its calculations and chances : he believes, that in such circumstances, when the first sentiments of governments ought to be, to calculate upon the catastrophes and calamities which may be engendered in a new war,—that their first duty is not only not to yield to motives of irritation, but to attempt,

by every way, to obviate difficulties, and to moderate the ungovernable passions of the people."

This important political document then refers to the offer made by France, of amicably referring the question respecting Malta to the powers who had guaranteed the independence of the island. "To this offer, breathing only equity, peace, and moderation, lord Whitworth," says this statement, "replied by the peremptory demand of his passports. The French government deeply felt the contrast between a determination so absolute, and that character of urbanity, justice, and conciliation, which, in all circumstances, but particularly in the last which occurred, it had endeavoured to display. Nevertheless it thought a sacrifice due to the interest of humanity. It would not abandon all hopes of peace till the last moment; and the undersigned delivered a new note to lord Whitworth, by which France offered to consent, that Malta should be given up to the protection of any of the three guarantying powers, Austria, Russia, or Prussia. This proposal made some impression upon lord Whitworth. He suspended his departure, and took the note *ad referendum*. The unhappy fatality which leads the British government now into war, afforded it no reply to this offer, but a false assertion. On the 21st of this month, lord Whitworth delivered a note, in which he stated, that Russia had refused what had been demanded of her. There were three guarantying powers; and, if Russia *had* refused her guarantee, still there remained the emperor of Germany and the king of Prussia. But how could Russia have signified her intentions on a new proposition which had been suggested only a few days? But Providence, which is sometimes pleased to con-

found bad faith, caused to arrive at the same hour; a courier from Russia, addressed to the plenipotentiaries of that power at Paris and at London; by which his majesty the emperor of Russia manifested, with particular energy, the pain that he had felt at learning the resolution of his Britannic majesty to keep Malta. He renewed the assurances of his guarantee, *and declared, that he accepted the demand made of his MEDIATION by the first consul, if both the powers would accede to it.* The undersigned, without delay, informed lord Whitworth, by a note, of the error into which his court had fallen—when lord Whitworth, without entering into any explanation, or without endeavouring either to contradict or discuss the declarations made to him, informed the undersigned, by a note of the same day, that, by the tenor of his instructions, he was ordered to depart thirty-six hours after the delivery of his last note, and renewed his demand for passports. The undersigned, therefore, forwarded them to him immediately. Could the English ambassador have behaved himself differently if the French government had been besieged in a town incapable of defence, and that the question was not about the most important interests which the British cabinet has treated of for more than eight hundred years, but about a simple capitulation? As to the conditions proposed, were they as agreeable to the treaty of Amiens, and the interest of France, as they are contrary to them, the form of the demand, the term of thirty-six hours prescribed for the answer, must decide the determination of the French government. Never will France acknowledge in any government the right of annulling, by a single act of its pleasure, the stipulations of a reciprocal engagement. If it has ever



permitted, that, in a form somewhat menacing, a verbal *ultimatum* be considered in seven days; if it has received another *ultimatum*, with a term of thirty-six hours annexed to it, and treaties presented in a conclusive form, which were never negotiated, it could have no other object than to give the British government an example of moderation; but it can consent to nothing that compromises its dignity or its power.

“The undersigned repeats the proposition of giving up Malta to one of the three guarantying powers; and, as to every other object, unconnected with the treaty of Amiens, it renews its declaration, that the French government is ready to open a negotiation with respect to them.”

In ENGLAND, however, nothing was hearkened to in this crisis, which could in the least tend to fix the charge of culpability, or even of indiscretion, on ministers; and the war might be pronounced at once the most unjust, the most impolitic, and the most popular into which this nation had ever entered. It was gravely and pompously said to be “a war not for Malta but for Egypt; not for Egypt, but for India; not for India, but for England”—and such rhetorical puerilities passed, as equivalent to logical demonstration. A single political writer, in a tract stiled, “THE QUESTION—WHY DO WE GO TO WAR?” ventured an attempt, altogether fruitless and hopeless at this crisis, to stem the torrent of public opinion. In an aphorism, equally noble and just, lord Bacon has declared, that “over wisdom, fortune has no power.” Unhappily for mankind, it is equally true, that over passion and folly, wisdom has no power. On the subject of Malta this anonymous author thus excellently expresses himself:—“Let us trace the supposed conse-

quence of evacuating Malta, as we were bound to do. *Suppose*, only we have been honest and faithful. The chief consul is then suddenly to seize on that island by a violent act of aggression; he must commit another act of gross violence in an attack upon the Turkish empire in Egypt. He must get possession of that country in spite of the efforts of other European powers to prevent it, and at the risque of other battles of Aboukir and Alexandria. He must then establish, in defiance of the Turks, the Mamelouks, and the Arabs, a tranquil and composed colony there. He is then to think of terminating the climax of his glory by the execution of the grand Indian scheme! How is he to set about it?—How is he to get there?—by sea or by land? If by sea, will he bring ships from Toulon, and cut through the Isthmus—or will he build ships at Suez? In the whole country there is not timber enough for the common purposes of agricultural implements\*. Will he plant acorns in the desert, and wait for their growth?—Will he transport the oaks of France? When at last his ships are built, they must proceed by a most tiresome and hazardous navigation down the Red Sea, to the narrow straits of Babelmandel, where a very few English men of war would block them up. Will his adventurous spirit prompt him to attempt the expedition by land? Upon looking into a map, it will be perceived, there are at least forty degrees of longitude between Cairo and Cambaia, on the north-west coast of India, which, multiplied by fifty-five, nearly the number of English miles in a degree of longitude at that distance from the equa-

\* Vide Sir Robert Wilson's History of the Expedition to Egypt.

tor, and we shall have 2,200 miles in a right line; so that we may fairly say, 3000 miles for this gallant hero to march his troops over burning sands and pathless deserts, in spite of whirlwinds and sirocco blasts. Or will he conquer Persia, and set up his staff finally at Ispahan—perhaps restore the ancient Babylon—thence march, like another Alexander, to the banks of the Indus? By whatever way he is to get to India, does it follow that when he is got there, he must conquer the country, and drive us out of it?—Do we not possess there immense territory and power? Is it then for this distant—*very* distant prospect of evil, the lengthened perspective of which diminishes to a scarce discernible point, this chimera—this dream of ills within no bounds of probability, that we are to embrace a certain and immediate calamity, to plunge into the horrors of a war to which we see no end? to be called upon to sacrifice our comforts and our peace, to be harassed and tormented with the perpetual threatenings of an invading enemy, whom out of idle fear of imaginary danger to a remote and scarcely approachable colony, we draw to our very heart and centre? Unaccountable infatuation! And wherefore this sudden alarm about Malta?—why is it become so suddenly of so much importance? Why did we not stipulate for Malta (if so absolutely necessary) when our conquests were in our hands? If we agreed to give it up, is it worth even the appearance of being retained contrary to treaty? A war to maintain our wrong, with every disadvantage, and every odium accumulated upon us!”—*pp.* 25-28.

But what adds, beyond all estimate of folly, to the senselessness, and consequently to the political criminality of the conduct of the English ministers in this

fatal business is, the consideration that they involved the nation in a war by which, according to their own acknowledgement, the very existence of the country was endangered, for the sake of an object which was actually in their possession. There is not the least proof or probability that France would have gone to war with England for the recovery of Malta, which she well knew that no force she could exert was capable of wresting from Great Britain. Had England, therefore, contented herself with declaring her resolution of retaining Malta, under whatever pretext, for any indefinite term, France would no doubt have complained of this breach of faith in terms of resentment and indignation, but she would have been restrained by the strongest motives of policy, from engaging in actual hostilities upon that account. Even after the departure of lord Whitworth from Paris, the French government was manifestly reluctant to believe a war with England inevitable. And the first consul in his message to the legislative body, (May 20th) eight days subsequent to that event, merely says—"The negotiations are interrupted, and we are ready to fight IF WE ARE ATTACKED." But the British ministers not only determined to keep Malta, in VIOLATION of the PUBLIC FAITH SOLEMNLY PLEDGED, but they resolved in the same moment to commence hostilities against France, if she refused expressly to sanction this abominable violation.

To sum up the whole in a few words, it may with all the confidence of truth be asserted, that there is not any branch of the argument relative to the origin or foundation of the war, from which an inference can be drawn in favor of the British ministry ; for it is evident,—



I. That France had not in fact, as alleged by them, gained any real accession of power, since the treaty of Amiens.

II. Supposing the allegation true, the mere increase of power would not of itself, unattended by a breach of good faith, justify the rupture of a solemn treaty.

III. The restitution of Malta to the order of St. John of Jerusalem, most unquestionably was not by any fair, rational, or consistent construction of the treaty of Amiens, made to depend upon obtaining the previous guarantee of the three great continental powers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia.

IV. There appeared no sort of proof whatever, at the commencement of the negotiation, of any DESIGN on the part of France, to make an hostile attack upon Egypt, but very strong and satisfactory evidence of the contrary.

V. Even if there *had* existed any previous cause of suspicion respecting such project, the various offers made on the part of France, were convincing proofs of the sincerity of her wishes, and indeed of her anxious solicitude for the preservation of peace; particularly the final proposal of giving up Malta in perpetuity to Austria or Russia.

It necessarily follows from these premisses, that the absolute and peremptory determination of the English government to retain possession of that island, in contempt or defiance of the treaty of Amiens, was a flagrant and inexcusable violation of public faith. Such, indeed, as Great Britain cannot in any other instance be accused of since the memorable war with Holland in 1672; and for which the ministers, thus abusing the confidence and perverting the counsels of their sovereign, have rendered

themselves liable to a terrible responsibility. They might even, it is probable, have accomplished their unjust purpose, had the accustomed forms of decorum been attended to, and the common arts of address been practised in the negotiation. But all was violence, precipitation, and folly. And *their* arts of address—miserably vulgar and trite, indeed—were reserved to excite the passions of the nation almost to frenzy against France, as the unprovoked assailant of Britain; and thus to preclude, as far as their efforts were successful, any prospect of future accommodation.

Formerly, in the times of a Walpole and a Pelham, ministers were beyond comparison wiser than the people, and they employed the talents and constitutional authority which they possessed, to carry their laudable and beneficial purposes into execution, even when opposed by popular clamour and prejudice. But during the far greater part of the present reign, ministers have made the worst possible use of their power and influence; and with such success, that the majority of the nation, deceived by the grossest misrepresentations, have for a long series of years been led to believe the most sagacious, zealous, and enlightened friends of the country and the constitution, to be the greatest enemies of both. Now, indeed, the public opinion, slow and tardy as it has been in its progress, begins materially to alter. Still the same fatality governs the conduct of public affairs; and that radical change of counsels which can alone be of lasting and essential service, is to be effected only by those exertions of mental and political energy, of which unhappily very few symptoms are at present discernible—though in other respects, the public spirit of Britain was never more

conspicuous, and the valor and magnanimity displayed by all classes of people in defence of the kingdom, in a crisis of unexampled difficulty and danger, must unquestionably in the view of Europe, of the world at large, and even of our too justly incensed enemies themselves, reflect the highest honor on the British name and nation.

END OF THE TWELFTH VOLUME.





















